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
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THE
HISTORY OF SICILY

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES

BY

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VOLUME III

THE ATHENIAN AND CARTHAGINIAN INVASIONS

WITH MAPS

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PREFACE.

THE present volume has grown to a bulk which was certainly unexpected, and which I fear may be inconvenient. But the Athenian invasion could not be cut short, and it seemed better to couple it and the Carthaginian invasion together. The two fill up the space between Sicily as I painted it in the last chapter of my second volume, Sicily free and independent but of no prominent account beyond its own borders, and Sicily, as we shall see it in the next volume, free no longer, but the seat of the greatest power in the European world.

In dealing with the Athenian invasion, I have come more nearly within the range of ordinary Greek scholarship than I have anywhere been called on to do before, save when I had to deal with the Sicilian odes of Pindar. I have been dealing with a period better known than any other period of Sicilian history; I might almost say better known than any other period of Greek history. The sixth and seventh books of Thucydides, forming, one might say, an epic by themselves, seem not unreasonably

to have drawn to themselves greater attention even than other parts of his History. My feelings towards the greatest of historical teachers will be seen in every page. But they have never led me to forget that Syracuse had her contemporary historian as well as Athens, or to neglect the valuable traces of him which are to be found in the writings of later writers who had his works open before them. And it is the most satisfactory thing of all to find that between the story told by Thucydides and the story told by Philistos there was no serious disagreement. And it is not only to the great master himself, but to his expounders in later times, that my feelings of thankfulness are due. I have had the advantage of building on the foundation of Thirlwall, Arnold, Grote, and Holm. And yet I believe I may say with perfect truth that a diligent comparison of the site and the record, sometimes alone, sometimes with instructive companions, has enabled me to bring to light some facts, some views of facts, which have not been thought of by earlier scholars.

This branch of my work has brought me, in a degree in which I have not been brought before and in which I am not likely to be brought again, within the range of what is called textual criticism. To one who has hitherto had little to do with the criticism of words, except so far as it is needful for criticism of facts, the results are sometimes astonishing. Verbal scholars, like Eastern scholars, seem to have laws of evidence different from those which are followed in

judging of the facts of history. According to these last rules, in those matters where we have to go by written records, the text of those records is our evidence, evidence with which we have no right to tamper. Through the whole of this present inquiry I have been struck at every step by the way in which certain scholars, whenever they cannot understand a passage in Thucydides, at once rush off to put something of their own in its stead. Thucydides' own style is confessedly hard. That is to say, it is hard to construe; for the meaning is often perfectly plain when the construing is hardest, and some passages which are hard to construe in the library are easy enough on the top of Epipolai. And Thucydides' style being hard, his text was yet more likely to be corrupted by transcribers than the text of other writers. We often feel morally certain that the text is corrupt; once or twice, by help of quotations in ancient writers, we can prove it to be corrupt. But, save in this last kind of case, the text, as we have it, is our evidence. We must deal with our witness as we find him. We must take his statement for what it is worth; we must not put some other statement instead of it. We must construe his words, if we can; if we cannot construe them, we must honestly say that we cannot. We must in no case put our own words into the mouth of our witness, and make him say something that he does not say. We must not be ashamed to practise the greatest lesson of all lessons, to dare to confess that there are things which we

do not know. For instance I do not profess to know what Thucydides wrote or what he meant, where, in the Letter of Nikias (vii. 13. 2), our present text gives us ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει. Göller, Arnold, Grote, all made praiseworthy attempts to construe the words ; but their attempts have not pleased everybody. In the very first page of Müller-Strübing's *Thukydideische Forschungen* there is a long list of guesses which ingenious men have wished to put instead of the words of the witness. One says it should be αὐτονομίας ; and αὐτονομίας and αὐτομολίας might certainly be confounded. Only it is not clear that αὐτονομίας would make any better sense than αὐτομολίας. But then others suggest ὑλοκοπίας, others σιτολογίας or λιθολογίας. Between these last two the choice is easy. Random foraging of this kind is far more likely to bring in stones than bread.

At the same time, while the historian must set his face against conjectural emendation, he will not forget that there are emendations which are not conjectural. It is not conjectural emendation when the editor of an imperfect inscription fills up its blanks with the formal words which his experience teaches him must have stood there. And in the texts of written books there are cases where meaning and palæography so happily play into one another's hands that an emendation carries full conviction with it. Such a case is when Mr. Bywater, for the meaningless καρδιά καὶ κοινῇ of the new Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία (c. 40), substituted καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ

κοινῇ (ΚΑΙΗΔΙΑΙ for ΚΑΡΔΙΑΙ). Such emendation as this is not conjecture at all; it is the keen instinct of the true expert seeing his way straight to the right thing.

After all, it is very wonderful how little the whole process of text-tinkering affects the facts of history. In this volume there is one case only in which a question of the reading at all touches the narrative. And this is not in Thucydides, but in Plutarch. It is the question about the reading *κελευσθέντας* or *καταλευσθέντας* in the 28th chapter of the Life of Nikias, of which I have more to say in Appendix XXIII.

I have now again to go through the pleasant work of thanking those who have helped me. To Mr. Arthur Evans my obligations are as deep as ever for the benefit of his companionship by the Kakyparis and the Assinaros, as well as for constant guidance on every numismatic point. But in the actual siege of Syracuse my first debt is to Mr. Goodwin. I spoke in my former preface of the gain which I had drawn from inquiries which he and I carried out together on Achradina and Epipolai. Deeply have they profited me in this volume, as also have other inquiries by the gorge of the Akragantine Hypsas and the Bridge of the Dead. And I have now above all to thank him for the never-to-be-forgotten kindness of looking over all the proofs of this volume, and for the precious suggestions which he has made to me on endless points. Mr. Goodwin and I naturally approach the narrative of Thucy-

dides from somewhat different sides. And it is the greatest satisfaction to me to find his skilled textual scholarship coming on all important points to the same conclusions which I reach by a slightly different path. Through the whole story, on every question of moment, I find myself supported by his sound judgement and the sound judgement of Holm against the endless vagaries of rash guessers and incompetent interpreters. Holm too I have to thank in a more personal way, Professor Beloch also, and Dr. Lupus of Strassburg, for the kindly and appreciative notices in which they have introduced my former volumes to continental scholars. Mr. Hicks too has been as kind and helpful as ever in all matters bearing on inscriptions; and in the boundless knowledge of Mr. Boase and Mr. Watson of Brasenose I have found *Quellen*, the path to which is not hard to seek, and which, unlike so many of the streams of Sicily, are never dry.

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HISTORY OF SICILY

E. A. FREEMAN

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ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.



- p. 5, l. 5 from bottom, *dele* "had."
- p. 16, note 4, for "434" read "424."
- p. 26, note 3. The paper of G. M. Columba, "La Prima Spedizione Ateniese in Sicilia" is printed in the "Archivio Storico Siciliano," New Series, Year XII. p. 65 (Palermo, 1887).
- p. 30, note 2, for "ialet" read "islea."
- p. 41, note 1, for *Μεσσηνῇ* read *Μεσσηνῶν*.
- p. 53, l. 14, for "largest" read "laxest."
- p. 59, note 1, *γγυνοίμεθα* seems the truer reading in the passage from Thucydides, but in any case the construing is hard and the sense fairly clear.
- p. 59, note 3, for *of* read *ol*.
- p. 63, l. 10 from bottom, and note 3. Perhaps this passage of Thucydides shows that "Morgantina" is a better form than "Morgantia" (see vol. i. p. 154): but both are in use, and I see that I have used both.
- p. 83, l. 9, for "Castellamare" read "Castellammare."
- p. 84, l. 13. On the internal state of Carthage just now, and the causes of her inaction, see more below, p. 447.
- p. 91, l. 8 from bottom, for "brought forth in the Athenian assembly" read "had brought with them."
- p. 93, l. 14. On the order of the names of the generals, see below, p. 614.
- p. 98, note 1, for *καυλώσιν* read *καλώσιν*.
- p. 104, l. 7 from bottom. I do not know how I came to miss the passage in Aristophanes (*Lysist.* 287 et seqq.) where this Dêmostratos is spoken of, as it was referred to both by Thirlwall (iii. 369) and Holm (ii. 408). The passage is rather long to quote; but, from it and the scholia on it, it looks as if the Adônia had coincided, not with the sailing of the fleet, but with the assembly in which Nikias and Dêmostratos spoke. Holm says that the reference may be to some later speech of Dêmostratos, but that would hardly mend matters. And the assembly in which Dêmostratos gave counsel *πλεῖν ἐς Σικελίαν* and *δυσλίτας καταλέγειν Ζακυνθίαν* is surely either this one or one earlier. Thirlwall accepts the passage as showing Plutarch's account to be mistaken, and he remarks that the counsel about the Zakynthian heavy-armed "would have suggested a very different notion of the tenor of the decree from that which we gain from Thucydides and Plutarch." I do not quite see this. The special mention of Zakynthos among all the places from which allies were to be brought together most likely refers to something which we do not know about, and the scholiast does not seem to have known any better. Zakynthos was an ally of Athens and on the road to Sicily; it might easily come in in some way or other, and

we must remember the zeal shown by the Zakynthians on behalf of Korkyra in Thuc. i. 47. 2.

p. 105, l. 14. The higher criticism has found out that this picture of the map-making comes from the irony of the Sikeliot Timaios. See below, p. 639. It reads to me much more like a genuine picture, though I do not profess to know where Plutarch found it.

p. 106, l. 9. On this hill Sikelia Holm (ii. 407) refers to two articles by himself and E. Curtius, which I have not seen. Curtius seems to have held that the Attic Sikelia was so called as being a *τρισελὴς λόφος*. This would seem to imply that it did not get the name till the *Triquetra* had become the badge of Sicily, that is, not till after the time of Agathoklêa. If so, our oracle cannot be genuine. Holm, with more reason, refers to the strange story in Pausanias (i. 28. 3) according to which the builders of the wall of the Athenian akropolis were *Σικελοί*, where the word seems equivalent to *Πελασγοί*. There is really no more necessity to think that an Attic *Σικελία* was directly called after our island than to think that Holland in Britain was called after Holland in the Netherlands.

p. 116, note. Perhaps I should not have said "sponge." The word is not *Aristophanês*; but the general idea is the same.

p. 120, note 2. I am not sure whether I knew that I was starting a new interpretation. Mr. Goodwin was at first inclined to accept it as such; but he prefers to take the words as meaning that the question will be, not one of fighting in Sicily, but of getting to Sicily. In either case the advice of *Hermokratês* is the same.

p. 131, l. 10. A Korkyraian contingent joined the second expedition under Demosthenês and Eurymedôn (see p. 304 and Thuc. vii. 31. 5, 33. 3), which will account for the presence of Korkyraians later on. Still it is strange if none joined the first expedition. (Cf. p. 169, note 2.)

p. 132, l. 1. Mr. Goodwin infers from their going in a *ἑνταγωγός*, and from the distinct statement in vi. 93. 4 and 98. 1, that the second set of Athenian horsemen did not bring horses with them, that this first set did. Yet it was a long way to take them; it was different from the horses in the Bayeux Tapestry, which were to be out only one night, and to be used the moment they landed.

p. 135, l. 6 from bottom, for "south-western" read "south-eastern."

p. 140, note. On the meaning of *ἀργυρά* Mr. Goodwin writes: "Until I began to write this I did not understand how Grote got his idea of 'silver-gilt.' But I see now (by help of the Lexicon) that in Hdt. ix. 82 we have *κλίνας χρυσίας καὶ ἀργυράς* in the Persian camp, where one would not expect *solid metal*. But here Hdt. refers to furniture which he had just spoken of as *κατασκευὴν χρύσειαν τε καὶ ἀργύρεαν κατασκευασμένην*, which I should take to mean *ornamented with gilding and silvering*. In ix. 80 he had just called the same things *κλίνας ἐπιχρυσέους καὶ ἐπαργύρους*. Still, I now see that Grote had much better authority than I supposed for doubting whether *ἀργυρά* in Th. vi. 46 *must* mean 'silver'; but I cannot see now how he came to silver-gilt rather than to 'silver-plated.'

Perhaps Thirlwall (iii. 382) is right in understanding the words to mean: "as they were of silver, their value was not so great as the splendour of the

display." That is, a few gold vessels, though really of greater value, would be less striking than a great stock of silver.

p. 146, l. 1. This is most likely one of those cases in which a thing which by some odd chance happened once comes to be spoken of as something habitual. One is reminded of the stories about Duke Robert of Normandy constantly lying in bed for want of clothes. Most likely Lamachos asked once and Robert lay in bed once.

p. 153, l. 9. The passage of Thucydides here quoted must be compared with that (vi. 88. 2) quoted in p. 194, note 4. Two different kinds of relation between Kamarina and Athens are assumed in the two places. In the first Kamarina is held to be at peace with Athens, and no more. She is to receive a single Athenian ship and no more. See pp. 25, 65. In the second, Kamarina is assumed to be an ally of Athens perplexed as to her duties as being an ally of Syracuse at the same time. She had already acted as an ally of Syracuse, though not a zealous ally. See pp. 164, 170, 183. But at the mission of Euphemos the Athenians (see p. 184) call on Kamarina to abide by or fall back on the earlier obligations of the alliance made with Lachés. Yet Thucydides does not mention any dealings of Lachés with Kamarina; Kamarina is an ally of Leontinoi (Thuc. iii. 86. 2, and p. 26), and therefore an ally of Athens. Such a relation might be supposed to be set aside by the Peace of Gela. Yet the Kamarinaians in Thuc. vi. 88. 2 acknowledge some alliance with Athens, and it can hardly be any other. One may suspect that, like men who owed allegiance to more than one lord, parties in Kamarina, as they came to the front, played somewhat fast and loose with obligations which might be spoken of as contradictory.

p. 195, note 2. *ὁ πολλός* seems now to be the received reading. It seems to be only conjectural; but it is better than most guesses.

p. 202, side-note, for "Mothekes" read "Mothakes."

p. 220, l. 18. On the Hérakleion see more in pp. 343, 669.

p. 251, l. 6, for "part" read "point."

p. 267, note 4. It is now said that the paper-plant is native in Sicily and was not the gift of any Ptolemy. I cannot judge of such questions.

p. 300, side-note, for "unquiet" read "unjust."

p. 311, side-note. Whether "August" is right depends on the question started by Mr. Goodwin in p. 721.

p. 318, l. 9 from bottom, for "his" read "its."

p. 324, note 3. On the place of Thucydides here quoted, see E. A. Junghahn, "Studien zu Thukydides," Neue Folge (Berlin, 1886, p. 54), where he defends it against text-patchers who want to strike out this and that.

p. 339. We must further remember the Lacedæmonian envoys in Thuc. vii. 24. 9. It is of course possible that they may not have been full Spartan citizens.

p. 340. On the date, see p. 720. This is the point of the reckoning there made at which I feel least comfortable. Still it makes things clearer to have some kalendar, and even the earlier days cannot be very far wrong, while the later, if they be wrong at all, must be wrong in a body.

p. 343, note 1. Cf. the description in Thuc. i. 49. 2.

p. 344, note 2. See the pamphlet of Junghahn already quoted, p. 50.

p. 350, l. 6 from bottom. Did a Greek ship ever strictly "go to the bottom"? Diodōros (xiii. 16) says, *ναῦς αὐ·άνδρος ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης κατεπίνετο*; but see Arnold's note on Thuc. i. 50. 1.

p. 359, note 1. We must remember that Hermokratēs, though not general, seems to have held a subordinate command. See p. 310.

p. 365, note 1, for "Cavallaro" read "Cavallari."

p. 369, note 5. See Junghahn, p. 59.

p. 373, note 1. See also p. 399.

p. 378, l. 8 from bottom. This must be taken with the limitations in p. 702. They were no longer directly aiming at Katané; but they hoped to get there somehow or other.

p. 383, l. 18 from bottom, for "Maralidi" read "Mamalidi."

p. 397, l. 3 from bottom, for "having thrown" read "throwing."

p. 415, side-note, for "Olympia" read "Delphoi."

p. 422, side-note, for "revolt" read "revolts."

p. 424, note 1. I ought to have gone on to refer to the words of Thucydides, viii. 46. 3; *οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπὸ μὲν σφῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθεροῦν νῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀπὸ δ' ἐκείνων τῶν βαρβάρων, ἣν μὴ ποτε αὐτοὺς μὴ ἐξέλκωσι, μὴ ἐλευθερώσῃαι* (Junghahn, p. 69, defends the text which puzzled Arnold). Alkibiadēs knew the theory of Hellenic duty, but he (for his own purposes) gave the Spartans too much credit for practising it.

p. 427, l. 7. I mean that Diodōros understood the inscription as evidence that only twelve men out of the whole fleet escaped, while it most likely referred only to a Boiotian contingent.

p. 432, side-note, *dele* "Hermokratēs at Sousa"; see p. 727.

p. 433, side-note, for "honour" read "honours."

p. 440, l. 4 from bottom, for "he" read "was he," and *dele* "was" in the next line. On the fact see more in p. 609.

p. 444, side-note, for "the two Carthaginian invasions" read "the Athenian and the Carthaginian invasion."

p. 472, l. 11 from bottom. The words "and tributaries" are better away. The subjects of course paid φόρος; but they were not in the case of the "tributaries" mentioned in p. 581, but in one much worse.

p. 489, l. 13. Some friends have objected to the use of the phrase "fires of Moloch," here, as in p. 524 and elsewhere, on the ground that "Moloch" is not the *name* of any Phœnician deity. This is undoubtedly true; מֹלֵךְ is simply "the King," a possible epithet of any deity, and at Carthage we have nothing to do with the Hebrew points. But, when one is not scientifically dealing with Phœnician mythology, surely Hebrew and English usage justifies us in using the epithet in its Semitic shape; that is what the phrase really comes to.

p. 495, last line, for "tributary" read "subject."

p. 510, side-note. I see that, whereas I used the form *Therma* in the earlier volumes, I have used *Therma* here. That is doubtless because it is the form used by Diodōros. There is good authority for both *Θερμαί* and *Θερμά*. See Bunbury, art. *Himera*.

Perhaps I should not have said that it ceased to be "an immediate possession of Carthage." By the time of Dionysios' treaty (see p. 581) *Therma* had clearly

somehow become reek; but it is equally clear that it was subject, and not merely tributary, to Carthage. And this comes out still more plainly at the birth of Agathoklés. See Diod. xix. 2.

p. 516, l. 1. "Gone" and "destroyed" are too strong. Selinous was "gone," as a Greek commonwealth; it lived on as a humble dwelling-place of men under Punio dominion.

p. 542, note 3. We must remember that we have now got within the range of the second part, the Dionysian part, of the History of Philistos (see below, p. 602). We need not doubt that Diodóros made use of him; but he must also have made use of other writers more unfavourable to Dionysios. We shall come to this again when we discuss the authorities for the next volume.

p. 689, l. 1. Assuming the *αρημωθε* which was fortified in Thuc. vi. 101. 1 (see p. 668) to be the cliff on the western side of Portella del Fusco, the double wall from that point to the Great Harbour has to be drawn conjecturally so as not to touch the Hérakleion. I still think that the eastern side of the combe is the most likely site for the temple, but one cannot be quite certain. In any case it is strange that Arnold (see p. 686) should have placed it on the *δμαλόν*. But another thing is strange also. In crossing the *δμαλόν*, the double wall must have gone very near the temple of the goddesses. Nikias would of course respect that as well as every other holy place; but one is rather amazed to hear no mention of it. But it is possible that we might not have heard about the Hérakleion, if the last battle had not been fought on the day of Héraklés.

p. 715, l. 11 from bottom. Mark also the phrase in Thuc. i. 44. 2; *ἰδοὺς γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίου πόλεμος καὶ ὅς ἐτεσθαι αὐτοῖς*. The article comes from the historian after the war had happened. No one would have used it before.

p. 720, l. 20. If any one insists that *εἰθὺς* must mean the next morning, the only result will be that we must make our whole kalendar from that point onward two or three days earlier. The last battle must have been on a day rather earlier than September 9, and the slaughter at the Assinaros on a day rather earlier than September 18. But Thucydides certainly uses *εἰθὺς* in cases where a longer time must have passed, as in i. 56, 57 (see pp. 614, 623), and nearer to our own case in vii. 2. 3 (see p. 614). He is also rather fond of the phrase *τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ* (i. 44. 1, 52. 1; vi. 71. 1, 101. 1; vii. 52. 1) when it does apply. The point must be left open; still, for clearness' sake, it is well to have some kalendar.

p. 725, l. 3 from bottom. There is certainly something remarkable in these fitting differences in the stories of Charondas and Dioklés, and in the report of their several laws. It would be too subtle to think that Diodóros or anybody else adapted them so carefully to one another. Yet a law that no man should appear armed in the *agora* under any circumstances whatsoever seems hardly credible. And, if Dioklés deserved death for carrying arms, all others who went to withstand Hermokratés deserved death no less. One is tempted to think that the *δύορά* of the one law answers to the *ἐκκλησιάζειν* of the other.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WARS OF SYRACUSE AND ATHENS.

B.C. 433-407¹.

WE have now come to that stage of Sicilian history which is more commonly known than any other, because it is the stage in which the history of Sicily and

¹ During the whole of this chapter, save for a few pages at the end, we have a privilege such as we have at no other stage of our journey, the guidance of a contemporary historian, whom we will not call of the first rank, because he stands alone above all ranks. For the Wars of Syracuse and Athens, saving a few events in their very last years, we have the continuous story of Thucydides. What I have to say about him and about his position with regard to other writers will be best said elsewhere (see Appendix I). But at no stage can we less afford to despise the subsidiary writers who have preserved to us some echoes of the other great contemporary historian. In reading both Diodóros and Plutarch, we are often reading Philistos. Plutarch wrote his Lives of Nikias and Alkibiadés with both Thucydides and Philistos before him, and he refers to both of them. Diodóros, during the more part of the story, falls distinctly below his Sicilian level; but he lights up in several places, specially when he comes to the battles in the Great Harbour, and he gives us some details which clearly come from the Syracusan contemporary and actor. At the very end of the story, Xenophón takes the place of Thucydides, and the gap between the chief guide and the native compiler is no longer so wide as before. Of writers not directly narrative, the comedies of Aristophanés supply us with many illustrations, and a little, but as yet very little, is to be picked up from Lysias and Isokratés. The later subsidiary writers, now as ever, when used with care, give occasional help. Of inscriptions Sicily itself as yet supplies us with none that tell us anything; at the very beginning of our story we get some valuable light from inscriptions at Athens. Of modern writers, we have the great narratives, each excellent in its way, of Thirlwall, Grote, and Holm. Of the topography of Syracuse, of such paramount importance at this time, Arnold and Grote, to say nothing of

CHAP. VIII. the history of Old Greece are most closely brought together. In truth they are more than brought together; for a time, a short time but a memorable one, the history of Old Greece is wrought out on the soil and on the waters of Sicily. We have come to the tale, a tale which must begin somewhat earlier than we have been wont to fancy, of the intervention of Athens in the affairs of Sicily. It is this tale which leads up to the great Athenian invasion, to the great Athenian overthrow on the hill and in the haven of Syracuse. At that intervention, that invasion, that overthrow, we must learn to look with Sikeliot and not with Athenian eyes. It is hard so to do. We are as it were brought up Athenians. We are at home at Athens as we are at home in no other spot in the contemporary world. We feel as if the tongue of Athens was our own tongue, as if the men of Athens were our own folk. In reading the story we feel the same kind of feeling towards Athens that we feel towards our own country. We are driven to allow that Athens or that England is wrong in this or that quarrel; but we cannot bring ourselves to wish that the Athenian or the Englishman should be defeated even in a wrongful quarrel. Nor is the feeling wholly unreasonable. Putting aside the share that Athens has had in shaping the intellectual life of the world,

Connexion
of Sicily
with the
affairs
of Old
Greece.

Athenian
intervention.

Natural
feeling
towards
Athens.

Göller and other earlier writers, understood much more than one could have thought possible in men who had never been on the spot. One may say this yet more fully of the wonderfully accurate model of Syracuse made, a few years back, under the same circumstances, by Mr. F. Haverfield. But by that time Arnold and Grote had been set right on some points by Schubring, and on yet more by Holm. Sir Edward Bunbury, dealing with the topography of the city, not with the history of the siege, had less to say, though even here he had something. Of Colonel Leake's paper on Syracuse I have been able to make less use. It was printed in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, and, though I believe separate copies were printed, I have never been able to buy one. On the whole, my notions of the works of the siege differ very slightly from those of Holm. The map in Lupus' *Stadt Syrakus* is remarkably clear and to the purpose.

putting aside her artists and her poets, the great democracy OSAP. VIII. claims our homage on yet higher grounds, as the city where men learned to put the fair debate and the free vote instead of the brute force of tyrants, mobs, or oligarchs. It is hard for us to take in the real feeling—a feeling made up of wonder and envy and reasonable dread—with which the mass of Greeks in the fifth century before Christ looked on the city which in so few years had risen to so strange a height among them. To most of them it was before all things the city which had brought down so many of the free commonwealths of Greece to the state of her tribute-paying subjects. Still harder is it to read the tale of the Athenian wars in Sicily in a way which seems to us to tell it backwards. It is hard to follow the story with the hopes and fears, not of an Athenian but of a Sikeliot, in the great time of all, with the hopes and fears of a Syracusan. The story to be looked at from the Sicilian side. Yet this is what the historian of Sicily must do. With his Thucydides ever in his hand, he must strive to be his own Philistos. He must teach his heart to dwell in the besieged city and not in the besieging camp. He must learn to share the feelings of the men who rushed to the shore when Gongylos brought the news that help was coming¹; he must learn to go forth in spirit with those true allies who checked the onset of the invaders in the night-attack by Euryalos: he must learn to join in the shout of victory and thankfulness which went up to Hêrâklês the Deliverer on that evening of wild delight which followed the crowning mercy in the Great Harbour. And surely, be it on Senlac or on Epipolai, it is a higher and more ennobling feeling when we fight in spirit, whether in defeat or in victory, with the men who are fighting for their own soil against unprovoked invasion.

One view of things moreover must be insisted on, which, when looked at from any but the Sicilian side, cannot fail

¹ See Thuc. vii. 2. 1; more fully Plat. Nik. 19.

CHAP. VIII. to have greatly the air of a paradox. We have, in our last
 Position of the chapter, been dealing with a time of full political indepen-
 of the dence and of singular prosperity in every way among the
 Athenian Greek cities of Sicily. The commonwealths showed that
 invasions in Sicilian whatever the tyrants could do, they could do as well.
 history. That independence, that prosperity, was in no way seriously
 touched by the Athenian invasions. Those invasions seem
 a greater landmark in Sicilian history than they really
 are, because the two evils from which Sicily had been
 free before them, barbarian attack and domestic tyranny,
 begin again so soon after them. The coming of Nikias is
 not so great a landmark, even in Syracusan history, as the
 coming of the elder Hannibal. The powers of Old Greece
 meddle in the affairs of Sicily; the strife between the great
 powers of Old Greece is fought out in Sicilian waters; but
 the only direct effects as regarded Sicily are the great pre-
 dominance given to the Dorian over the Ionian cities in
 the island, and the appearance of Sikeliot allies in the
 waters of Old Greece. No change was wrought in the
 external relations of the island; Nikias failed to subdue
 Syracuse; Gylippos did not attempt to subdue her. Athens
 was overthrown beneath the walls of Syracuse; but as
 Syracuse herself was not overthrown, so she can hardly be
 said herself to have overthrown Athens. The Athenian
 invasion of Sicily is indeed a kind of episode in the history
 both of Old Greece and of Sicily. But in the history
 of Old Greece it is an episode which really, in the end
 though not at the moment, decided the strife between
 Athens and Sparta. In the history of Sicily it is an
 episode which does little more than test the power and
 raise the spirits of some of the chief Sikeliot cities.

The nar-
 rative of
 Thucy-
 dides.

Now to us that episode, in its minutest details, is better
 known than any other piece of Sicilian history. This is
 partly because of its vast importance in the history of Old
 Greece, but also because the tale of the struggle between

Athens and Syracuse has been more nobly told, not only CHAP. VIII. than any other piece of Sicilian history, but than any other piece of the history of mankind. How nobly it has been told those only can fully know who have read every word of the great master's story with the waters of the Great Harbour beneath their eyes. To wake each morning with the rising sun lighting up the white columns of the Olympieion, to turn from the reading of the immortal tale to a climb up the side of Epipolai or a sail to Daskôn or Plémmyrion—that is indeed a teaching which brings out in full life at once the greatness of the tale and the greatness of him who told it. But for that very reason we must give the tale its true place, and no other. It is no more than the simple truth to say that the most famous event in the history of Sicily is of less moment in the history of Sicily than it is in the history of the world. The story of Thucydides fills no more than its right place in the history of Greece and of the world. It may easily be made to fill more than its right place in the history of Sicily. Thucydides, read by the Great Harbour, has a charm which nought else can approach. But shut up the text of the great master—his own text in all its fulness, that text which none can clothe in the words of another tongue—stand elsewhere than by those memorable waters, and our thoughts are tempted to go back to the fall of the tyrants, to go onward to the next coming of the Phœnician. Either of these events is, in strictly Sicilian history, a greater landmark than the coming and the overthrow of the great Athenian fleet. The importance of the coming of that fleet is mainly negative. Had it come, and had come not to meet overthrow, the proportions of events, in Sicily and in the whole world, might have been changed. As it was, Sicily was more directly and more generally affected by the overthrow of Thrasyboulos and by the coming of Hannibal than it was by the events of

The invasion more important for Old Greece than for Sicily.

Comparison with earlier and later events.

CHAP. VIII. which Thucydides has given us the record. What we mourn is that we have no Thucydides to tell us of events which, with Sicilian eyes, we must look upon as greater. We could even, from a strictly insular point of view, gladly exchange our full knowledge of the Athenian siege for a much smaller knowledge of the acts of Ducetius and of the politics of Syracuse and Akragas in his day. The real result of the Athenian invasion, as far as Sicily is concerned, is that from that time Sicily largely loses the character of a world of its own. It now becomes more fully part of the larger world of Hellas and of Europe. And its European character will soon be put to the test. Among all these stirring events, amidst the rich growth of Hellenic life in every form in which Sicily had so great a share, the barbarian enemy in the western corner of the island is still only sleeping. We have a stirring tale to tell in this chapter; we shall have a tale fully as stirring, and far more grievous, to tell in the next.

Sicily from
henceforth
less a
world of
its own.

§ 1. *The Early Athenian Interventions in Sicily.*

B.C. 433-422.

Action of
Syracuse.
B.C. c. 439.

We have now to go back to those events, isolated but clearly memorable, isolated no doubt only through the fragmentary state of our materials, of which we spoke at the end of our last chapter. There we saw Syracuse making great military preparations, to what end we were not told, which struck general dread into the hearts of her neighbours, and which were thought to bespeak designs on the independence of her neighbours generally¹. The date of those preparations and those fears we may be unable to fix with certainty. They must come later than the war in which Syracuse overthrew Palica and Trinacia². They must come earlier than those negotiations of Athens

¹ See vol. ii. p. 425.

² *Ib.* pp. 386, 387.

with one Italiot and one Sikeliot city to which we may feel sure that they directly or indirectly led¹. They may not unlikely come nearer to the later events than to the earlier; that is, the application of Rhégion and Leontinoi to Athens may have come sooner after the preparations of Syracuse than the dates that are given us might at first lead us to think². The treaties between Athens and the two Chalkidian towns are fixed to a time within the twelve months of an Athenian archonship, by the most certain of all evidence, by the letters of contemporary documents still speaking to us from the stones on which they were first graven³. The Syracusan preparations cannot have been made more than six years before the treaties; the gap between the two may well have been smaller. But the certain date of the treaties shows on what ground we are now getting. They are contemporary with those pleadings and fightings in the assembly of Athens and on the waters of Korkyra which form the opening scene of the great Peloponnesian War. Being contemporary, they are assuredly not unconnected with events and designs in which Sicily held from the beginning no small part in the minds of the disputants on both sides. When Syracuse decreed to double the number of her horsemen, she was in truth making ready for the fights by the Anapos, for the victory of Nikias and the death of Lamachos. When she decreed to build a hundred triremes, she was making ready to meet the fleet of Dêmostenês and Eurymedôn in the Great Harbour.

The treaties of Rhégion and Leontinoi with Athens. B. C. 433.

Connexion with the war in Old Greece.

But if these events look forwards, they also look backwards. The treaty between Athens and Leontinoi is not the earliest case that we have had to record of Athenian dealing with Sicilian affairs. We have seen, in a darkly-told tale certainly, that perhaps twenty years earlier Athens

Treaty between Athens and Segesta. B. C. c. 454.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 426.

² See Appendix III.

³ See below, p. 19, and Appendix III.

CHAP. VIII. at least listened to an appeal from a Sicilian city, and that a barbarian city. The prayer would seem to be for help against another barbarian city; but we can hardly help suspecting that Greek cities also had a share in the matter on one side or the other. Athens hearkened to Segesta; she seems to have made a treaty with Segesta; she does not seem to have given any active help to Segesta¹. So neither do we hear of any active help being given to Leontinoi till six years after her treaty. The value of all these notices lies more in what men thought would come of the events referred to in them than in anything that actually did come. They fall in with a number of other signs which show that Athens had been looking westward for many years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In the very stress of the Persian invasion Themistoklēs could speak of an Athenian migration to the Italiot Siris, an old possession, he said, of Athens, as a possible event². It was not without a meaning that he gave his daughters names so remarkable as Sybaris and Italia³. The tales about him that we have already had to mention, the possible story of his shutting out Hierôn from the games at Olympia⁴, the impossible story of his taking refuge with Hierôn in his exile⁵, whatever else they are worth, point to a belief that Sicily, and therefore still more Italy, filled a large place in the thoughts of Themistoklēs and of his countrymen. We may further remember a number of notices which connect Themistoklēs, if not directly with Italy or Sicily, yet with that side of Greece and the neighbouring lands which looks out towards Italy and Sicily. Some have even connected him

Early
designs of
Athens in
the West.

B.C. 480.

Relations
of Themis-
toklēs to
the West;

¹ See vol. ii. p. 342.

² Herod. viii. 62.

³ Plut. Them. 32.

⁴ See vol. ii. pp. 246, 537.

⁵ See vol. ii. p. 287. If the dates given by Mr. Kenyon in p. 70 of the newly found *Ἀθηναίων Πόλεις* are at all right, this story becomes more impossible than ever.

with them by kindred through an Akarnanian mother¹. CHAP. VIII. It is more certain that he had guided the policy of Athens to acts which had caused him to be enrolled as a benefactor of Korkyra² and to be looked on as an enemy by the Molottian king Admêtos. And in the true story of his flight, though Argos is at the moment his dwelling-place, yet it is on the western side of Greece, with the grateful commonwealth and with the generous enemy, that he seeks shelter³. All this points to a westward policy as of Periklês. no small importance in the mind of Themistoklês, and that policy was clearly handed on to Periklês as his political heir. That a city of Sicily, above all that a barbarian city, should make an application to Athens of any kind, whatever was its object and whatever was its result, shows that it was well known in Sicily that Athens had strongly-marked westward views. Presently those views took a definite shape in the foundation of Thourioi as in some sort a restoration of fallen Sybaris. The nature of that foundation shows us what thoughts were working in the mind of Periklês a dozen years before the beginning of the general war. Those views had found a good deal of enlargement in the general Athenian mind, perhaps before the first actual armed intervention of Athens in Sicilian affairs, assuredly before the sailing of that great expedition of which Alkibiadês was the leading spirit.

As yet Athens did not seek for direct dominion in the

¹ Anyhow she was not Athenian. Plutarch (Them. 1) gives us the choice of Thrace and Karia, with a preference to Halikarnassos. But Busolt (li. 119) prefers the version of Cornelius Nepos (Them. 1) which makes her Akarnanian.

² Thuc. i. 136. 1; *φεύγει . . . ἐς Κέρκυραν, ὃν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης*. Plutarch (Them. 24) describes the *εὐεργεσία*· *γενόμενος αὐτῶν κριτὴς πρὸς Κορινθίους ἐχόντων διαφορὰν, ἔλυσεν τὴν ἐχθρὰν εἰκοσι τάλαντα κρίνας τοὺς Κορινθίους καταβαλεῖν καὶ Λευκάδα κοινῇ νέμειν ἀμφοτέρων ἀποικον*. This becomes of importance when we come to the quarrel about Epidamnus. See below, p. 20.

³ Thuc. i. 136. 2; more fully again in Plutarch, u. s.

CHAP. VIII. West. At all events Periklès did not. It is always dangerous to strive too hard at being wise above what is written, and it is specially dangerous to strive to see the inner workings of parties in any commonwealth more clearly than our evidence allows us to see them. But there are signs that Periklès, at the height of his power, did not always wield at will the fierce democracy, that he had opponents who often proposed, and sometimes carried into action, a policy different from that which he approved. It would be quite in accordance with what little we know of the matter to hold that Periklès had to strive with a party which was far more eager for Athenian aggrandisement in the West than he was himself¹. And in the great instance of Athenian action at this time a spirit of moderation is shown which may suggest that we see the great leader yielding somewhat to the clamour of an extreme party, but not giving way to its more extravagant demands. We see Athens taking a step in the western regions which would greatly extend her influence in those regions, which might be fairly expected to increase her Pan-hellenic reputation everywhere, but which was no direct extension of Athenian dominion. A favourable time for such action came when the Sybarite remnant, defeated by hostile Krotôn in their attempts to restore their fallen city by Thessalian help², called, first on Sparta and then on Athens, to become the metropolis of a new Sybaris³. At

Western
dominion
not sought
by Peri-
klès.

A more
advanced
party at
Athens.

Founda-
tion of
Thourioi.
B.C. c. 443.

¹ Nissen, in the article "Der Ausbruch des Peloponnesischen Krieges" (*Historische Zeitschrift*, xxvii. 396), goes deeply into the state of Athenian parties, more deeply perhaps than all will be able to follow him. But the opposition to Periklès, even in his later days, stands out plainly enough, and we shall perhaps come to an example of successful opposition in our own story. See Appendix III.

² Diodóros mentions this twice, xi. 90 and xii. 10. The first time he speaks of a personal Thessalos as founder; the second time he says Θερραλὸς συνψίκαται. This later statement may seem to have the force of a correction, and it is so taken by Bunbury, *Diet. Geog.*, art. Thurií.

³ Diod. xii. 10.

Sparta the prayer was unheeded; at Athens it was answered, but not exactly in the shape in which it was put up. The foundation of Periklēs did not bear the name of the daughter of Themistoklēs.

But, if the new Italiot city was not in the strictest sense a revival of Old Sybaris, it was not a mere enlargement of the possessions of Athens. It was not a mere Athenian outpost, a *klérouchia* (a *colonia* in the Roman sense) for the profit of Athenian citizens. It was to be a colony in the true Greek sense, a colony of which Athens should be the metropolis and nothing more. But it was not to be an Athenian colony in the sense of admitting none but Athenians to a share in the new settlement. Besides Athenians, besides the Sybarite remnant, besides the Achaïans from whose land Sybaris had first been planted, settlers from Greece in general were freely welcomed¹. Hence disputes arose on grounds most characteristic of a Greek commonwealth. The Sybarite settlers, looking on Thourioi as a mere continuation of Sybaris, claimed privileges, civil and religious, which the citizens who came from other places refused to allow them². The quarrel led to bloodshed and banishment; the Sybarite remnant, once more in exile, founded a new settlement by the river Traeis, which was presently swept away by the Bruttians³. New settlers were invited; the names of the ten tribes into which the Thurian population were divided show its mingled character. One preserved the memory either of Athens or of the goddess of Athens⁴;

Character
of the set-
tlement.

Revolu-
tions of
Thourioi.
Sybarite
claims.

The tribes.

¹ Diodōros (xii. 10) marks the special application to the Peloponnesians. On the Athenian action cf. Plut. Per. 11, Nik. 5. The Hieron of whom he there speaks does not appear in Diodōros.

² Diod. xii. 11. They were to have the chief offices (τὰς ἀξιολογαντάς ἀρχάς), the other only the smaller (τὰς ἐντελείς). Their wives were to sacrifice first and then the others. They were to have the lots of land nearest the town, the others those further off. Compare the claims of the old Syracusan citizens in vol. ii. p. 311.

³ Diod. xii. 22. Cf. Iamb. Vit. Pyth. c. 35.

⁴ Diod. xii. 11. He gives the list. Athénais comes in with Ias, Eubols,

CHAP. VIII. but the Athenian element was so small that the metropolitan rights of Athens were disputed. The question was referred to the god at Delphoi, and Apollôn, not without practical wisdom, declared Thourioi to be a colony of his own and himself to be its only founder¹.

Later relations between Thourioi and Athens. We shall hear of Thourioi again in the course of our Sicilian story. The foundation of Apollôn will appear as neither the constant friend nor the constant enemy of the earthly metropolis whose claims she had disowned. Thourioi, like many other cities, acts for or against Athens, according to

Settlers at Thourioi; the rise and fall of parties within her own walls². The successor of Sybaris has a further interest for Sicilian history on account of some men who took a part in the

Herodotus; first settlement or joined it at a later time. Herodotus of Halikarnassos was one of the settlers. His sojourn in the West gave him that knowledge of Italy and Sicily to which we have owed so much in earlier stages of our story³. Had he stayed for ever in his Asiatic birthplace, we should have lacked the more part of such knowledge as we have of the acts of Hippokratês and Gelôn. A fellow-settler of a younger generation unites in his birth and life the story of

Lysias; Italy, Sicily, and Athens, in a remarkable way. It is another and a notable sign of the heed which Periklês gave to the affairs of Sicily that Kephalos, son of Lysanias, a wealthy Syracusan, was his friend and guest, specially invited by him to take up his abode at Athens⁴. There was born his

B.C. 458.

and Nésiôtis. It is just after this that Diodôros goes off into his wild translation of Charôndas to these times. See vol. ii. pp. 61, 451.

¹ Diod. xii. 35. On the chronology see Appendix III.

² Thuc. vii. 33. 5, 57. 11.

³ The illustration in iv. 99 would not have come into the head of any man save one to whom southern Italy was very familiar. To most Greeks the Attic comparison would surely have been the clearer.

⁴ Plut. X Or. Vit., Lysias. He came ἐπιθυμία τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ Περικλέους τοῦ ἑαυθίπτου πείσαντος αὐτὸν, φίλον ὄντα καὶ ξένον, πλοῦτον διαφέρειν. He came in the archonship of Philoklês, that is B. C. 459. ὅς δέ τινες, ἐκτεσῶν τῶν Συρακουσῶν, ἤρκα ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἐτυραννοῦντο. This last is a

son Lysias, who, after his father's death, went, at the age CHAP. VIII. of fifteen years, with his Syracusan-born brother Polemarchos, to take a share in the settlement of Thourioi¹. The friendship of Periklēs had not procured for Kephalos the privilege of Athenian citizenship²; why his sons preferred settlement at Thourioi to a return to Syracuse we are not distinctly told; but we can well believe that friendship for Athens might, even at the time of the settlement of Thourioi, already tell against a man at Syracuse. And Lysias was so strongly marked as a friend of Athens that, after the overthrow of the Athenian power before Syracuse, he was one of three hundred citizens of Thourioi who were driven out B.C. 411. on a charge of favouring the cause of the city of his birth³. Restored to Athens, he did good service to the commonwealth in her day of need; and he comes again within our Sicilian range when he did what Themistoklēs may or may not have done before him, when he called on the assembled Greeks at Olympia to show the full hatred of freemen towards the ostentatious pomp of a Syracusan tyrant⁴.

In Lysias we see one who was enabled by the circumstances of his life to combine an Athenian and a Syracusan patriotism. Another settler at Thourioi suggests events in Kleandridas. which Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse are strangely brought together. The Spartan Kleandridas, banished for taking Athenian bribes, found shelter and citizenship among the B.C. 445. motley population of Thourioi⁵. His son was Gylippos,

most unlucky guess to account for a Syracusan migrating to Athens, a thing certainly remarkable enough.

¹ Plut. u. s. and Dionysios, Lysias, 1. He was born in the archonship of Philoklēs (Plut. u. s.), and went to Thourioi at the age of fifteen, which seems to fix the settlement to the year 443.

² This appears from the proposal to grant the citizenship to Lysias after the driving out of the Thirty. Plut. u. s. But both Plutarch and Dionysios witness to Kephalos keeping the best company in Athens.

³ Plut. u. s.; *ἀλιταῖς ἀρρικίειν*.

⁴ Diod. xiv. 109. We shall come to this later on.

⁵ Thucydides (vi. 104. 2) speaks of the *πολιτεία* of Kleandridas at

CHAP. VIII. for ever glorious as the deliverer of Syracuse from Athenian invasion, but not wholly free from the same weakness as his father¹. And Kleandridas too had a share in a settlement which went in the teeth of those ancient rights of Athens on Italian soil which had been asserted by Themistoklēs. After the Sybarite element had vanished from Thourioi, there was no longer any ground for hatred between Thourioi and Krotôn: but a new enemy was found at Taras. Some have thought that the enmity arose out of claims on the part of Thourioi to the Athenian heritage at Siris². In any case wars were waged, and peace was made between the two cities; Thourioi and Taras united in a joint settlement of Siris, in which the Lacedæmonian Kleandridas had a share, and in which the rank of metropolis was assigned to Lacedæmonian Taras³. A few years later, in the very thick of the events to which we are now coming, Siris sank to be the haven of a new inland city, the new Tarantine Hêrakleia, the common meeting-place of the Greeks of Italy⁴.

Siris and
Hêrakleia.
442.

432.

Diotimos
at Nea-
polis.

One instance more of Athenian interference in the West is uncertain in date and strange in its own nature. At some time or other, the Athenian general Diotimos, most likely the same of whom we shall presently hear, made his way to the Campanian Neapolis, and there set up a torch-race after the Athenian fashion. And his visit is said to have been in some way connected with a war in Sicily, at

Thourioi. His taking of bribes comes out in Plutarch, Per. 22; Nik. 28. Both come in Diod. xiii. 106, who calls him Klearchos.

¹ Diod. xiii. 106.

² Busolt, ii. 592.

³ Diod. xii. 23. Strabo (vi. 1. 14) records the share of Kleandridas in the war, and the terms of peace; *περὶ τῆς Σειρίτιδος συμβῆναι καὶ συνοικῆσαι μὲν κοινῇ, τὴν δ' ἀποικίαν κληθῆναι Ταραντίνων*. Compare the arrangements about Kymē and Naxos, vol. i. p. 316.

⁴ Strabo, u. s. Diod. xii. 36. Strabo afterwards (vi. 3. 4) speaks of *τὴν κοινὴν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτῃ παρήγγυρι, ἣν ἔθος ἦν ἐν Ἑρακλείᾳ συντελεῖν τῆς Ταραντίνης*. Alexander of Epeleros tried to move it to Thourioi.

whose date we have to guess, as well as at the disputants CHAP. VIII. engaged. It has been noticed that coins of Neapolis show the head of the goddess of Athens in a specially Attic fashion, and some have even inferred an Athenian settlement at Neapolis¹. It is perhaps safer to leave the story without date or detail, as in any case another instance of Athenian action in the West.

In all these ways we see signs that Athens was, for many years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, looking to the West, to Italy and Sicily, as a field of Athenian action, a field where as yet political influence only was looked for, but where political influence might easily grow into direct dominion. It is hard to say exactly what Athenian objects were at this stage; our pictures of them are statements coming from the days of the great Athenian invasion. They are most likely exaggerated statements, statements perhaps exaggerated for the special purposes of Alkibiadês. Nothing is more likely than that the thoughts of that later time should be carried back to an earlier stage. In the days of the great invasion, a spokesman of the invaders, speaking to a Sikeliot audience, could contrast the East and the West, the East where the interests of Athens led her to seek for actual dominion, and the West, where the same interests led her to seek only for alliances and influence². All that we know of Athenian action in the West, as long at least as Periklês guided the counsels of Athens, falls in with this view. Athens had gained so ill a name as the destroyer of the independence of Greek cities in Old Greece and in Asia that it might well suit her objects to show herself in another character in the West. There she might take her place as the protector of the weak against the strong, as the promoter of Panhellenic interests by the foundation of

Designs of
Athens in
the West

and in
the East;
contrast of
dominion
and in-
fluence.

¹ See Appendix III.

² Thuc. vi. 83-87.

CHAP. VIII. a Panhellenic settlement like that of Thourioi. We must further remember that Athens had a busy trade with Italy and Sicily and with lands beyond Italy and Sicily¹. We have seen how fully the good things of Sicily and of more distant lands were appreciated at Athens². When a list is given of the lands whose fruits were brought to her as the harvest of her widespread seafaring power, Sicily and Italy come at the head³. How soon she began to look for influence, for dominion, for anything else, beyond the bounds of the Grecian world, beyond the bounds of the European world, it might be hard to say. But it was hardly a motive of pure science, it must have been some thought either of Athenian commerce or of Athenian dominion, which in these days led Euktêmôn, a citizen of Athens, a colonist of Amphipolis, to draw up a *Periplus* of the western seas, which was found useful by inquirers in much later ages⁴. So to do seems to be a kind of intrusion on the special domain of Carthage. Punic explorers and conquerors were, at this very time, setting down the results of their researches and victories. Allusions in Athenian comedy show that, in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, Athens had already taken Carthage within her range of thought and outlook. The views

Athenian
trade with
the West.

Periplus
of Euktê-
môn.

Athenian
designs on
Carthage.

¹ This is fully drawn out by H. Droysen, *Athen und der Westen*, 40 et seqq.

² See vol. ii. p. 399.

³ In that *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* which used to be attributed to Xenophôn we read at ii. 7; διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης πρῶτον μὲν τρόπους εὐωχίων ἐξεύρον, ἐπιμογόμενοι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ὅ τι ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἢ δὴ ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ ἢ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἢ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἢ ἐν Λυδίᾳ ἢ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ ἢ ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ ἢ ἄλλοθι πού, ταῦτα πάντα εἰς ἐν ἡβροίσθη διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης. And in Aristophanês, *Wasps*, 700, the subjects of Athens are said to reach ἀπὸ τοῦ Πόντου μέχρι Σαρδού.

⁴ On this Euktêmôn see Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, i. 77. 203 et seqq. His survey is made use of by Festus Avienus, who calls him both "Atheniensis" and "Amphipolis urbis incola." It was only between B. C. 437 and 434 that those two descriptions would suit the same man.

on Carthage and beyond Carthage which Alkibiadēs at-tributes to his countrymen, if they ever were really entertained, cannot have been entertained so early. The notion of sending a hundred triremes to Carthage was fully as wild as the notion of Dēmos sitting to judge causes at Ekbatana¹. But the comic mention of such a thing shows that, as the Median wars had made the name of Ekbatana familiar at Athens, so something had made the name of Carthage familiar also. There could have been no point in describing a successful demagogue as casting one eye towards Karia and another towards Carthage², unless Carthage was well within the range of Athenian political vision, as Karia had long been.

CHAP. VIII.
Witness
of Aristo-
phanes.

Any general view of the position of Carthage during the central years of the fifth century before Christ will be best kept till we come to the time when Carthaginian action in Sicily begins again. As yet the position of Carthage in Sicily is a negative one. She does nothing, and we wonder that she does nothing. We have already wondered that she did nothing during that mysterious war in Western Sicily, whatever was its nature, which has caused us no small searching of heart³. We may wonder now and hereafter why she did nothing when Athens was again busy in Sicilian affairs, above all when she came so near to the special Phœnician land as to interfere in the disputes of Segesta and Selinous. The reason is to be found in the position of Carthage in her own continent. When she had recovered from the blow dealt to her by Gelôn, she had enough to do in strengthening her dominion in Africa and in making changes in her own constitution⁴. In Sicily her position must have been well known. Men must have been aware that the power which had been so dangerous before was

Inaction of
Carthage
in Sicily.

Her occu-
pation in
Africa.

¹ Arist. Knights, 1085; *χῶτε γ' ἐν Ἐκβατάνοις διαδέσεις, λείπων ἐπίπαστα.*

² See Appendix II.

³ See vol. ii. pp. 338, 549.

⁴ See Maltzer, G. K. i. 224. We shall come to this again.

CHAP. VIII. likely some day to be dangerous again. But it was felt that for the time no hostile action on the part of the old enemy was likely; even an alliance between Carthage and Syracuse against Athens was looked on as a possible thing¹. At the greater distance of Athens the seeming inaction of Carthage may well have been mistaken for a sign of weakness; it may have suggested the thought that, if not Athenian dominion, at least Athenian influence, might make its way into a third continent.

Approach
of the
Pelopon-
nesian war.

While Athens was thus in many ways looking westward, other causes in Old Greece were busily working towards the breach of that Truce for Thirty Years which had made Athens and Sparta no longer open enemies. The causes were in the nature of things; the occasions only were needed. At last two occasions came which led to the general war which tore the Greek world in pieces, and in which Sicily, and above all Syracuse, had so memorable a share. In both of those occasions Syracuse must have taken a certain interest; one of them touched all Greek Italy and Sicily very nearly. The causes of the war lay deeper; its occasions were the dealings, dealings of opposite kinds, between Athens and two of the colonies of Corinth. The one settlement of Corinth towards the East does not immediately concern our story; but a Syracusan proud of his descent from the city of Bellerophon² must have felt at least a sentimental interest in aught that touched any one of the sisters of Syracuse. And to the student of Greek politics, specially to the student of the relations of dependencies, there is something especially attractive in the position of Potidaia, dependent at once on Athens and on Corinth, a tributary ally of Athens, but at the same time receiving yearly

Athens
and the
colonies of
Corinth;

Potidaia;

¹ Thuc. vi. 34. 2.

² See vol. i. p. 334.

magistrates sent out from Corinth¹. With the twin-
 sister of Syracuse, the daughter whom the common parent
 deemed so undutiful, the case was otherwise. Korkyra
 kept the path from Athens, from Old Greece in general,
 to Italy and Sicily. And a time presently came when
 Korkyra herself found it expedient to enlarge on that fact
 before an Athenian assembly, to point out how she could
 hinder either a Sicilian or Italian fleet from coming to the
 help of Peloponnêsos or a Peloponnesian fleet from going
 to help or to invade any part of Italy or Sicily². And
 when Athens comes to her decision to give such help to
 Korkyra as may at least save her from destruction, it is
 the position of the island with regard to Italy and Sicily
 which is set forth as one of the foremost of the prevailing
 motives³.

The first formal act, as far as we know, by which Athens
 entered into any direct relations with the Greeks of Sicily
 was when she contracted those alliances with the Chalkidian
 cities of Rhêgion and Leontinoi to which a slight reference
 has been already made⁴. They were concluded on the
 same day in a memorable year. Two years earlier Corinth
 and Korkyra had come to open warfare about the affairs
 of Epidamnos, the colony on the Illyrian coast which had

CHAP. VIII.

importance
of the
position of
Korkyra.Treaties
of Athens
with
Rhêgion
and Leon-
tinoi.
B.C. 433.War
between
Corinth
and Kor-
kyra about

¹ Thuc. i. 56. 2. The Potidaists are Κορινθίων ἀποικοί, ταυτῶν [Ἀθηναίων] δὲ σύμμαχοι φόρου ὑποτελεῖς. The Athenians hid them τοῖς τε ἐπιδημιουργοῖς ἐκπέμπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ δέχεσθαι οὐδὲ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον Κορίνθιοι ἐπεμpton. This double dependency on two states not holding in condominium is very remarkable. The dependence of Potidaia on Corinth no doubt came from its being a foundation of Periandros. Nic. Dam. vii. 60.

² Thuc. i. 36. 2; τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κείται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκείθεν ναυτικὸν ἔλσαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν τό τε ἐνθὺνδε πρὸς τάκῃ παραπέμψαι καὶ ἐς τὰλλα συμφορώτατόν ἐστι.

³ Ib. 44. 3; ὅμα δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κείσθαι. With Thucydides this is only one motive among several. Diodôros, referring to the matter out of place (xii. 54), says that they concluded the alliance wholly διὰ τὸ τὴν Κέρκυραν εὐφυνῶς κείσθαι πρὸς τὸν εἰς Σικελίαν πλοῦν. See Appendix IV.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 427.

CHAP. VIII. been planted when Periandros was lord both of Corinth and
 Epidam- of Korkyra¹. By a strange turning about of political parties,
 nos. democratic Korkyra appears as taking up the cause of
 B.C. 435- banished Epidamnian oligarchs, while aristocratic Corinth
 433- gives her support to the Epidamnian commons². Korkyra is
 for a while victorious; she compels Epidamnos to receive
 the exiles³; but, after a year and more of preparation⁴,
 Corinth is found so strong and threatening that Korkyra has
 to seek for help, and determines to seek for it at Athens.
 Then come those memorable pleadings of Korkyraian and
 Corinthian orators in the Athenian assembly, which are
 so instructive, not only as a piece of the narrative his-
 tory of Greece, but as throwing such light on the relations
 of metropolis and colony⁵. They concern us most of all
 from the way in which Italiot and Sikeliot relations are

Korky-
 raian appli-
 cation to
 Athens.
 B.C. 433.

¹ Thuc. i. 24. The explanation of the peculiar relations of Epidamnos to both Korkyra and Corinth, which are puzzling, even as stated by Thucydides, becomes a little clearer by the light of the account of Kypselid colonization given by Nikolaos of Damascus (see Additions and Corrections, vol. i. p. xxxiii). Even Diodoros does not put it badly when he says (xii. 30) ἀποικοὶ ὑπάρχοντες Κερκυραίων καὶ Κορινθίων. But his account of the matter (xii. 30-33) is, as so often, confused in its chronology. Cf. the quarrel about Leukas in Plut. Them. i. 24. See above, p. 9.

² Thuc. i. 24-25.

³ Ib. 29.

⁴ Ib. 31. 1; τὸν δ' ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν ὕστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὀργῇ φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυπηγοῦντο, κ.τ.λ.

⁵ See vol. i. p. 340. The Korkyraians in Thucydides (i. 34. 1) set forth the general law of Greek settlements; πᾶσα ἀποικία εὖ μὲν πάσχουσα τιμῇ τὴν μητρόπολιν, ἀδικουμένη δὲ ἀλλοτριοῦται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ δουλείᾳ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ τοῖς λειπομένοις εἶναι ἐκπέμπονται. The Corinthian answer (i. 38. 1) runs thus; ἀποικοὶ ὄντες ἀφ' ἐστᾶσι τε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὅς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ κακῇ πάσχειν ἐκπεμθείσαν. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ φάμεν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίεσθαι κατοικίσειν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ ἡγεμόνευσι τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα. Much here turns on the word εἰκότα. Corinth might claim τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι even by independent Syracuse, and Syracuse would not have denied the claim. But the εἰκότα which Corinth demanded of Korkyra included ἡγεμονία. That is, Corinth claimed to put Korkyra—revolted Korkyra, she would say—on the same level as the dependent colonies founded by the Kypselids. See vol. i. p. 32.

put forth as motives which are specially likely to guide the decision of the Athenian people. It seems to have been the party of moderation led by Periklēs which sought to secure the friendship of so valuable an ally as Korkyra without breaking the peace with Corinth and the other members of the Peloponnesian alliance¹. Ten ships only were sent, not to make war on Corinth, but to defend Korkyra, a city friendly to Athens, in case of Corinthian attack². A change of feeling must have followed very soon; after not many days twenty ships more were sent forth, which turned the scale for Korkyra, and saved her from more thorough overthrow at Sybota³. The truce was still not to be broken; but the commanders of the second expedition had less scruples than those of the first. On the first day the ten Athenian ships kept themselves from actively mingling in the battle, till the sight of the defeat of their allies proved too strong for obedience to irksome orders. On the second day the whole body of thirty joined in vainly offering battle to the navy of Corinth. A time of action in Thrace, a long time of negotiation, followed before the great war actually began⁴; but it would have been hard to keep the peace after Athenians and Corinthians had met in arms off Sybota.

CHAP. VIII.
Policy of
Periklēs;
the ten
ships sent;
August.

Sending
of the
twenty
ships;
September.

Battle of
Sybota.

War in
Thrace,
and nego-
tiations;
433-431.

It is impossible to say with certainty what was the exact connexion between these events and the conclusion of the Athenian alliances with Rhêgion and Leontinoi. But they come very close together in order of time; both come within the official year of the archôn Apseudēs; and it is hard to believe that they were not closely connected as a matter of cause and effect. One is tempted to think that

Treaties
with Rhê-
gion and
Leontinoi.

¹ See Appendix III.

² It was not to be *συνμαχία*, but *ἐμπροχία*. See Thuc. i. 44. 1.

³ Thuc. i. 50. 6. See Appendix II. Cf. Diod. xii. 33, who has an altogether wrong archon, Nausimachos, made seemingly out of Lysimachos in 436-431.

⁴ See Appendix III.

CHAP. VIII. the state of things in Italy and Sicily was leading the Chalkidian cities there to ask for Athenian help, while in Italy it was such that Athens might have been inclined

Connexion
with events
at Thourioi.

to step in even without any such prayer. As far as we can make out from a very confused chronology, it must have been about this time that Athenian influence was weakened at Thourioi, that the colony disclaimed the metropolis, and went into partnership with Lacedæmonian Taras¹. These things might well cause alarm at Rhégion, and the threatening action of Syracuse might well cause alarm at Leontinoi. Thus much we may safely say,

Connexion
with the
application
from
Korkyra.

though we have no further details as yet. The moment when Athens entered into relations with Korkyra might well be thought a favourable one at Rhégion and Leontinoi for pleading the Chalkidian cause at Athens, and the line of argument employed by the Korkyraian orator might suggest that the pleadings of Chalkidians and Korkyraians were to some extent made in concert. We might even fancy that it was the same party, the party of more vigorous action in the West than Periklès approved, which procured both the sending of the second fleet to Korkyra and the conclusion of the treaties with Rhégion and Leontinoi.

Character
of the
treaties.

Suggestions of this kind do not go beyond guess-work. What we know is that treaties of alliance were, within this same year, concluded between Athens and the two Chalkidian cities. The two treaties were quite distinct, and neither contains any reference to the other². The formal grounds of alliance with Rhégion and with Leontinoi were most likely quite different. Leontinoi doubtless asked to be defended against Syracuse; the alliance with Rhégion was likely to have some reference to the affairs of Thourioi. But that the two treaties were closely con-

Their connexion.

¹ Diod. xii. 23, 36; Strabo, vi. i. 14. The dates are very hard.

² Hicks, 56, 57. See Appendix III.

nected in policy, that they formed part of one general scheme, is shown by their being voted on the same day, and voted on the motion of the same speaker. Their mover Kallias can hardly have been either of those well-known bearers of that name who belonged to the sacred and wealthy house in which it alternated with Hipponikos. There were others of the name at Athens; one of them plays a part as a general and dies before Potidaia¹. But we can only record our facts, and wish in vain that our immortal guide had deigned to report the speeches of Rhégines and Leontines as well as those of Corinthians and Korkyraians.

It may have been owing to some fluctuation in Athenian policy, it may have been simply owing to the busy occupation of the Athenian arms elsewhere, that the value of Korkyra in hindering Sikeliot fleets from sailing to Peloponnêsos, or in hindering Sikeliot fleets from sailing to Sicily, was not openly put to the test till six years after the conclusion of the treaties, till some years after the death of Periklês. And it was then only in answer to a second and specially urgent appeal from both Rhégion and Leontinoi. Yet the alliance of Korkyra and Athens may have indirectly worked for Athens in those regions. Our next notice of Sikeliot or Italiot affairs in relation to the great war comes from the other side at a stage somewhat later than the Athenian treaties. At the very beginning of the war, after Plataia had been attacked but before Attica had been invaded, the Peloponnesian alliance determined to form a mighty fleet of five hundred ships. To that fleet those cities of Italy and Sicily which took the Lacedæmonian side were bidden to contribute ships each in its measure, and moreover to pay a fixed contribution

CHAP. VIII.
Their
mover
Kallias.

No Athe-
nian action
in Sicily;
433-427.

Pelopon-
nesian de-
mands on
Sicily and
Italy.
431.

¹ Thuc. i. 62. 3. See Appendix II.

CHAP. VIII. in money¹. This order, for it distinctly takes the shape of an order, is somewhat startling. It implies that there were Italiot and Sikeliot cities which did not take the Lacedæmonian side, and it further implies that those which did were bound to obey requisitions from the Peloponnesian alliance. But nothing that we have hitherto heard of has at all suggested the thought that any Dorian city of Italy or Sicily was bound to any city of Old Greece by any tie stronger than those colonial ties which assuredly bound Syracuse to Corinth, and which may have bound Selinous to the elder Megara. Such relations established no political bond between the colony and the political allies of the metropolis. Syracuse might conceivably be appealed to to step in among the members of the common household, to help to chastise rebellious Korkyra or to deliver threatened Potidaia. But, beyond any vague sentiment of common Dorian origin, Syracuse had no tie to Sparta, and, apart from the grievances of Corinth, she had no known ground of quarrel with Athens. And it is hard to see any special ground on which any of the other Dorian cities of Sicily could be expected to come forward zealously with contingents for the Peloponnesian fleet or with gifts of money for the Peloponnesian hoard. Yet the words of the history in more than one place seem to imply the existence of some relation by treaty between the Peloponnesian alliance and some cities of Italy and Sicily. It may be then that, between the conclusion of the alliance between Athens and Leontinoi and the Theban attack on Plataia, Corinth had been busy with diplomacy at Syracuse and other Sikeliot and Italiot cities. It may be that Sikeliot help was talked of, but that Korkyra blocked the way, or that it was expedient to say that she did so.

Relations
of the
Sikeliots
and Ita-
liots to
Pelopon-
nésos.

Syracuse
and the
other
Corinthian
colonies.

Possible
Corinthian
negotia-
tions.

The orders sent from Peloponnésos to the Dorian cities

¹ See Appendix IV.

of Sicily bade them to get their fleet ready, but meanwhile to do no open act of hostility towards Athens. Till the new ships were ready for action, they were to observe towards her the usual practice of neutrals in time of war. A single Athenian ship of war was to be received into any Sikeliot haven; a greater number was to be refused admittance¹. Whether any ships were really begun or not is not clear; certainly none were sent, at this stage of the long war, to any Peloponnesian muster. Four years passed, taking in some of the most stirring scenes of the long struggle, without the Greeks of Sicily having any part or lot in the matter². Athens was smitten by the plague and lost her leader in Periklēs—Plataia was besieged and taken by Sparta—Mitylénê revolted against Athens and was won back again—before we hear of a blow being struck in Sicily or from Sicily.

CHAP. VIII.
Pelopon-
nesian
orders
to the
Sikeliota.

No part
taken in
Sicily;

431-427.

When our first mention of Sicilian affairs comes, it is at a striking moment. Thucydides has just recorded the revolutions of Korkyra, he has made his deep comments on them and on all revolutions³, when he again casts his eyes further to the west, and records the first appearance of Attic triremes off Sicilian shores. As yet Syracuse had sent no help to Corinth; Leontinoi had received no help from Athens. It is at this moment that we first hear of a war between Syracuse and Leontinoi⁴; we do not distinctly know whether its beginning was at this time. It may have begun, it may

First
Athenian
action in
Sicily, 427.

War of
Syracuse
and Leon-
tinoi.

¹ Thuc. ii. 7. 2; τὰ ἄλλα ἡσυχάζοντας καὶ Ἀθηναίους δεχομένους μὴ νηῖας ἀν ταῦτα παρασκευασθῆ.

² Thucydides says this in so many words (iii. 86. 3). The Dorian cities of Sicily πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχίαν ἐτάχθησαν, οὐ μέντοι ξυνεπολέμησάν γε.

³ Ib. iii. 82-85.

⁴ Ib. 86. 1; Συρακούσαι καὶ Λεοντῖνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλήλους καθίστασαν. So Diod. xii. 53; Λεοντῖνοι, Χαλκιδῆων μὲν ὄντες ἄνιοι, συγγενεῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίων, ἔτυχον ἐπὶ Συρακούσῃσι πολεμοῦμενοι. Thucydides gives no reason; Diodoros simply suggests one.

CHAP. VIII. have been merely threatening, at the time of the alliance between Athens and Leontinoi. At any rate it was going on now; the share of Sicily in the general warfare of Hellas as yet took the shape, not of help given by Sikeliot cities to cities in Old Greece or by cities in Old Greece to Sikeliot cities, but of warfare among the Sikeliot cities themselves. But the lesser strife was part of the greater. Syracusans did not go forth against Ionian neighbours without feeling that they were taking part in the great event of their time, and the weaker Ionian alliance in Sicily deemed the Dorian aggression to be ground for calling with renewed urgency for help at the hands of the ally of Leontinoi, the greatest of Ionian cities.

Allies on
each side.

The quarrel between Syracuse and Leontinoi divided all Greek Sicily and spread into Italy. The line of cleavage was nearly according to race. All the Dorian cities of the island, save Kamarina and Akragas, took the part of Syracuse¹. For Kamarina to join the Syracusan alliance would have been almost like Korkyra enlisting under the banners of Corinth. She parted from her fellows, and took the side of Leontinoi. But Dorian feeling must have been strong indeed if it could lead Akragas to take part in an enterprise of which Syracuse was the head. Most likely, as at a later time, she stood aloof in sullen neutrality². And along with the Dorian Sikeliots was ranged one Italiot city which had not forgotten how much she had once owed to a Syracusan deliverer³. For Lokroi to take one side might of itself have been reason enough for Rhêgion to take the other. But Rhêgion was naturally on the side of Leontinoi. Both cities were of Chalkidian origin; both were, in name at least, allies of Athens. The Leontine side was

Action of
Lokroi and
Rhêgion;

¹ Thuc. iii. 86. 3; τοῖς δὲ Λεοντίνοις αἱ Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις καὶ Καμέρινα.

² Ib. vii. 46. 1, 50. 1, 58. 1. Cf. Columba, p. 78.

³ Ib. iii. 86. 3; τῇς δὲ Ἰταλίας Δοκροὶ μὲν Συρακοσίαν ἦσαν, Ἐγγήνοι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐγγυγενὲς Λεοντίνων.

clearly by far the weaker. It is not easy to see what CHAP. VIII. Sikeliot allies Leontinoi can have had besides Katanê, Naxos, and Kamarina. Himera, with a Syracusan element of Himera; in her population, took the Syracusan side. Leontinoi and her allies must have been sore pressed, and it is not wonderful if they thought of an appeal for Athenian help under the terms of the existing treaty.

It is to be noticed that, though these lists of allied cities are given, yet, in the few words which describe the operations of the campaign, none are mentioned save the two central powers on each side, Syracuse and Leontinoi. The strength of the two cities was widely disproportioned; Leontinoi was brought to great straits. Its position, more Distress of Leontinoi; inland than that of any other Greek city in Sicily, comes clearly out when we hear that the Syracusans cut them off alike from the land and from the sea¹. The same position which in after times made Leontinoi so useful an outpost of Syracuse now made her sadly exposed to the attacks of Syracuse when the furthest Syracusan outpost on that side was Megara. Against such an enemy with such a following of allies Sikeliot and Italiot help was hopeless. Indeed of the other Chalkidian towns. the position of the other Chalkidian cities in Sicily was not much better than that of Leontinoi². Naxos was threatened by Messana; Katanê must have been sore pressed by the presence of a Syracusan garrison at Inessa and by the enmity of the neighbouring Hybla, a Sikeli town by that time most likely pretty thoroughly hellenized³. The only hope for Leontinoi and her allies lay in

¹ Thuc. iii. 86. 4; ἐπὶ Συρακούσων τῆς τε γῆς ἐργοντο καὶ θαλάσσης.

² This is the remark of Columba, in the article already referred to, p. 75.

³ Of the relations between Syracuse and Inessa we shall hear presently. Columba (p. 75) suggests that there was also a Syracusan garrison in the Galectic Hybla. That that Hybla was at a later time on the Syracusan side appears from Thucydides, vi. 62. 5, 94. 3. But it is not spoken of as a possession or dependency of Syracuse, and, considering its action

CHAP. VIII. the help of the great Ionian city beyond the sea, the ally both of Leontinoi and of Rhégion. An embassy was accordingly sent to Athens, an embassy by no means void of importance at the time, but which in after times drew to itself a degree of notice both greater in amount and different in kind from any that it finds at the hands of our contemporary guide¹.

Pleadings of the allies. From the few words which Thucydides gives to the matter, we learn only that, besides the general claims of Ionian blood, the orators of the Leontine alliance naturally laid special stress on the treaties which were still in force between Athens and two of their number. We are not told the name of any member of the embassy. The later historian of the island speaks of an embassy of which the renowned Gorgias of Leontinoi was the head; and he tells us, as other later writers do also, how the special style of his rhetoric, a style as yet unknown at Athens, so won the ear of the assembly that it was in answer to his irresistible pleading that Athenian help was voted to his threatened city². There is no reason to doubt that Gorgias was there, or that he made an eloquent speech in a somewhat artificial style of oratory. There is no reason to doubt that this embassy marked a period in the life of Gorgias, his transfer from a purely Sicilian to a Panhellenic position³. Nor is there any reason to doubt that in this way the embassy became an event of importance in the general history of Greek oratory, by extending the influence of Gorgias and increasing the popularity of his style. But the immediate political effect of his mission has clearly been exaggerated. As with so many other orators, philosophers, and poets⁴, his fame grew in later

Effects of his oratory.

Later exaggerations.

in the time of Ducetius (see vol. ii. p. 365), it may well have been an independent ally.

¹ See Appendix V.

² See vol. ii. p. 413.

³ See Appendix V.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 343.

ages, and the notion of his political importance grew with it. The statesman of the time gives more practical reasons for the help given by Athens to Leontinoi than the magic effect of the speech of Gorgias. Kindred blood was openly professed as the motive; the Athenians would not leave their kinsmen of Leontinoi to be eaten up by the Dorians of Syracuse. That was doubtless the pretext of the original treaty; and the Sikeliot kinsfolk of Athens were now so hardly pressed that Athens could not for very shame any longer refuse to do something for them. But Athenian politicians could further see the advantage of hindering Sicilian corn from being brought to Peloponnêsos. They also thought it worth while to make some practical inquiries as to the chances of winning for Athens something in the shape of direct Sicilian dominion, as distinguished from the forms of influence and alliance which were all that she had as yet sought for¹. The former motive may have been of special force at a time when Korkyra, torn by internal strife, was hardly in a position to fulfil her duty as keeper of the Ionian sea. The latter shows that the interest which Athens had long taken in the affairs of the West was already beginning to grow into the spirit which came to its full size eleven years later. As yet the possibility of Sicilian dominion for Athens was a question to be solved; eleven years later there was, in the Athenian mind, no doubt on the subject.

Objects of
Athens.

The fleet—clearly not a large one²—under two commanders, Lachês and Charoiadês, set forth while it was still summer. It is perhaps vain to ask what was the plan

First
Athenian
fleet in
Sicily.
Summer,
427.

¹ See Appendix V.

² Thuc. iii. 86. 1, 6; *καταστάντες οὖν ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιεῦντο μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων*. The numbers of the fleet are not given; but in c. 88 the joint fleets of Athens and Rhêgion number only thirty ships. Diodôros (xii. 54) makes a hundred Athenian ships go forth, which are joined by a hundred from Rhêgion.

CHAP. VIII. of campaign. There was most likely none. They came to search out the land, to see what could be done, and to do whatever might come within their power. Rhêgion became the head-quarters of the Athenians and their allies. The value of the friendship of that city was great indeed. There could be no better starting-point for invaders of Sicily whose plans were not yet put into shape. Rhêgion commanded one side of the strait; it stood as a bar which cut off Syracuse from Italy and northern Sicily. It had also free communication with Athens, and it was a point from which help might at once be given if Naxos or Katanê were threatened. And the Athenians were better off there than if they had stayed at home, for the next winter was marked at Athens by the second attack of the plague¹. In the course of the summer some operations were carried on by them and their allies of which no special account is given. The winter was given to an enterprise hardly of the first moment, but of which we wish to hear something more. Thirty ships of Athens and Rhêgion visited the Isles of Fire and laid waste the land². The colonists of Knidos were members of the Dorian alliance³; but the harrying of their lands could do little to advance the deliverance of the Leontines held so tight in the grasp of Syracuse. In short, during this whole stage of the war, when the Athenians are only feeling their way, a general feeling of littleness runs through everything. The feeling is shown by the historian himself, when, in a style rather

The fleet
at Rhêgion.

Operations
of the
winter
427-426;
their
pettiness.

The Isles
of Lipara
ravaged.

¹ Thuc. iii. 87.

² The ships come in the summer. This expedition is made in the winter (Thuc. iii. 88. 1); *θέρος γὰρ δι' ἀνυδρίας ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιστρεφέναι* (see Holm, ii. 4). This accurate chronology of Thucydides is contrasted with the carelessness of Diodôros, who jumbles up these events with those of several years before and after under a single archonship.

It is here that Thucydides stops to describe the islet of Aiolos. See vol. i. pp. 87, 88.

³ Thuc. iii. 88. 5; *ἐμμάχου ἦσαν τῶν Συρακοσίων*.

unusual with him, he sets forth his purpose of recording only the more important events of the campaign¹. We can see too that the same feeling was at work both at Athens and in Sicily itself². Some passages of arms must have gone on directly between Athenians and Syracusans; for it was in Syracusan warfare that one of the Athenian commanders, Charoiadês, met his death³.

Warfare with Syracuse; death of Charoiadês.

It is not till the summer after its coming to Sicily that the Athenian fleet attempts any operation of importance. Messana was hostile to Athens. From the name which the town now bore we should have looked for the sympathies of its people to lie with the enemy of Sparta, the patron of Naupaktos. But it might be dangerous to infer anything as to the natural tendencies of so mixed a people as those who inhabited the city which had been Zanklê. Dislike to Rhêgion, the city ever before their eyes, was not unlikely to be their strongest feeling. Events however showed that the motley population of Messana was not of one mind. Athens had friends within its walls, whether a remnant of the Chalkidian stock of Zanklê⁴ or the settlers from the elder Messenian land. But at this moment Messana was hostile, and the Italiot and Sikeliot allies of Athens suggested to the surviving Athenian commander Lachês an attack on the Messanian fortress of Mylai, the furthest outpost of the city on the northern

Politics of Messana.

Mylai taken by the Athenians. Summer, 426.

¹ Thuc. iii. 90. 1; ἐπολέμουν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι ὥς ἐκάστοις ἐνέβαινον ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Σικελιώται ἐπ' ἀλλήλους στρατεύοντες καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τοῖς σφετέρους ἐνυμμάχοις· ἃ δὲ λόγου μάλιστα ἔξια ἦ μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ ἐύμαχοι ἔπραξαν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ἀντιπολέμοι, τοῦτον μνησθήσομαι. Diodôros (xii. 54) gets through them all with wonderful speed; he leaves out the main thing of all, the taking and taking again of Messana, and there is something wanting in the text in his account of the attack on Mylai.

² Ib. 115. See below.

³ Ib. 90. 2; Χαροιάδου ἡδὴ τοῦ Ἀθηναίου στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων πολέμῳ. We have had no distinct mention of any engagement with Syracusans.

⁴ So Holm, ii. 5.

CHAP. VIII. coast¹. The town on the peninsula was held by the force of two Messanian tribes, a phrase which makes us wish to know more of the civil and military arrangements of Messana². In a commonwealth whose citizens came of so many branches of the Greek name, with some most likely that did not belong to the Greek name at all, the division into tribes would naturally follow distinctions of race³, and this or that tribe might not unlikely have objects and a policy of its own. Besides the garrison in the fortress, an ambush was laid to set on the Athenians and their allies on landing⁴. The liers-in-wait were soon scattered with great slaughter, and the allied force attacked the walls of Mylai. The Messanian tribes that defended it had clearly no very burning zeal for the cause of Syracuse and her allies. They seem to have made no resistance at all; they at once surrendered the akropolis, and even agreed to join the Athenians in their march on Messana itself⁵. The city yielded with as little trouble as its outlying fortress. Messana joined the alliance, giving hostages and agreeing to every Athenian demand⁶.

Messana
joins
Athens.

Value and
effect
of the
Messianian
alliance.

An important Sikeliot city was thus gained to the Athenian side. Indeed very few successes could have been more valuable to the invaders than the occupation of Messana. Those who held both Messana and Rhégion commanded the strait without danger of opposition. This great advantage had not indeed been gained by any special display of Athenian strength. The Athenians had

¹ Thuc. iii. 90. 2; ἐπὶ Μυλαῖς τὰς τῶν Μεσσηνίων.

² Ib. 3; ἐτυχον δὲ δύο φυλαὶ ἐν ταῖς Μυλαῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων φρουροῦσαι.

³ As at Thourioi; see above, p. 11; as at Kyrênê, Herod. iv. 161.

⁴ Thuc. iii. 90. 4; καὶ τινα καὶ ἐνέδραν πεποιημέναι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν.

⁵ Ib.; τῷ ἐρύματι προσβαλόντες ἠνάγκασαν ὁμολογίᾳ τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν παραδούναι καὶ ἐπὶ Μεσσήνῃν ἐυστρατεῦσαι.

⁶ Ib. 5; προσεχώρησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ [οἱ Μεσσήνιοι] ὁμήρους τε δόντες καὶ ἄλλα πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι.

won Messana because a part of its population had taken the side of those who attacked it. Still, by whatever means, Messana was gained for Athens; and it is clear that this success had a powerful effect on men's minds throughout the island. It seems to have specially impressed those who were not of Hellenic blood. It was felt by the Elymian rival of Selinous and by the Sikels who were unwilling subjects of Syracuse. It is from Thucydides himself, though only casually in a later notice, that we learn that it was now that Segesta renewed the alliance with Athens which she had entered into nearly thirty years before¹. We can better understand the motive now than we could at the earlier time. However things may have stood in the days when Halikyai was seemingly looked on as dangerous, we may be sure that the immediate motive now is to be found in the never-failing disputes between Segesta and her nearest Greek neighbour to the south. Selinous was hostile to Athens; so was Himera, the nearest Greek neighbour of Segesta to the east; but on that side Phœnician Panormos and Solous would doubtless be protection enough for the Elymian city. We are not told whether anything immediately came of this alliance, any more than of that which went before it, or of the first alliances with Rhégion and Leontinoi. But it would be remembered with no small effect in later times, and both this and the earlier alliance are signs of the increased importance which is beginning to belong to the western side of Sicily. The dark hints that we have already had may show that this importance is nothing really new, but rather something which is simply coming more prominently into sight. But this renewed alliance between Athens and Segesta directly connects itself with the two great events of the second half of the century. It was the

Renewed
alliance
with
Segesta.

Segesta
and Selin-
ous.

¹ In Thuc. vi. 6. 2 the Segestans appeal to ἡ γερρονία ἐν Ἀδελφῶν . . . συμμάχια. See Appendix VIII.

CHAP. VIII. affairs of Segesta, her disputes with Selinous, which were the immediate occasion both of the great Athenian invasion and of the Carthaginian invasion that followed it.

Sikel
move-
ments.

For the present at least there are others among the non-Hellenic inhabitants of Sicily whose fates awaken a deeper interest than those of the Elymians of Segesta. The mere coming of the Athenian force had caused no small stir among those Sikel communities which had been brought under the dominion of Syracuse after the death of Ducetius. To them Athens or any other power that was hostile to Syracuse seemed a deliverer. Enrolled against their will among the allies of Syracuse—the name allies shows that they remained distinct though subject communities—they threw off the yoke and joined the Athenian alliance¹. The Sikels could have no share in the last enterprise of the summer, though it was carried on in a land which had once belonged to their forefathers. The Athenian fleet sailed to the territory of Lokroi; a descent was made; the Lokrians were defeated, and a fort known as the *Peripolion* by the mouth of the river Halêx was taken². But the winter saw an enterprise which must indeed have stirred every Sikel heart. Inessa, once the Hieronian Ætna, then one of the chief trophies of the successful days of Ducetius³,

The Sikel
allies of
Syracuse
join
Athens.

Taking
of the
Lokrian
Peripolion.

Joint
attack on
Inessa; its

¹ Thuc. iii. 103. 1. The Athenians act μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμμάχων καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀρχόμενοι ἐπὶ Συρακοσίαν καὶ ζύμμαχοι ὄντες ἀποστάντες ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν Συρακοσίαν ξυνεπολέμου.

² Thuc. iii. 99; καὶ Περιπόλιον αἰρούσι δ ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀλφειῷ ποταμῷ. Arnold remarks: 'a guard fort or station of the περίπολοι. . . . Formerly the word was written with a capital letter, as if it were a proper name.' Doubtless the name means *fort*; but it would seem to have become a proper name. That is, if the coins with the legend ΓΕΡΡΙΓΘΑΩΝ ΠΙΤΑΝΑΤΑΝ belong to it. See Holm, ii. 404; Head, Hist. Num. 91; Columba, p. 80. For Sicilian history the point may fairly be left open.

³ Thuc. iii. 103. 1; Ἰνέσσαν τὸ Σικελικὸν πόλισμα. The τὸ is emphatic, and is by no means fully represented by an indefinite article. To those who have read the history of Ducetius it might seem dangerous to alter the order of a single word in Thucydides' account. The subjection which these Sikels sought to throw off was very recent,

was now so far in Syracusan hands that it had a Syracusan garrison in its akropolis¹. A foreign garrison in the chief fortress of a town is a state of things with which we become familiar in a later stage of Greek history; Athens herself had to endure it when Macedonia was too strong for her. Such an occupation of course implies complete practical subjection; but it in no way carried with it the suppression of the ordinary life of an independent community in the rest of the town. A Syracusan garrison in Inessa, a sharp thorn in the side of Greek Katanê, was to the new Sikeliot allies of Athens a badge of subjection which it must have been their foremost object to get rid of. The whole allied force therefore, Athenian, Sikeliot, and Sikel, marched against Inessa and attacked the Syracusan fortress². To take it was found to be beyond their power, and they were driven to retreat. Then the garrison of Inessa sallied forth; they set upon the allies who formed the Athenian reaward—did the Sikels take the post of honour in the retreat?—and slew and put to flight not a few³. Presently the Athenian fleet, seemingly without the help of any allies, made another successful inroad into the territory of Lokroi. Of the Lokrians who came to defend their lands three hundred were slain⁴; but this was small compensation for the breakdown of the combined enterprise against Inessa.

CHAP. VIII.
Syracusan
garrison.

Defeat
of the
Athenians
and Sikels
at Inessa.

Further
inroads on
Lokroi.

It was most likely the ill-success of that enterprise which led the Sikeliot allies of Athens to send an embassy to the protecting city, praying that a greater force might be sent to their help⁵. The envoys set forth the state of

New
Sikeliot
embassy
to Athens.
Winter of
426-425.

¹ Thuc. iii. 103. 2; οὗ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν Συρακόσιοι εἶχον.

² Ib.; ἐν τῇ ἀναχωρήσει δυστέροις Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τειχίσματος Συρακόσιοι.

³ Ib.

⁴ Ib.

⁵ Ib. 115. 3; οἱ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ξυμμάχοι πλείονας ἐπέισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν σφίσι πλείοσι ναυσί.

CHAP. VIII. the case in plain words. By land the Syracusans had the better of them, even in their own territory. That is to say, the enterprise which was to relieve them from the grievance of the Syracusan garrison at Inessa had failed to give them any help. By sea the small Athenian force was able to keep their enemies in check; but the Syracusans were minded to endure this no longer; they were getting ready a naval force of their own¹. That no naval help had gone from Syracuse to Peloponnêsos we know very well; but one wonders that the powerful fleet of which we heard some years back had been, as seems now to be implied, allowed to come to nothing. The Athenians granted the prayer of their allies; they wished to bring the Sicilian war to a quicker end. They further wished, at a moment when they had no great naval enterprise on hand, to keep their own seamen in practice². Forty ships were voted for Sicilian service. Pythodôros, one of the generals of the year, was sent out at once with a small force. Two other commanders, Sophoklês and Eurymedôn—the latter a name which we shall often hear again—were to follow presently with a larger body³.

New expedition voted.

Pythodôros sails at once.

Lachês goes against Himera and Lipara. 426-425.

Meanwhile Lachês was not idle, neither were his Sikel allies. The masters of the strait could do what they pleased on the northern coast. The Athenian ships sailed to the territory of Himera; they made a landing, in which the Sikels from the hills bore a part by invading the more distant parts of the Himeraian lands⁴. The extreme

¹ Thuc. iii. 115. 4; τῆς μὲν γῆς αὐτῶν οἱ Συρακούσιοι ἐκράτουν, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης ὀλίγαις ναυσὶν εἰργόμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ναυτικὸν ξυμπεφόρῳτες οὐ περιεφόμενοι.

² Ib. 5; ἀμα μὲν ἡγούμενοι θᾶσσον τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλύθησεν, ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ποιεῖσθαι.

³ Ib. 6; τὸν μὲν οὖν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπέστειλαν Πυθόδωρον ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ, Σοφοκλέα δὲ τὸν Σωστρατίδου καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλίου ἐπὶ τῶν πλείονων νεῶν ἀποπέμψειν ἔμελλον.

⁴ Ib. 1; ἀπόβασιν ἐποίησαντο ἐκ τῶν νεῶν μετὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἀναθεν ἐσβεβληκότων ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἱμεραίας. The expedition of Σικελῶν

eastern part must be meant. That was the only part of CHAP. VIII. the lands of Himera which lay open to Sikel enemies, to the men of Paropus and Cephaloedium, who had doubtless kept their complete independence of Syracuse or any other Greek power. We long to hear something of Ducetius' new city of Kalê Aktê, something of his friend Archônidês of Herbita, so pointedly marked out as the friend of Athens¹. But neither is mentioned. The isles of Aiolos were harried this winter also, and Lachês came back to Rhêgion to find himself superseded in his command by Pythodôros². The new commander's beginning was, in one region at Pythodôros defeated by the Lokrians. 425- least, less successful than that of his predecessor. Early in the spring he sailed once more to Peripolion, which would seem to have passed again into Lokrian hands. He met the Lokrians in battle; he underwent a defeat, and went back to Rhêgion³.

The spring was further marked by an eruption of Eruption of Ætna. 425. Ætna, the third known to Thucydides to have happened since the beginning of Greek settlement in Sicily⁴. The first and second, the mythical and the historical, we have already heard of⁵. The second is ennobled by the verse of Æschylus and Pindar⁶; a few words of the prose

for *Σικελιωτῶν* is quite certain; yet the necessity of guessing is unpleasant.

¹ Thuc. vii. 1. 4. See vol. ii. p. 381.

² Thuc. iii. 115. 1; ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐς Ῥήγιον Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸν καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ ταῖς ναῦς διάδοχον αὖν ὁ Λάχης ἦρχεν. This Sicilian campaign of Lachês seems to be referred to by Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 240; ἀλλ' ἐγκονῶμεν, ἄνδρες, ὡς ἔσται Λάχῃτι νυνί. The Scholiast is not very clear about the matter; but it seems that Kleôn prosecuted Lachês for peculation, ὡς τὰ δημόσια χρήματα σφετερισμένον καὶ πλουτήσαντος.

³ Thuc. iii. 115. 7; ἐπλευσε τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπὶ τὸ Λοκρῶν φρούριον ὁ πρότερον Λάχης εἶλε.

⁴ Ib. 116. 1; ἑρρῆη περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ βῆας τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἰτνῆς.

⁵ See vol. i. p. 378; ii. p. 242.

⁶ See vol. ii. pp. 274, 279.

CHAP. VIII. of Thucydides, a not less worthy tribute, are all that fall to the lot of the third. As could not well fail, the fire-flood did damage in the lands of Katanê. Why was not Empedoklês there to play the part of the Pious Brethren in one age and of Saint Agatha in another? It befits the strange mixture of the mystical and the practical in his character, if we answer that he was fighting for Syracuse against the allies of Katanê¹.

The year
425 B.C.;
its importance
in
Greek
history.

The year on which we have entered is, for both Athens and Sparta, one of the most memorable in the whole story of the war. It is the year of Pylos and Sphaktêria; it is one of the years of Korkyra. Had it been less memorable in the general history of Greece, it might have been more memorable in the special history of Sicily; at any rate it might have had to record a longer tale of Athenian success. Early in the summer, when the corn was coming into ear², an Athenian fleet of forty ships was sent forth under Eurymedôn and Sophoklês. Their chief and final object was Sicily; but they were bidden to stop on their way to give help to the democratic party in Korkyra. Moreover the energetic Dêmosthenês went with them, with no regular command, but with a general authority to use the fleet for any enterprise along the Peloponnêsian coast that he thought good³. Of this last commission came the most brilliant Athenian success of the whole war; Pylos was occupied as a lasting thorn in the side of Sparta; the Spartans in Sphaktêria were led captive to Athens. But the Athenian cause in Sicily was ruined. The fleet tarried at Pylos; it tarried again at Korkyra; it reached

Athenian
interests
in Sicily
ruined by
the success
at Pylos.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 354.

² Thuc. iv. 1. 1; τοῦ ἐπιγεγραμμένου θέρους περὶ αἴτου ἐκβολήν. The date is given for the Syracusan attack on Messana; but the other events were ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις τοῦ ἔτους (iv. 2. 1).

³ Ib. 2. 4.

Sicily too late to support Pythodôros in a struggle against superior forces, too late to hinder or to revenge the loss of the one great advantage which Athens had gained in the island. ORAP. VIII.

The accession of Messana to the Athenian side was felt by the enemies of Athens in Sicily and Italy as a special call to its recovery. Our Athenian guide clearly points out the difference of feeling between a greater and a smaller commonwealth, between one which does not rise above purely local friendship and hatred and one whose position entitles and compels it to shape its policy from a wider point of view. At Lokroi there was a strong desire to win back Messana to the Dorian alliance; but it was mainly because the hated Rhêgion could be better attacked if it were again put between two enemies at Lokroi and at Messana¹. At Syracuse Messana was looked on as the key of Sicily; let Messana become the Athenian headquarters, and from that base of operations it would be easy to come against Syracuse with a greater force². A joint enterprise was therefore planned. Syracuse and Lokroi each furnished ten ships for the attack on Messana by sea, while the Lokrians entered the Rhegine territory with their full land-force. The commonwealth of Rhêgion was just then not of one mind; the resistance therefore was feeble, and the Lokrians harried without hindrance. There were even Rhegine exiles, banished oligarchs, we must suppose, who did not scruple to lead the Lokrian invaders against their own city³. Nor was Messana of one mind

¹ Thuc. iv. 1. 2; οἱ Λοκροὶ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Ἐγγίον, βουλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς καταπολεμεῖν.

² Ib. 2; οἱ Συρακόσιοι ὄρῶντες προσβολὴν ἔχον τὸ χωρίον τῆς Σικελίας καὶ φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὀρμώμενοι ποτε σφίσι μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἐπέλθωσιν.

³ Ib. 3; ἀμα δὲ καὶ ξυνεπαγόντων Ἐγγίον φυγάδων, οἱ ἦσαν παρ' αὐτοῖς· τὸ γὰρ Ἐγγίον ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἑτασίαζε, καὶ ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι. I can make nothing more than Grote (vii. 176) could

CHAP. VIII. either; one revolution had just before made the city an ally of Athens; another revolution brought back the former state of things. Messana now revolted from Athens and became once more an ally of Syracuse¹. The full command of the strait which Athens had held for a while now passed away from her. Her post at Rhêgion was again watched face to face from the hostile post at Messana. The victors knew well where their advantage lay. The Lokrian land-force went home; but the ships both of Lokroi and Syracuse tarried to keep guard over Messana. It was agreed that other ships that were making ready should presently join them, and make the strait the scene of naval warfare².

Naval
operations
in the
strait.

Nothing hindered the carrying out of this scheme. Before long the strait was held by the superior naval force of the Dorian alliance, eager to risk a sea-fight with the Athenians while the number of their ships was still small. That is to say, they wished to decide the war in their own island, while the main Athenian fleet, instead of sailing on to Sicily, was engaged in the siege of Sphak-têria³. Successful in such a fight, they could attack Rhêgion by land and sea, with every prospect of taking the town. An accident one evening brought on an unlooked-for action. Thirty ships of the allied fleet were

out of the story in Justin (iv. 3) about seditions in Rhêgion, and how the Himeraians, called in by one party, seized the town, much like the Marmertines in days to come. One could fancy the Lokrians, rather than the Himeraians, doing something of the kind; but they are not recorded to have done it.

¹ Thuc. iv. 1. 1; Συρακοσίαν δέκα νῆες πλείσασαι καὶ Λοκρίδες ἴσαι Μεσσηνίην τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβον, αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων, καὶ ἀπέστη Μεσσηνίη Ἀθηναίων. "Sie knüpfen Verbindungen," says Holm (ii. 6), "mit den Unzufriedenen, d. h. den Doriern." Not all the Dorians surely, not those from the old Messenâ.

² Ib. 3.

³ Ib. 24. 3; ναυμαχίας ἀποπειρᾶσθαι ἐβόλοντο, ὁρῶντες τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰς μὲν παρούσας ὀλίγας ναῦς, ταῖς δὲ πλείους καὶ μελλούσας ἔχειν πυνθαμένους τὴν νῆσον πολιορκεῖσθαι.

put to flight by twelve of Athens and eight of Rhégion. CHAP. VIII. Presently the land- and sea-force of Syracuse and Lokroi was gathered at Pelôris; two encounters followed, in each of which the Athenians lost a ship. The Syracusans, evidently well pleased at their first brush with Athens on her own element, went back to their quarters in the sheltered Messanian haven¹.

These small encounters are of more interest for the student of Greek naval tactics than for the historian of Sicily. We gain more of political instruction when we hear that a party in Kamarina, the one Dorian commonwealth which had taken the Chalkidian side, made overtures to Syracuse for the betrayal of the city². The name of the party-leader, that of their founder Archias, may have seemed of good omen in Syracusan ears; but any action on the part of the Syracusans to support their friends in Kamarina was hindered by the energetic movements of the Athenian fleet. That fleet at once sailed round Pachynos, and was ready before Kamarina to stop any attempts of the hostile party. It is plain that the plot was hindered; when we next hear of Kamarina, it is not very zealous for the Athenian alliance, but it is clearly not in Syracusan hands or in the Syracusan alliance³. It was at

Attempt to betray Kamarina to Syracuse;

hindered by the Athenian fleet.

¹ Thuc. iv. 25. 1-5. First of all, *ἐναγασθήσαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμέρας ναυμαχῆσαι περὶ πλοῖον διαπλέοντος*. The Athenians defeat them; they lose one ship, and go, *ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἐτυχον*, *ἐς τὰ οἰκίαι στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνί καὶ ἐν τῇ Ῥηγίῃ*. This last is an odd phrase, which must mean the camp of the Lokrians in the Rhégine territory. At Pelôris the Athenians lose a ship. The Syracusans are at anchor, and the Athenians and Rhégines, *ὄρῶντες τὰς ναῦς κενὰς ἐπέβαλον, καὶ χειρὶ σιδηρᾷ ἐπιβληθείσῃ μίαν ναῦν αὐτοὶ ἀνῶλεσαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκολυμβησάντων*. The iron hand is as yet on the Syracusan side; in vii. 62 it goes over to Athens. Then the Syracusans are towed to Messana (*παρὰπλέοντων ἀπὸ κάλῳ*); the Athenians attack, but, *ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων*, a nautical phrase on which I will not dispute, they lose another ship.

² Ib. 25. 7; *Καμαρίνης ἀγγελθείσης προδίδοσθαι Συρακοσίοις ὑπ' Ἀρχίου καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ*.

³ See Thuc. iv. 58.

CHAP. VIII. Kamarina as at Messana, as at Rhêgion. In every city there is a party ready to welcome and help the enemy against the existing government. It may be deemed a treasonable frame of mind ; but in weighing it, we must never forget that the enemies were fellow-Greeks. In Sicily we must further remember how all local and ancestral ties had been shaken by the plantations and transplantations which had happened under the tyrants and after their fall. To betray Messana or Kamarina, with their new and motley population, was not like betraying ancestral Athens or Corinth.

Messanian
enterprise
against
Naxos.

A deeper interest again attaches to another enterprise in which we again come across the ancient folk of the land as playing an important part. The Messanians now set forth, with their full force and with the fleets of Syracuse and Lokroi that were gathered in their haven, to attack their neighbours of Naxos¹. For as yet, while no city sat on the height of Tauros, the lands of Messana and Naxos marched on each other. The land-force came first, and, on the day they came, they beleaguered Naxos on the land side, and harried the fields². The next day the fleet followed, and took up its quarters near the mouth of the Akésinês, the wide *fiumara* of Cantara, between the heights of Tauros and the Naxian peninsula³. The fleet seems to have done nothing more than keep guard while the land-force assaulted Naxos. Presently an armed force was seen coming down from the mountains. It could hardly have been from the steep of Tauros itself, but rather from the hills on the other side of the Naxian promontory. For the besieged Naxians took the new-

¹ Thuc. iv. 25. 7 ; Μεσσηνιοὶ πανδημεὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Νάξον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν ὁμορον οὖσαν.

² Ib. 8 ; τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τειχέρεαι ποιήσαντες τοὺς Νάξιους. That could be only on the land side ; isthmus is not exactly the word.

³ Ib. ; τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκεσίνην ποταμὸν τὴν γῆν εἰδόντων. See Bunbury, Dict. Geog., art. Acsinæa.

comers for the Leontines and their other Greek allies, and they could have come to their help only from the south. The men from the hills were indeed friends, but not Greek friends. They were Sikels from the inland parts who came to give help against the Messanians ¹. This form of words would seem to imply rather hatred of Messana than friendship for Naxos. In truth, in an ordinary state of things, Naxos, the beginning and the badge of Greek dominion in Sicily, must have been more hateful to Sikel feeling than any other Sikeliot city ². But just now Naxos was not threatening, and the first feeling in every Sikel mind must have been hatred to Syracuse, to the city which had, but a few years before, brought so many Sikel communities into subjection. Messana is likely enough to have been an active enemy in her own corner; in any case she was an ally of Syracuse. Against either Syracuse or Messana Naxos was to be defended. So the Sikels came in force; the sight of them, and the mistaken inference drawn from the sight, stirred up the Naxians to special exertion. They sallied; they scattered the besiegers, and slew a thousand of them. Of the rest only a few got back to Messana; for the barbarians set upon them by the way and slew the more part ³. After this rout of the Messanian land-force, the ships that had come on the

Defeated
by the
Sikels.

Sikel
feeling
towards
Naxos and
Messana.

Effect on
the fleet.

¹ Thuc. iv. 25. 9; *οι Σικελοὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄκρων πολλοὶ κατέβαινον βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους. καὶ οἱ Νάξιοι ὡς εἶδον, θαρσύναντες καὶ παρακελεύμενοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὡς οἱ Λεοντῖνοι σφίσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ξύμμαχοι εἰς τιμωρίαν ἐπέρχονται.* It would seem that the Naxians did not look for Sikel help, but that the Sikels came of their own accord *ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους*. Also one must think that they had adopted Greek arms and dress.

I am tempted to suspect that in the confused text of Diodōros, xii. 54, where we read *ἐπιβοηθησάντων τῶν πλησιοχώρων Σικελῶν τοῖς Μυλαιοῖς* this help given to Naxos is really meant. Thucydides says nothing of Sikels at Mylai.

² See Diod. iv. 88.

³ Such is the phrase of Thucydides (iv. 25. 9); *οἱ βάρβαροι ἐν ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς πλείστοις διέφθειραν.* The word seems rather needlessly brought in.

CHAP. VIII. same errand, Syracusan, Lokrian, or any other, had no means of action. They sailed back to Messana, and thence withdrew to their several homes¹. The result of the Messanian enterprise against Naxos had been complete and serious defeat on the part of the Messanian land-force, and the fleet of the Dorian confederacy was, for a season at least, broken up.

Athenian
attempt on
Messana.

The belief of the Naxians that their Leontine allies were coming to their help was premature, but it was not wholly mistaken. The weakened state of Messana after her defeat before Naxos suggested to the Athenians and their allies the thought of a general attack on that city. The Messanian loss in the late enterprise had been so great that a body of Lokrian allies had been received into Messana to form part of its garrison². The Athenians and their Sicilian allies joined in a common expedition. A Sikeliot, partly perhaps a Sikel, force marched against the city by land. One would have looked for the Naxians to be foremost on such an errand of vengeance; but, while the allies are mentioned generally, it is the Leontines only who are spoken of by name, and the force is even spoken of as a Leontine army³. Meanwhile the Athenian ships sailed into the harbour of Messana⁴. The question arises, how far the *Zanklon* itself, the natural defence of the haven, was strengthened by art against naval attacks. As the allies drew near by land, the Messanians and their local helpers, under their captain Démotelês, made a vigorous sally; they put most of the invaders to flight, and slew many. The Athenians were watching from their ships, and they marked the con-

¹ Thuc. iv. 25. 9. αἱ νῆες σχοῦσαι ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὕστερον ἐπ' οἴκου ἑκασταὶ διεκρίθησαν.

² Ib. 12; Λοκρῶν τινὲς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοτέλους οἱ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἐγκατελείφθησαν φρουροί. ³ It is τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Λεοντίνων a little later.

⁴ Ib. 11; προσβάλλοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπείραον, ὃ δὲ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν.

fusion into which the pursuit had thrown the victorious CHAP. VIII. Messanians. They landed and set upon them, and drove them into the city. We expect to hear of some more decided success; but all that is said is that the Athenians set up a trophy and went back to Rhégion. They clearly felt that they were not equal to any great enterprise till the reinforcements came under Eurymedôn and Sophoklés. Coming of Eurymedôn and Sophoklés. For a while they took no part at all in the struggle which the Greeks of Sicily still carried on with one another by land¹. Athenian inaction. When the reinforcements did come, the Athenians began again to take a part in what was going on; but it is implied that nothing was done on any great scale².

Our chief guide at this stage is the foremost of all guides; but, as Sicilian affairs hold as yet but a secondary part in the general strife of Greece, we do not get, even from him, the same clear and connected account of them which we do when at a later stage Sicily becomes the chief battle-field of the whole war. But we certainly are somewhat surprised to find that the strengthened Athenian fleet, if we cannot say that it did absolutely nothing, at least did nothing that Thucydides thought worthy of being recorded in detail. The practical effect of its coming seems to have been to suggest to the Greeks of Sicily the thought of peace within their own island. The result was not wonderful. A time of unparalleled quiet and prosperity, a series of years in which wars between Greek and Greek had been wonderfully few, had been brought to an end because the Greeks of Sicily had allowed themselves to be dragged into the quarrels of the Greeks of the mother country, in which Movement towards peace in Sicily.

¹ Thuc. iv. 25. 13; μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἕλληνες ἀνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ γῆν ἰσχυράτερον ἐπ' ἀλλήλους.

² Ib. 48. 6; οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ἵνα περ τὸ πρῶτον ὤρμητο, ἀποπλεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ συμμάχων ἐπολέμουν. That is, the fleet under Eurymedôn and Sophoklés, after tarrying at Pylos and Korkyra, at last reached Sicily.

CHAP. VIII. they had no direct interest. Since then both sides had felt the evils of a state of war, while it could not be said that either side had gained much either in military fame or in material profit. The Ionian towns were beginning to see that Athens used them only for her own purposes. She sent her fleets to Sicily for practice when they had nothing special to do elsewhere¹. When she promised help to her Sicilian allies, its coming was delayed by any prospect of advantage which showed itself on the coast of Peloponnêsos.

Little help
from Old
Greece
to either
side in
Sicily.

And when at last the enlarged fleet came, its action was less energetic than the action of the Sikeliots themselves. The Dorians, on the other hand, had received no help whatever from those powers in Old Greece which had called on them for help². They had fought single-handed against Athens and their own Ionian neighbours; even Corinth had never sent a single ship to the support of her daughter Syracuse. The war had been a war of mutual damage to the profit of nobody; Dorians and Ionians alike began to look back to the happy days of peace which had been so needlessly and unluckily broken in upon.

Relations
of Kamarina
to
Syracuse
and Gela.

The first steps came from a city which stood in a peculiar position. Kamarina was a Dorian city which had joined the Ionian confederacy out of fear and dislike to a single Dorian city, her neighbour Syracuse. By Syracuse Kamarina had once been swept away; between the two commonwealths it seemed that there could be no friendship. But this position of Kamarina made her the enemy of the city to which before all others she owed friendship and thankfulness. The men of Gela had been the last founders of Kamarina³; but, as long as Kamarina was the friend of Athens and the enemy of Syracuse, she was necessarily also the enemy of Gela. We have seen that the faithfulness of Kamarina to the Athenian alliance had already

¹ See above, p. 36.

² See above, p. 23.

³ See vol. ii. p. 318.

seemed doubtful; the presence of an Athenian force had been needed to hinder a party in Kamarina from betraying the city to the Syracusans¹. We know not what was the disposition of the naval or military forces of the contending cities in the summer of the year in which the fleet of Eurymedôn and Sophoklēs reached Sicily. We have seen that their coming was not marked by any specially memorable warlike actions². Indeed its effect was the other way. A proclamation made by the Athenian commanders, calling on the Sikeliot cities, on all at least that were in alliance with Athens, to join heartily in the war against Syracuse³ seems to have at once suggested the thought of peace to some of their number. The first movement came from Kamarina. She concluded a truce—its length is not stated—with her old friends at Gela⁴. The two cities which had thus agreed together, at least for a season, sent to their respective allies, urging the advantages of a general agreement⁵. The call for peace spread, and presently a congress of envoys from all the Sikeliot cities, the allies of Athens among them, came together at Gela. The gathering was strictly a diplomatic conference. This way of settling the matter seems to have been deliberately preferred by Gela and Kamarina to what, according to Greek ideas, would have been the more obvious process of asking

CHAP. VIII.

Summer,
424.Truce
between
Kamarina
and Gela.Congress
at Gela;¹ See above, p. 41.² See above, p. 45.³ We are helped to this by Polybios' extract from the twenty-first book of Timaios, quoted (xii. 25 k) for the purpose of finding fault with the speech put into the mouth of Hermokratēs. *Εὐρυμέδων παραγενόμενος εἰς Σικελίαν παρέκλειε τὰς πόλεις εἰς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων πόλεμον.*⁴ Thuc. iv. 58. 1; *Καμαριναίοις καὶ Γελίοις ἐκεχειρία γίγνεται πρῶτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.* Timaios (u. s.) makes the first proposal come from Gela; *τότε τοὺς Γελίους κάμνοντας τῷ πολέμῳ διακέμεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Καμαριναίους ὑπὲρ ἀνοχῶν τῶν δὲ προθύμως δεξαμένων.* What were the special sufferings of Gela? From Thucydides one would think that Kamarina was the first to act.⁵ Timaios, u. s.; *πρεσβεύειν ἑατέρους πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν συμμάχους καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἄνδρας ἐκπέμψαι πιστοὺς, οἵτινες συνελθόντες εἰς Γέλαν βουλευσονται περὶ διαλύσεως καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων.* See Appendix VI.

CHAP. VIII. each city separately to agree to the peace which they had themselves made. That is to say, discussion by a single smaller body was of set purpose preferred to discussion by a series of popular assemblies¹. The chosen representatives of each city came charged with a commission to discuss the terms on which the Sikeliot cities might settle their present differences, and might come back to the happy state of things which had followed the overthrow of the tyrants².

its diplomatic character. First appearance of HERMOKRATÈS. The man who had the chief hand in bringing this assembly together, the man who most truly laboured for peace and who strove to bring about a peace in this particular way³, was one who for some years to come was undoubtedly the first man in Sicily, and who down to the day of his death played a more memorable part than any other man born in the island. Hermokratès son of Hermôn, one of the representatives of Syracuse in the congress of Gela, was looked on by native historians of Sicily as holding a place among the very foremost actors in Sicilian history. Between Gelôn and his own day, so held Timaios of Tauromenion and Polybios also, the three most renowned men of action in Sicily were Hermokratès, Timoleôn, and the Epeirot Pyrrhos⁴. The two republican leaders are strangely joined with the king; the simple citizen of Syracuse is strangely joined, either with the Corinthian deliverer or with the Epeirot, at once deliverer and master. But to be joined

His eminence in Sicilian history;

bracketted with Timoleôn and Pyrrhos.

¹ This comes from the speech in Timaios discussed by Polybios (xii. 25 k), but it is quite borne out by Thucydides. See Appendix VI.

² Thuc. iv. 58. 1; *εἴτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Σικελιώται συνελθόντες ἐς Γέλαν, ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων πρέσβεις ἐς λόγους κατέστησαν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πᾶσι συμφέρον λαγείν.*

³ Ib. 2; *Ἑρμοκράτης δ' Ἑρμῆνος Συρακόσιος, ὅσπερ καὶ ἔπεισε μάλιστα αὐτοὺς.* See Appendix VI.

⁴ Timaios, ap. Pol. xii. 25 k; *τῶν δεδυναστευκότων ἐν Σικελίᾳ μετὰ Γέλασα πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας παρελήφμεν Ἑρμοκράτην, Τιμολέοντα, Πύρρον τὸν Ἑπειρώτην. δυναστεύειν* is an odd word to apply to either Hermokratès or Timoleôn. Yet I have heard, in our own day, of a "Swiss subject."

with such names, as the doer of deeds on a scale worthy to CHAP. VIII. be ranked with theirs, shows the reputation which Hermokratês must have won in his life-time and must have left behind him long after his death. It shows how fully he must have been looked upon as the life and soul of Syracusan resistance in the great struggle with Athens. The character and position of Hermokratês are instructive His character. from many points of view. Brave, eloquent, clear-sighted, full of resources in peace and war, the best of advisers for his city in matters of warfare and foreign policy, from one side of him he was all that a Greek commonwealth could seek for in a magistrate or political leader. Those functions, it must be remembered, did not necessarily go together in a Greek commonwealth; the man to whom the assembly most readily listened was not always the man who was at the moment entrusted with executive functions. Hermokratês was nobly born, a descendant of the ancient *Gamoroi*. He is said to have traced his pedigree to the god *Hermês* whose name he and his father bore ¹. He was doubtless an His politics. aristocrat in feeling; he may even have been an oligarch of a more decided cast, seeking for an opportunity to change the democratic constitution of the commonwealth. That he was suspected of such tendencies is certain; but such suspicions were almost sure to arise against any man in his position who did not, like *Nikias*, lay himself out of set purpose to show that there was no ground for them. That, when banished, unjustly in his own eyes, he did not His armed return from banishment. scruple to attempt a return by force, is no more than was usual with every man who had the chance both in Old Greek and in far later history. At any rate he shows how a man, possibly disloyal to the internal constitution of his city, could yet be loyal above all men to its external independence and greatness. Hermokratês was at

¹ See the fragment of *Timaio*s, 103 Müller. We shall come to this again.

CHAP. VIII. once suspected and trusted. Men were not sure that he might not some day overthrow the Syracusan democracy on behalf of himself, his house, his order, his party.

His foreign policy. They were quite sure that he would never betray the smallest interest of Syracuse to any power outside her walls. He would never, as magistrate or general, take a bribe from an enemy. Whatever were his personal or party objects, he would never seek to promote them by the help of an enemy. He would be the leader of Syracuse; he might even think of being her master; but it was of an independent Syracuse that he would be either master or leader. He is the exact opposite to the renowned Athenian Alkibiadês, against whom he was not called on actually to wage war, but against whose schemes he had for a while to make every military preparation and to practise every diplomatic art. Hermokratês, even in seeking to return by force, can hardly be said to have turned his arms against his own city. Alkibiadês taught the enemies of his own city how they might do her greater damage than they knew how to devise of their own hearts.

Comparison with Alkibiadês.

Simply then as a Syracusan statesman, the character and acts of Hermokratês are well worthy of study. It is to the honour of Syracuse both to have given birth to such a citizen and to have given him full play for many years on the most useful and honourable side of his character.

His peculiar Sikeliot patriotism.

But Hermokratês is far more than a Syracusan statesman. He rises altogether above the common local prejudices of the Greek, which saw a rival in every neighbour, an enemy in every branch of the Greek nation other than his own. The policy and the patriotism of Hermokratês rise far above the local passions of Syracuse; they rise above the traditional prejudices of Dorian and Chalkidian. But to a Pan-hellenic policy or patriotism he makes no claim. If he is the opposite to Alkibiadês, he is not the yoke-fellow of Kallikratidas. Indeed the character of a Pan-hellenic

His position not Pan-hellenic.

patriot did not come so easily within the range of a man of CHAP. VIII. Syracuse as it did within the range of a man of Sparta or Athens. But the very causes which cut Hermokratês off from a Pan-hellenic career gave him the opportunity of being foremost in a third kind of statesmanship which to us is perhaps the most instructive of all. If he shows no zeal for the whole Hellenic nation, his zeal is by no means confined to one of its cities. If his patriotism is not national, it is territorial; if not Hellenic, it is Sikeliot. His range is Sicily, or at least the Greek cities of Sicily. His care and good will takes in all of them, but goes no further. His position towards the rest of the Greek nation is startling. All men out of Sicily are strangers¹. Greeks out of Sicily "strangers." He makes no exception for the Dorian kinsfolk of Syracuse, no exception even for her Corinthian parent. All powers outside the island are to be carefully kept from meddling with any matter within the island. A closer tie binds together all the Greek inhabitants of Sicily than can bind any of them to any city or people out of Sicily. They have a common country, an island country withal, parted by the sea from other lands. And from that island country they have taken a common name. Sicily is for the Sikeliots, a possession in which none but Sikeliots have any part or lot².

This peculiar kind of patriotic feeling, one that goes thus far and no further, was assuredly not common among the men of any division of the Greek nation. Cold towards Hellas as a whole, cold, it would seem, to those traditional sources of love and hatred which made up so much of the political life of Greece, Hermokratês felt warmly towards a part of Hellas with defined geographical boundaries. And that part was no part of the elder Hellas, the motherland, but part of the lands which had

¹ ἀλλόφρονες in Thuc. iv. 64. 3. See below, p. 60.

² See below, p. 59, note 2.

CHAP. VIII. been made Hellenic by settlement from the motherland.

His position was one which it is more easy to understand in our own days than it could have been in his own. Hermokratês is preeminently a colonial statesman. In so saying, we must of course remember that to the Greek mind the very idea of colonial statesmanship implies the independence of the colony. The modern world allows no exact parallel to his position; but it comes nearer to that of a President of the United States than to that of either king or minister in any country of Europe. Hermokratês is doubtless still Greek; but he is no longer of the elder Greece. The motherland is less to him than the new Greek land which has sprung up in his own island. In his eyes Sicily is a world by itself, a world of independent commonwealths, which may have their disputes and even their wars among themselves, but which should at least agree in one great principle. All differences between one Sikeliot city and another are to be argued or fought out among themselves, without allowing any power out of Sicily to step in. From this point of view his doctrine naturally follows, that the Greeks of other lands are politically strangers, to be kept out of every form of dominion or influence within the island.

His
"Monroe
doctrine."

Comparison
between
Sicily and
America.

Hermokratês in short lays down with regard to the Western offshoots of Hellas the same principle which has since been laid down with regard to the Western offshoots of England and of other European lands. It is in truth a "Monroe doctrine" which he preaches on behalf of the Greeks of Sicily. The points of likeness and of unlikeness in the two cases are obvious. The civilized states of America have all grown out of European settlements, just as the Sikeliot commonwealths had all of them grown out of Greek settlements. But the commonwealths of America have not, like the Sikeliot cities, all grown out of settlements of the same European nation. To find a

common word to take in every metropolis and every colony, CHAP. VIII. we are driven to use the word *Europeans*. And there is Difficulty of nomenclature. this difficulty in using that word, that it is not national but geographical, that it is therefore less easy to use in a sense other than strictly geographical than national names like "Greek" or "English." Yet even with these last we have seen the occasional difficulty of carrying them beyond their first geographical meaning¹. Yet, on the other hand, the English and Spanish commonwealths of the New World ought not to refuse to be classed as Europeans in opposition to the barbarians of Asia and Africa². The Greeks in Sicily and Europeans in America. commonwealths whose envoys came together at Gela were, as being states politically independent, less to one another than the members of even the largest confederation must be. As speakers of one tongue, though of different dialects of that tongue, as settlers from one land, though from different cities of that land, they were more to one another than nations whose only point of connexion is that they are all dwellers in one continent and that they were all settlers from another. Gela and Katané were less to one another than Virginia and Massachusetts; they were more to one another than Mexico and the United States. Their exact relation is not at this moment to be seen in the northern continent of America; but it would be seen there now if the Southern Confederacy had kept its distinct being; it will be seen there if ever Canada should throw off its British allegiance. In that case there would be commonwealths in a relation to each other exactly answering to that of the Sikeliot cities, commonwealths one in language and origin, but politically independent, possibly hostile. But in the English and Spanish southern America the exact relation may be seen in its

¹ See vol. ii. p. 179.

² We must of course allow for the difference between the population of the United States, mainly English, wholly European, and that of some of the Spanish states of America where the Indian blood prevails.

CHAP. VIII. fulness among the independent, sometimes hostile, common-wealths of Spanish speech and origin. And if we may be allowed to restore the word *Spanish* to the strict geographical sense which it has lost only through a political accident¹, we might say that the settlements of Castile and the settlements of Portugal answer fairly enough to the Dorian and Ionian cities in Sicily. On all the commonwealths standing in this relation to one another Hermokratês enforces his general rule. That rule is not necessarily one of universal peace within Sicily; but it is a rule by which Sikeliot quarrels are to be settled wholly by Sikeliot forces.

Speech of
Hermokratês at
Gela.

This teaching of Hermokratês is set before us in the first among the famous speeches embodied in the History of Thucydides which concerns our Sicilian story. It is the only one which he devotes to Sicilian matters at this stage of his narrative. That we have in it the actual words of Hermokratês there is not the slightest reason to think; that we have a fair general expression of his policy there is not the slightest reason for doubting. What we are to look for in these speeches Thucydides himself has told us². When he had any means of learning the real matter of the speech, he has preserved its substance³. When the speech was wholly lost, he has put into the mouth of the speaker such statements, such counsels, as it seemed to him that that particular man would be likely to utter under those particular circumstances⁴. And, if we cannot have what Hermokratês actually said, it is a great matter to have what such a contemporary as Thucydides deemed

Its general
trust-
worthiness.

¹ See Hist. Geog. i. 4.

² Thuc. i. 22. 1. See Arnold's note.

³ Ib.; ἐμοὶ τε ἂν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσι.

⁴ Ib.; ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν δὲ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν. No doubt every later maker of speeches for men of past time would say that he acted on the same principle; but then all men's notions of τὰ δέοντα were not worth so much as that of Thucydides.

him likely to have said. There is in truth every likelihood that we have much more than this. The actual words, the special illustrations, the special turns of argument, are most likely Thucydides' own; but these are simply the framework for a trustworthy statement of the general policy of Hermokratês. What that was Thucydides had every means of knowing; the careers of the Athenian and the Syracusan gave them many opportunities of meeting face to face. And if Thucydides knew what Hermokratês said, he was not a man to misrepresent what he knew. We may therefore accept this and the other speeches in Thucydides as historic matter of the highest value. They must never be confounded with the speeches which later historians composed for their actors, and which are for the most part little better than rhetorical exercises. Such a speech, put into the mouth of Hermokratês at Gela by Timaios of Tauromenion, is criticized by Polybios, and criticized severely¹. Yet even from this despised speech, as reported by the severe critic, we may still learn something². Still if we had the speech as a whole, we should be dealing with a speech of Timaios, in no sense with a speech of Hermokratês. But the speech which Thucydides gives us as addressed by Hermokratês to the congress at Gela, if not a speech of Hermokratês, is at least a fair picture of the policy of Hermokratês set forth in the words of Thucydides.

Another point to be noted is that the speech is not the less to be trusted because we can hardly doubt that it was written in its present shape some years after the point in the story at which it is brought in. We need not trust it the less because it contains one or two phrases more strictly

¹ Pol. xii. 25 k. He is very severe on Timaios, as he commonly is. But perhaps the most remarkable thing is that he does not think of contrasting his speech with that of Thucydides. See Appendix I. and VI.

² See Appendix VI.

CHAP. VIII.
Hermokratês and
Thucydides.

Speech of
Hermokratês in
Timaios.

The speech
a later
insertion

CHAP. VIII. applicable to a later time¹. In truth Thucydides would be far better able to set forth the true views of Hermokratês at the later than at the earlier time. When he wrote the narrative of the fourth book, Sicilian affairs were still, naturally enough, quite secondary in his eyes. They had not then become, as he lived to see them become, the centre and turning-point of all Greek affairs. He had not then gained that minute knowledge of the soil of Sicily and of all that happened on it which he did gain in later days. He had not then reaped the full advantage of his banishment, that happy banishment which enabled him to hear the tale of Sicily from Hermokratês in his banishment and from Philistos in his own city². Then it doubtless was that the author of the sixth and seventh books inserted this memorable speech, the fruit of his enlarged knowledge, in the earlier text of his fourth book. It is to the words of Thucydides that we are immediately listening; but it is to the words of Thucydides describing the policy of Hermokratês from the teaching of Hermokratês himself³.

Results of
the banish-
ment of
Thucy-
dides.

Summary
of the
speech;

Preemin-
ence of
Syracuse
taken for
granted.

In the speech itself, as thus reported, Hermokratês begins by claiming to speak to the representatives of Sicily from no other motive than good will to Sicily as a whole⁴. He represents its greatest city, a city more in the habit of attacking than being attacked, and one which has not specially suffered during the late war⁵. The preeminence of Syracuse among the cities of

¹ See Grote, vii. 188, 189, and Appendix VI.

² See Thuc. v. 26. 1, and Arnold's note.

³ See Appendix VI.

⁴ Thuc. iv. 59. 5; *ἐς κοινὸν δὲ τὴν δοκοῦσάν μοι βελτίστην γνώμην εἶναι ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ πάσῃ*. According to Timaios he began by praising the men of Gela and Kamarina for their zeal on behalf of peace. No great harm surely, if he did.

⁵ His first words (iv. 59. 1) are; *οὔτε πόλεις ὧν ἐλαχίστην, ὧ Σικελιώται, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι, οὔτε πονουμένης μάλιστα τῇ πολέμῳ*. Further on, in c. 64. 1, he says, more distinctly; *ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, πόλιν τε*

Sicily is thus taken for granted, not at all in a style of CHAP. VIII. offensive boasting, but simply as a fact which none was likely to gainsay. There was no need, he argued, to enlarge on the evils of war in general; no one was ever kept back by such arguments from any war which he thought suited his own purpose¹. His point is that, while the Athenians are dangerous, while they are so narrowly watching, so busily meddling, in Sicilian affairs, so ready to take advantage of any mistakes on the part of the Greeks of Sicily, it is the business of the Greeks of Sicily to keep peace among themselves, and to give no occasion against themselves to a power, the greatest power in Greece², whose plans of ambition took in the whole island³.

Sicily to
unite to
keep out
Athens.

We might be tempted to suspect that this is a picture of the designs of Athens a few years later rather than of anything that she was actually planning at the present moment, when she was as yet at most feeling her way towards Sicilian dominion. But the language used is at the outside slightly exaggerated, slightly premature; it describes the full growth of what was as yet only growing. In either case the practical advice is equally sound; in either case it was equally true that the fair name of alliance which the Athenians put forward was only a cloak for future subjection⁴. It was unwisdom indeed to call in to share in the domestic quarrels of the island a power which was ready to step in

Designs of
Athens.

μεγίστην παρεχόμενος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμυνόμενος. Hermokratēs identifies himself and his city.

¹ Thuc. iv. 59. 2; *ἐμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰ κέρδη μείζω φαίνεσθαι τῶν δεινῶν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐθέλουσιν ὑφίστασθαι πρὸ τοῦ αὐτίκα τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι.* Thucydides goes to the root of the matter; but one could fancy that so general a sentiment might have been thought *μειραῖως* in the mouth of Timaios.

² Ib. 60. 1; *Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ δυνάμει ἔχοντες μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, κ.τ.λ.* See Appendix VI.

³ Ib.; *ἐπιβουλευομένην τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, ὅς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων.*

⁴ Ib.; *ὁνόματι ἐννόμῳ ἐγμυαχίας τὸ φύσει πολέμιον εὐπρεπῶς ἐς τὸ ἐμφέρον καθίστασθαι.*

CHAP. VIII. even when it was not called on. Whenever the Athenians saw Sicily weak enough for their purpose, they would assuredly come with a greater force to take possession of the whole island¹. Such, he repeats, is their object; they come for the good things of Sicily, for the good things of the whole of Sicily. It is mere delusion to think that they care about any distinctions of Dorian and Ionian, to think that, while the Dorian fears the treatment of an enemy, the Ionian may hope to be dealt with as a kinsman and ally². In such a case division is ruinous; while all Sicily is in danger, her cities are divided against one another³. Let then every man make up his quarrels with every other man and every city its quarrels with every other city, and let all join to defend Sicily as a whole⁴. If all can agree, all are safe; by their union Athens will lose her greatest advantage. They are not like neighbours whom she can attack from a starting-point in her own territory; her only starting-point in Sicily has been given to her by those who have called on her to meddle in Sicilian quarrels⁵.

Real objects of Athens.

Necessity of immediate union,

He winds up with his practical advice. Let us, he says, send out of the land the enemies who have come against us; then let us, if possible, conclude an everlasting peace among ourselves, at any rate a truce for as many years as may be⁶. Each city will then be

and lasting peace.

¹ Thuc. iv. 60. 2; εἰκὸς ὅταν γινῶσιν ἡμᾶς τετραχωμένους καὶ πλείονι ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι.

² Ib. 61. 2; παρεστάναι δὲ μηδενὶ ὥς οἱ μὲν Δωριεῖς ἡμῶν πολέμοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δὲ Χαλκαϊδικὸν τῇ Ἰάδῃ ξυγγενείᾳ ἀσφαλές· οὐ γὰρ τοῖς Ἰθρεσιν, ὅτι διχα πέφυκε, τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔχθει ἐπίαςιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐφίεμενοι, ἃ κοινῇ κερτήμεθα.

³ Ib. 1; νόμισαι τε στάσιν μάλιστα φθεῖρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ὥς γε οἱ ἔνοικοι ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβουλεύόμεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν.

⁴ Ib.; ἃ χρὴ γινόντας καὶ ἰδιώτην καταλλαγῆναι καὶ πόλιν πόλει καὶ πειράσθαι κοινῇ σώζειν τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν.

⁵ Ib. 7; οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν ὁρμῶνται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων.

⁶ Ib. 63. 1; τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας πολέμιους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀποπέμψωμεν, καὶ

free and independent to act for itself towards friends or CHAP. VIII. enemies; but if, by distrusting one another, we become subjects of another power, we may have to make friends of our enemies and enemies of our friends¹. Speaking on behalf of the greatest city of Sicily, the orator says, I do not look on myself as master of fortune; I am ready to make concessions; I will not wait to be constrained to make them by an enemy. He now comes to the setting forth of his main doctrine. It is no disgrace to yield to one's own kindred, Dorian to Dorian, Chalkidian to Chalkidian; nay more, we have further ties; neighbours we are all of us, dwellers in one country and that an island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots². We may again have our wars with one another; if so, let us end those wars by treaties among ourselves³. But when strangers come among us, we will all, in face of a common danger, join to drive them out; we will never again call them in as allies

Ties among the Sikeliot cities.

αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς δίδιον ζυμβῶμεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, χρόνον ὡς πλείστον σπεισάμενοι τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς ἐς αἰθῆς ἀναβαλόμεθα. One thinks of the different varieties of σπονδαί in the Acharnians, 189 et seqq., and the superior merits of the

. . . τριακοντούτιδες
κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ θάλασσαν.

But these are outdone by the σπονδαί for fifty years in Thuc. v. 18 between Athens and Sparta. The σπονδαί for a hundred years in c. 47 (like those between Sparta and Argos for fifty in 79) are more than σπονδαί; they are σπονδαί καὶ ζυμμαχία, which is not meant here.

¹ Thuc. iv. 63. 2; τὸ ζύμψαν τε δὴ γινώμεν πειθόμενοι μὲν ἡμεῖς πόλιν ἔχοντες ἕκαστος ἑλευθέραν, ἀφ' ἧς αὐτοκράτορες ὄντες τὸν εἶ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνόμεθα· ἦν δὲ ἀπιστήσαντες ἄλλοις ὑπακούσωμεν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμαρῆσθαι τινα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαν εἰ τύχοιμεν, φίλοι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ἐχθίστοις, διαφοροὶ δὲ οἷς οὐ χρὴ κατ' ἀνάγκην γιγνώμεθα. I do not profess to construe every word of the last sentence. See Arnold's note.

² Ib. 64. 3; τὸ δὲ ζύμψαν γείτονας ὄντας καὶ ξυνοίκους μιᾶς χώρας καὶ περιρρέτον, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν κεκλημένους Σικελιώτας. This is the place where the lack of reference to the barbarians of Sicily is most striking. Sicily is χώρα περιρρέτος, but the part of it occupied by Sikeliots was not, any more than England, Scotland, or Wales, is περιρρέτος.

³ Ib.; οἱ πολεμῆσμέν τε, οἶμαι, ὅταν ζυμβῇ, καὶ συγχαρησόμεθά γε πάλιν καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς λόγους κοινοὺς χρόμους.

CHAP. VIII. or mediators¹. We shall thus get rid of two evils, the presence of the Athenians and civil war among ourselves². We shall for the future dwell in a free land, and one which will be less likely to be attacked by others³.

No high
moral
ground
taken up.

I have not attempted to translate this memorable speech ; for who can reproduce Thucydides in another tongue ? I have not even attempted to give the substance of every sentence, but only to bring out those points which illustrate the political position of Sicily at the time. Like many other speeches in Thucydides, specially like that of Diodotos pleading for mercy towards Mitylênê, this speech of Hermokratês does not take up, it rather disclaims, any high moral ground. He is made expressly to say that he does not blame the Athenians for trying to get all that they can ; in so doing, they are only following the bidding of human nature. But it is no less the bidding of human nature to withstand those who come against us ; it is those who fail in so doing who are blameworthy⁴. He speaks only of Athens, because Athens only was dangerous at that time ; but his language, as we have seen, tells equally against the intermeddling of any other non-Sikeliot power in the affairs of the island world of Sicily. The insular character of the policy of Hermokratês cannot be too closely

Insular
character
of his
policy.

¹ Thuc. iv. 64. 3 ; τοὺς δὲ ἀλλοφύλους ἐπελθόντας ἀθρόοι δεῖ, ἣν σκεπρωγῶμεν, ἀμυνόμεθα, εἴπερ καὶ καθ' ἑκάστου βλαπτόμενοι ξυμπάρτες κινδυνεύομεν· συμμαχοῦσι δὲ οὐδέποτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαζόμεθα οὐδὲ διαλλακτάς. On the word ἀλλόφυλοι, see above, p. 51.

² Ib. 4 ; θυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν οὐ στερήσομεν τὴν Σικελίαν, Ἀθηναίων τε ἀπαλαγήναι καὶ οἰκεῖον πόλεμον.

³ Ib. ; καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέραν νεμούμεθα καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἤσσαν ἐπιβουλευομένην.

⁴ Ib. 61. 5 ; καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι πολλὰ ἐγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἀρχαῖς βουλευμένοις μέμφομαι ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπακούουσιν ἐτοιμοτέροις οὖσι· πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἀρχεῖν μὲν τοῦ ἐλευόντος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπιόν. "The good old rule, the simple plan," is here taken for granted in the case of the Athenian commonwealth in almost the same words in which it is ages after taken for granted of the sons of Tancred of Hauteville ; Galf. Malaterra, ii. 38.

studied. To him an island was an island; the silver streak or the wider sea that parted Sicily from other lands was an indication of Providence not to be neglected or overstepped. But his island is an island world, a world like the wider world of the elder Hellas, like the wider world of Greek and barbarian of which Hellas and Sicily were again parts. Sicily is one land; its Greek people are united by many ties; but he does not dream of uniting its Greek cities into one state or into an union of states. He does not preach federation; he does not even preach alliance. He conceives the possibility of disputes and wars among the Sikeliot cities; he only pleads for peace wherever peace can be had, and for the settlement of all differences without the intervention of strangers. Under that name he reckons all Greeks whose dwelling is in Sicily; the kindred Dorian no less than the Ionian rival, the Corinthian metropolis no less than the Athenian invader¹. The purely insular way of looking at things could hardly be carried further.

No hint
of federa-
tion.

Use of
the word
"stran-
gers."

This way of speaking is startling. There is another aspect of the speech at which we may also be somewhat startled. Sicily is an island, the common country of the Sikeliots. One who drew his notions of Sicily from the pleading of Hermokratés only might fancy that in his day Sicily was a purely Greek island, which the Greeks who took their name from it had wholly to themselves. Such an one would hardly imagine that of the land from which Hermokratés proposes to drive away all stranger Greeks so large a part was actually occupied by barbarians. Still less would he deem that one part was not even occupied by native barbarians, but subject to barbarians beyond the sea. Just now indeed the Sikel was not dangerous; but no great time had passed since he had shown that he could be dangerous. And Sicily contained barbarians far

No hint of
barbarians
in Sicily.

The Sikels.

¹ See above, p. 51.

CHAP. VIII. more dangerous than any Sikel. At Syracuse men might deem that Gelôn had for ever stopped the aggressive power of Carthage; they could hardly feel so safe on that head at Himera and at Selinous. Hermokratês, to be sure, when he warned his countrymen against strangers, was speaking of fellow-Greeks coming under plausible pretexts of alliance; there was nothing immediately to suggest renewed danger from Motya and Panormos. Still there is something strange in his picture of Sicily occupied by free and independent Greek commonwealths, when so large a part of the island was in so different a case.

Position of
Carthage.

Yet Hermokratês was surely statesman enough to know that the great Phœnician commonwealth was only a sleeping lion. He must have known that Carthage, which had been so terrible fifty-six years back, might be terrible again. He perhaps thought it enough to speak of dangers which were actually pressing. Still his way of speaking is strange. He at least did not foresee that, within twenty years, he should himself see Sikeliot cities attacked from a Sicilian standing-point by a barbarian enemy far more fearful than Athens. He did not foresee that, within ten years, he should see a far greater Athenian enterprise than that on which Eurymedôn and Sophoklês had sailed stirred up against his own city by the practice of the barbarians of Segesta.

The policy
of Hermo-
kratês
never fully
carried out.

The dream of a Greek Sicily dwelling apart from the rest of the world and settling all its affairs of war and peace within its own coasts was destined to remain a dream. By a kind of irony of fortune, Hermokratês became the very embodiment of increased intercourse between Greek Sicily and the rest of the world. He it was who was most zealous in bringing in deliverers from Old Greece to beat back invaders from Old Greece. He it was who counselled an appeal to Carthage herself to come on the

like errand¹. But he too it was who, when Carthage did come on quite another errand, was the first to brave her in her own corner and to win back at least one spot of Sikeliot ground from her grasp. And he it was who was to guide the fleets of Sicily into the waters of the mother-land, to do for Peloponnêsos what Peloponnêsos had done for Sicily, and to make the Syracusan name famous in Europe and in Asia. But as an immediate call to peace among the Greek cities of Sicily, his words had no small effect. For the moment the good estate of Sicily came back. A peace, or a truce for a long term of years, was at once agreed upon among all the Sikeliot cities. It does not seem certain whether the diplomatic representatives sent to Gela came with full powers to agree to terms among themselves, or whether a vote of each of the cities had still to be taken in the popular assembly of each². In either case no difficulty seems to have been found in coming to an agreement. The terms were that each city should keep whatever it held at the time of the congress³. One exception was made. Syracuse was to cede Morgantia to Kamarina on the payment of a fixed sum of money⁴. The sale of territory, so much less common in these times than in some much later ages⁵, is itself to be noticed, and this sale is of a specially strange character. Morgantia was the town with whose taking the great career of Ducetius began⁶. We have not heard of it since; but this passage implies that it was one of those Sikel towns which were taken by Syracuse after the death of Ducetius⁷. But it is hard to see either what claim Kamarina could have to it, or what

CHAP. VIII.
His later
career and
changed
policy.

Immediate
effect
of his
counsel,

Peace
agreed to.

Morgantia
sold by
Syracuse to
Kamarina.

¹ See Thuc. vi. 34. 2.

² See Appendix VI.

³ Thuc. iv. 65. 1; ὅστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου ἔχοντες ἃ ἕκαστοι ἔχουσιν; the rule of *uti possidetis*.

⁴ Ib.; τοῖς δὲ Καμαριναίοις Μοργαντινὴν εἶναι ἀργέριον τακτὸν τοῖς Συρακοῖσις ἀποδοῦναι. See Arnold's note, 582, 638.

⁵ See Hist. Fed. Gov. i. 638.

⁶ See vol. ii. p. 368.

⁷ See vol. ii. p. 386.

CHAP. VIII. object that city could have in pressing a claim to an inland town at so great a distance. All that can be said is that the fact is recorded, and recorded by Thucydides. When the terms of the treaty were agreed on, but seemingly before it was actually sworn to, the allies of Athens announced to the Athenian commanders that they themselves were about to agree to the treaty, and added that it was open to Athens to do the same. The Athenian commanders agreed, seemingly in the name of their city, and then sailed away¹. There is no mention of any Italiot envoys at Gela, but the treaty was held to extend to the Italiot cities or to so many as chose to enter into it. That is, the treaty, agreed to by the Sikeliot cities, and, if not by Athens, at least by the Athenian commanders, was announced to the Italiot cities, which accepted it or not as they chose. The Lokrians, out of their bitter hatred to Athens, or rather to Rhêgion, would have none of it, and remained outside the truce². Rhêgion, on the other hand, must have accepted it, though with her, as with Leontinoi, its terms would seem to have amounted to throwing off her old engagements to Athens. Certain it is that the next time we hear of Rhêgion, she has ceased to be zealous in the Athenian alliance³.

The Athenian generals accept the peace.

The Italiots, except Lokroi, accept it.

Effects of the treaty.

By this treaty all the Sikeliot cities were again acknowledged as free and independent. No Greek city of Sicily was to be the subject, or seemingly the ally, of any other. Athens no longer had in Sicily either Greek allies or Greek enemies. We may suppose that the old state of things

¹ Thuc. iv. 65. 1, 2; *οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐϋμαχοὶ παρακάλεσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας, εἶπον ὅτι ἐϋμβήσονται καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἔσονται κάκεινοις κοιναί. ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐποιούντο τὴν ὁμολογίαν, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ Σικελίας.* The tense of *ἐϋμβήσονται* shows the stage of the negotiations at which the announcement was made to the Athenians.

² *Ib.* v. 5. 3; *μόνοι τῶν ἐϋμάχων, ὅτε Σικελιώται ἐξηλλάσσοντο, οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο Ἀθηναίους.*

³ *Ib.* vi. 44. 3.

came again, in which one Athenian ship of war, but one CHAP. VIII. only, was to be received in any Sikeliot haven¹. But barbarians and alliances with barbarians were seemingly not thought of. Athens ceased to be the ally of Leontinoi Athens and Segesta. and Kamarina; she remained the ally of Segesta², and at Segesta the fact was remembered.

The immediate work of Hermokratēs was thus by no means in vain. He dealt a heavy blow to all Athenian schemes in Sicily, whether those schemes had or had not already reached the height of a complete conquest of the island. It was so felt at Athens. The commanders of the fleet in Sicily met with an angry reception on their return. It was believed that they had been led by bribes to go away Punishment of the Athenian generals. when it was in their power greatly to advance Athenian interests³. One never knows what to say to such charges as these. That they are so constantly brought shows that they were not in themselves unlikely; but it lessons our belief in each particular case. They are like the treasons of Eadric and the murders of Fredegund; they are like the constant rumours of poisoning in Italy in later times. In this case it is plain that the charge was carefully gone into; for the popular court before which the commanders would be tried drew a marked distinction among them. Eurymedôn was simply fined; Pythodôros and Sophoklēs were banished⁴. Eurymedôn we shall again see in high command; there is no further mention of Pythodôros, nor seemingly of Sophoklēs⁵. Eurymedôn

¹ See above, p. 25.

² See above, p. 32.

³ Thuc. iv. 65. 3; *ὡς ἔβον αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι δόπος πισθόντες ἀποχωρήσειαν*. Were the actual words *τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι* part of the formal indictment? They would likely enough be in the minds of the people.

⁴ Thuc. u. 2.

⁵ The Sophoklēs in Arist. Rhet. iii. 18. 6 is pretty surely the poet. This smaller Sophoklēs would have been distinguished as *ὁ Σωστρατίδου* or in some other way.

CHAP. VIII. must therefore have done something which made the people take a less unfavourable view of him than of his colleagues. Their position was in any case a difficult one. They were sent, not avowedly to make conquests for Athens, but to give help to certain allies of Athens against their enemies. If those allies chose to make peace with their enemies, Athens might fairly reproach them with this separate dealing with the other side; she might fairly complain of scant courtesy when her own allies announced to her generals the conclusion of a treaty to which Athens was asked to consent, but as to which she had not been consulted. But by the conclusion of the treaty the matter had passed out of the hands of the generals into those of the Athenian people. It was for them to decide what action, if any, should be taken in the case of the allies who had forsaken them. It was hardly for the generals, in such a case, without further instructions from home, either to go on warring against Syracuse, to turn about and attack Naxos or Leontinoi, or even to turn their whole force against the obstinate Lokrians. The people could hardly have blamed them, if they had come back, saying that circumstances had so changed that they could not carry out their instructions. But the people might reasonably blame them, if, when commissioned to act as generals, they took upon them to act as envoys, and plighted the faith of Athens to a ready-made treaty to which they were simply asked to say Yea or Nay. This, one would think, must have been their fault; and there must have been something in the conduct of Eurymedôn, some opposition, we may suppose, to the will of his colleagues, which made the fault seem less black in his case than in that of Sophoklés and Pythodôros. In any case all vigorous Athenian action in Sicily was hindered till the setting out of the great expedition nine years later.

No more
vigorous
Athenian
action in
Sicily.

424-415.

Thus far Hermokratês had prevailed. Nor was it wholly in vain that he laboured for peace among the cities of his

own island. It is true that dissensions and wars, dissensions CHAP. VIII. and wars in which his own city was concerned, broke out again in the very year after the peace of Gela. Yet there Work of Hermokratês in Sicily. was none the less for several years a far nearer approach to peace in Sicily than was often seen in a land split up among a number of Greek commonwealths. The days which had been before the beginning of Athenian intermeddling seemed to have come again. And it was eminently characteristic, though eminently unlucky, that the most serious interruption to peace of which we hear at this time led almost at once to renewed Athenian intervention. ⁴²² Athens indeed this time stepped in only to find that her intermeddling was premature, and the cause which led to that vain enterprise was one of the causes which led to the great enterprise seven years after. And even in face of that great enterprise we see how much had really been done by the peace-policy of Hermokratês. Great as was Effect of the policy of Hermokratês on the great invasion. the struggle of the famous invasion, it was little more than a local struggle; and it was the policy of Hermokratês that made it so. Could Athens, when the congress of Gela came together, have appeared in Sicily with the full force that was afterwards led by Nikias and Lamachos, by Demosthenês and Eurymedôn, a far easier field for conquest would have been found. Athens would have come against Syracuse, not as a distant city with her starting-point far away, but as the head of a Sikeliot and Italiot alliance, with its starting-point in Sicily. That it was not so was before all things the work of Hermokratês.

It was again disputes between Syracuse and Leontinoi that brought the dangerous Athenians once more into Sicily before the great expedition. And the same dispute which now begins lingered on to be one of the occasions of the great expedition. But we find almost casually that there were disputes in other parts of the island, at Messina as

CHAP. VIII. well as at Leontinoi. It was not without reason that Hermokratês had said, Let man agree with man as well as city with city. For in Greek politics an internal dispute in a commonwealth had always a tendency to lead to intervention from outside. So it was in both the cases with which we are now concerned. In both cases the internal dispute is mentioned as beginning after the pacification made by Hermokratês¹. This may be a mere note of time, or it may imply that the new state of things caused the cities to look to their internal constitutions. Those who had been allies of Athens might be forgiven if they thought that peace with Syracuse might not be everlasting, and that it would be well to strengthen themselves against any chances of the future. At Leontinoi the constitution must have been democratic; indeed there is nothing to make us think that any of the Sikeliot cities had fallen away from the democratic models which were set up after the fall of the tyrants. But the Leontine oligarchs were strong, determined, and ready for united action. It must have been to guard against designs of theirs that it was decreed to strengthen the city by enrolling a number of new citizens. As usual in such cases, it was next proposed to provide for the new-comers by grants of land. We are left to guess whether such grants were to be made at the cost of existing owners, or whether, as is far more likely, the lots of the new citizens were to be cut off from the Leontine *folkland*². To the former course the rich men of the city would naturally object, and even to the latter course they might well object more strongly than the commons. It would be

Internal
disputes at
Leontinoi.
c. 423.

Admission
of new
citizens;
proposed
grants of
land.

Opposition
of the
oligarchs.

¹ In Thuc. v. 4. 2 the Leontines enroll citizens ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν εὐμβασιν: in c. 5. 1 the Messanian disputes begin μετὰ τὴν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν ὁμολογίαν.

² Ib. v. 4. 2; πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. On this ἀναδάσασθαι, see Arnold's note; Thirlwall, iii. 356; Grote, vii. 191 et seqq. I do not see Grote's difficulty; why should not Leontinoi have had *folkland* to divide?

likely to come more clearly home to them in the light of CHAP. VIII. weakening the resources of the city to the profit of particular men; and if, as is likely enough, they themselves contrived to enrich themselves by profitable occupation of the folkland, it would seem to them much the same as the confiscation of their own freeholds. In all questions of Roman analogies. this kind, the great pattern of Rome cannot fail ever to be before our eyes; but in one point the civil dissensions of Rome stand in marked contrast to those of Leontinoi. At Rome, whatever the patricians were, they were, at least in all the dissensions of early times, the better Romans. It is the plebeians who secede to the Sacred Hill, and who propose to migrate from Rome to Veii. This was but natural when the patricians were the descendants of the earliest Roman settlers on the Roman hills. But in Leontinoi, or in any other Sikeliot city, it is hard to say whence either patricians or commons may have come. At any rate the local feelings of the powerful men of Leontinoi were not strong. A later Roman analogy comes in, the analogy of the days when the oligarchic parties throughout Italy looked to Rome as their support. When the division of lands was proposed, the Leontine oligarchs asked for The oligarchs seek help at Syracuse and drive out the commons. Syracusan help. By that help they drove the commons out of the city to seek shelter where they might find it¹.

One instinctively asks whether the sending of help in such a case as this was the act of Hermokratês or was approved by him. His politics were oligarchic; he might be well pleased to see the cause of oligarchy flourish in any city. But such interference as this in the internal affairs of an independent commonwealth is quite inconsistent with the spirit of his speech, and it is wonderful how the Syracusan people could be brought to agree to it. Their constitution was certainly democratic; yet we see

Did Hermokratês agree?

¹ Thus. v. 4. 3; οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρακοσίων τε ἐπ' ἐγγύτητι καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον.

CHAP. VIII. democratic Syracuse lending its aid to the oligarchs of Leontinoi against the commons of their own city. We have indeed seen the like in our own day, when one of the first acts of the new-born commonwealth of France 1848-1849. was to overthrow the new-born commonwealth of Rome. What followed was yet more strongly opposed to the spirit of the pacification of Gela. The Syracusan commonwealth marches almost step for step in the path of its own tyrant. Short of selling men into bondage, the democracy deals by Leontinoi as Gelôn had dealt by Megara and Eubœia¹. The oligarchs of Leontinoi made an agreement with Syracuse by which the Leontine commonwealth was merged in that of Syracuse. The Leontine city was forsaken, and the Leontine oligarchs were received as Syracusan citizens².

Leontinoi
merged in
Syracuse.

Part of the
oligarchs
go back
and occupy
parts of
the city
and ter-
ritory.

Presently a change came over the feelings of some of the new settlers at Syracuse. They may well have been dissatisfied with their position in their new home, where each man would count for less than he had done in Leontinoi³. Or mere home-sickness may have led them back to the place, most likely of their birth, certainly of their former dwelling. They occupied a certain part of the town of Leontinoi, known as Phôkaiai. The story reads as if the site of Leontinoi, like the site of Megara, was occupied as a Syracusan fortress⁴, and as if Phôkaiai had separate defences of its own. It has therefore been supposed⁵ that Phôkaiai was the name of the eastern akro-

¹ See vol. ii. p. 131.

² Thuc. v. 4. 3; ὁμολογήσαντες Συρακοσίοις καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ ἐρημώσαντες Συρακούσας ἐπὶ πολιτείᾳ ᾤκησαν.

³ Ib. 4; ὕστερον πάλιν αὐτῶν τινὲς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι ἀπολιπόντες ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν.

⁴ The hurried and blundering account in Diodôros (xii. 54)—he thinks that all the Leontines received Syracusan citizenship—at least brings this out; τὴν πόλιν φρούριον ἀπέδειξαν τῶν Συρακοσίων. Cf. Diod. xiv. 58 for αἱ ἐν Λεοντίνοις ἀκροπόλεις among the φρούρια of Syracuse.

⁵ Schubring, Sicilische Studien, 386. See vol. i. p. 371.

polis of Leontinoi, that the returning Leontines planted themselves on that height, while Syracuse, it would seem, still held the opposite height and the town between the two. Yet Phôkaiai would be a singular name for an akropolis at Leontinoi; it is in no way analogous to the ancient Lindian height at Gela¹. The Phokaiaians, though a kindred and a colonizing people, are not spoken of as having any share in the settlement of Leontinoi; and the words of Thucydides, though they point to a distinct Phôkaiai fortress, hardly suggest an akropolis. But—save only the inland position of Leontinoi—there would be nothing wonderful in the presence of Phokaiaians in the kindred city, nothing wonderful in their occupying a quarter of their own, like the settlements of Genoese and Amalfitans in other cities during the Italian middle age. The site of such a quarter can only be guessed at; it might be rash to suggest as its site the third hill, now crowned by the settlement of the Emperor-King². Besides this part of the town itself, the returning Leontines further occupied a strong place in the Leontine territory called Brikinniai³. Its site has been placed among the hills to the north of the city, now bearing the name of Saint Basil⁴. A double start was thus made by the dissatisfied oligarchs towards the restoration of an independent Leontinoi. In such an enterprise the old political grudges within the city were forgotten. The oligarchs who held Phôkaiai and Brikinniai were soon joined by the more part of the scattered commons, and from their two strongholds they kept up a war against Syracuse⁵.

They are joined by the commons, and make war against Syracuse.

¹ See vol. i. p. 401.

² See vol. i. p. 370.

³ Thuc. v. 4. 4; *Φοκίας τε τῆς πόλεως τε τῆς Λεοντίνων χωρίον καλούμενον καταλαμβάνουσι καὶ Βρικινίας δὲ ἔσρημα ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ*. The fort in the country is clearly distinguished from the part of the town which was occupied.

⁴ Schubring, *Sicillische Studien*, pp. 378–382. I have not seen the place.

⁵ Thuc. v. 4. 4; *καταστάντες ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν ἐπολέμουν*.

CHAP. VIII.

Impression
made by
the treat-
ment of
Leontinoi.

Revolu-
tions of
Messana.

Relations
between
Messana
and Lokroi.

Such an event as this, following so soon after the general pacification of Sicily, would strongly impress all Sikeliot minds, and it could not pass without notice in any part of Greece. The Syracusan democracy, it was easy to say, had got rid of the Athenians only to play the same part in Sicily which their own tyrants had once played. Another Hellenic city was swept away, a city doubtless then in high reputation as the birthplace of the renowned Gorgias¹. First Megara, then Leontinoi, the Sikeliot cities were fast sinking into mere outposts of Syracuse. Meanwhile a revolution with some points of likeness to that of Leontinoi was going on in Messana. Here too were fierce internal dissensions; we are not told the immediate occasion; but we have seen enough of division and shifting policy among the mingled population of that city not to be surprised at anything which might happen there. This time one of two contending factions called in help from Lokroi; new settlers from Lokroi were sent to be enrolled as citizens of Messana; it is even said that Messana became for a while a possession of Lokroi². The days of Anaxilas seem to have come again; an Italiot power again holds dominion on Sicilian ground; only this time it is a commonwealth and not a tyrant. But what was the form of the union? The merging of two adjoining commonwealths into one is once recorded in Greek history, when Corinth merged its name in Argos and the land-

¹ Grote, vii. 195; "The birth-place of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse."

² Thucydides (v. 5) does not tell the Messanian story in order, as he does the Leontine story. He brings it in casually when speaking of the return voyage of Phaiax; *Λοκρῶν ἐντυγχάνει τοῖς ἐκ Μεσσηνίας ἐποίκους ἐκπεπτωκόσιν, οἱ μετὰ τὴν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν ὁμολογίαν στασιασάντων Μεσσηνίων καὶ ἐπαγαγόμενον τῶν ἑτέρων Λοκροῦς ἔπουκοι ἐξενέμψθησαν, καὶ ἐγένετο Μεσσηνὴ Λοκρῶν τινὰ χρόνον*. It is from this casual reference that one has to put together the story of the Messanian revolutions.

marks of Corinthian and Argeian territory were taken up¹. CHAP. VIII.
 But Argos and Corinth were at least adjoining lands; the landmarks between Messana and Lokroi were of a kind which the hand of man could not sweep away. Or did Messana stoop to become a formal dependency of Lokroi? That is hard to believe. One would rather take the words as implying only that the Lokrian element in Messana became so strong that Messana practically followed the lead of Lokroi. Anyhow, while Lokroi was spreading her power in Sicily, she had to strive against dissatisfied dependencies nearer home. She was at present at war with the people of two unknown towns in Southern Italy, Itônê and Mela. These are described as her own colonists and as marching on her territory². War between metropolis and colony suggests the story of Syracuse and Kamarina; it suggests that here too the parent city was unwise enough to seek to make the rights of a parent grow into the rights of a mistress.

Position of
 Lokroi in
 Italy.

All this did not fail to be heard and heeded at Athens. It may be that the remnant of Leontinoi sent a suppliant embassy to pray for renewed help³; it may be that Gorgias spoke again, as Themistoklês spoke at Salamis⁴, as a man who had no city to plead for. But Athens hardly needed embassies to stir her up. The craving after

¹ Xen. *Hell.* iv. 4. 6. §. 1.

² This again comes quite casually in Thuc. v. 5. 3. The Lokrians would not have made a treaty with Athens, *ei μὴ αὐτοὶ κατείχον ὁ πρὸς Ἰταλίας καὶ Μελαίους πόλεμος ὁμόρου τε ὄντας καὶ ἀποίκους*.

³ Grote (vii. 194) seems to take the pitiful embassy that comes from Katanê in Justin, iv. 4. 1, for an embassy from Leontinoi. And Justin clearly confounded the two, for he has much to say about Katanê, which is not mentioned by Thucydides at this stage, and nothing about Leontinoi. But the embassy "sordida veste" &c. comes just before the great invasion. In Justin (iv. 3) it is Katanê which alone makes the pacification, and, before Lachês and Choriadês, *Lampônios* is sent out to help them, a confusion with the foundation of Thurioi.

⁴ See Herod. viii. 61 for Themistoklês as ἀπολις ἀνήρ.

CHAP. VIII. Sicilian dominion or influence had by no means died away, and the story of the wrongs of Leontinoi, whether pleaded or not by Leontine envoys, would at once suggest the thought of another attempt. But it was at least not thought wise to send a threatening force at once. Nor was the immediate moment favourable for such an enterprise. When the former expedition set forth, Athens was in her full power and pride. She had weakened Sparta at Pylos and at Kythêra, and the men from Sphaktêria were in her keeping. So they were still; but Athens meanwhile had been humbled and weakened at Dêlion, and Brasidas had torn away many of her possessions north of the Ægean. Still, if it was no time for warlike enterprises, something might be done in the diplomatic way; it might be well to find out what chances there were of success if a blow should be struck. Two ships only were sent, and their commanders could hardly reckon as generals. At their head was Phaiax, a man of whom we hear a good deal in the political life of Athens at this time, but never in any strictly military character. And from the accounts that we have of him, he seems to have been hardly more of an orator than of a soldier. But he is spoken of as a man of specially winning manners and conversation, a man qualified beyond others for that personal influence which the diplomacy of the age in no way shut out, but who most likely left to one of his colleagues those public addresses to the assemblies of the cities to which he was commissioned which the diplomacy of the age demanded¹. The orator

Athenian
embassy
of 422.

Phaiax.

¹ Phaiax goes (Thuc. v. 4. 1) *τρίτος αὐτὸς αὖς πρεσβευτῆς*. He is described by Plutarch (Alk. 13); *ἐντευκὶς ἰδίᾳ καὶ πιθανὸς ἐδόκει μᾶλλον ἢ φέρειν ἀγῶνας ἐν δῆμῳ δυνατός. ἦν γὰρ, ὡς Εὐπολὶς φησί,*

λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν.

Aristophanês (Knights, 1374) describes his style of speaking, and his Scholiast adds a story which seems hardly to agree with the judgement of Eupolis—*δεινὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ Φαῖαξ οὗτος ὡς καὶ ἀποφνεῖν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἐπ' αὐτοφῶρ κρινόμενος.*

of the embassy was seemingly Andokidês, who was pre-
sently to win for himself a name, such as it was, in the
affair of the Hermês-breaking¹. These two, with a third
colleague unknown, were sent forth, not to fight, but to
see what cities of Italy and Sicily might, under their
natural alarm at the new action of Syracuse, be won
over to the Athenian alliance. The pacification of Gela,
it might be plausibly argued, was already broken on the
Syracusan side.

CHAP. VIII.
Andokidês

The Athenian envoys were sent, not only to those cities
which had been allies of Athens during the late war,
but to the Sikeliot commonwealths generally. Syracuse
was to be held up as a power that threatened all her
neighbours. A common league was, if possible, to be
formed, to deliver the Leontine commons from their enemy
and to set up again the Leontine commonwealth². The
envoys must have been further charged to do anything,
at least in the diplomatic way, which could be done for
the service of Athens on the road. Their first diplomatic
success was won in a quarter where one would least have
looked for it. Their coasting-voyage took them by Lokroi,
the one city which had stood out at Gela against any
dealings with Athens or her allies. But Lokroi, hard
pressed in the war with her own hostile colonies, was now

Objects
of the
embassy.

Lokroi
joins
Athens.

¹ In the oration against Alkibiadês attributed to Andokidês, he speaks (41) of various embassies on which he had gone, ending with one to Italy and Sicily. This passage has caused some discussion (see Thirlwall, iii. 357, 495), and another Sicilian embassy of Andokidês has been inferred. Sicily is also reckoned among the places which Andokidês visited by Lysias, Andok. 6. But these were places which he visited afterwards, not as envoy, but *ἐν τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ*. Is it not more likely that, as Phaiax went *πρῶτος αὐτός*, the embassy of Andokidês and that of Phaiax is the same, that Phaiax was the head of the embassy and did the secret persuasion, while Andokidês made the public speeches?

² Thuc. v. 4-5. The commission (4. 5) was, *εἰ πως πείσαντες τοὺς σφίσιν ὄντας αὐτῷ συμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἧν δύνανται, Σικελίαντες κοινῇ ὡς Συρακοσίαν δύναμιν περιποιούμενον ἐπιστρατεύσαι, διασώσειαν τὸν δῆμον τῶν Λεοντίνων*.

CHAP. VIII. glad to conclude, if not an alliance, at least a peace, with Athens¹. They then sailed round the south-eastern corner of Sicily, and successfully pleaded the cause of Athens or of Leontinoi at Kamarina and at Akragas². In the last war we heard nothing directly of Akragas; but there seems to have been at that time no open breach between her and Syracuse³. Still the lurking jealousy of Syracuse in the Akragantine mind might well be stirred up afresh by the late Syracusan advance. Kamarina, lately so zealous for peace, had still more reason for actual fear than Akragas. But between Kamarina and Akragas, at Gela, the Athenian envoys had no success, and they heard enough to make them refrain from any further attempts. Yet which were the cities which remained ill-disposed to Athens? Katanê seems to have been friendly, at least not hostile. It was there that the envoys, or at least Phaiax, joined their ships again after a land-journey from Gela. Messana at the present moment, under Lokrian influence, if not friendly, could not have been openly hostile. The remaining cities are Selinous, Himera, Naxos, and, if it were reckoned, the new Kalê Aktê of Ducetius. One almost wonders that, with the powerful support of The Sikels. Akragas, Athens did not risk more. But one quarter where Athens was sure of good will Phaiax did not neglect. He went from Gela to Katanê through the Sikel country⁴. Even if nothing was to be done at the moment, it was

¹ Thuc. v. 5. 2; ἐγγένητο γὰρ τοῖς Λοκροῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογία συμβάσεως πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. See above, p. 72, note 2.

² Ib. 4. 6; ὁ Φαίλαξ ἀφικόμενος τοὺς μὲν Καμαριναίους πείθει καὶ Ἀκραγαντίνους, ἐν δὲ Γέλῳ ἀντιστάμενος αὐτῷ τοῦ πράγματος οὐκ ἐκτελεῖ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρχεται.

³ See above, p. 26.

⁴ Thuc. v. 4. 6; ἀναχωρήσας δὲ τῶν Σικελῶν εἰς Κατάνην. Such a journey, if he went north to Henna and turned east, would go by the chief Sikel towns, as Agyrium and Centuripa. In a straight line he would go by Echetla, but he would have to refrain from business at Morgantia, now ceded to friendly Kamarina.

well that the countrymen of Ducetius should bear in mind CHAP. VIII. that Syracuse had an enemy who might be ready to act on any favourable opportunity. Phaiax then went to the Leontine post at Brikinniai—nothing is said of the other Phaiax and the Leontines. post within the walls of Leontinoi—and exhorted its defenders to hold out¹. Such an exhortation would be almost a mockery, unless it was accompanied with promises of Athenian help. And, if it was so accompanied, it was a greater mockery still. It does not appear that Athens struck a blow or spoke a word on behalf of Leontinoi for more than seven years to come.

At Katané the envoys, having practically done nothing, The envoys go back. began their homeward voyage along the coasts of Sicily and Italy. They tried—it is not quite clear whether they succeeded—to win over some unnamed places in both countries to the Athenian alliance². On their way they fell in with Revolutions of Messana and Lokroi. the victims of another revolution at Messana; whether it was in any way caused by their coming we are not told. Just at this time the Lokrian settlers had been driven out, and the Athenian ships seem to have met them actually on their voyage back to Lokroi³. It is somewhat oddly told us that Phaiax did them no harm, because of the treaty which he had a little time before made with Lokroi. And this is the point chosen to add that the Lokrians would not have made that treaty if they had not been driven to do so by their war with their immediate neighbours⁴. Lokroi and Athens clearly did not love one another, though formal obligations hindered them from doing one another any actual harm.

¹ Thuc. v. 4. 6; ὅμα ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ καὶ ἐς τὰς Βρικιννίας ἔλθων καὶ παρασύντας ἀπέπλει.

² Ib.; ἐν δὲ τῇ παρακομῇ τῇ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀναχωρήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ ἐχρημάτισε περὶ φιλίας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. This seems to imply at least attempts on some Sikeliot as well as Italiot cities on the way back.

³ See above, p. 72, note 2.

⁴ See above, p. 73, note 2.

CHAP. VI

Kamarina
and
Akras

CHAP. VII. From this time we have no notices of Sicilian affairs till we come, six years later, to the immediate occasions of the great Athenian invasion. Leontinoi remained empty of Leontines, unless any still contrived to hold their strong posts of Phókaiai or Brikinniai. The town became an out-post of Syracuse. We are not directly told what was the feeling at Kamarina and Akragas. They had accepted the Athenian alliance, and they must have felt themselves deceived when the diplomatic following of Phaiax sailed away and no military following came in its place. We may perhaps see the effects of this feeling in their conduct when the great struggle came. But just now we have no Sicilian history. The gap is filled up by a fearful event in the history of the Greeks of Italy. Two years, it would seem, after the voyage of Phaiax, Kymê, once the most western outpost of Hellas, still her most western outpost on Italian soil, ceased to be a city of Hellas. It was in defending Kymê that Hierôn of Syracuse had won his purest glory¹; but the enemy this time was one against whom a Syracusan fleet could have given but little help. As in the days of Aristodêmos², a strong Italian force came against the Greek city by land. This time it was the Samnites of Campania, now for twenty years the lords of Capua, who met the men of Kymê in the field and routed them. They then besieged the city, and, after several assaults, took it by storm³. The city on the hill-top looking out on the western sea passed away from Hellas. But its fate at the hands of the barbarians was lighter than Greek cities often suffered at the hands of Greek enemies. It was lighter than Skiônê and Mêlos

Taking of
Kymê by
the Sam-
nites.
420.

Its fate.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 250.

² See vol. ii. p. 249. See Beloch, Campanien, p. 151.

³ Diod. xii. 76; Καμπανοὶ μεγάλῃ δυνάμει στρατεύσαντες ἐπὶ Κύμῃ ἐνίκησαν μάχῃ τοὺς Κυμαίους, καὶ πλείστους τῶν ἀντιταχθέντων κατέκοψαν, προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ πλείους προσβολὰς ποιησάμενοι κατὰ κράτος εἶλον τὴν πόλιν. Cf. Liny, iv. 44.

suffered at the hands of Athens a few years later. We hear of no general massacre; the men, it would seem this time, were sold as slaves¹; the women passed into the hands of their conquerors, to hand on some traditions of Hellenic life to their children of mingled blood². Those who escaped found a friendly shelter at Neapolis, a city which becomes from henceforth for ages to come the centre of Greek life in Campania³, a city which was to be in more distant times the first Italian conquest of Belisarius, the proudest conquest of Roger of Sicily. Thus, if the barbarians of Asia and Africa were for a while kept in check, the barbarians of Europe were advancing. The Sikel had failed; but the Samnite had acted with terrible force, and the Lucanian was making ready. Twelve years only now part us from the time when the barbarian of Africa was to show himself in more fearful might than ever. But meanwhile we have to tell of the greatest strife of Greek against Greek that ever was waged on Sicilian soil or in Sicilian waters.

Growth of
Neapolis.

Barbarian
advance in
Europe.

§ 2. *The Preparations for the Great Athenian Expedition.*

B.C. 416-415.

It is hard to tell once more a tale which has been told so often as the tale of the great Athenian expedition to Sicily, a tale which was told at its first telling as no other tale has been told since. Yet something may be done, some small measure of freshness may be gained, if we can

Connexion
of the great
expedition
with the
earlier
ones.

¹ Diod. xii. 76; διαρπάσαντες αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς καταληφθέντας ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι.

² Strabo, v. 4. 4; ἔβρισαν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πολλὰ, καὶ δὴ ταῖς γυναῖξιν αὐτῶν συνεψέσσαν αὐτοί. ὅμοι δ' οὖν ἐτι σώζεται πολλὰ ἰχνη τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν νομίμων. Beloch says that this must refer to the time of Strabo's authority, not to that of Strabo himself; in either case Greek mothers would help to keep up the elder traditions.

³ Dionysios, in a fragment of his fifteenth book (Reiske, iv. 2318); οὗς [Κυμαίους] οἱ Νεαπολίται τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπεσόντας ὑπεδέξαντο καὶ πάντων ἐποιήσαντο κοινονοὺς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν.

CHAP. VIII. bring ourselves to look at that famous struggle from a strictly Sicilian point of view. The connexion between the great expedition to which we have now come and the smaller Athenian expeditions to Sicily of which we have already told the story is really closer than we are apt to think from the place which the great expedition holds in general Greek history, and therefore in the narrative of Thucydides. Up to this time the affairs of Sicily have been something altogether secondary in the general story of the Peloponnesian war. They now become, for a few memorable years, the main centre of interest to all Greece. Thucydides therefore, recording the general history of Greece, taking up his pen again after an interval, gives two books of which Sicily is the main subject, and in which the mention of other places is almost more incidental than the mention of Sicily was in his earlier narrative. He begins as it were a new work, a Sicilian work; now that Sicily has come to the front, he does what he had not thought it needful to do while Sicily was only secondary; he draws his memorable picture of the geography and early history of the island. All this tends to part off the great expedition from the smaller ones that went before it, and that in a way which, from the Sicilian point of view, is likely to mislead. Though we have read the accounts of the earlier expeditions, we are apt to think, at least to speak as if we thought, that Sicily was now for the first time brought before the Athenian mind. Sicily and schemes in Sicily were now brought before the Athenian mind on a greater scale and in more glowing colours; they became the first object of Athenian thought, instead of a very secondary object; plans of Sicilian enterprise were taken up with a passionate zeal such as had never been poured forth on any earlier enterprise. The expedition therefore took a gigantic scale, unparalleled in the earlier stages of the war, and the failure of the expedition

The Sicilian books of Thucydides.

Increased importance of Sicily in general Greek history.

was on a scale answering to that of the expedition itself. CHAP. VIII.
 But from the Sicilian side there is but a small break Special Sicilian view.
 between the lesser events and the greater; the same immediate occasions help to bring about each in turn; the same greater causes lie behind the immediate occasions in either case. As the run of general Greek history tends to keep them apart, the run of special Sicilian history tends to bring them together. We have no strictly Sicilian events to record between the return of Phaiax from his diplomatic mission and the occasions which led to the unwilling coming of Nikias on the errand of warfare which he strove to hinder.

Of both those occasions we have heard already. One of Occasions of the renewed war; Leontinoi and Segesta.
 them leads us backwards, the other forwards. We have already heard of the dealings of Syracuse towards Leontinoi; we may have failed to notice that Athens had again admitted Segesta to her alliance¹. The enmity of Syracuse and Leontinoi is an old story; so, as a name, is the alliance of Athens and Segesta. The name now becomes more than a name. It was the Elymian city, in its enmity towards its Greek neighbour Selinous, which brought on Greek Sicily, first the Athenian invasion, and then the more fearful blow of renewed Carthaginian invasion. Athens can in no wise escape the charge that, in her greatest dealing with Sicilian affairs, she entered Sicily, partly perhaps to support the Ionian against the Dorian, but far more clearly to support the barbarian against the Greek.

Of strife between Greek Selinous and Elymian Segesta Relations between Segesta and Selinous; disputed frontier;
 we have already heard more than once². The territories of the two cities met, seemingly on the upper course of the river Mazaros³; but the physical boundary did not hinder

¹ See above, pp. 33, 65.

² See vol. ii. pp. 340, 553.

³ See Benndorf, *Metopen*, p. 28 et seqq. He refers to Diodôros, xi. 86

CHAP. VIII. border disputes. The other cause of strife is more remarkable. Notwithstanding difference of origin, notwithstanding frequent quarrels, a right of *connubium* must have existed between the Greek and the barbarian city. For, besides the dispute about territory, questions about marriage are spoken of as helping to bring about the war which now broke out¹. As far as we can see, the disputed lands lay on the Segestan side of the stream; Selinous seems to have claimed or sought after a kind of inland *Peraia*. Whatever disputes or negotiations may have gone before, the first blow seems to have been struck by the Selinuntines. They crossed the river; they occupied the disputed lands, and thence harried the undoubted Segestan territory beyond them². The men of Segesta, as the tale is told us, still sent one more peaceful message, calling on the invaders to forbear from any damage to the territories of others. The attempt was fruitless; the Segestans took to arms and drove the Selinuntines out of the disputed land³. Neither city had as yet put forth its full strength; each now called out its whole force; a battle followed in which the Segestans were defeated⁴. The question now comes, Were the Selinuntines alone in this engagement?

right
of inter-
marriage.

War
breaks out.
c. 416.

(see vol. ii. p. 557). The position of Halikyai (see vol. i. p. 120) shows, he remarks, that it could not have been the Halikyas, the stream of Delia that flows by the recovered church not far from Castelvetrano.

¹ Thuc. vi. 6. 2; *ἄποροι ὄντες τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐς πόλεμον καθέστασαν περὶ τε γαμῶν τινῶν καὶ περὶ γῆς ἀμφισβητήτου*. I do not see that the fuller account of Diodoros, which may very well be from Philistos, is at all inconsistent with the shorter statement of Thucydides.

² Diod. xii. 82; *ἐπολέμησαν περὶ χώρας ἀμφισβητησίμου, ποταμοῦ τὴν χώραν τῶν διαφορομένων πόλεων ὀρίζοντος*. Σελινούντιοι δὲ διαβάντες τὸ βέθρον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῆς παραποταμίας βίᾳ κατέσχον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τῆς προσκειμένης χώρας πολλὴν ἀποτεμέμενοι. (He adds a moral reflexion from the Elymian side; *κατεφρόνησαν τῶν ἡδικημένων*.) I suppose the general meaning is what I have given in the text.

³ Ib.; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διὰ τῶν λόγων πείθειν ἐπεβάλοντο μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν τῆς ἰλλοτρίας γῆς.

⁴ Ib.; *γενομένης διαφορᾶς μεγάλης ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσιν, στρατιώτας ἀθροίσαντες, διὰ τῶν ὕλων ἐποιούντο τὴν κρίσιν*.

We hardly know what to make of a statement that the CHAP. VIII. Segestans craved for help at Akragas and Syracuse¹. At all events, no such help was given, as none was likely to be given. Syracuse indeed took the step, much more in accordance with her obvious policy, of granting help to Syracuse helps Selinous. Doric Selinous against the barbarian ally of Athens. By the joint forces of Selinous and Syracuse Segesta was hemmed in by land and sea². We must conceive a Syracusan fleet in the deep bay of Castellamare. Whatever course the ships took, whether they sailed through the strait or coasted along the south-west coast of Sicily to join any vessels from Selinous, they must have passed in front of one or more havens of the Carthaginian power, in the former case by that of Panormos itself. It is somewhat Operations by sea. singular that, as the affairs of Segesta gradually stirred up a mightier warfare, we cease to hear of this smaller struggle, and we are specially curious to hear something more about these operations by sea. The blockading fleet must either have soon withdrawn, or else its blockade must have been remarkably ineffective. It is plain that nothing hindered Segesta from sending and receiving envoys to and from any part of the world that she thought good.

The first application of the barbarian city pressed by Relations between Segesta and Carthage. Greek assailants was to her barbarian neighbour. The exact relations which existed between Carthage and the Elymian towns, those again which existed between the two Elymian towns themselves, are nowhere clearly described. But we can see, on the one hand, that the

¹ Diod. xii. 82; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ἀκραγαντίνους καὶ Συρακοσίους ἐπειθὸν συμμαχεῖν. The distinct assertion of Thucydides that the Selinuntines had Syracusan help makes one suspect that Diodóros has mistaken their embassy for one from Segesta. But no such objection applies to his account of the embassy to Carthage, which is as natural as the other is unnatural, and which Thucydides was not bound to record.

² Thuc. vi. 6. 2; οἱ Σελινούντιοι Συρακοσίους ἐπαγόμενοι ἐυμμάχους κατεῖργον αὐτοὺς τῇ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

CHAP. VIII. traditional friendship between Elymians and Phœnicians still went on, and on the other hand that Segesta, however much under Carthaginian influence, was still an independent state, capable of dealing freely with Carthage or with any other power. An embassy went from Segesta to Carthage, craving help against Selinous and Syracuse. The help was refused¹. We are left to guess at the grounds of refusal. I have already remarked on the way in which Carthage, occupied, it would seem, with her own internal politics, had long kept herself from meddling in the affairs of Sicily². We are indeed drawing near to days when she again began to meddle; by that time she had fully recovered her strength; as yet she may have been only recovering it. It is even hinted, and incidental notices confirm the belief, that the aggressive spirit of Athens was already dreaded at Carthage³, where there certainly was no need to dread it at the time of the next Punic interference in Sicilian and Segestan affairs. Save for some causes like these, one would have thought that the application from Segesta supplied a tempting opportunity for Carthage to revenge herself on the Sikelots generally, and on revolted Selinous above all. Anyhow all that we can say is that the envoys from Segesta went away empty from Carthage.

Carthage
refuses
help to
Segesta.

Relations
between
Segesta
and
Athens.

They then sought, as the native historian puts it in a remarkable phrase, for help beyond the sea⁴. Geographically Carthage certainly lay, as far as Segesta was concerned, in a land beyond the sea; but the sea which rolled between Carthage and her dependents and allies was not a

¹ Diod. xii. 82. He gives no details.

² See above, p. 17.

³ This comes from the later speech of Hermokratēs, Thuc. vi. 34. 1. 2; *ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσι [Καρχηδόνιοι] μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσι*. This may be a little exaggerated; but it shows that Carthage at least took heed to the movements of Athens. See Appendix VII.

⁴ Diod. xii. 82; *ἐξήτουν τινα διαπόντιον συμμαχίαν*.

barrier but a highway. But Segesta now remembered that she had an ally beyond the sea in quite another sense, an ally beyond that sea which formed the ordinary boundary of Sicilian dealings. Segesta had had friendly dealings with Athens forty years before¹; she had renewed her alliance during the first Athenian expedition to Sicily², and, as Segesta was not included in the Peace of Hermokratês, she remained the ally of Athens still. By virtue of this tie, a tie not many years old but one which already belonged in some sort to a past state of things, envoys were sent to Segesta to ask Athens again to take a part in the affairs of Sicily. The great ruling city, the mistress of the seas, was implored to take up the cause of her Elymian ally against Selinuntine and Syracusan invaders³.

Segesta
seeks
Athenian
help.
416.

We must now for a while turn our thoughts to the city which was now called on to take a step which proved so memorable in the history of our island, and more memorable still in her own history. We must listen to the debates in the Athenian assembly on the great question whether it were for the interest of Athens to take up the cause of Segesta or no. We must follow her negotiations in Sicily and elsewhere. We must watch her preparations for the great enterprise, till the main thread of our narrative, and with it for a while the main history of the Greek world, comes back again to Sicilian soil. When the envoys from Segesta came to Athens imploring help against Selinous, they found Athens in far better case for undertaking such an enterprise than she was when she was first persuaded to send help to her own Chalkidian kinsfolk. The call came in the midst of that time of doubtful and ever-shifting relations among the cities of Old Greece which followed the Peace of Nikias five years earlier.

Position of
Athens.

Period of
shifting
relations.
421-413.

¹ See vol. ii. pp. 339, 553.

² See above, p. 33.

³ Thuc. vi. 6. 2; Diod. xii. 83.

CHAP. VIII. That peace had never been fully carried out in all its points, least of all on the Macedonian and Thracian coasts. Thucydides therefore looks on the war as not having really come to an end¹. The changes to and fro among the states of Old Greece do not directly touch Sicilian history.

Alliance between Athens and Argos. But it does in some measure concern us when the final result of many changes at Argos within and without was to attach that Dorian and Peloponnesian city to the side of Athens as a new and powerful ally. At this moment the relations between Athens and Argos only help to widen the breach between Athens and Sparta; but in the course of our Sicilian story we shall come to important services to Athens wrought by Argeian warriors on Sicilian soil.

Importance of Alkibiadēs. In these years too Alkibiadēs, in our tale first the present enemy and then the absent friend of Syracuse, had come to the front as one of the foremost men of Athens. He had filled all Greece with the splendour of his displays at Olympia, and with the restless energy with which he gave himself to the political and military affairs of Peloponnēsos.

Relations of Athens to Sparta and her allies. Athenians and Lacedæmonians, while still nominally friends and allies, had met in arms at the first battle of Mantinea. Towards the Boiotians, perhaps towards some other of the Lacedæmonian allies, Athens had at this moment no better security than a truce which either party might put an end to by a ten days' notice². Athens moreover had not yet recovered Amphipolis and some other of her possessions north of the Ægean; and her forces were at this very time pressing the siege of the Lacedæmonian colony of Mēlos.

Siege of Mēlos.
416.

No time, one would have thought, save a time of actual

¹ Thuc. v. 26. 2; τὴν διὰ μέσου ἐύμβασιν εἰ τις μὴ ἀξιώσει πόλεμον νομίζειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δικαιώσει.

² Ib. v. 32. 5; vi. 10. 3. The δεχήμεροι σπονδαί apply only to some of the allies, not to the Lacedæmonians, who still professed to keep to the fifty years' alliance between Athens and Sparta recorded in v. 23. See v. 115. 2.

pressure of war at her own gates, could seem worse chosen CHAP. VIII. than this for a great and distant and dangerous expedition, the result of which no man could even guess at, and in which Athens assuredly had no direct interest whatever. Prudent men, Nikias at their head, saw all this; but the spirit of the Athenian commonwealth was now embodied in Alkibiadês. By this time Athens had altogether recovered from the efforts and sufferings of the first part of the Peloponnesian war¹. The most frightful form of that war, the yearly harrying of the Attic land, had, through the success of Athens at Sphaktêria, ceased for several years before the end of the war. The naval strength of Athens had hardly been touched; whatever she had lost in other ways had been repaired. She was at least as rich in resources, at least as capable of effort, as she had been in the days of Periklês. And there were powers at work, such as there had not been in the days of Periklês, to tempt her to a lavish use of resources, to an unwearied putting forth of all her strength. A generation had sprung up, full, like their leader, of life, hope, and enterprise, full of dreams of conquest, glory, and wealth, for their city and for themselves. To them war meant boundless adventure, boundless success, in every part of the world; the other meaning that war had borne in the days of yearly Peloponnesian inroads was to them at most a matter of childish memory. Athens had lost precious possessions, Amphipolis itself among them; but the prospect of winning back what was lost was less attractive, less full of the charm of novelty, than the prospect of winning new dominions in unknown lands. We are not bound literally to accept the later assertion of Alkibiadês himself that the fixed purpose of the Athenian people was

Renewed
strength of
Athens.

The new
generation.

¹ Thuc. vi. 26. 2; ἀρτι δ' ἀνελήφει ἡ πόλις ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς πολέμου ἐς τε ἡλικίας πλῆθος ἐπιγεγεννημένης καὶ ἐς χρημάτων ἰθροισιν διὰ τὴν ἐκτελείαν.

CHAP. VIII. to subdue Italy and Sicily, but to subdue them only as a means towards subduing Carthage. And Carthage was to be subdued only as a means towards getting possession of countless barbarian mercenaries from Spain and elsewhere; the final object of all was that the conquerors were to come back at the head of their new-found force to subdue Peloponnêsos itself. Such dreams in all their fulness may have crossed the brain of Alkibiadês and of others like him. Something of the kind was at least talked of; the overthrow of Carthage was in his mouth, if in no other, a serious thought. We shall see that there was a vague fear of Athens in Carthage itself; the Athenian comedy of the day perhaps made itself merry with the expected coming of the Iberian swordsmen, who were to transfer their weapons from the service of conquered Carthage to that of conquering Athens¹.

Attractions of Sicily.

Effect of past Sicilian experiences.

But, setting aside dreams like these, Sicily was a land great enough and far enough away to provide wide scope for the fancies prevailing at Athens. It was a distant land, a famous land, a land whose name was familiar, but about which comparatively few knew anything definite. It was an island; Athens claimed the lordship of islands²; she had just attacked Mêlos on hardly any other ground than such a claim; and few had any distinct knowledge how much greater Sicily was than Mêlos or than any other of the islands which they knew best³. It was a land too in which Athens had already played some part. It was not a part which had brought special credit to Athens; it had been distinctly a part of failure; but it was failure which

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Thuc. v. 99, in the Melian controversy. There was at least more to be said for such a claim than for the claim of the same kind afterwards set up by the Popes.

³ Ib. vi. 1. 1; ἀπειροὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων. So again, c. 6. 1; ἐπὶ τοσόνδε οὔσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ἔρμηγτο. See Grote, vii. 221.

could be laid to the charge of particular men¹. With CHAP. VIII. those who thought of the past at all and with whom the name of Sicily did not simply call up wild hopes for the future, past failure might seem to call to renewed undertakings which should not end in failure. A new and pressing call to Sicilian enterprise, a call in which the love of enterprise, the desire for dominion, could be cloked under well-sounding pretexts, was sure of a favourable hearing². The appeal to Athens to defend her ally of Segesta against Selinuntine aggression, to save the remnant of Leontinoi from Syracusan dominion, to call up Leontinoi again from its ruins, was a call which it would need no small measure of experience and of hardihood to venture to cast aside.

In the spring then of the year 416 before Christ envoys The Segestan embassy. from Segesta came to Athens to plead the cause of their own city and to enforce its case by arguments drawn from the general state of Sicily. Whether there was at Action of the Leontines. that moment any acknowledged Leontine commonwealth capable of sending a formal embassy to Athens may perhaps be doubted. But Leontine exiles had found their way to Athens, and were ready to join with the envoys of Segesta in calling on the Athenians to give help to their imperilled allies. Nor did the Segestans forget to take up Pleadings of the Segestans. the wrongs of Leontinoi as a point to strengthen their own case³. They pleaded the obligations of Athens under their own treaty⁴, and they argued that it was the direct interest of Athens to fulfil them⁵. The chief argument was that the Syracusans had already destroyed Leontinoi

¹ See above, p. 65.

² See Appendix VII.

³ See Appendix VIII.

⁴ See Appendix VIII.

⁵ Thuc. vi. 6. 2; *μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἐγεσταιῶν τε πρέσβεις παρόντες . . . ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχηςτος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων ὁ Ἐγεσταίων συμμαχίαν ἀναμνησκόντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.* See Appendix VIII.

CHAP. VIII. with impunity; that they were going on to destroy the other allies of Athens in Sicily¹; that, when they had brought the whole island under their power, they would come, Dorians as they were, colonists of Corinth², to help their metropolis and their Dorian kinsfolk, and to join them in overthrowing the power of Athens. It was the policy of Athens to join with such Sicilian allies as she had still left to her in withstanding the growing power of Syracuse. On one point they need not fear; they, the men of Segesta, were fully provided with money for the war³.

Alleged
wealth of
Segesta.

An em-
bassy sent
to Segesta.

The decision was not hastily given. The envoys from Segesta and the Athenian speakers who took their part were listened to in several assemblies⁴; but no vote for or against the expedition was taken. As a preliminary step, an embassy was sent to Segesta to look into the state of things there. The Athenians were specially moved by the reports which the Segestan envoys had given in as to the wealth of their own city. The envoys now sent were bidden to find out what amount of treasure there was either in the public hoard of Segesta or in the temples within her territory⁵. They were further to report as to the progress of the war between Segesta and Selinous⁶.

¹ Thuc. vi. 6. 2; λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακούσιοι Λεοντίνους τε ἀναστήσαντες ἀτιμώρητοι γενήσονται, κ.τ.λ.

² Ib.; Δωριῆς τε Δωριεῦσι κατὰ τὸ φυγενὲς καὶ ἅμα ἀποικοὶ τοῖς ἐκπέμψαι Πελοποννησίοις βοηθήσαντες. Strictly this applies only to Syracuse and Corinth. The other Dorian states of Sicily were not settled from Peloponnēsos.

³ Ib.; ἄλλως τε καὶ χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανά.

⁴ Ib. 3; ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἑγεσταίων πολλὰκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ἑυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς. See Grote, vii. 198.

⁵ Ib.; περὶ τε τῶν χρημάτων σκεψομένους εἰ ὑπάρχει, ὥσπερ φασὶν, ἐν τῷ κοινῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς. Cf. the way in which the treasures of temples are spoken of as resources in Thuc. i. 121. 3; ii. 13. 3. They were of course to be some day made good.

⁶ Ib.

It does not directly bear on the affairs of Sicily, but it CHAP. VIII. throws some light on the state of mind in which Athens entered on her plans of aggression against Sicily, if we notice that the winter which the envoys spent in their mission to Segesta was spent nearer home by Athens and by Sparta, if not in directly warring against one another, yet in giving support to each other's enemies. Thirty ships of Athens sailed to the coast of Peloponnêsos to support her Argeian allies against Argeian exiles whom Sparta had planted in the border district of Orneai¹. In more north- Warfare in Argolis and Thrace. ern lands Sparta called, but called in vain, on the Chalkidians of Thrace, to help Perdikkas of Macedonia against a Macedonian party which Athens supported against him². It was while things were in such a state as this in Old Greece and the neighbouring lands that Athens took upon herself an expedition to distant Sicily on a scale such as no Greek city had ever sent out before.

The Athenian envoys to Segesta went to Sicily along with the envoys who had come from Segesta to Athens. Early in the spring they came back in the same company. Return of the envoys from Segesta. 415. They came full of zeal for their new friends, full of wonder at the wealth of their city, sacred and profane³. As an earnest of that wealth, the Segestan envoys brought forth Money from Segesta. in the Athenian assembly sixty talents of uncoined silver. They offered it, they said, as a month's pay for the crews of sixty triremes; that was the number which they prayed the Athenians at once to send to the help of their allies⁴. And now begin those famous debates in the Athenian assembly of which we may be sure that we have at least the genuine substance in the report of Thucydides. Every

¹ Thuc. vi. 7. 1.² Ib. 3.³ Ib. 8. 2; *τά τε ἄλλα ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς εἴη ἐτοίμα ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοινού.* So Diod. xii. 83; *τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν Ἑγεσταιῶν ἀπαγγελλάντων.*⁴ Ib.

CHAP. VIII. word of them has been studied and commented on as it deserves by those whose subject is either the text of the historian, the political history of Athens, or the general history of Greece. For our Sicilian story we need notice those points only, and they are not a few, which have a direct bearing on Sicilian matters.

Report
of the
Athenian
envoys.

In the first meeting then of the Athenian assembly after the return of the Athenian and Segestan envoys from Segesta, the Athenian envoys made their report. They confirmed by their personal witness all that the Segestans said as to the wealth of their city, when they came forward with their offering of the sixty talents. The travelled Athenians told in good faith of the splendid display of riches in every shape which they had seen in the Elymian

The temple
of Eryx.

city. First and foremost came the stores of the great temple on Eryx. The Athenians had at the beginning of the war with Sparta reckoned the wealth of their own Athênê as part of the ways and means of her city¹. And the men of Segesta now looked with the same eyes on the wealth of Ashtoreth or Aphroditê. What we should greatly like to know, but what we can hardly expect an Athenian historian to tell us, is what was the exact relation at this time between the two Elymian cities. That the men of Segesta could deal with the wealth of the goddess of Eryx as their own implies either subjection on the part of Eryx, or else the closest friendship between the two cities. In any case the envoys of Athens were led to the top of the mountain; they were shown the temple and all its glories; they saw the offerings made to the goddess, the vessels used in her service, the vases, the censers, and all the holy things, many and goodly to the eye². The

Relations
of Segesta
and Eryx.

¹ See p. 91, note 3.

² Thuc. vi. 46. 3; ἔς τε τὸ ἐν Ἐρυκί ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀγαγόντες αὐτοὺς ἐπέδειξαν τὰ ἀναθήματα, φιάλας τε καὶ οἰνοχόας καὶ θυματήρια καὶ ἄλλα κατασκευὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην, κ.τ.λ. We shall come to this visit again.

envoys too and the crews of the triremes were received with unsparing hospitality by the chief men of Segesta. They were bidden to a round of entertainments at each of which their eyes were dazzled by the brilliant display of gold and silver plate¹. All this was told in the assembly; and no doubt such tales went far to incline the minds of those who heard them towards undertaking the defence of allies whose resources were so great, and who were so free-handed in making use of them.

CHAP. VIII.
Splendid
hospitality
at Segesta.

The assembly listened favourably to the words both of their own envoys and of those who were sent from Segesta. The vote of the people was to send to Sicily the sixty triremes which the envoys from Segesta asked for, and to put them under the command of Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachos, as generals with full powers. Their orders were threefold. They were to give help to Segesta against Selinous; they were to restore the banished and scattered Leontines, if any were left; they were moreover, by a vaguer commission, to do anything in Sicily which they thought might serve the interests of Athens². It is thoroughly characteristic of the Athenian democracy that Nikias, who utterly disapproved of the whole scheme, was put at the head of those who were to carry it out³. He had no wish for the command for himself, and he had no wish to entrust it to another. He even ventured on a formal irregularity in the hope of getting rid of the whole matter. Another assembly was held five days after that

The expe-
dition first
voted.

Nikias, Al-
kibiadês,
and Lama-
chos ap-
pointed
generals;
their com-
mission.

Position of
Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vi. 46. 3; καὶ ἰδίᾳ ξενίαις ποιοῦμενοι τῶν τριημιτῶν . . . ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ . . . ἐστίφειν ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις. καὶ . . . μεγάλῃ τὴν ἐκπλήξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις παρείχε, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας διεθρόσαν ὥς χρήματα πολλὰ ἰδοιεν.

² Ib. 8. 2; βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις πρὸς Χελιουντίους, ἐγκατακυκίαι δὲ καὶ Λεοντίνους, ἣν τι περιγένηται αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρᾶξαι ὅπῃ ἂν γινώσκουσιν ὀρθοῦς Ἀθηναίοις.

³ Ib. 4; ὁ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾗρημένος ἀρχεῖν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλευθεῖσαι. Plutarch (Alk. 18) adds another motive; he was too οὐχ ἥμισυ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ διὰ τὸν συνάραχον φεύγων.

CHAP. VIII. in which the expedition had been voted. Its object was to consider, not the question which was already decided, but certain points as to its carrying out¹. But Nikias ventured to raise the whole question again from the beginning. He again argued against it at length, and some of his sayings are of importance from the special Sicilian point of view.

Nikias
raises the
question
again.

His speech;
impolicy of
the expedi-
tion;

his views
of the
Segestan
and other
alliances.

His main point is the folly of undertaking a great expedition to which they had no special call, when they have not yet won back their own revolted possessions in the North, and when a war may any day arise in Greece itself. Between Nikias and Hermokratēs no difference could have arisen; each was equally anxious from his own point of view to keep Athens out of all meddling with Sicilian affairs. To the connexion with Segesta Nikias has the deepest dislike. He cannot deny the fact of the alliance; but he argues that the Athenians should look to their own wrongs before looking to those even of their allies². The Segestans, by undertaking a war with Selinous without the consent of Athens, have lost all claim to Athenian help in that war, and may be left to settle matters for themselves³. He objects to the whole system of such alliances, through which Athens has to defend her allies, while they do nothing for her in return⁴. All this is heightened by a certain dislike, specially natural on the part of a conservative Greek of Old Greece, to entanglements with strangers, with barbarians like the men of Segesta⁵. This seems to

¹ Thuc. vi. 8. 4. See Grote, vii. 203, 206.

² Ib. 10. 5; ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὐσι ξυμμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὀφείας βοηθοῦμεν, ὅψ' ὧν δ' αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστάντων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι.

³ Ib. 13. 2; τοῖς δ' Ἐγεσταίοις ἰδίᾳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀνευ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνῆψαν πρὸς Σελινουντίους τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον, μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καταλύεσθαι.

⁴ Ib.; καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμμάχους μὴ ποιεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν, οἷς κακῶς μὲν πράξαι ἀμννοῦμεν, ὠφελίας δ' αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες οὐ τευζόμεθα.

⁵ Ib. 9. 1; ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοφύλοις πειθόμενος. 11. 7; οὐ περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἐγεσταίων ἡμῖν ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων ὁ ἀγών.

be the only place in the whole story—other than the CHAP. VIII. geographical picture—in which that name applied to them. Use of the name barbarian. The barbarian character of Segesta was one of those arguments which are kept in store to be used by any party when it suits its purposes, but which, unless they are specially needed, are allowed to sleep. Nikias argues that, if Sicily should be brought under the dominion of Syracuse, Athens would be none the worse. As things are, if Athens sends a force to a distance, there is a strong chance of attack at once from Sicily and from enemies in Old Greece¹. There is always the danger that the Dorians of Sicily may be persuaded to give help to their kinsfolk at home². But, if Syracuse were once mistress of Sicily, she would have no temptation to match her dominion against the dominion of Athens³. For, while she came against Athens, her dominion in Sicily would crumble away. In other words, Nikias takes for granted on the part of the people of Syracuse those counsels of common prudence which he is vainly striving to bring home to the minds of the people of Athens.

The speaker further ventures on a more remarkable argument. If the Athenians wish to bring about a belief No danger to Athens from Syracuse. in their power in the minds of the people of Sicily, they will do best never to show themselves in Sicily at all. Or if they must go thither, let them come again as soon as possible⁴. They must not run the least risk of defeat. Those powers keep their reputation longest which give the least opportunity of proving their real strength⁵. His

¹ Thuc. vi. 10. 4; *εἰ ἄρα ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν, ὑπὲρ τῶν σπειδόμεν, καὶ πάντων ἀν' ἐννεπιθεῖντο μετὰ Σικελιωτῶν.*

² Ib. 11. 3; *τῶν μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἔλθοιεν ἴσως Λακεδαιμονίων ἕκαστοι χάριτι.*

³ Ib.; *ἐκείνως δ' οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν στρατεύσαι· ὃ γὰρ ἀν' τρόπῳ τὴν ἡμέτεραν μετὰ Πελοποννησίων ἀφέλονται, εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαιρεθῆναι.*

⁴ Ib. 4; *ἡμᾶς δ' ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἕλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπεληγμένοι εἶεν, εἰ μὴ ἀφικοίμεθα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ εἰ δείξαντες τὴν δύναμιν δι' ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν.*

⁵ Ib.; *τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμάζόμενα καὶ τὰ πείραν ἥκιστα τῆς δόξης δόντα.*

Doctrine of prestige.

CHAP. VIII. final counsel is to undo the vote already passed. Let them leave between them and Sicily that boundary of the sea which nature has fixed¹. Let them tell the Segestans that, having given no help to Athens, they have no claim to help at her hands².

He asks
for a repeal
of the
former
vote.

In reading the narrative of Thucydides the striking thing before all others in this speech of Nikias is the personal blow dealt at Alkibiadês and the answer which Alkibiadês makes³. To us the most important thing in that telling reply is the picture which Alkibiadês gives of the state of Sicily, a picture to which I have already had occasion to refer⁴. He sets forth in the strongest terms, doubtless, as was his interest, in exaggerated terms, the results of those changes to and fro among the inhabitants of the Sikeliot cities of which we have seen so many under the tyrants and at their overthrow. Much more recent examples might be seen at Messana and at Leontinoi, the latter of which was one of the chief grounds on which men asked for Athenian intervention in Sicilian matters. Sicily, Alkibiadês argues, is not to be looked on or dreaded as a great power⁵. Her cities are full of men; but those

Alkibiadês'
picture of
Sicily.

¹ Thuc. vi. 13.; τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας ὁσπερ νῦν ὁροῖς χωριζόμενους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ, παρὰ γῆν ἣν τις πλέη, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ, διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὐτῶν νεμομένους καθ' αὐτούς. The direct sea voyage is thus assumed as possible.

² Diodōros (xii. 83), who rolls all the speeches of Nikias into one, makes him argue that Carthage, with all her power (ἔχοντες μεγίστην ἡγεμονίαν), has never been able in all her Sicilian wars to conquer the whole island; still less can Athens, with a much smaller power than Carthage (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὸν λειπομένους τῇ δυνάμει τῶν Καρχηδονίων), overcome the greatest and mightiest of islands (τὴν μεγίστην τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην νήσων, τὴν κρατίστην τῶν νήσων). All this is of clear Sicilian workmanship. But a speech put into the mouth of Nikias savours rather of Timaios than of Philistos.

Plutarch twice gives a summary as from Thucydides; Nik. 12, Alk. 18.

³ Thuc. vi. 12-16.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 326.

⁵ Thuc. vi. 17. 2; καὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν μὴ μεταγνώσκετε ὥς ἐπὶ μεγάλῃν δύναμιν ἐσόμενον. Here the cherished technical term of modern diplomacy has crept in.

men are only motley crowds; changes of constitution, CHAP. VIII.
enrolments of new citizens, are every-day matters among them¹. No man in Sicily cares for any spot as the home of his fathers; no man is ready to gird on his armour or to make the contributions required by law for the defence of a place which he does not look on as really his own city². Each man deems that either by persuasion or by violence he may gain enough out of the common stock to enable him to go and live elsewhere in case of failure³. Such a confused multitude as this was not likely to listen to any common counsels or to join in any common enterprise⁴. Any of them, he says, will come over to us, if we speak words likely to win them, all the more as they are at present full of strifes and divisions⁵. The amount of their military force, he went on to say, was nothing like what had been said; they had seen nearer home how deceptive numbers were in such matters⁶. Allies would be ready for Athens among the barbarians—that is the Sikels—who were eager to throw off the dominion of Syracuse⁷. They must therefore support and not forsake such allies as they had in Sicily already. It was no purpose to argue, with Nikias, that those allies had done them no service in wars at home. It was not for that end that the alliances had been contracted; it was rather that the Sicilian allies of Athens might hinder her Sicilian

His doctrine of alliances.

¹ Thuc. vi. 17. 2.; ὅχλοι τε γὰρ συμμέκτοις πολυανδρούσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ βραδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς.

² Ib. 3; οὐδεὶς δι' αὐτὸ ὅς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ νομίμοις κατασκευαῖς.

³ Ib.; ὁ τι δὲ ἕκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν οἰεται ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινού λαβὼν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκῆσειν, ταῦτα ἐτοιμάζεται.

⁴ Ib.; οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄμιλον οὔτε λόγου μᾶλλον ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπασθαι.

⁵ Ib.; ταχὺ δ' ἂν ἂς ἕκαστοι, εἰ τι καθ' ἡδονὴν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῖεν, ἅλλως τε καὶ εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα.

⁶ Ib. 5.

⁷ Ib. 6; βαρβάρους γὰρ πολλοὺς ἔχομεν οἱ Συρακοσίῳ μίσει ξυνηπιθήσονται αὐτοῖς.

CHAP. VIII. enemies from coming to attack them¹. They had won their dominion by helping any, Greeks or barbarians, who asked for their help². Such an active and daring policy was the right one. If, instead of keeping quiet, they sailed for Sicily, the Peloponnesians would fear them the more for their so doing³. They had a fair chance, through the increased power which they would win in Sicily, of becoming masters of all Greece. At the very least, they would humble Syracuse, a gain both to themselves and to their allies⁴. Their fleet, greater than that of all the Sikeliots together⁵, would enable them to abide in the island or to come back, as the chances of war might make convenient.

Prospects
of success.

Appeal
of the
Leontines.

Attempt
of Nikias
to frighten
the people
by the
greatness

The envoys from Segesta were present at the debate ; so were the exiles from Leontinoi. These last, in the guise of suppliants, called on the Athenians to come and help them, and not to forget the solemn oaths that they had sworn to them⁶. The speech of Alkibiadēs, followed by these earnest appeals, strongly confirmed the mind of the assembly in favour of the expedition. The only hope of Nikias, a hope not quite honest and, as it turned out, fatal, lay in trying to frighten the people with the unparalleled demands of every kind which such an expedition

¹ Thuc. vi. 18. 1 ; οἷς χρεῶν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ξυνωμόσαμεν, ἐπαμύνειν καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἑκείνοι ἡμῖν οὐ γὰρ ἵνα δεῦρο ἀντιβοηθῶσι προσθέμεθα αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὄντες δεῦρο κουλύωσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπίνειν. Ἐχθρός here, as in later Greek, is used for πολέμος; but it is doubtless meant to convey a stronger meaning. Cf. vii. 68. 1.

² Ib. 2 ; παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς δει ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἑλλήσιν ἐπικαλουμένοις. He draws out the process and its policy at some length. It is the usual path to power—καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἤρξαν.

³ Ib. 4 ; ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι.

⁴ Ib. ; ἀμα ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων, πάσης τῇ εἰκότι ἀρξομεν ἢ κακώσομεν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐγμμάχοι ὠφελήσονται.

⁵ Ib. 5 ; ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων Σικελιωτῶν.

⁶ Ib. 19. 1.

would need. Taking the enterprise for granted, as already CHAP. VIII. decided on, he began to set forth the greatness of the task of the enterprise. and its dangers, and the vast outlay of every kind which it would call for. It was as directly the interest of Nikias to exaggerate, if need be, the strength and resources of Sicily as it was that of Alkiabadês to depreciate them.

After the picture drawn by Alkiabadês of the ever-shifting His picture of Sicily. state of the Sikeliot cities, it is a little startling to read

the description which Nikias gives of the island with its cities, great cities and independent of all masters, cities which have no need for change, where no man is driven by his present bondage to grasp at any hope of revolution as promising a better chance. "They," he adds, "are not likely to accept our dominion in exchange for the freedom which they now enjoy¹." With one or two exceptions, Its general truth.

such as that of the relations between Syracuse and Leontinoi, this is a perfectly true description of the political state of the Greeks of Sicily at this time. Since the fall of the tyrants, the great body of the Sikeliot cities had been, as we have seen, truly free and independent. No city was subject to a foreign power; none was subject to another Greek city, like the dependent allies of Athens; none had a tyrant within its own walls. Even in the matter of Leontinoi, the answer of Case of Leontinoi. Syracuse would be that Leontinoi had not been brought under bondage to Syracuse. The commonwealth of Leontinoi, it would be said, had been with its own consent merged in that of Syracuse, and all those citizens of Leontinoi who had not despised the gift had become citizens of Syracuse. Doubtless it has sometimes happened in

¹ Thuc. vi. 20. 1; ἐπὶ πόλεις . . . μέλλομεν εἶναι μεγάλας καὶ οὐδ' ὑπηκόους ἀλλήλων οὔτε δεομένας μεταβολῆς, ἢ ἂν ἐκ βιαίου τις δουλείας ἀσμενος ἐς βίην μετέσταςιν χωροίη, οὐδ' ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐλεύθως ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας προσδεχόμενος. Nikias here draws the picture of Sicily Free and Independent, as I tried to set it forth in the last Chapter.

The same description comes again in vii. 55. 2.

CHAP. VIII. the world's history that too close an union has strengthened the longing for separation; but in a formal diplomatic answer the case of Syracuse was not without a fair side. But the truth of the picture drawn by Nikias does not set aside a large element of truth in the picture drawn by Alkibiadês. The two together bring us back to our old position that the colonial cities often outstripped the cities of the mother-land at some particular moment, but that their greatness, their freedom, their very being, was less lasting¹. At this moment, the Greeks of Sicily stood, in point both of political advancement and of material well-being, higher than the mass of the Greeks of Old Greece. In a very few years the balance was turned the other way.

Element
of truth
in the
speech of
Alkibiadês.

Nikias
describes
the Sikeliot
cities.

Nikias next goes on to set forth the number and resources of these flourishing Sikeliot cities. They were nine in number; of these two only, Naxos and Katanê, would, out of sympathy with the kindred Leontines, take the Athenian side. The other seven would be arrayed against Athens. All of these were well furnished for war, furnished with the same arms and equipments as Athens herself; specially so were the two cities which would be her immediate enemies, Syracuse and Selinous². The seven will stand thus; Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Akragas, Selinous, Himera, Messana. Nikias does not think it needful to point out the chance that Akragas and Kamarina might not be found on the side of Syracuse, nor the chance that Athens might again find something to her advantage among the shifting parties of Messana. He tells of the heavy-armed, the bowmen, the darters,

¹ See vol. i. p. 328.

² Thuc. vi. 20. 3; *παρεσκευασμένοι τοῖς πᾶσιν δημοσκόπως μάλιστα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δυνάμει, καὶ οὐχ ἥμισυ ἐπὶ ᾧ μάλιστα πλείονες, Σελινόους καὶ Συράκουσαι*. Did he not know how much better the Athenian heavy-armed were than the Syracusan? He knew well all about the horse.

whom the Sikeliot cities could send forth ; of the many triremes and the men who stood ready to form their crews. Of money they had abundance. They had private wealth ; Selinous above all had hoards in her temples¹. We have to call up those pillars of the giants on which we now gaze in ruin, some already built and perfect, sheltering the treasures of their protecting gods, some still rising under the craftsman's hand towards that full perfection which they were never to reach. The Syracusans, he goes on to say, drew tribute from their barbarian subjects². The likelihood of those barbarian subjects joining Athens had been naturally dwelled on by Alkibiadês ; Nikias as naturally passed it over. And then he spoke with emphasis of that arm in which Sicily so far outstripped Athens and most parts of Old Greece. The Sikeliot cities were rich in horses and horsemen, and they, unlike Athens, could feed their horses with corn grown on their own soil, and not brought from afar³.

CHAP. VIII.
The wealth
and power
of Sicily.
Wealth of
Selinous.

The Sikels.

The horse-
men.

Here undoubtedly lay the special military strength of the cities which Athens was going to attack. The Sikeliot heavy-armed were, as we shall presently see, of no great account. They fell at least as far behind the standard of the like force at Athens as these last fell behind the perfect model at Sparta. It was not wonderful that it was so. The Greeks of Sicily had fought only one great battle within the century, one might almost say only one great battle since the Greek settlement of the island. And the fight of Himera, a fight against barbarians, was not one in which the victors could learn much from the enemy, unless indeed the Greeks had taken to the use of the

Inferiority
of the
Sikeliot
heavy-
armed.

¹ Thuc. vi. 20. 4; *χρήματά τ' ἔχουσι, τὰ μὲν ἰδία, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐστὶ Σελινουρτίους*. See vol. ii. p. 408. They had also (besides their offerings at Delphi) a treasury at Olympia (Paus. vi. 19. 7), which has lately been brought to light, as well as that of the Geloans (ib. 15).

² Thuc. vi. 20. 4; *Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φέρεται*.

³ Ib.; *οἵ τε οὐκ εἰσὶν καὶ οὐκ ἐκαστὴν χρῶνται*.

CHAP. VIII. Spanish sword. Their few wars among themselves, the occasional strife between Syracuse and Akragas, could have given the Sikeliot Greeks no such military training as Athens and Sparta and their allies had gained in the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. For the Persian wars, it must be remembered, were wars in which the horsemen of Thessaly and the heavy-armed of Thebes were on the side of the barbarian. But against the Sikeliot horse Athens was altogether unable to bring any force of the like kind. Nor does Nikias say a word suggesting an effort to strengthen the Athenian power on this side. He fears that the many horsemen will keep them out of the land ¹. He fears that the cities will combine against Athens, and that Segesta alone will be left to give any help against the horsemen ². But he says nothing about bringing together any force of cavalry on the Athenian side. There is to be a powerful land-force to withstand the horse; but it is to be a force of heavy-armed, and of bowmen and darters, these lighter troops being of special value against cavalry ³. They must have, not only troops of their own citizens and of their subject allies, but any that they could bring from Peloponnêsos either by persuasion or by hire ⁴. The persuasion looks to Argos, the hire to Arkadia, and we shall find that both did their work ⁵. But above all, they must have abundance of ships, not only for naval warfare, but for every other purpose. They must have a good store

Sikeliot in-
experience
of war.

He does
not ask for
cavalry.

Allies.

¹ Thuc. vi. 21. 1; *εἴπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιόν τι τῆς διανοίας ἔρῃν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἰργεσθαι τῆς γῆς.*

² Ib.; *ἄλλως τε καὶ ἦν ἐυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι, καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαρίσχωσιν ἡμῶν φίλοι τινὲς γενόμενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀμυνόμεθα ἱππικῶν.* That Segesta was likely to supply horse appears from vi. 37. 1; 62. 9; 98. 1.

³ Ib. 22; *τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὥσως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσιν.*

⁴ Ib. *τῶν ἐυμμάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἦν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνάμεθα ἢ πείσαι, ἢ μισθῷ προσαγαγεῖσθαι.*

⁵ See below, p. 105, and Thuc. vii. 57. 9.

of provisions to be ready against all accidents¹; they must have good store of money, for the wealth of Segesta would be found to exist chiefly in talk². They must in short take care to be in every point superior to those in whose land they were about to carry on warfare; the Sikeliot cavalry must be counterbalanced by a great and a varied infantry³.

CHAP. VIII.
Need of
all kinds
of stores.

All this might have been no less true of a great enterprise nearer home. Nikias next goes on to speak of the special conditions of distant warfare like that in Sicily. The invaders of the island must act as men who were going to settle in a city surrounded by strangers and enemies⁴; they must from the first day of their landing make themselves masters of the land⁵. They must remember that, in the case of any failure, every hand in Sicily would be turned against them⁶. They must remember how different a thing warfare in Sicily would be from such warfare as they had been used to among their allies in the islands and on the coasts of the Ægean. There all that they wanted could easily be brought from Attica or some other friendly country. Now, they must fully understand, they were going to carry on war in a distant, a foreign, a hostile, land. From Sicily in winter even a messenger could not come in a less space of time than four months⁷. They must make themselves independent alike of allies and of accidents, and leave as little as might be to the power of fortune⁸.

Special
conditions
of distant
warfare.

¹ The details are given in Thuc. vi. 22.

² Ib.; τὰ δὲ παρ' Ἐγεσταιῶν, ἃ λέγεται εἶναι ἐτοῖμα, νομίζετε καὶ λόγῳ ἂν μάλιστα ἐτοῖμα εἶναι.

³ Ib. 23. 1.

⁴ Ib. 2; πόλιν τε νομίσαι χρὴ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις καὶ πολεμίοις οἰκισύνας ἵσταναι.

⁵ Ib.; τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν ᾗ ἂν κατέσχωσιν ἐθέθης κρατῆν τῆς γῆς.

⁶ Ib.; ἥν σφέλλανται, πάντα πολέμα ἔξουσιν.

⁷ Ib. 21. 2; μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν χειμεριῶν ὄγγελον ῥῆθρον ἰλθεῖν.

⁸ Ib. 23. 3; ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοῦναι.

CHAP. VIII. In this speech Nikias had a twofold hope. By enlarging on the greatness of the efforts needed for Sicilian warfare, he trusted to lead the people to cancel their first decree. Failing that, he hoped to give the expedition such a scale that, if he was forced to go on this hated errand, he and those who went with them might risk the least possible amount of danger¹. His former object failed. Sicilian enterprise had taken full possession of the public mind of Athens. The people at large were in no way checked in their wish for the undertaking by the vastness of the effort which it called for². Nor had Nikias many supporters even among those to whom he might reasonably have looked for support. The men of his own class, the rich gentlemen of Athens, shrank from any open opposition to the general impulse, lest they should be denounced as shrinking from the burthens which the war was likely to lay upon them in the character of trierarchs³. At last a speaker in the assembly, a demagogue named Dêmostratos, who is described as specially eager in pressing on the war, called on Nikias to leave off all delays and excuses and to state at once what force he really wanted⁴. Thus pressed, he asked for a hundred triremes—forty more than the original demand from Segesta—Athenian and allied. Of heavy-armed he asked for five thousand, more rather than less, together with bowmen

The assembly keeps to its purpose.

Appeal of Dêmostratos.

Demands of Nikias.

¹ The various motives are fully explained in c. 24; but they are of Athenian rather than of Sicilian interest.

² Thuc. vi. 24. 1.

³ Plut. Nik. 12; ὁ Νικίας ἐναντιούμενος οὔτε πολλοὺς οὔτε δυνατοὺς εἶχε συναγωγιστάς· οἱ γὰρ εὐποροὶ δεδιότες μὴ δοκῶσι τὰς λειτουργίας καὶ τριηραρχίας ἀποδιδράσκειν, παρὰ γνώμῃ ἡσύχαζον. This hardly comes from Thuc. vi. 24. 4; διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλειόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἰ τῷ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 25. 1; τέλος παρελθὼν τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ παρακαλέσας τὸν Νικίαν, οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν. Plutarch (Nik. 12) gives us the name; ὁ μάλιστα τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον παραδύνων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους Δημόστρατος ἔφη τὸν Νικίαν προφάσεις λέγοντα παύσειν.

from Crete and slingers, and all other arms in proportion ¹. CHAP. VIII.
 Undismayed by the vast demand, the assembly not only The gene-
 accepted it, but, on the motion of Dêmostratos, voted that erals vested
 the generals should have full powers to levy what force with full
 they pleased, and to settle all the details of the expedition ². powers.
 The preparations now began. The generals called on the
 citizens on the military list to perform their duty of service ³.
 Demands were sent to the tributary allies; the influence
 of Alkibiadês brought Peloponnesian contingents from
 Argos and Mantinea ⁴.

The whole mind of Athens was set on the enterprise. Excite-
 Young and old thought and talked of nothing else. We ment at
 read how in their several gatherings they sat and drew plans Athens.
 of Sicily according to the notions of the time—how they
 marked out the coast, the towns, the havens—how, with an
 eye turned towards Carthage, they specially marked the
 points which pointed, or were held to point, towards
 Africa ⁵. The religious mind of the city was stirred.
 Some priests of the gods of Athens, in league, one might
 almost venture to guess, with the devout Nikias, had signs
 and wonders to report which might serve as warnings
 against the enterprise ⁶. But little heed was paid to them Oracles.
 amid the press of encouraging sayings drawn from ancient
 soothsayers ⁷ and of favourable answers from all the oracles

¹ Thuc. vi. 25. 2; πεντακισχιλίων μὲν οὐκ ἐλάσσουσιν, ἣν δὲ τι δύνανται, καὶ πλείοσι.

² Ib. 26. 1.

³ Ib. 2.

⁴ Ib. 29. 3.

⁵ See Appendix VII.

⁶ Plut. Nik. 13; λέγεται πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν. Nikias' own name was a bad omen, according to Timaios (1); ὅταν λέγῃ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οὐρανὸν ἠγγέσασθαι γεγονέναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς νίκης ἔχοντα τοῦτομα στρατηγὸν ἀπεικόνοντα πρὸς τὴν στρατηγίαν.

⁷ Ib.; ἑτέροισι ἔχον μάντις ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ δὲ τινων λογίων προῦφερε παλαιῶν μέγα κλέος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ Σικελίας ἔσεσθαι. One thinks of our old friends Onomakritos, Bakis, and Glamis, perhaps even of Laios of Thebes. See vol. ii. p. 86.

CHAP. VIII. of the world, which the care of Alkibiadēs brought together to relieve or to strengthen the public conscience. It was to men sent on his errand that distant Ammôn announced that the Athenians should take all the Syracusans¹, a prediction whose fulfilment we shall come to in the course of our story. Zeus of Dôdôna bade the Athenians occupy *Sikelia*. Men gave the word its obvious sense, and knew not till too late that the god meant nothing further off than the hill of *Sikelia* in their own Attica².

References
in Aris-
tophanēs.

It was the eagerness of all men in Athens to fly to new worlds in Sicily which led the fancy of Aristophanēs to conceive the picture of the birds building their city of Nephelokokkygia. Perhaps for that very reason, the direct Sicilian allusions in the play are not many. But *Nikias*, besieging Syracuse when the comedy was acted, is pointed at as one apt to delay and busy with military engines³. The bringing of oracles from the ends of the earth is jeered at⁴, and a Sicilian fragment of Pindar in honour of Hierôn of Ætna is

¹ Plut. Nik. 13; καὶ θεοπρόνοι τινὲς αὐτῷ [Ἀλκιβιάδῃ] παρ' Ἀμμοῦ ἀφίκοντο χρησμὸν κομίζοντες ὡς λήφονται Συρακουσίους πάντας Ἀθηναῖοι. Cf. c. 14 ad fin. He adds, τὰ δ' ἐναντία φοβούμενοι δυσφημεῖν ἐκρυπτον.

² PAUS. viii. 11. 12; Ἀθηναίοις δὲ μάντευμα ἐκ Δωδώνης Σικελίαν ἦλθεν οἰκίζειν. ἡ δὲ οὐ πόρρω τῆς πόλεως ἡ Σικελία λόφος [see vol. i. p. 487] ἐστὶν οὐ μέγας· οἱ δὲ οὐ συμφρονήσαντες τὸ εἰρημένον ἐς τε ὑπερορίους στρατείας προήχθησαν καὶ ἐς τὸν Συρακοσίαν πόλεμον. The story comes among a string of oracles fulfilled in an unexpected way through two places bearing the same name. But one can make nothing of the tale in Soudas which makes the younger Archidamos, warned at Pythô Σικελίαν φυλάττεσθαι, die fighting at the Attic *Sikelia*. We learn however that this last was τρισκελὴς λόφος.

³ Birds, 362;

ὦ σοφάτατ', εἴ γ' ἀνέυρες αὐτὸ καὶ στρατηγηκῶς
ὑπερακοντίζεις σὺ γ' ἤδη Νικίαν ταῖς μηχαναῖς.

⁴ Ib. 618;

. κοῦκ ἐς Δελφοῦς
οὐδ' εἰς Ἀμμοῦν' ἐλθόντες ἐπεὶ
θύσσομεν.

Ib. 716;

ἐσμέν δ' ὑμῖν Ἀμμοῦν, Δελφοί, Δωδώνη, Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

parodied to a higher use¹. Among the few at Athens who opposed the enterprise were Sôkratês, warned against it by his dæmon², and the astronomer Metôn, of whom a strange story is told which reminds one of some of the symbolic warnings of the Hebrew prophets. He set fire to his house, counterfeiting madness as some said, in order to get off holding a command in the invading army. Others said that he set fire to it privily by night, and then pleaded his loss as a ground to induce the people to excuse his son from the trierarchy which had fallen to his lot³. Metôn is one of the only two real characters who appear in the Birds by their real names; and his reception in Nephelokokkygia is not pleasant⁴. Sôkratês might at such a moment have looked for some favour from a poet who for once was on the same side; but he and his friend Chairephôn—neither beast nor bird, but bat—come in for some of the accustomed jeerings⁵. More strange is it when Gorgias, in a passing allusion, is classed among barbarians⁶, as if Aristophanês had wilfully confounded the two appeals from Leontinoi and from Segesta. And it was not only in comedy that the birds gave warning to Athens. Out of the Median spoils the city had dedicated at Delphoi a golden Palladion on a brazen palm-tree with golden dates. Ravens, so the soothsayers

¹ Birds, 925;

οὐδὲ πᾶν κτίστον Αἴττας,
ζῷον λεῖον ὀνόμαυμε.

These are the lines of Pindar quoted in vol. ii. p. 233, by him addressed to Hierôn, and now, with less fitness, to Zeus. Cf. directly after, 939. In 1297 the words Συρακοσίῳ δὲ κίττα are immediately a gibe at an Athenian named Syrakosios; but his name was perhaps brought in to make merriment of a wider kind, as the name of Opountios mentioned just before is punned on (153, 1294).

² Plut. Nik. 13.

³ Ib.

⁴ Birds, 992 et seqq.

⁵ Χαιρεφῶν ἢ νυκτερίς. See 1281, 1296, 1564.

⁶ Birds, 1698;

βάρβαροι δ' εἰσὶν γένος,
Γοργῆαι τε καὶ Φίλιπποι.

The Scholiast explains that this Philippos was a contemporary orator, but he does not say why either he or Gorgias should be called βάρβαροι.

CHAP. VIII. of Pythô witnessed, came and pecked both at the sacred image and at the dates¹. Favourers of Athens said that the tale was got up by Syracusan practice at Delphoi². But Syracuse could have had no hand in the warning voice which came from the other side of the Ægean. The Athenians were bidden to send for the priestess of Athênê at Klazomenai. She came, and she was found to bear the name of Hêsychia, a name which sounded as a voice of reproof in a state of things so full of unquietness as was to be seen in the Athens of that day³.

Madness
of the
enterprise.

1854.

But the arguments of Nikias and the name of Hêsychia were alike fruitless to turn the people of Athens from the frantic enterprise on which their hearts were set. No piece of history better bears out the suggestion of Joseph Butler that it is within the compass of possible things that a whole nation may go mad⁴. We have perhaps had such an experience within the last forty years. We have seen a nation give its whole soul to an enterprise which did not indeed lead to utter overthrow like the Athenian expedition to Sicily, but which was surely

¹ Plut. Nik. 13; ἐν δὲ Δελφοῖς Παλλάδιον ἔστηκε χρυσοῦν ἐπὶ φοίνικος χαλκοῦ βεβηκὸς, ἀνάθημα τῆς πόλεως ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἀριστείαν· τοῦτ' ἔκοπτον ἐφ' ἡμέρας πολλὰς προσπετόμενοι κόρακες, καὶ τὸν καρπὸν ὄντα χρυσοῦν τοῦ φοίνικος ἀπέτρωγον καὶ κατέβαλλον. He tells the story again, De Pyth. Or. 8; but there he puts it ἐν τοῖς Σικελικοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀτυχήμασιν. Perhaps he looked on the whole expedition as an ἀτύχημα.

² Ib.; οἱ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἔφασαν εἶναι Δελφῶν πλάσματα πεπεισμένων ἐπὶ Συρακοσίων.

³ Ib. Have we a reference to her and her name in the Birds, 1320!

Σοφία, Πόθος, ἀμβρόσια Χάριτες,
τό τε τῆς ἀγανόφρονος Ἑσυχίας
εὐάμερον πρόσωπον.

⁴ "Why might not whole communities and public bodies be seized with fits of insanity as well as individuals!" He goes so far as to add: "Nothing but this principle, that they are liable to insanity equally at least with private persons, can account for the major part of the transactions which we read in history." The story is told by Dean Tucker, Address and Appeal to the Landed Interest, p. 20. I have to thank the Rev. Albert Watson, of Brasenose College, for the reference.

as wild, as unjust, as utterly lacking in any reasonable CHAP. VIII. hope either of advantage or of true glory. There was a fairer plea for helping Leontinoi and even Segesta than there was for helping the Turk; yet a time was when it was said that those who protested against helping the Turk could, like Nikias, Metôn, and Sôkratês, have been counted on a man's fingers. Another parallel has been found in the French invasion of Egypt at the end of the last century. The enterprise, wild in itself, seems wilder still when we think of the position in which Athens stood at the moment in Old Greece—how precarious was the state of peace between her and her most powerful neighbours, how likely it was that an enterprise which touched so many interests in Old Greece would at once cause the sleeping lions of Peloponnesian and Boiotian enmity to wake up in their full strength. Maddest of all was the stage which we have not yet reached, when one expedition to Sicily had failed, when there was actual warfare at the gates of Athens, and when a second expedition went forth to fail yet more utterly than the first. From any point of view we wonder; from the Athenian point of view, so familiar to most of us, we are tempted to lament and to rebuke. The historian of Sicily may be allowed to feel some inward satisfaction as he tells how well Zeus on Polichna and Artemis in the Island looked after their faithful worshippers, how Athênê herself better loved her less lofty house in Ortygia, and filled the hearts of her own chosen people with madness.

We have spoken of omens of ill which might have warned the religious mind of Athens from the frantic undertaking. Presently came the most frightful warning of all. The famous tale of the breaking of the figures of Hermês and the alleged profanation of the mysteries of Eleusis concern us in Sicily, only so far as they led

Breaking
of the
statues of
Hermês.

CHAP. VIII. to the change of the most active enemy of Syracuse into her most zealous and effective friend¹. Perhaps too they concern us in a less direct way when we remember that a historian of Sicily held that the wrath of Hermês at the desecration of his statues was shown in the heavy blows dealt against Athens by the hands of Hermokratês son of Hermôn, descendant of Hermês himself². With this view of things in our minds, we might have looked to hear that the goddesses alike of Eleusis and of Sicily stepped in to avenge the wrong done to them in their older home by help given to their more faithful servants who guarded their house between Epipolai and Anapos. That seventy years later Dêmêtêr and the Korê guided the ship of Timoleôn to the deliverance of Syracuse³, while they are not recorded to have in any way strengthened the hands of Hermokratês or Gylippos, may possibly mark two stages in the growth of their Sikeliot worship. But the tale of the godless doings in Athens concerns us directly only as part of the tale of Alkibiadês. It was startling when, just as the fleet was on the point of sailing, one of the three appointed generals was suddenly charged with a share in acts of impiety which were sure to bring down the vengeance of the gods on the expedition and on the city. Alkibiadês asked, and with reason, for an immediate trial. It was not fitting that

Charge
against
Alkibiadês.

¹ The Hermes-breaking would concern us more if we could believe the story which had reached Plutarch (Alk. 18), that the Corinthians did it in the interest of the Syracusans.

² So thought Timaios, quoted by Longinus, fr. 103, C. Müller, i. 218; τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἀλοῦσι περὶ Σικελίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐπιφανεῖ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἀσεβήσαντες διὰ τοῦτ' ἔδωκαν δίκην· οὐχ ἥμισυ δὲ δι' ἑνα ἄνδρα, ὃς ἀπὸ τοῦ παρανομηθέντος διὰ πατέραν ἦν, Ἑρμοκράτην τὸν Ἑρμῆος. Plutarch must refer to the same passage when he says (Nik. 1), τῇ περικοπῇ τῶν Ἑρμῶν προσημᾶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὥς ὑπὸ Ἑρμοκράτους τοῦ Ἑρμῆος πλείστα πείσονται παρὰ τὸν πόλεμον. Cf. Grote, vii. 230. See above, p. 49.

³ Plut. Tim. 8.

he should go forth on such a command with so frightful CHAP. VIII. a charge hanging over his head, an object for every slander that his enemies might bring against him in his absence. Let him be tried at once, and either condemned or acquitted. If condemned, he was ready to bear his punishment, to die, if so it was decreed; if acquitted, he could go forth on his command with a good hope and a good conscience¹. But his enemies were too strong for him. They feared the result of an immediate trial while he was still at hand in the height of his influence as commander of the expedition on which men's hearts were set. They feared his popularity with the sailors; they feared above all that the contingents from Argos and Mantinea, which had been brought to the Athenian side mainly through his influence, might, if he were withdrawn from the command, go back to their own homes². Let him go forth to his work, the orators of this party argued; let not the expedition be kept back; when the evidence for the trial was ready, he might be summoned home again. In other words, whether Alkibiadês was guilty or innocent, his enemies sought to get him out of the way, while they put together charges against him which he had no means of answering³.

He sets forth untried.

It was now midsummer, and everything was ready for June, 415. the great armament to set forth. The main body of the allies, with the provision-ships and the other vessels which were not ships of war, were bidden to sail straight for Korkyra, which was appointed as the place of meeting

Greatness of the armament.

¹ Thuc. vi. 29. 1. He calls on them *μη άπόντος περί αυτού διαβολάς αποδέχεσθαι, άλλ' ήδη άποκτείνειν, ει άδικεί*. Plutarch (Alk. 19) has many more details.

² Ib. 3; Plut. Alk. 19.

³ A suspicion becomes of some value when it is guaranteed by Thucydides (u. s.); *βουλόμενοι, εκ μείζονος διαβολής ήν έμελλον βῆον αυτού άπόντος ποριείν, μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αυτόν άγωνίσασθαι*.

CHAP. VIII. for the whole armament¹. The Athenian triremes, with some few of the allies, were to come together on a fixed day in the haven of Peiræus. And this part of the fleet, its kernel in truth, formed of itself a striking and memorable spectacle. The historian stops to remark that fleets greater in numbers had been brought together at particular moments in earlier wars. But no armament so great in number and in such perfect array had ever gone forth from any Greek haven bound on an errand so distant and likely to be so long². The ships were ready to sail; all the dwellers in Athens, citizens and strangers, were ready by the shore to see the men embark who were to sail in them. Many went to see the last of their kinsfolk and friends who were going forth to the dangers of so distant a warfare. Hope was mingled with regret; now that the hour of parting was come, men felt more keenly the dangers of the enterprise than they did when they decreed it by their votes³. But the armament was a great and a gallant one, one that lifted up men's hearts to see going forth from their own city. Of Athenian triremes the men of Segesta had asked for sixty; sixty were there, of full swiftness and ready for naval warfare; the tale of a hundred asked for by Nikias was made up by forty more which served as transports for the heavy-armed⁴. The city on its side, the trierarchs on theirs, had spared neither pains nor cost to bring both ships and crews to the most perfect state

Its perfect
array.

¹ Thuc. vi. 30. 1. The reason is given; ὡς ἐκείθεν ἀθρόοις ἐπὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν τὸν Ἴόνιον διαβαλοῦσιν.

² Ib. 31. 1; παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτῃ δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτῃ τῶν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. He mentions two earlier ones as equal in number of ships and heavy-armed; but adds (3), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τε βραχεὶ πλεῖ ὠρμήθησαν καὶ παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ, οὗτος δὲ ὁ στόλος ὡς χρόνιός τε ἐσόμενος καὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρω, οὗ ἂν δέη, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ὅμα ἐξαρτυθεῖς.

³ Ib. 30. 2; ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ, ὡς ἦδη ἐμελλον μετὰ κινδύνων ἀλλήλους ἀπολιπεῖν, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἐσθὲι τὰ δευρὰ ἢ ὅτε ἐψηφίζοντο πλεῖν.

⁴ Ib. 31. 3; ἐξήκοντα μὲν ταχείας, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ὀπλιταγωγούς. Cf. 43. 1, and above, p. 104.

of efficiency¹. The heavy-armed soldiers vied with one another in the perfection of their weapons and of all that belonged to their military array. To make a fair show in the eyes of one another and of all Greece was as much in their minds as warfare with the expected enemy². Much wealth, public and private, was on board the ships; not a few looked to profit in the distant land by trade as well as by warfare³. Men's minds were struck by the greatness and splendour of the armament, by the distant service on which it was sent, and by the boundless hopes of victory and dominion with which that distant service had stirred all hearts⁴.

Effect
on men's
minds.

At last the moment came when the fleet which was to avenge the wrongs of Segesta and Leontinoi, which was, in the dreams of some, to make Athens mistress of Sicily and Africa and the whole western seas, was ready to leave the waters of Attica. The trumpet bade silence; the prayers usual on the sailing of a vessel were uttered, not severally in each ship, but by the whole host following the words of the herald⁵. But on board each ship, officers, soldiers, seamen, made their libations to the gods with gold and silver cups. On shore the whole multitude of spectators joined in the prayer⁶. At last the religious rites were

Sailing of
the fleet
from Pei-
raeus.

¹ Thuc. vi. 31. 3; τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν μεγάλας δαπάναις τῶν τε τριηράρχων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκπονηθέν. He goes on with details.

² Ib. 4; ξυνίβη δὲ πρὸς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἄμα εἶναι γενέσθαι, ᾧ τις ἕκαστος προσετάχθη καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἐπίδειξιν μᾶλλον εἰκασθῆναι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἢ ἐπὶ πολέμοις παρασκευῇν.

³ Ib. 5; ὅσα ἐπὶ μεταβολῇ τις ἢ στρατιώτης ἢ ἔμπορος ἔχων ἔπλει. See Arnold's note.

⁴ Ib. 6; ὅτι μέγιστος ἦδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.

⁵ Ib. 32. 1; εὐχὰς τὰς νομιζομένας πρὸ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς οὐ κατὰ ναῦν ἑκάστην, ξύμπαντες δὲ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐποιούντο. They were "taught by the priest."

⁶ Ib. 2; ξυνεπύχοντο δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄμιλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς γῆς, τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος εὐνους παρῆν σφίσι. Some nominal ξύμμαχοι might not be εὐνοί.

CHAP. VIII. over; the pæan was sung; the ships sailed out of the haven in column; when they reached the open sea, a strife began which could make its way first to Aigina¹. And so they sailed on in pride and hope towards Korkyra, leaving yet one more omen of dread behind them at Athens. The day of their sailing was one of the days of the mournful solemnity of the Adônia, rites of old Phœnicia translated to the soil of Hellas, which would have seemed more in place in Panormos or Motya than by the streams of Ilissos and Kêphisos. The prayers, the pæans, of the fleet sailing forth for Sicily were strangely mingled with the wailing of women weeping for Tammuz². Images were taken from their places, and laid on the earth in sign of sorrow. Mimic rites of burial were gone through for the slain favourite of Aphroditê³. And there were not wanting those who saw in all this a presage of what might befall the host which had just set forth in all its pride⁴.

The
Adônia.

We must now look to our own island. While these mighty preparations were making for the invasion of Sicily, we have no sign as to what was going on in Sicily itself, save the one vague hint that Syracuse had found it worth while to tamper with the prophetic voice of Pythô⁵. The veil is not lifted till the Athenian fleet had actually sailed from Peiræus. We then hear how men felt at Syracuse when they heard that the invading armada was actually on its voyage for Sicily. The general feeling in

State of
feeling at
Syracuse.

¹ Thuc. vi. 32. 3; ἐπὶ κέρας τὸ πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαντες ἀμύλλαν ἤδη μέγρι Αἰγίνης ἐποιούντο.

² Plut. Nik. 13; οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐν αἷς τὸν στόλον ἐξέπεμπον ὑπέθραπτον. Ἀδώνια γὰρ εἶχον αἱ γυναῖκες τότε.

³ Ib.; ταφαὶ περὶ αὐτὰ [τὰ εἰδῶλα] καὶ κοπετοὶ γυναικῶν ἦσαν. Cf. Ezekiel, ix. 14.

⁴ Ib.; ὥστε τοὺς ἐν λόγῳ ποιουμένους τιτὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυσχεραίνειν καὶ δεδιέναι περὶ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐκείνης καὶ δυνάμεως, μὴ λαμπρότητα καὶ ἀκμήν ἐπιφανεστάτην σχοῦσα ταχέως μαρανθῇ.

⁵ See above, p. 108.

the city was one of disbelief¹. That Athens, at such a moment, without the shadow of any reasonable cause, should send forth such an armament as report spoke of for a purposeless attack on a distant land, seemed to islanders shut up in their own island to overleap the admitted bounds of human folly. Some believed the story to be simple invention; others rather wished that it might be true, as the discomfiture of the invaders in such a case would be certain. But there were men in Syracuse who knew better than either, who both knew the fact and understood the danger. The assembly was summoned, under the presidency of the generals of the commonwealth, fifteen in number. The place of meeting was doubtless in the *agora*, in the flat ground of Achradina. Many speakers arose, some believing the report, some denying it. A long debate was brought to an end by two memorable speeches, to which we must apply our usual estimate. They may be reports of the general substance of what was really spoken; they are at least what a contemporary who had every means of knowledge thought that the two speakers were likely to have said.

Meeting
of the
assembly.

Of these two speakers the first was a man whom we well know already, Hermokratês son of Hermôn. The other was a certain Athênagoras, of whom we hear nothing before or after, but who is described as the leader of the people and the man in whom the mass of the citizens put most confidence². The two men are well contrasted; the oligarch in home politics with the champion of democracy—the official man, knowing the ins and outs of all official affairs, with the popular speaker, who holds no official place, who has no means of information save such as are open to

Speeches
of Hermokratês and
Athênagoras.

¹ Thuc. vi. 32. 4; ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας ἡγγέλλετο μὲν πολλαχόθεν τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου, οὐ μὲντοι ἐπιστεύετο ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον οὐδέν.

² Ib. 35. 2; 'Αθηναγόρας, ὃς δῆμον τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῇ παρόντι πιθανότατος τοῖς πολλοῖς.

CHAP. VIII. every citizen, whose only source of power and influence is that his fellow-citizens choose to set store by what he says. As we follow the story, it is plain that neither Athénagoras nor Hermokratês was at that moment in office.

Position of
Athéna-
goras.

Athénagoras assuredly was not. The name by which he is described, one familiar at Athens, has sometimes been taken for a formal title; but it is far more likely that both at Athens and at Syracuse it simply means the man in whom the people trust, who is expected to come forward as the champion of the people, but whose influence is purely personal and not official¹. A *tribunus plebis*, a *defensor populi*, was assuredly not needed in commonwealths like Athens and Syracuse, where the assembled people had all power in their own hands. Nor would it seem that Hermokratês was at that moment in office; he certainly was not one of the generals presiding at the meeting. But he belonged to an official class; he had been in office and he was likely to be in office again; he spoke with all the weight of a man experienced in the immediate management of affairs, in opposition to the popular orator who criticizes matters from without. Legally Hermokratês and Athénagoras were simply two citizens in the assembly, with equal right of speaking and voting. Practically there was the same

Official
and quasi
position.

¹ I cannot believe that *δήμου προστάτης* means any definite office known to the law, any more than *δημαγωγός* does. The *δήμου προστάτης* was the man whom the multitude expected to come forward as their champion—*ἐν τῷ παρόντι*, as long as they continued to trust him. He need not even have been so definitely marked out as our Prime Minister, Leader of the House, and Leader of Opposition, all of them positions unknown to the law. The *δήμου προστάτης* comes nearest to the Leader of Opposition, but with this difference, that the Leader of Opposition, though not at the time in office, is sure to belong to the official class.

See Aristoph. *Knights*, 1123. *Dêmos*, in his character of despot, used the *προστάτης* as his sponge;

κλέπτοντά τε βούλομαι
τρέφειν ἕνα προστάτην
τοῦτον δ', ὅταν ᾗ πλέως,
ἀρας ἐπάταξα.

kind of difference between them which there is in our own CHAP. VIII.
House of Commons between the Right Honourable member, versed in affairs, whether actually on the Treasury bench or not, and the Honourable member on the cross-benches, who has no position but what he makes for himself by his words, but whose words are perhaps looked for with eagerness through the length and breadth of the land.

Hermokratês then, believing himself to have the best Speech of Hermokratês.
information on every point¹, began by saying that he was going to tell them a true tale, but that he hardly expected to be believed in telling it. People who told unpopular truths must expect, not only to carry no conviction with them, but to be themselves looked on as unwise². However much they might be amazed at the news, the The Athenians are really coming.
Athenians were coming with a vast force for warfare by land and sea. They were coming under the pretext of helping their allies at Segesta and of restoring the Leontines³; their real purpose was to get possession of Sicily, and first and foremost of Syracuse. For the invaders deemed that, if Syracuse were won, all the rest would easily follow. They would be in Sicily before long; it was the business of his hearers to get themselves in readiness for the defence with all speed. They must neither disbelieve and take no heed, nor yet must they despise the enemy, and so be taken by him while still unarmed⁴. Nor need those who believed the truth be over-discouraged at the power and daring of the enemy. Their vast force His hopes.
will neither make them better able to do mischief nor

¹ Thuc. vi. 32. 4; ὡς σαφὲς οὐρανός εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, and just after in 33. 1, πείθων γε ἑμαυτὸν σαφέστερόν τι ἑτέρου εἰδὸς λέγειν.

² Ib. 33. 1; οὐ μόνον οὐ πείθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄφρονες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

³ Ib. 2; πρόφασιν μὲν Ἑγεσταίων συμμαχίᾳ καὶ Λεοντίνων κατοικίσει.

⁴ Ib. 3; καὶ μήτε καταφρονήσαντες ἄφρακτοι ληφθήσεσθε μήτε ἀπιστήσαντες τοῦ ξύμματος ἀμελήσετε.

CHAP. VIII. secure themselves against loss¹. It may even in one way be a gain; it will frighten the other Sikeliot cities, and make them the more ready to act in concert with Syracuse. If the Syracusans can either overcome the invaders or drive them away without having accomplished their purpose, their deed will be noble and famous. And that the invaders will be really able to accomplish their purpose in the teeth of Syracusan resistance he does not fear in the least. He goes on to speak of other great and distant enterprises, undertaken both by Greeks and barbarians, which had failed, as he believes this of Athens will fail also. Preeminent among them he quotes the Persian invasion of Old Greece, through the failure of which Athens herself had risen to greatness.

His present and former views.

Hermokratês then goes on to his practical counsels, which are conceived in a very different strain from those which he had set forth in his speech at Gela nine years earlier. Sicily is no longer looked on as a separate world, from all meddling in which even Greeks of other lands are to be carefully kept out. He is no longer silent as to the existence of barbarian neighbours, both in and out of Sicily.

Alliances to be sought for; Sikels;

His advice to his countrymen now is to call in the help of every possible ally, far and near, Greek and barbarian.

They are to send to the Sikels, to confirm some in their alliance or allegiance, and to seek the friendship and alliance of others². The difference is clearly marked between the Sikels of the east coast, familiar to Syracuse as subjects, neighbours, or enemies, and the Sikel towns of the interior, now fast beginning to advance in power and in Hellenic culture. The Sikeliot cities were to be called on to help in a danger which was common to all of them.

Sikeliota;

¹ Thuc. vi. 33. 4; οὔτε γὰρ βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πλείω οἱοί τε ἴσονται ἢ πάσχειν, οὐθ' ὅτι μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπέρχονται, ἀνωφελεῖς.

² Ib. 34. 1; καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελοὺς πέμποντες τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιώσωμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φίλιαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιείσθαι.

The Greeks of Italy were to be urged to join in the alliance with those of Sicily; if they refused this, they should be prayed at least not to receive the Athenians into their havens¹. Envoys were to be sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, praying those cities both to send speedy help to Sicily and to stir up the war again against Athens at home². All these counsels are obvious; it is more remarkable when Hermokratês counsels his countrymen, but counsels them in a tone which shows that he thought that the advice might sound strange, to send an embassy to Carthage³. He distinctly says that the Carthaginians lived in constant fear of an Athenian attack, and that they might not be unlikely to give some help to Syracuse against a common enemy⁴. Such help might be either open or secret⁵; he enlarges on the wealth of Carthage⁶; he has clearly neither hope nor wish to bring a Punic host into Sicily even as allies of Syracuse; but he feels that the hands of Syracuse might be greatly strengthened by a Carthaginian subsidy. On this most interesting part of the subject we are sorry to hear no more. We do not hear whether any Syracusan embassy really went to Carthage; it is certain that no Carthaginian help came to Syracuse.

But the most striking and the most practical part of the advice of Hermokratês is where he counsels his fellow-citizens to take a step which he knows will be startling

CHAP. VIII.
Italians;
Peloponnesians.
Carthage.
He exhorts the Syracusans to strike the first blow.

¹ Thuc. vi. 34. 1; καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν [πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις], ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιούμεθα ἡμῖν, ἢ μὴ δέχονται Ἀθηναίους.

² Ib. 3; πέμπωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον, δεόμενοι δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν. This is very different from the counsel in the speech at Gela; still one would have looked for some more marked mention of the metropolis.

³ Ib. 2; δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἀμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι.

⁴ Ib. See Appendix VII.

⁵ Ib.; ἥτοι κρύφα γε ἢ φανερώς.

⁶ Ib.; δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσι μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουλευθέντες χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀργυρον πλείστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὃ τε πόλεμος καὶ τάλλα εὐπορεῖ.

CHAP. VIII. and unpalatable for them to hear of¹. If they are wise, they will not wait for the Athenians to attack them. They will do better to meet them on the road. Let them join, with all the Sikeliots, if possible, at any rate with as many as they can win to their side, and go forth with their whole naval force, victualled for two months, and sail as far as the furthest point of Iapygia. The question will thus be, not whether the Athenians shall make conquests in Sicily or land in Sicily at all, but whether they shall get back home again from the expedition which will thus be cut short². The advantage will be on the Sikeliot side. The distance on their side is much shorter; they will be able to attack the enemy when they are wearied with their long voyage. They will have the friendly haven of Taras as a base of operations and a place of shelter in case of need; the enemy will have to shift for himself how he can along desert or unfriendly coasts, where the Sikeliots will be able to attack or harass or blockade him at pleasure³. If this plan is followed, the Athenians will not venture to set forth from Korkyra; the expedition will either be driven on into the winter or else given up altogether⁴. Furthermore Hermokratês has reason to believe that the most experienced of the Athenian generals is altogether opposed to the war; he has been forced into the command against his will and would gladly seize any excuse for going back⁵. In such a case daring

Friendship
of Taras.

¹ Thuc. vi. 34. 4; δ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπικάειρον, ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ εὐνηθεὶς ἥσυχον ἤκεισθ' ἂν ὁξέως πείθοισθε ὅμως εἰρήσεται. This rebuke of Syracusan lack of enterprise should be noticed.

² This seems to be the meaning of the words in vi. 34. 4; δῆλον ποιῆσαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῇ Σικελίᾳ [al. τῆς Σικελίας] πρότερον ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν ἢ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθῆναι τὸν Ἴόνιον.

³ Thuc. vi. 34. 5. See Arnold's note.

⁴ Ib. 6; ἐξωσθῆναι ἂν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐς χειμῶνα ἢ καταπλαγέντας τῇ ἄδοκῃ καταλῦσαι ἂν τὸν πλοῦν.

⁵ Ib.; ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμπειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω,

is the wisest policy. General opinion will go with those who strike the first blow. The Athenians look for no resistance. They despise us, and justly, because we did not help the Lacedæmonians to overthrow them¹. If they find themselves attacked first, they will be struck with fear; they will rate the Sikeliot power beyond its real strength². All these things, Hermokratès argues, are in favour of the Syracusans. But they must not be led to despise the enemy; they must make every preparation to meet him. As to the facts of the case there is no doubt. They may be assured that the enemy is coming and that he is already on his voyage.

The mass of the assembly were not with Hermokratès³. The more part were not inclined to any efforts. They disbelieved his story. Some treated the whole thing as a subject for laughter; others said that, if the Athenians did come, they would be able to give them more than as good as they brought⁴. Of this frame of mind the popular opposition-speaker Athénagoras made himself the mouth-piece. His speech is one of the most memorable in the whole collection of Thucydides. Whether actually spoken or not, it exactly suits the circumstances of the speaker. It is the speech of an honest, thoughtful, and patriotic man, but a man not well informed as to facts. It is the speech of one who has no direct share in administration, but whose business it is to watch and often to blame those

Feeling
of the
assembly;
Hermo-
kratès
distrusted.

ἀκοντος ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἂν πρόφασιν λαβόντος εἰ τι ἐξιοχρεῖαν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ὀφθείη.

¹ Thuc. vi. 34. 8; ἐπέρχονται ἡμῖν ὥς οὐκ ἀμυνομένοις, δικαίως κατεγνακότες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίαν ἐφθείρομεν. See above, p. 25, and Appendix IV.

² Ib.; εἰ δ' ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκῆτῃ μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει. Cf. Alkibiadès, above, p. 98.

³ Ib. 35. 1; ὀλίγον ἢ τὸ πιστεῖον τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει καὶ φοβούμενον τὸ μέλλον.

⁴ Ib.; εἰ καὶ ἔλθοιεν, τί ἂν δράσαιεν αὐτοὺς ὃ τι οὐκ ἂν μείζον' ἀντιπάθοιεν; ἄλλα δὲ καὶ πάννυ καταφρονούντες ἐς γέλωτα ἔτρεπον τὸ πρᾶγμα.

CHAP. VIII. who have. As a counsellor for the needs of the moment, Athénagoras was wholly wrong and Hermokratês was wholly right; but Athénagoras was not without good grounds for watching with a careful and even a suspicious eye every step taken or proposed by Hermokratês and his party. That Athénagoras mistook the facts of the case was perhaps not wholly his own fault. The private member, with no special means of information, had to watch and criticize the official member, official, even if not holding office, who had special means of information, but whose advantage in this way was counterbalanced in the popular mind by a feeling that, in home politics at least, he was dangerous. When events had once proved that Hermokratês was right in his facts, that the danger really was such as he described, Hermokratês became, and most justly, the trusted adviser of the commonwealth, and we hear nothing more of Athénagoras. But as long as the facts were doubtful, there was no lack of reason on the side of Athénagoras. In time of war Hermokratês could be trusted before all men not to betray the commonwealth to the enemy. In time of peace it was by no means clear that he might not be seeking to overthrow the existing constitution of the commonwealth in the interest of himself or his party. Worthy of all confidence in time of actual war, he was not equally trustworthy as long as things had not got beyond rumours of wars.

Growth
of an
official
class in
democratic
bodies.

But the position and language of Athénagoras have a wider range than merely as illustrating the politics of Syracuse in his own day. They throw light on some of the most general and most remarkable facts of man's political nature. It is much easier to draw up a democratic constitution than to work it, when drawn up, in a democratic spirit. The dislike to exertion, the shrinking from putting oneself forward without some special call, is very

strong in the mass of mankind. It has become a proverb CHAP. VIII. that everybody's business is nobody's business. And this is true from one side; but it is equally true that what is everybody's business is sure to become somebody's special business. In some men the love of business is inborn. They must be employed, be the employment never so petty and uninviting. Without consciously putting themselves forward, they do put themselves forward in every matter. Without consciously asserting that "we are they that ought to speak," they instinctively assume that it is for them to speak and to be listened to on all points. And men are apt, from the mere willingness that trouble should be taken off their hands, to take such men at their own estimate of themselves. In bodies therefore whose constitution is strictly democratic, bodies where there is nothing really answering to office or opposition, bodies where the position of every member is formally as good as that of every other, a *quasi* oligarchic, a *quasi* official, class is always likely to arise. It forms itself in assemblies where any influence of wealth or rank is out of the question; it comes by a kind of natural or unnatural selection; influence by no means always falls to the men of the most striking ability, but rather to those who are most willing to toil at the least attractive forms of drudgery. Without real office, they form an official class; it is for them to speak and to act; it is for others, if they dare, to doubt, to question, to answer, to take their chance of encouragement or discouragement on the part of the assembly in general.

That this tendency of mankind existed in the ancient commonwealths is clear; but in them it entered into partnership with another tendency. No Greek state was so wholly democratic as altogether to shut out the existence of an oligarchic party. The ancient families, shorn of political privilege, still kept up their importance Aristocratic and official tendencies.

CHAP. VIII. in their own eyes and also in those of the people at large. Some were clothed with a sacred character by virtue of hereditary priesthoods; some were illustrious by exploits as well as by descent; some, like Nikias, won universal favour by their personal demeanour and by a judicious employment of their wealth. Suspected, but at the same time honoured, they were habitually chosen before other men to the high places of the state; above all, they were likely to be chosen to them at an earlier age than men who had to make their reputations for themselves. The official class which was sure to grow of itself was largely formed of the oligarchic class, and an oligarchic spirit beyond that of mere officialism was likely to spread even among those members of it who were not of illustrious birth. Of the official class at Athens, the magistrates who defraud the assembly of its rights¹, the men to whom embassies and offices fall in their youth while they never come to the worthy elders of the commons², a vivid picture is drawn in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanês. Athênagoras of Syracuse had clearly to struggle against a body of the same kind, against men who could be at least suspected of administering the affairs of the state to the profit of themselves or their party, men who kept the people at large out of that knowledge of affairs which they might rightly claim, men who, it would seem, had cried

¹ *Acharn.* 40, 56;

ἄνδρες πρυτάνεις, ἀδικεῖτε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, κ.τ.λ.

² *Ib.* 607;

αἴτιον δὲ τί

*ὁμῶς μὲν δεῖ μισθοφορεῖν ἀμνητέην,
τωνδὲ δὲ μηδέν'; ἐτεόν, ὦ Μαρτιάδην,
ἤδη πεπρίσβευκας σὺ πολὺς ἄν; ἐνί,
ἀνένευσεν· καίτοι γ' ἐστὶ σῶφρον κἀργάτης.
τί δαὶ Δράκυλλος κεύφορίζης ἢ Πρινίδης;
οἶδέν τις ὑμῶν τὰ κβάταν' ἢ τοὺς Χαόνας;
οὐ φασιν. ἄλλ' ὁ Κοισύρας καὶ Λάμαχος.*

Here is one at least of our enemies, who also saw Hêrakleia on the Pontos; *Thuc.* iv. 75. 2.

Wolf, wolf, so often that they were not believed when the wolf was at the door indeed. CHAP. VIII.

The popular leader begins by setting forth his utter disbelief in the tale told by Hermokratès. The Athenians are not coming; the story is got up by the oligarchs. They seek to throw the people into a state of groundless alarm, in order that some special commands may be granted to themselves, which they may turn to the overthrow of democratic freedom¹. Such things had happened before; Syracuse had seen both tyrannies and oligarchies². There must have been many elderly men among the hearers of Athênagoras who could remember the tyranny of Thrasyboulos and of Hierôn; few, if any, could remember the rule of the Gamoroi; but all had heard of it from fathers and grand-fathers. That the Athenians were not coming Athênagoras argued on *a priori* grounds, grounds which show that he had not fully fathomed the depths of human folly. The Athenians had too much sense, too much experience, to come where they were sure to meet only with defeat³. He even wishes that they would come; so sure is he that the power of Syracuse would overthrow them⁴. He enlarges, like Nikias at Athens, on the lack of any Athenian force that could match the Syracusan horse. He argues, much less justly as the event proved, that Athens could not bring by sea any considerable force of heavy-armed, and he had clearly no notion of the great inferiority of

Athênagoras denies the report of invasion.

The Athenians are too wise to come.

¹ Thuc. vi. 38. 1, 2. They sought, καταπλήξαντες τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος, αὐτοὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀρχεῖν.

² Ib. 3; τοιγάρτοι δὲ αὐτὰ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ὀλιγάκις μὲν ἡσυχάζει, στάσεις δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας οὐ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πλείονας ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀναιρεῖται, τυραννίδας δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ δυναστείας ἀδίκους.

³ Ib. 36. 3; ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦν εὖ βουλευήσθε, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν οὗτοι ἀγγέλλουσι σκοποῦντες λογιέσθε τὰ εἰκότα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἄνθρωποι δεινοὶ καὶ πολλῶν ἐμπειροί, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Ἀθηναίους ἀξιώ, δράσειαν.

⁴ This comes in the opening words of the speech; τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὅστις μὴ βούλεται οὕτω κακῶς φρονῆσαι, καὶ ὑποχείριους ἡμῶν γενέσθαι ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἡ δειλὸς ἔστιν ἡ τῇ πόλει οὐκ εὖνους.

CHAP. VIII. Syracuse in that arm¹. He believes that the invaders would be sure of defeat, even if they could make their base of operations in a Sicilian city equal in size to Syracuse². How much more when all Sicily would join against them³, when they would have to encamp where they could, with no defence against the Syracusan cavalry, save haply a few stray horsemen from Segesta⁴. Indeed he does not believe that, if they do come, they will ever land at all; Syracuse has a force strong enough to hinder them⁵.

They will
be de-
feated if
they do
come.

This overweening confidence, this rose-coloured picture of the military and naval strength of Syracuse, most likely goes further than anything that the real Athénagoras said; but it is the line of argument which one in his position was pretty certain to take. From the unwisdom of his view of foreign affairs we turn with pleasure to his setting forth of internal politics. He rebukes the young oligarchs who sought for power and office before the legal age⁶; he defends democracy from the charges which they brought against it, and he takes the opportunity to give the best definition ever given of that misapplied and slandered name. Many writers, Greek and others, have striven to tell us what democracy is and is not; but none has ever set forth its nature so truly and so clearly as the demagogue of Syracuse. The words are doubtless those of the Athenian historian; but it is something that Thucydides

Athéna-
goras'
definition
of demo-
cracy.

¹ Thuc. vi. 37. 1; οὐδ' ὀπλίτας ἰσοπλήθεις τοῖς ἡμετέροις, ἐπὶ νεῶν γε ἐλθόντας. As he says only ἰσοπλήθεις, this may be literally true.

² Ib. 2; εἰ πόλιν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσαι Συράκουσαι εἰσιν, ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες, καὶ ὁμορον οἰκῆσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖντο.

³ Ib.; ἡ ποῦ γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ πολεμῇ Σικελίᾳ, ξυστήσεται γάρ.

⁴ Ib. 1; οὐδ' ἱπποὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας οὐδ' αὐτόθεν πορισθησομένους, εἰ μὴ ὀλίγους τινὰς παρὰ Ἑγεσταίων. In 2. he describes their encampment ἐκ σκηρινίδων, which reminds one of the γυνάρια and πυργίδια in which Dēmos (Arist. Knights, 793) dwelled for eight years.

⁵ Ib. 37. 2; τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν οὐδ' ἂν κρατῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγοῦμαι· τοσοῦτῃ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσω νομίζω.

⁶ Ib. 38. 5; τί καὶ βούλεσθε, ᾧ νεώτεροι; πότερον ἀρχεῖν ἤδη; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔννομον.

looked on Athénagoras as worthy of having such an utter-
 ance of political wisdom put into his mouth. He uses the
 name democracy in its true political sense, the sense of
 Periklês, Isokratês, and Polybios, a sense which has been
 somewhat overshadowed by the philosophical prejudices
 even of Aristotle¹. With Athénagoras democracy is no
 corruption, no falling away from any higher model; he
 does not discuss the abstract claims of ideal kingship or
 of ideal aristocracy; he takes the actual and lawful consti-
 tution of Syracuse as he finds it, and contrasts it with the
 tyrannies and oligarchies which had been in past times, and
 which, if the people did not watch over their rights, might
 be again. The definition lies in a nutshell; democracy
 is the rule of the whole people; oligarchy is the rule of a
 part only. In the democracy of Athénagoras the rich and
 noble are in no way shut out from taking their share along
 with other citizens in the administration and honours of
 the commonwealth. They are not put into subjection to
 any other class; they have their own special function in
 the state assigned to them. For in a democracy each
 man, each class of men, has its fitting place. It is for
 the rich, he says, to be the guardians of the public purse;
 it is for the wise to give counsel; it is for the people at
 large to listen to their counsel, and to decide between
 opposing advisers². In an oligarchy on the other hand,
 dangers and burthens are thrown on the people at large,
 while all advantages become the exclusive possession of
 a few³.

Contrast
with oli-
garchy.

Having laid down his general definition the speaker

¹ See Appendix IX.

² Thuc. vi. 39. 1; ἐγὼ δὲ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον εὐμπαρ ἁνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευσάς δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνοτοὺς, κρῖναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλοὺς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ εὐμπαρτα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν.

³ Ib. 2; ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ' ἀφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐμπαρ ἀφελομένη ἔχει.

CHAP. VIII. turns to its practical bearing. He turns fiercely on the powerful men, the young men, who would disturb the existing state of things, who would overthrow the just settlement made for the common good, and put in its stead one designed only for their own advantage. He warns them that so great a city as Syracuse cannot be ruled in the interest of a few; he even makes an appeal to the more enlightened self-interest of the better disposed among the oligarchs themselves. If they can be satisfied with taking their places in a democratic commonwealth, they may be sure that a larger share of honour and authority will fall to them than to ordinary citizens¹. Such has been in truth the universal experience of democratic commonwealths, alike in Attica and in Uri, whenever the rich and noble have had the sense to take their fair chance, and no more, of the good will of their fellow-citizens. If, says Athênagoras, they will seek for more than this, they will be in danger of losing everything². As for the rumours of invasion, if, as he did not himself believe, there was any truth in them, it was for the generals to take heed to them³. But in no case would the people be led by rumours true or false to submit to a voluntary bondage by clothing any dangerous person with unusual powers⁴. Syracuse was in possession of freedom, and she meant to keep it⁵.

Danger
from the
oligarchs.

We have nowhere else in our story so full and clear a report as this of the proceedings of a free and regular Syracusan

¹ Thuc. vi. 40. 1; ἡγησάμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἂν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὕμῶν ἤπερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος μετασχεῖν.

² Ib.; εἰ δ' ἄλλα βουλήσεσθε, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς κινδυνεύσαι στερηθῆναι.

³ Ib. 2; στρατηγοὶ εἰσιν ἡμῖν οἱ σκίψονται αὐτά. We must again remember that Hermokratēs, the chief spreader of rumours, was not in office at the time.

⁴ Ib.; οὐ πρὸς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἀγγελίας καταπλαγεῖσα καὶ ἰλομένη ὑμᾶς ἀρχοντας αἰθαίρετον δουλείαν ἐπιβαλεῖται.

⁵ Ib.; τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐλευθερίαν οὐχὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἀφαιρεθήσεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἔργῳ φυλασσομένη μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πειράσεται σώζειν.

assembly while the democratic constitution was still un- CHAP. VIII.
tampered with. We note, perhaps with surprise, the large Powers
powers of the presiding magistrates. These, unlike the of the
practice of Athens or Achaia, were the generals. They presiding
seem to have been authorized to put an end to a debate generals.
without taking a vote. There was indeed hardly material
for a vote. Hermokratēs and Athēnagoras had both given
advice and made suggestions; but neither had made any
definite motion to which the assembly could say Yea or
Nay. When Athēnagoras sat down, one of the generals, The as-
sembly dissolved
most likely one who, like the Athenian *Epistatēs*¹, was by the
the actual president of the day, arose and forbade the presiding
debate to go any further. He and his colleagues dis- general.
approved of the reproaches cast on certain citizens in the
speech of Athēnagoras². The need of the time, for the
whole city and for each man in it, was not to utter or to
listen to revilings, but to make ready to withstand inva-
sion. It was well that the city should be prepared with
horses and arms and all that was needed for warfare, even
if things should so turn out that they were not needed.
The generals were already looking to these things, and
they would go on looking to them. They would send to
the several cities both for information and for any other
purpose that might be needed. When they had any news
to tell, the assembly should hear it³.

With this speech, a speech implying a considerable de-

¹ On the *ἐπιστάτης* see Grote, viii. 271.

² Thuc. vi. 41. 1; τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν εἰς ἀναστάς ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα ἐτι
εἶπε παραλθεῖν. It is clear that the generals presided in the Syracusan
assembly, which they did not at Athens or in Achaia. See Fed. Gov. i.
296. This stretch of power seems considerable; yet it is small com-
pared with that which seems to be attributed to Periklēs as general in Thuc.
ii. 22. 1, of hindering the ordinary assemblies. (See Grote, vi. 178.) That
the generals, though not presidents, should have the power of summoning
(ii. 59. 4; iv. 118. 6) is less wonderful.

³ Thuc. vi. 41. 1; θαβολὰς μὲν οὐ σῶφρον οὔτε λέγειν τινας ἐς ἀλλήλους
οὔτε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀποδέχεσθαι.

CHAP. VIII. mand of public confidence on behalf of the actual government, the Syracusan general dismissed the assembly¹. We shall see that negotiations and preparations were being actively carried on, if not from this moment, at least a little later². But nothing seems to have come of the most striking and daring points in the exhortation of Hermokratès. We hear nothing of any embassy being sent to Carthage, and assuredly no Syracusan fleet was sent to the furthest point of Iapygia, to meet the Athenians on the way, and to drive them back to their own land.

Negotiations.

§ 3. *The Beginning of War in Sicily.*

B.C. 415-414.

Meeting of the Athenian fleet at Korkyra.

The numbers.

We must now turn to the progress of the invading armament. When the whole Athenian fleet had come together and had begun its voyage towards Sicily, we may, though no blow is struck for some time to come, look on the threatened war as actually beginning. It was in the trysting-place of Korkyra that the whole power of Athens and her allies met in full readiness for their errand of Sicilian aggression. All earlier descriptions and comparisons apply to a part only of the Athenian preparations, to that part which was supplied by Athens herself and those of her allies for whom Peiræus was a convenient haven of meeting. But now the whole force of Athenians, free allies, subject allies, and mercenaries, was gathered in one place. The crowd of vessels that filled the havens and the narrow sea of Korkyra numbered in all one hundred and thirty-six ships of war³. Of these two were Rho-

¹ Thuc. vi. 41. 3; ὃ τι ἀν αἰσθόμεθα, ἐς ὧμᾶς οἴσομεν.

² Ib.; οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι τοσαῦτα εἰπόντες τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, διελύθησαν ἐκ τοῦ συλλόγου. The meeting was called ἐκκλησία in 32. 4; so it may not have been, as ῥύλλογος seems to imply at Athens, a meeting specially called.

What would one give for a Syracusan inscription explaining all these parliamentary matters. It would be more than "the pleasure of looking at an autograph."

³ Thuc. vi. 43. 1.

dian vessels of fifty oars after the ancient pattern¹; the rest were triremes. Of Athenian triremes the number, as we have seen, was one hundred, counting the forty that served as transports². Thirty-four ships were the contribution of those members of the Athenian confederacy who still supplied ships, and had not sunk to pay tribute in money. Of these our guide mentions none by name but the Chians; but we learn from other passages of his story that the people of Méthymna still served on the same favourable terms³. And some addition to the fleet was surely made by the sea-faring city in whose havens it had met. Korkyra was ready to fight against her twin-sister as long as that twin-sister abode in friendly relations to the parent whom Korkyra so deeply hated. Korkyraian soldiers are seen before Syracuse at a later stage of the war, and we may surely infer the presence of Korkyraian ships from the beginning. Besides these there were a crowd of vessels in attendance on the ships of war. Thirty carried corn; others, the number is not given, carried carpenters, masons, every kind of man and thing that was needed for siege-works⁴. A hundred merchant-ships, pressed into its service by the Athenian commonwealth, accompanied these heavily burthened vessels, to tow them, we may suppose, in case of need⁵. Besides these, not a few private vessels of various kinds followed the fleet on their own account, for the purpose of trade in the course of the voyage⁶. One horse-transport was enough to carry the thirty horse-
men who were to face the cavalry of Syracuse and all The horsemen.

¹ Thuc. vi. 43. 1; *δυσὶν ἑκατὸν πεντηκοντόροις*. Cf. i. 14. 2.

² Ib. 43; *αἱ μὲν ἐξήκοντα ταχέϊαι, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι στρατιώτιδες*. See 31. 3, and above, p. 112.

³ See vi. 85. 2; vii. 57. 5; *Μηθυμναῖοι μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῃ ἐπήκοοι*.

⁴ Ib. vi. 44. 1.

⁵ Ib.; *ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετὰ τῶν ὀγκύων ξυνέπλει*.

⁶ Ib.; *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλοῖα καὶ ὀγκύες ἐκούσιοι ξυνηκολούθουν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐμπορίας ἔνεκα*. See above, p. 113

CHAP. VIII. Dorian Sicily¹. There is no mention of their horses ; they were to find them in the land where horses were the kindly growth of the soil.

The heavy-
armed.

But of footmen of every class there was no lack. Nikias had asked for five thousand heavy-armed, citizens and allies. The full tale came up to one hundred more than the demand. Of these fifteen hundred were native Athenians whose names were on the roll of citizens liable to military service, citizens finding their own arms, but receiving pay during their time of service. Seven hundred were citizens of the lower rate of fortune called *thétes*, who, if called on to serve as heavy-armed, had their arms found for them by the state. They were to act as *epibatai* or marines on board the triremes². The rest came from the allies, free and dependent, reckoning a few who were mere mercenaries. The commonwealth of Argos had, under the influence of Alkiabiadês, sent five hundred. From Mantinea, whether sent by their own commonwealth or simply as volunteers, came a number not stated, which with a body of mercenaries, doubtless from Arkadia, made up the not very great total of two hundred and fifty³. These Peloponnesians were doubtless the best heavy-armed troops in the army; one is rather surprised to find that the heavy-armed contingent of the subject allies, that is mainly from the islands of the Ægean, reached the number of 2150⁴. Of light troops the bowmen numbered eighty from Crete, four hundred from elsewhere. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers ; and the list is wound up by an entry characteristic of the relations common among the Greek cities. A hundred and twenty citizens of the elder Megara, a city now bitterly hostile to Athens, men banished in some of the civil

The light
troops.

¹ Thuc. vi. 43. 2 ; *ἡπαγωγῇ μὲν, τριάκοντα ἐχούσῃ ἰσπίας*.

² Ib. ; *ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν*.

³ Ib. ; *Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων*.

⁴ The whole number is 5100. 2200 Athenians, 500 Argeians, 250 Arkadians, leave 2150 for the *ὑπήκοοι*.

dissensions of their own commonwealth, banished doubtless on account of Athenian sympathies, took service for the city which had given them shelter. They had been, one may believe, in their old days at Megara, men at least of the heavy-armed if not of the knightly *census*; as exiles they could serve their adopted city, not with spear and shield, but only with the light weapons of the Rhodian subject or of the Cretan mercenary¹. CHAP. VIII.
The Megarian exiles.

These figures give the total of the fighting men; to them must be added a certain number of unarmed men as servants of the horsemen and heavy-armed; also the crews of the provision-ships, the masons, carpenters, and others, with the crews of the ships that carried them. And above all these, there were those who, though they wore no weapons, might be as truly called fighting-men as any who carried spear and buckler. Those were the men who guided the mightiest and most cunning weapon of all, the Athenian trireme. They formed in fact by far the greatest part of the whole warlike body. The crews of the war-ships, throwing in the two Rhodian *pentekonters*, have been minutely reckoned at 25,580², of whom a large proportion would be Athenian citizens, practising the special craft by which Athens had risen to her greatness. It was a mighty force indeed to be sent forth at the bidding of a single city. It was a force by no means wholly the growth of the city which sent it forth; it numbered allies and subjects as well as citizens. But if the whole force of Athens was not Athenian, there was in every branch of it an Athenian kernel round which the other elements gathered and which gave its character to the whole. The host of Athens was Athenian in a sense in which no Carthaginian host was Carthaginian. But the more one thinks of the greatness of the effort, the more one is The ships and their crews.

Character of the Athenian force.

¹ Thuc. vi. 43. 2; Μεγαρεῖσι φίλοις, φυγάσιν, εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν.

² See Holm, ii. 408.

CHAP. VIII. struck with the risk which was run in such an effort.

Athens ruled over a scattered dominion; she ruled, for the most part, as a mistress, perhaps not actively hated but certainly not actively loved. When her fleet sailed for Sicily, it left behind subjects of Athens who were likely to fall away at the first report of Athenian failure in Sicily. Yet she ventured, to an appreciable extent, to fight the battle which she had chosen to fight in Sicily with the arms of those same subjects.

Effect
of the
greatness
of the
fleet.

In truth the vastness of the Athenian armament seems, as Hermokratês had foretold¹, to have gone a long way to defeat its own objects. Men everywhere, even those who had before been friendly to Athens, were startled and frightened at the armed multitude which was coming against their coasts². Their faith could not carry them so far as to believe that such preparations as these meant nothing more than the restoration of Leontinoi and the defence of Segesta against Selinous. Thus even the old allies of Athens, who had fought for her in her earlier Sicilian enterprises, if they did not actually turn against her, at least looked jealously on, and refused her the society, help, and comfort which she doubtless looked for from them. The relations of the Italiot and Sikeliot cities to Athens doubtless still bound them to receive a single Athenian ship of war, but not more³; they would therefore be fully justified in refusing admission to the whole of the fleet or to any division of it. And most of them acted on this principle.

Conduct
of the
Italiot
cities.

The three
divisions.

The assembled fleet was now reviewed and examined in every point, and every arrangement was made by the

¹ See above, p. 118. Cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 20.

² Justin, though he blunders about the embassies, says with truth (iv. 4. 3); "Tantis viribus Sicilia repetitur ut ipsis terrori essent in quorum auxilia mittebantur."

³ See above, pp. 25, 65.

generals for the course of landing and for the places at which they might have to land and encamp. The fleet was then parted into three divisions, each general taking his share by lot. They hoped in this way both to keep better order, and to be better able to obtain water and whatever else they needed in the several havens which they would pass, than if the whole multitude had come to any one point at once¹. Three ships were sent in advance to the Italian and Sicilian cities, above all to Segesta, to find out the state of things in each, to learn where the fleet was likely to find a friendly reception, and to bring back word to head-quarters². Then the three divisions set forth in order from Korkyra. They sailed through the narrow strait which parts the long island from the Epeirot coast. Then, having skirted the northern coast of Korkyra, they struck across the Ionian gulf—the one piece of open sea in the whole voyage—to the Iapygian promontory, the south-western point of Italy in any sense of that word³. There, if Hermokratēs had had his will, they would have been met by the combined naval powers of Syracuse and of all Greek Sicily⁴. But the preparations with which the Syracusan generals were busy did not take in so daring a step as this, and the Athenian commanders nowhere

¹ Thuc. vi. 42. 1.

² Ib. 2; *ἔπειτα δὲ προὔπεμψαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν τρεῖς ναῦς εἰσορμόνας αἰτίνας σφᾶς τῶν πόλεων δέξονται· καὶ εἰρητο αὐταῖς προσηπαντᾶν, ὅπως ἐπιστάμενοι καταπλεύσι.* We meet them again in c. 46.

³ The careful geography of Thucydides (vi. 44. 2) is to be noticed. The fleet *ξυμβέβαλλε τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον, καὶ προσβαλοῦσα ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρὸς τε ἄκρην Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ πρὸς Τάραντα, καὶ παρεκομίζοντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν . . . ὅς ἀφίκοντο ἐς Πήγγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρατήριον.* So in vii. 33. 3; *ἐπεραιώθησαν . . . τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐς ἄκρην Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ ὀρμηθέντες αὐτόθεν . . . ἀφικνούνται ἐς Μεταπόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας.* Here the two peninsulas, the heel and the toe, are severally Iapygia and Italia. Tarent is not in Italia; but Metapontion is (see vol. i. p. 480). Diodōros (xiii. 3) employs the geography of his own age, when Tarentum and a great deal besides counted as Italy; *διαπλεύσαντες τὸν Ἰόνιον κόπον, πρὸς ἄκρην Ἰαπυγίαν κατηνέχθησαν καὶ κει-θον ἥδη παρελθόντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν.*

⁴ See above, p. 120.

CHAP. VIII. found their course barred by an enemy. From the Iapygian point, according to the practice of the time, they did not venture to strike across the wider stretch of sea which might have landed them in the proper Italy, perhaps at Krotôn. The ships skirted the whole shore of the Tarantine gulf, till they found their first resting-place at Rhêgion.

How they fared at the several points on the way depended on the disposition of each town that they came to. The force of Athens might have gone far to extort what it would from any single town; but it would have been impolitic to make any new enemy besides those whom they were sent to attack. They therefore submitted to such treatment as they met with at each place¹. The first was Taras. Of that famous city we have not before heard in these wars; but we know from the speech of Hermokratês at Gela that it was now well-disposed to Syracuse². Dorian, Lacedæmonian, descent might well move the city on the gulf to such a course, yet in the darkest day of Taras we have seen Ionian Rhêgion acting as her faithful ally³. The other towns, even those which refused to receive the Athenians within their walls or even to give them a market without their walls, at least allowed them to anchor and take in water. Taras refused even thus much. The fleet sailed by Metapontion, first city of Italy, and by Hêrakleia, that is by Siris, now the haven of that still youthful city⁴. At Thourioi, colony either of Athens or of Apollôn, and at Krotôn, the accounts of their reception vary⁵. They then

¹ The words of Thucydides (vi. 44. 2) are wonderfully few and terse; τῶν μὲν πόλεων οὐ δεχομένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ σίτῃ, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ δρυμὶ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτοις.

² See above, p. 120.

³ See vol. ii. p. 254.

⁴ See above, p. 14.

⁵ Diodorês (xiii. 3), in his fuller περίπλους, says that εἰς Θουρίους κατενεχθέντες πάντων ἔτυχε τῶν φιλανθρώπων, and presently adds, λαβόντες ἀγορὰν παρὰ τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν. This hardly agrees with the statement of Thucydides, and from our later accounts (Thuc. vii. 33. 5, 35) one would

passed by the famous temple of the Lakinian Hêra, by the headland of the Dioskouroi and by the town of Skyllêtion, Lokroi. and came to Lokroi¹. A few years before, in the expedition of Phaiax, Lokroi had become an ally of Athens². But it was an unwilling alliance, which could not be reckoned on when far older friends were cooling in their zeal. At Lokroi they fared no better than they had fared at Taras.

It was at Rhêgion, the old ally of Athens, the far older enemy of Lokroi³, a town which had fought on the Athenian side in earlier warfare, that the Athenian generals had most fully looked for welcome and alliance. The Chalkidians of Rhêgion at all events must be ready to avenge the wrongs of their Chalkidian kinsfolk of Leontinoi, their fellows in the first alliance made between Athens and any Sikeliot or Italiot city⁴. At Rhêgion the three divisions came together⁵; a mighty show they must have made in the narrow waters. Here they did meet with better treatment than at Taras or Lokroi; but still very far beneath their hopes. They were allowed to draw up their ships on shore, and, as the historian emphatically adds, they rested⁶. To Greek sailors the trireme after all was not a home for a long journey, but a means of conveyance and an engine of battle. Owing to the unfriendliness of the other towns, they had had to live almost wholly at their oars ever since they

Rest at
Rhêgion.

infer that at this time Thourioi was not friendly to Athens. On these points Thucydides is better authority than Philistos, and Diodôros may have confused his Philistos.

¹ See Diod. ii. 8. ² See Thuc. vii. 33. 3. ³ See vol. ii. p. 240.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 46. 2; *καὶ οἱ Ἑγγίνοι οὐκ ἐβελήσαντες ξυστρατεύειν οὐδὲ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο πείθειν, καὶ εἰς τὴν μάλιστα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας καὶ σφίσι δαί ἐπιτηδείους.*

⁵ Ib. 44. 1, 2. The whole force is at Taras; then, *ὡς ἕκαστοι εὐπόρησαν, παρεκομίσοντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν . . . ὅτε ἀφίσκοντο εἰς Ῥήγιον . . . καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἡβροῖσαντο.*

⁶ Ib. 3; *τὰς ναῦς ἀνελκύσαντες ἡσύχασαν.*

CHAP. VIII. started from Korkyra. The rest at Rhêgion must have been indeed welcome; but rest and food only were to be had. The army was quartered, and a market was found for them, outside the city, in the precinct of the Rhêgine Artemis¹. But none were received within the walls, save those who went in the character of envoys, among whom we may fancy Alkibiadês rather than Nikias taking the leading place. They addressed the Rhêgine assembly, and called on them to join in helping their Leontine kinsfolk. The answer was that Rhêgion would not act alone for either side, but would do whatever was agreed on by the other Italiots².

Answer
of the
Rhêgines.

Tendency
towards
Italiot
union.

The answer of the Rhêgines is remarkable on every ground. When an old ally of Athens like Rhêgion shrinks from giving her any active support and falls back on relations towards other cities against some of which Rhêgion and Athens had fought in partnership, we see how deep was the spirit of fear and mistrust which, as Hermokratês had foreseen, would be awakened even among the friends of Athens by the vast scale which her enterprise had taken. But it also teaches something deeper and more abiding than this. It points to the growth of a confederate spirit among the Italian Greeks; it looks to joint action on their part, action in which Lokroi and Rhêgion may both agree. It is the spirit of Hermokratês at Gela; and it must be remembered that the peace which he wrought in Sicily had in some measure extended to the Italiot cities also³. In both lands we see the germs of possible federal unions, which later events hindered from taking any firm root.

¹ Thuc. vi. 44. 3; ἐξω τῆς πόλεως, ὡς αὐτοὺς εἶσω οὐκ ἰδέχοντο, στρατόπεδόν τε κατασκευάσαντο ἐν τῇ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερῇ, οὗ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρείχον.

² Ib. 5; οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ μεθ' ἑτέραν ἔφασαν ἕσσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνοική τοῦτο ποιήσιν.

³ Ib. v. 5. 3. See above, pp. 64, 72.

The halt of the invading force at Rhêgion was a time of busy preparation at Syracuse. The news came both from their own spies and from other quarters that the Athenian fleet was actually in the strait. There was no longer any room for disbelieving¹. It was time to make ready for the coming of the invaders. It is characteristic of the position of Syracuse that one important part of her preparations was to try to secure herself on the side of her Sikel neighbours. There was ever the fear that the independent Sikels might join any enemy of Syracuse, and that those who were subject to Syracuse might take the coming of such an enemy as a call to revolt. To the subject places garrisons were sent; to the independent Sikel towns envoys went to try to hinder any hostile action². All the military posts in the immediate Syracusan territory received garrisons; reviews were held of horses and arms; everything was done that needed to be done when the invaders were all but at the gates. In all this we see the spirit of Hermokratês; and, in an hour of danger from an enemy without the city, Syracuse and all Greece could furnish no more trusty guide than he.

Dealings of
Syracuse
with the
Sikels.

While the land to be invaded was thus making itself ready to withstand invasion, the invaders heard a piece of news which was not at all to their liking. The three ships which the Athenian generals had sent to spy out the state of things at Segesta now came back to Rhêgion. And a disheartening tale it was that they brought with

Return of
the envoys
from
Segesta:

¹ Thuc. vi. 45. 1; πολλὰ χόθεν τε ἤδη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκόπων σαφὴ ἡγγέλετο ὅτι ἐν Ἐγγίῳ αἱ νῆες εἰσὶ, καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις παρεσκευάζοντο πᾶσιν τῇ γῳνίῃ καὶ οὐκέτι ἡπίστονον.

² Ib. 2; καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελότας περιέπεμπον, ἵνα μὲν φύλακας, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις καὶ ἐς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρὰς ἐσεκόμζον. Φύλακες go to dependent Sikels; πρέσβεις to independent; φρουραὶ to forts ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, that is the *ager Syracusanus*. But they did not now, as Diodōros (xiii. 4) says, elect the three generals mentioned in Thuc. vi. 73.

CHAP. VIII. them. Instead of the boundless wealth which was to find their report; pay for the whole Athenian force, the public hoard of poverty of Segesta had in it thirty talents only. The sixty that had been brought to Athens had brought the city thus near to emptiness. It was found out that the former envoys and their companions had been made the victims of a very elaborate and yet very simple trick. The sacred vessels of Eryx which had made so goodly a show turned out to be only silver-gilt¹; the former envoys had seemingly taken them for solid gold. As for the gold and silver plate which had shone on so many Segestan tables, and which the Athenian guests had taken as a sign of the number of men in Segesta rich enough to entertain in such a style, the truth came out that they had eaten and drunk from the same service at many tables, nor was that service the property of any one citizen of Segesta. The wily Elymians had got together all the plate in Segesta and all that they could borrow from neighbouring cities. The whole was then passed on from one man to another, and was believed by the trusting guests to be the property of the host of each day². The good terms on which this story implies that the Segestans stood towards their neighbours are in themselves remarkable. But they become more remarkable when we are told that the plate was borrowed, not only from Phœnician but from Greek cities. It is certainly hard to see to what Greek cities the Segestans, enemies of their nearest Greek neighbour Selinous, could have sent to borrow. Deep and bitter was the wrath of the Athenian armament when the news was brought of the way in which their representatives had been deceived.

Tricks
of the
Segestans.

Surprise
of the
army.

¹ Thuc. vi. 46. 3; ἃ ὄντα ἀργυρᾷ πολλῇ πλείων τὴν ὕλην ἀπ' ὀλίγης ἐννόμους χρημάτων παρείχοντο. I took this, with Grote (vii. 199), to mean "silver-gilt vessels, falsely passed off as solid gold." But the words are not quite clear.

² Ib. 4; ἐπέφερον ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἰκίαι ἕκαστοι . . . πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρημένον καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων.

And loud were the cries of the whole army against the CHAP. VIII.
envoys and their companions who had allowed themselves
to be entrapped in such a fashion ¹.

The disappointment of the army in general was fully
shared by two of its commanders. Alkibiadēs and Lama-
chos seem really to have believed all the boasts and promises
of the Segestans; to Nikias the report that the treasury
of Segesta was so nearly empty was no more than he had
looked for all along ². The generals had now to consider
their course in such an untoward state of things, made
more untoward by the refusal of their Rhegine allies,
from whom they had on every ground looked for zealous
help ³. But it does not appear that even Nikias thought
of throwing up the enterprise altogether on the strength
of the trick which had been played them by those whom
they came to help. But that trick and the lack of active
support on the part even of allies like the Rhêgines
strengthened the oldest general in his wish to do as little
and risk as little as might be. Such a policy had been a
wise one when Nikias was a statesman in the assembly
arguing for or against this or that course; it was hardly
so becoming in a general sent to carry out a certain com-
mission, however displeasing that commission might be to
himself ⁴. His counsel was to sail against Selinous with

Council
of the
generals.

¹ Thuc. vi. 46. 5; πολλὴν τὴν αἰτίαν εἶχον ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

² Ib. 2; τῷ μὲν Νικίᾳ προσδεχομένῳ ἦν τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων, τοῖν δ' ἐτίμουν καὶ ἀλογώτερα.

³ See above, p. 138.

⁴ It is at this point that Nikias receives a most severe lecture at the hands of his own biographer (Plut. Nik. 14). It is perfectly true that, after Nikias had discharged his conscience in the assembly, he ought, when he was sent as general against his will, to have done his duty as general. But it is hard to say *πολλάκις ἐναμβλῖναι καὶ τοὺς συνάρχοντας αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν διαφθεῖραι τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἔδει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμφύοντα καὶ προσκείμενον ἐλέγχειν τὴν τύχην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγόνων*. This is perfectly true as between Nikias and Lamachos, not at all true as between Nikias and Alkibiadēs, who, at this stage, much better deserved to have a verb like *μελλονικιᾶν* (Arist. Birds, 639) coined for him than Nikias himself.

CHAP. VIII. their whole force; that was the object for which they
 Plan of were specially sent¹. They would then formally call on
 Nikias. the Segestans to perform their promise of finding pay for
 the whole army. If they could do so, they would then
 take counsel as to their further course. If things were
 otherwise, they would demand at least provisions for the
 sixty triremes for which the Segestans themselves had at
 first asked. They would then, either by force or by persua-
 sion, patch up some kind of reconciliation between Selinous
 and Segesta. This done, they would sail round the coasts
 of Sicily, displaying to each city the power of Athens, and
 her good will towards her allies². Then, having done what
 they were specially sent to do, they would sail home. If,
 without any special danger or difficulty, any opportunity
 should arise either for giving any help to the Leontines or
 for winning over any cities to the Athenian alliance, that
 might be done. Only nothing was to be risked which
 would have to be done at Athenian cost or which might
 tend to Athenian damage.

Plan of Al- Alkibiadês next spoke his mind. The one object of
 kibiadês; Nikias was to keep his country, as far as he could, out of
 harm's way, to bring home her precious fleet and those who
 sailed in it as soon and with as little loss as might be.
 The object of Alkibiadês was to do all that might be done,
 with such splendid means as they had at hand, to advance
 the reputation and influence of Athens, and his own. His
 counsel is not rash; it is hardly bold; it is the counsel
 of a diplomatist rather than that of a soldier. To the pro-
 posal of Nikias he answered that it would be shameful to
 set forth with such a power, and then simply to sail home

¹ Thuc. vi. 47. 1; πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινόυντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ' ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμθησαν.

² Ib.; ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας δὲ τὴν ἐς τοὺς φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους προθυμίαν. Mark the somewhat solemn phrase ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις (cf. vol. i. p. 371, note 4).

again without doing anything. He wished to form the widest Athenian connexion in Sicily that might be, whether with the further views that have been put into his mouth or no. Let them send heralds to all the Sikeliot cities to win them over to the Athenian alliance. Syracuse and Selinous were of course to be left out on such an errand. The work of persuasion was to begin with Messana, the most valuable of friends if her friendship could be had, the city on the strait that held the key of Sicily, and in whose haven even their great armada might ride at anchor¹. Alkibiadēs further showed that he understood the weak point of Syracuse as fully as Hermokratēs himself. The Athenians were to try to form alliances with the independent Sikels, and to persuade those who were subjects of Syracuse to revolt. From their alliance he looked both for provisions and for military help². When they knew what allies, Greek or barbarian, they might hope to win, then they were to attack both Syracuse and Selinous, unless indeed Syracuse would agree to the restoration of the Leontines, and unless Selinous would make peace with Segesta³.

This counsel of Alkibiadēs, it has been remarked with somewhat of surprise, implies that he still looked on a direct attack on Syracuse as a thing to be contemplated, but still a thing that might possibly be avoided⁴. But it must not be forgotten that the fleet had no direct orders to attack Syracuse. The commission given to its commanders, as regards eastern Sicily, was to restore the Leontines. That commission was not likely to be carried

¹ Thuc. vi. 48; ἐν πόρῃ γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ προσβολῇ εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῆς Σικελίας καὶ λιμένα καὶ ἐφόρμησιν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἱκανωτάτην εἶσεσθαι.

² Ib. πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τοὺς Σικελούς τοὺς μὲν ἀφιστάναι ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα οἷτον καὶ στρατιᾶν ἔχωσι.

³ Ib.; οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσας καὶ Ζελινούντι ἐπείχειν, ἣν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἑγεσταιῶς ἐνυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἐᾶσι κατοικεῖν.

⁴ Grote, vii. 263.

CHAP. VIII. out without the conquest or humiliation of Syracuse; but it implied that, before Syracuse was actually attacked, she should be called on to do the will of Athens of her own accord. From the purely military point of view, there can be no doubt that the wisest counsel was that of the third general, Lamachos. Nikias and Alkibiadês were statesmen and diplomatists as well as soldiers; each had a policy. Lamachos, as far as we can see, had no policy. Plan of Lamachos; For that very reason perhaps, he saw more clearly than either of his colleagues what, from the soldier's point of view, was the right thing to do. Putting aside all immediate diplomatic formalities, all possibilities that were mere attack on Syracuse. possibilities, the practical business of the expedition was to attack Syracuse. The Leontines were to be restored, and there was not the slightest hope of restoring them by any other means. Syracuse was certainly not going to restore them unless constrained by force. To the practical military mind of Lamachos the one thing to be done was to make the attack on Syracuse, and the sooner it was made the better. The main point of all was to strike at once, while the enemy was still unprepared, while he was still perplexed and frightened at their coming. An invading army, he argues, is always most dreaded at its first coming; the hope of victory is always greatest when the enemy is still looking out in fear for the attack. If the invader delays, those who are threatened begin to pluck up heart; they no longer fear him, and they will make a stouter resistance. Besides this, Lamachos added, many of the Syracusans, not fully believing that the Athenians were coming, would not yet have sought shelter in the city. They would be made prisoners in the open country, and their property or their ransoms would be useful resources in the case of a siege¹. The other Sikeliot cities would

¹ Thuc. vi. 49. 3; *ἐσκομζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἀπορήσειαν χρημάτων, ἣν πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθίζηται.*

be best won by bold and successful operations against CHAP. VIII.
Syracuse. They would choose the alliance of Athens, and would no longer wait to see which side had the better. The forsaken site which had once been the Hyblaian Megara, at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or water, should be chosen as the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet¹.

The wisdom of this counsel cannot be doubted; it was conceived in that spirit of clear-sighted daring which is so often the highest prudence. Happily the gods who watched over Syracuse stepped in to keep the wise words of Lamachos from convincing the minds of his colleagues. His counsel was far too bold for Nikias, and it would allow Alkibiadēs no opportunity for the display of those diplomatic gifts which there is no doubt that he really possessed in large measure. The personal position of the general who had last spoken was widely different from that of either of his colleagues. In a direct attack on Syracuse by force of arms the hero Lamachos² was likely to be the foremost captain of the three. But Lamachos was captain and hero, and nothing more; out of the camp he was nobody. A man of no political weight, capable of being caricatured as a needy and greedy swash-buckler³, so poor, it was said, perhaps jestingly, that, whenever he

Position
and cha-
racter of
Lamachos.

¹ Thuc. vi. 49. 4; *ναύσταθμον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμυσθέντας Μέγαρον ἐφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἔρημα, ἀπείχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολλὸν οὔτε δδόν.* Cf. vi. 94. 1. See Arnold's note here and vol. i. p. 387, ii. pp. 132, 499.

² He is addressed in mockery in the Acharnians, 549;

ὦ Λάμαχ' ἦρας, τῶν λόφων καὶ τῶν λόχων.

But the dead Lamachos gets the name in all seriousness in Frogs, 1039;

ἀλλ' ἄλλους τοὶ πολλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, ὧν ἦν καὶ Λάμαχος ἦρας.

There is, also after his death, a respectful reference to his mother, but without her name, in Thesm. 840.

³ So in many places in the Acharnians, as 565 et seqq., 594, 614, 619, 1069 et seqq. There must have been some special joke about the Gorgon on his shield, which comes over and over again, and in 1131 gives him a patronymic *Λάμαχος δὲ Γοργάσου*. Are we to believe with Süvern (Birds, p. 47) that Lamachos with his crest is Epops?

CHAP. VIII. was chosen general, he had to ask the assembly for a little money to buy clothes and shoes¹, the best soldier in the camp had not, even in the camp, the same influence as the two wealthy statesmen who were his colleagues. His keen eye for a military advantage did not, with soldiers who had not ceased to be citizens, go for so much as the mild virtues and irreproachable behaviour of Nikias or as the versatile brilliancy of Alkibiadês. The worse reason therefore prevailed in the Athenian military counsels, the worst reason indeed of all three. When Lamachos could not convince his colleagues, he shrank from the timid plans of Nikias, and gave his vote in favour of the counsel of Alkibiadês. It was a memorable vote. Had he joined the side of Nikias, he would have saved Sicily without destroying Athens. By going over to Alkibiadês, he saved Sicily, and destroyed Athens as well. It was the natural vote for a man of action who could not carry out his own wiser scheme. But the effect of it was ruin to the errand on which he was sent. Instead of the attack by land and sea which might have ended the war at one stroke, time was wasted; the strength of the armament was frittered away; the Syracusans were taught to cast away their fears, and to look on the Athenians as foes who dared not attack them.

He joins
Alkibiadês.

We have no glimpses within the walls of Syracuse just

¹ Plut. Nik. 15; ὁ δὲ Λάμαχος ἦν μὲν ἀνδρώδης καὶ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ τῇ χειρὶ χρώμενος ἀφειδῶς κατὰ τὰς μάχας, πένης δὲ τοσοῦτον καὶ λιτὸς ὥστε καθ' ἐκάστην στρατηγίαν ἀπολογίζεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μικρὸν ἀργύριον εἰς ἐσθῆτα καὶ κρηπίδας ταυτῶν. (Was then the Gorgon-shield supplied by the state to a Thêes?) Alk. 21; ὁ γὰρ Λάμαχος ἦν μὲν πολεμικὸς καὶ ἀνδρώδης, δξίωμα δ' οὐ προσῆν οὐδ' ὄγκος αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν. This in Nik. 15 he contrasts with the influence which Nikias drew from his wealth. In Nik. 12 he speaks of the *πρώτης* of Lamachos. Ælian (Var. Hist. ii. 24), says generally *πενέστατοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ἀριστοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων*, and gives a list, which takes in Lamachos in company with Aristides, Phôkiôn, Epaminôndas, and Sôkratês, as also Pelopidas, who should not be there.

at this moment; but we may be sure that Hermokratès at least breathed more freely when he heard the decision to which the Athenian commanders had come. Alkibiadès now had things his own way. He began his diplomatic task, as he had proposed, by crossing the strait in his own ship to Messana. He was heard in the Messanian assembly, inviting Messana to make common cause with Athens. The party that was just then uppermost in the ever-shifting politics of Messana was not inclined to decisive measures either way. The alliance was declined; the Athenians were refused admission into the city, but were offered a market outside the walls¹. Having thus failed in his first attempt, an attempt to which he attached special importance, Alkibiadès went back to Rhégion. His next attempt had better luck. Two of the generals—himself and Lamachos?—with sixty ships, left their colleague with the rest of the fleet at Rhégion. They sailed along the coast to Naxos, then the first Greek city that they would come to after leaving the strait. The Naxians, kinsfolk of the Leontines, received the champion of Leontinoi gladly². Having at last gained one ally, the Athenian generals went on to seek another at Katanê. Here they might look for the same working of Chalkidian sympathies as at Naxos. There was a party in Katanê which was friendly to Syracuse³, and the magistrates of the year must have belonged to it. Their answer was unfavourable; the Athenians went away empty from Katanê, and passed the night off the mouth of the river Têrias, the stream that flows near Leontinoi. They were near the range of their immediate errand. So near to Syracuse Lamachos must have yearned to strike a decisive blow.

Alkibiadès
at Mes-
sana;

the alliance
declined.

Naxos
joins
Athens.

Katanê
refuses.

¹ Thuc. vi. 50. 1; πόλει μὲν ἂν οὐδέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ' ἐξω παρέξειν.

² Ib. 3; Ναξίων δεξαμένων τῇ πόλει.

³ Ib.; ἐνῆσαν γὰρ αὐτοῖσι ἄνδρες τὰ Συρακοσίων βουλόμεναι. We shall presently see who these were.

CHAP. VIII. But the fates were on the side of Syracuse. The threatened city was to have every warning, every means of making herself ready, to withstand any blow that might be struck.

Athenian
ships in
the Great
Harbour.

In the step which was taken the next day we see the true spirit of Alkibiadês. No blow was to be struck, but a striking piece of bravado was to be wrought. The Syracusans were to be given their chance of repenting at the last moment, and the chance was to be given them in a stately and impressive fashion. It must be remembered that Athens and Syracuse were still not strictly speaking at war. There was still a chance that the Syracusans might even now do justice to Leontinoi. Even according to the plan of Lamachos, some formal notice must have been given to Syracuse, even though an instant refusal was followed by an instant assault. But besides this last effort of formal diplomacy, it was expedient to take a survey of the enemy's position, to judge what Syracuse and her strength really was, and above all to find out how she stood in the matter of ships. Did the Great Harbour contain any Syracusan fleet drawn up on shore on that part of its coast which served as the inner dock of the Syracusan war-ships¹? The sixty Athenian ships therefore set forth from the mouth of the Têrias. They sailed along the coast in single column by the site of Megara and the peninsula of Thapsos; they skirted the eastern cliffs of Achradina and the eastern side of Ortygia itself, a sight of wonder, perhaps still of fear, to all Syracuse. At the mouth of the Great Harbour they halted; the wide opening must have been feebly guarded or not at all. Ten ships were sent in advance into the harbour; from one of them, from that, we may believe, which held Alkibiadês, the

Their pro-
clamation
to the
Leontines.

¹ Thuc. vi. 50. 4; *δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προῦπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεῦσαι τε καὶ κατασκέψασθαι εἴ τι ναυτικόν ἐστι καθεικυσμένον*. On the docks in the Great Harbour see Appendix XVI.

herald of Athens made his solemn proclamation. "The Athenians have come to restore their allies and kinsfolk the Leontines to their own land; let then the Leontines who are now in Syracuse come forth without fear to their friends and benefactors the Athenians ¹." None came forth; no answer was made. It is to be supposed that silence was looked on as equivalent to the refusal of all Athenian demands; the Leontines were held to be forcibly hindered from accepting any Athenian offers. Now at least Syracuse and Athens were openly at war.

The ten Athenian ships had sailed into the Great Harbour of Syracuse without resistance. There was clearly no Syracusan fleet ready to resist them, nor were there any ships to be seen drawn up in the docks. The Athenians sailed about as they pleased, making their observations on the city, the harbour, and the coast, and considering what would be the fittest points to occupy when they should come again with a serious purpose ². But before they sailed out again, the first blow in the great Athenian expedition to Sicily was struck. One of the cheering oracles which had come before its starting was fulfilled in an unexpected sort. It would seem that the only Syracusan vessel which the ten Athenian ships found afloat in the Great Harbour was one which was making the very short voyage from the coast by the Olympieion to the island of Ortygia. It fell into the hands of the invaders, who were doubtless hard by the point of Daskôn, which was presently to be their first foothold on Syracusan soil ³.

Examination of the harbour.

"All the Syracusans" taken.

¹ Thuc. vi. 50. 4; κηρύξαι ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν προσπλεύσαντας ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἔκουσιν Λεοντίνους ἐς τὴν ταυτῶν κατοικιοῦντες κατὰ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ συγγένειαν τοὺς οὖν ὄντας ἐν Συρακούσαις Λεοντίνων ὡς παρὰ φίλους καὶ εὐεργέτας Ἀθηναίους ἀδεῶς ἀπέναι. Cf. Plut. Nik. 14.

² Ib.; κατεσκέψαντο τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὀρμαινόμενοι πολεμητέα ἦν.

³ As we shall see presently, this was emphatically one of the places where πολεμητέα ἦν.

CHAP. VIII. It was found to bear the tables which contained the register of the citizens of Syracuse arranged in their tribes. These were perhaps kept in the temple of Olympian Zeus; at any rate they were there at this moment. They had been sent for to the city in order to call out those who were liable to military service¹. The prize was hardly a lucky one. The prophets gave out that this was the fulfilment of the saying which had caused so much delight at the sailing of the fleet. The Athenians were to take all the Syracusans, and now they had taken them². After this exploit, and after examining the Lesser Harbour in the same sort as they had already examined the Greater³, the sixty ships sailed back, not to their station of the night before, but straight to the haven of Katané.

Our first impression certainly is that nothing could be more unwise, more opposed to the sound instinct of Lamachos, than thus to show a part of the Athenian force to the Syracusans, but only to show it and then go away again. Nothing was more likely to rid the Syracusans of all feelings of surprise and dread, and to give them that kind of familiarity with the invading armament which was sure to lead to contempt⁴. Yet this voyage and return

¹ Plut. Nik. 14; λαμβάνουσι ταῦν πολεμίων σανίδας κομίζουσιν, εἰς ἃς ἀπεγράφοντο κατὰ φυλὰς αὐτοὺς οἱ Συρακούσιοι. κείμεναι δ' ἄπωθεν τῆς πόλεως ἐν ἱερῷ Διὸς Ὀλυμπίου τότε πρὸς ἐξέτασιν καὶ κατάλογον τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ μετέπεμψαν. See vol. i. p. 361. I am more inclined than I was then to look on the Olympieion as the permanent dwelling-place of this register. If so, the very strangeness of the choice shows that it must have been owing to some very ancient tradition. Still I do not see that it proves that Polichna was the oldest Syrakousa. But see Holm, G. S. i. 125, 388.

² Ib.; ὅς οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀλοῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐκομίσθησαν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἄφθῃ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἡχθέσθησαν οἱ μάντις, μή ποτε ἄρα τὸ χρεὼν ἐνταῦθα τοῦ χρησμοῦ περαίνει, λέγοντες ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι λήφοντα Συρακούσιους ἅπαντας. See above, p. 106. I think this must be the right place for the story. Plutarch however has another version according to which the oracle was fulfilled—it is hard to see how—καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἀποστρέφας Δίωνα Κάλλιππος δ' Ἀθηναῖος ἔσχε Συρακούσας.

³ This is implied in the words τοὺς λιμένας in note 2, p. 149.

⁴ See above, p. 144. Grote, vii. 265.

seem, in some way not fully explained, to have had an effect at Katanê which was distinctly favourable to Athens. The magistrates of Katanê and the mass of the people were clearly not of the same mind. When the Athenian fleet had appeared unexpectedly at Katanê, the magistrates had declined all dealings with the Athenians. Since then an assembly had been held, and its vote was less unfavourable. Admission was to be refused to any Athenians except the generals, but the generals might come and address the Katanaian assembly, if they thought good¹. This was meeting the Athenian advances half-way. The generals went in accordingly, and Alkibiadês began his speech. A strange accident did more for Athens than his eloquence. Some of the Athenian soldiers had come on land, though they had not entered the city. They seem, whether from mere curiosity or with any further purpose, to have been examining the walls. They found a postern which had been walled up. But the work was so slightly done as to be no hindrance, above all while all Katanê was listening to the famous Athenian. They made their way in, and showed themselves in the *agora*². The ancient city is so faintly represented in modern Catania that we cannot call up the scene as we can call up the events which happened in the *agora* of Syracuse. But we can see that, while the debate was still going on, before the vote had been

CHAP. VIII.
State of
feeling at
Katanê.

Alkibiadês
in the
Katanaian
assembly.

The
Athenian
soldiers
come in.

¹ Thuc. vi. 51. 1; ἐκκλησίας γενομένης τὴν μὲν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Κατωναῖοι, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγούς ἐσελθόντας ἐκέλευον, εἴ τι βούλονται, εἰπεῖν. This makes it plain that the more unfriendly action mentioned above, p. 147, was the provisional action of an unfriendly magistracy. Now the assembly is called, and the people can speak its mind.

² Ib.; τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίᾳ τετραμμένων, οἱ στρατιῶται πυλῖδα τιὰ ἐνφοδομημένην καὶ ἔλαθον διελθόντες καὶ ἐσελθόντες ἡγώραζον εἰς τὴν πόλιν. On ἡγώραζον see Arnold's note. Polyainos (i. 40. 4) makes all this planned by Alkibiadês; τῶν δὲ [Κατωναίων] ἐπιτρεψάντων καὶ θεόντων ἐς ἐκκλησίαν, συνέταξεν δοῖαι τῶν τειχῶν ἦσαν πυλίδες ἐνφοδομημέναι σαθράς, ταύτας ἐξελόντας εἰσὼν παρελθεῖν. Frontinus (iii. 2. 4), as Arnold notices, further transfers the story to an imaginary siege of Akragas.

CHAP. VIII. taken whether Katanê should become the friend of Athens or not, Athenians in arms were present in the assembly. They simply showed themselves and no more; but their presence was enough. Its effect was to allow a free vote on the part of the Katanaian friends of Athens. The partisans of Syracuse, a small body, after all, seeing Athenian soldiers within the walls, left the city in fear¹. The remainder of the Katanaian people then passed a vote accepting the Athenian alliance, and inviting the rest of the Athenian force to come and make Katanê their headquarters².

A valuable ally was thus gained. The Athenians had now a station much nearer to Syracuse than Rhêgion or even than Naxos, a station from which the long hill of Syracuse may be clearly seen. But even after the accession of two Sikeliot cities, Nikias and Alkibiadês were not prepared to strike any decisive blow. A report came from Kamarina that, if the Athenians appeared before that city, it would join their alliance. Further news came that the Syracusans were busy manning a fleet³. The whole Athenian fleet accordingly sailed from Katanê. To go thence to Kamarina, it was needful again to sail by Syracuse, and to make the Syracusans familiar with the sight of the whole fleet going to and fro. The Athenian ships

Unsuccessful attempt at alliance with Kamarina.

¹ Thuc. vi. 51. 2; οἱ μὲν τὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρονούντες, ὥς εἶδον τὸ στράτευμα ἔνδον, εὐθὺς περιδεῖς γενόμενοι ὑπεξήλθον, οὐ πολλοὶ τινες.

² Ib.; οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐψηφίσαντό τε συμμαχίαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἐκέλευον ἐκ Ῥηγίου κομίζειν. The confusion that Diodôros (xiii. 4) makes at this stage is wonderful; Ἀκραγαντῖνοι μὲν οὖν καὶ Νάξιοι συμμαχήσειν ἔφασαν Ἀθηναίοις· Καμαριναῖοι δὲ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι τὴν μὲν εἰρήνην ἄξιν ὁμολόγησαν τὰς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς συμμαχίας ἀποκρίσεις ἀνεβάλοντο· Ἱμεραῖοι δὲ καὶ Σελινούντιοι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Γελῶφι καὶ Καταναῖοι, συναγωνεῖσθαι τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐπηγγείλαντο. Then comes the discovery of the poverty of Segesta; then the entry into Katanê, told much as in Thucydides. About Akragas we should really like to know something; but it is only later that we begin to trace its course.

³ Ib. 52. 1; ἐσηγγέλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τε Καμαρίνης ὥς εἰ ἔλθοιεν, προσχωροῖεν ἂν, καὶ ὅτι Συρακοσίοις πληροῦσι ναυτικόν.

not only sailed by Syracuse; they sailed again to Syracuse. CHAP. VIII. They went on another visit of inspection, in which they found that no naval preparations were making¹. Then they sailed round Pachynos, and reached Kamarina. There they drew up by the shore, and sent a herald up to the city, calling on the men of Kamarina to join their alliance. The answer given—whether by the magistrates on their own authority or by a suddenly called assembly—was that the people of Kamarina were bound by treaty—the old treaty of Gela, it would seem—to receive a single Athenian ship, but no more, unless at their own request². The invaders of Sicily had thus to go away empty from Kamarina, as they had gone away empty from Messana³. On their way back they had their first experience of those Sikeliot horsemen who, as Nikias had warned them, were so likely to keep them out of the island. The army, or some part of it, landed at some unnamed point of the Syracusan territory. They were wandering in search of plunder, when the Syracusan horsemen and light-armed came to the defence of their lands. They slew some of the scattered spoilers; the rest went back to their ships.

The Athenians defeated in a skirmish.

Had the counsel of Nikias been followed, the fleet might by this time have been on its way back to Athens, bearing peace, with or without honour. Had the counsel of Lamachos been followed, the Athenians might by this time have taken all the Syracusans in another sense from that in which the oracle had been fulfilled. Under the guidance of Alkibiadês, they had won two allies; they had failed to win two others; they had carried off a Syracusan official document. Moreover they had taught the

Effects of the policy of Alkibiadês.

¹ Thuc. vi. 52. 1.; *πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας καὶ οὐδὲν εὖρον ναυτικὸν πληρούμενον.*

² *Ib.*; *οἱ δ' οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὅρκα εἶναι μὴ νηὶ καταπλέοντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους μεταπέμψωσιν.*

³ *Ib.*; *ἀπρακτοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι ἀπέπλεον.*

CHAP. VIII. Syracusans to think lightly of the Athenian force, as they saw it go harmlessly to and fro. They had moreover been defeated in the first action of the war, a mere skirmish indeed, but, to say the least, an unlucky beginning. But of Alkibiadês as a commander the great fleet that had sailed to the invasion of Sicily was to see no more. They were indeed presently to feel full bitterly what he could do

His recall. as an enemy. On his return to Katanê, he found the Salaminian trireme, one of the official vessels of the Athenian commonwealth, waiting for him. She brought orders for him and for some other persons who were serving in the army to come home and take their trial on a charge of impiety. The long and striking tale of the internal history of Athens after the fleet had sailed, the informations, the prosecutions, the false witnesses, concern not Sicily directly.

His action against Athens. They touch our story only so far as they put an end to the action of Alkibiadês against Syracuse as an Athenian commander, and led to his action on behalf of Syracuse as the adviser of the Peloponnesian enemies of Athens. He set out for Athens; but he escaped on the way, having dealt one blow against his country on the road¹. We next hear of him in the Peloponnesian congress at Sparta. There he sets forth, with all the malignant zeal of a traitor, how his own city might be weakened and her enterprise in Sicily brought to nought². Indirectly he worked as no other man did for Syracuse and Sicily; personally he concerns us no more. The course of the invading force is left for the present to Nikias and Lamachos, to the skill and daring of the hero, paralysed by the superior authority of a general who could put no heart into the work on which he was sent.

As long as Alkibiadês was the leading spirit of the

¹ See vi. 74. 1. We shall come to this presently.

² Thuc. vi. 88. 9; Plut. Alk. 23.

invading army, Western Sicily seems to have wholly CHAP. VIII. passed out of the Athenian reckoning. Nikias, if he was driven to do anything at all, was more inclined to do it in that quarter than in the more dangerous neighbourhood of Syracuse. He had more definite instructions about Selinous and Segesta than he had about Syracuse and Leontinoi. An attempt was therefore now made to carry out his original plan. While the Syracusans were left to strengthen themselves, and to boast that the Athenians had shrunk from attacking them, the whole force of Athens sailed off to Segesta. The fleet and army were parted into two divisions, each general taking one by lot¹; but they sailed together. Their objects are described as being to find out whether Segesta could even now supply them with money, to inquire into the state of things at Selinous, and—somewhat late it might seem—to learn the points of quarrel between the Selinuntines whom they had come to attack and the Segestans whom they had come to defend². Selinous they seem never to have reached or gone near to; towards Segesta or its distant haven they sailed along the north coast of Sicily. Their first attempt was to win to their alliance the one Greek city on that coast, solitary Himera³. They found no welcome, and they sailed on. Their course must have led them by Solous and Panormos; but of the line taken by the Phœnician cities of Sicily or their mistress Carthage we hear not a word. One thing is plain; nothing had come of Hermokratês' suggestion of an alliance between Syracuse and Carthage, of subsidies to be paid by Carthage to Syracuse. It was among the other

The Athenians in Western Sicily.

Failure at Himera.

¹ Thuc. vi. 62. 1; δύο μέρη ποιήσαντες τοῦ στρατεύματος, καὶ λαχὼν ἑκάτερος.

² Ib.; κατασκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ διάφορα μαθεῖν τὰ πρὸς Ἑγεσταίους.

³ Ib. 2; Ἰμέραν ἥπερ μόνη ἐν τούτῳ τῇ μέρει τῆς Σικελίας Ἑλλὰς πόλις ἐστὶ. Kalé Akté therefore counted as Sikel. We see further that Thucydides wrote this before the destruction of Himera in B.C. 408.

CHAP. VIII. barbarians of the island that the power of Athens was just now most active. When the fleet had passed Panormos, it presently came to the Sikan fishing-town of Hykkara¹. By this time some horsemen from Segesta had come to meet their friends. It was from them doubtless that the Athenians learned that the people of Hykkara were enemies of Segesta. The friends of Segesta made a prize of them. The town was stormed by the Athenian and Segestan force, and the inhabitants were made slaves. The same kind of bargain was made which was made in after days between Rome and Aitôlia for the sacking of Aigina and other Greek towns. The Athenians carried off the moveable goods, among which the human spoil seems to have been the most valuable part. The town and its territory were given over to Segesta, which had representatives there to accept the gift².

Taking of
Hykkara.

March to
Katanê. At this point the land and the sea force divided. The land force marched back to Katanê through the Sikel country. This is all that we hear; we should be glad indeed to know some details of such an armed journey through the heart of Sicily. From what followed we should expect that the enemies of Syracuse would be welcome in most places, but that the feeling would not be the same everywhere. The mass of the fleet too sailed back to Katanê; it was loaded with the whole population of Hykkara, who were to be disposed of in the slave-market of Katanê. Nikias meanwhile, doubtless with a few ships, sailed on to the haven of Segesta, and thence went up to the city. We are pointedly told that he did business there³. What reports he heard of the affairs of Selinous we are not told; certainly

Nikias at
Segesta;

¹ Thuc. vi. 62. 3; ἐν τῇ παράπλῳ αἰρουσιν Ὑκκαρά, πόλισμα Σικανικὸν μὲν, Ἐγεσταίοις δὲ πολέμων ἦν δὲ παραθαλασσίδιον. Plutarch, Nik. 15, calls it βαρβαρικὸν χωρίον. See vol. i. pp. 119, 282.

² Ib.; ἀνδραποδίσαντες τὴν πόλιν παράδοσαν Ἐγεσταίοις, παρεγένοντο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἱππῆς. Cf. Hist. Fed. Gov. i. p. 582.

³ Ib. 4; τάλαντα χρηματίσας καὶ λαβὼν τάλαντα τριάκοντα.

nothing was done in the way of warfare, and we hear of CHAP. VIII. nothing in the way of diplomacy. But the Athenian he takes general took away from Segesta the thirty talents of the thirty talents. which we have already heard; their surrender must have left the hoard of the Elymian city altogether empty. A much larger revenue was made out of the captives of Hykkara. In all matters touching slaves and slave-dealing Nikias was an expert. It startles us a little when we read that a large part of the wealth of the most devout and respectable gentleman in Athens came from the gang of slaves whom he let out to work in the silver-mines¹. The Sale of the Hykkarian captives. human plunder of Hykkara was doubtless sold to the best advantage; part of it, we shall afterwards find, passed into the hands of officers and soldiers in the Athenian army². The whole sale brought in a hundred and twenty talents, four times as much as the remaining store of the commonwealth of Segesta. But could men have divined the future of one, perhaps two, of those captives, the price might have been higher. The women of Hykkara must surely have vied in beauty with their neighbours on Eryx whose reputation still abides. Perhaps it was not confined to Hykkara, but was shared by the whole Sikan nation. Some make the famous courtesan who bore the name of *Lais*. *Lais* to have been part of the spoil of Nikias, but at an age when she may not have fetched a higher price than an average child³. A lucky Corinthian bought her, perhaps

¹ Plut. Nik. 4; *πλήθος ἀνδραπόδων ἔτρεφεν αὐτόθι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐν ἀργυρίῳ τὸ πλείστον εἶχεν*. According to Xenophōn, Mem. ii. 5. 2, he bought his overseer for a talent. See Grote, vi. 390.

² Thuc. vi. 62. 4; *τὰνδράποδα ἀπέδοσαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα*. See Arnold's note, and Grote, vii. 295. Whatever is to be made out of ἀπέδοσαν or ἀπέδοντο, Thirlwall, iii. 396, it is plain that they were not, as Grote thinks, ransomed, but sold. For, as Mr. Jowett (Thuc. ii. 377) remarks, we hear of the ἀνδράποδα Ὑκκαρικά again in vii. 13. 2. Moreover, who was there to ransom them?

³ Plut. Nik. 15; *ὅθεν λέγεται καὶ Λαῖδα τὴν ἑταῖραν ἔτι κόρην ἐν τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις πρᾶθεισαν εἰς Πελοπόννησον κομισθῆναι*. See Appendix X.

CHAP. VIII. not in the market of Katanê. Some to be sure, still keeping within the Sikan fold, bring *Lais*, not from Hykkara but from Krastos. But then Timandra, the mistress of Alki-*biadês* in his last days, is in other accounts brought from Hykkara also. The matter has been debated at length by more than one grave scholar¹; it is perhaps more interesting to learn that *Lais*, under the name of the Fair One of Hykkara, has become a heroine of popular romance on her own shores².

Athenian
mission
to the
northern
Sikels.

The fleet and army were now again gathered at Katanê, with a much richer military chest than they had had a short time before, but with no greater stock of military glory than could be got out of the taking of a single Sikan town. But there was still something to be done, though only in the barbarian department. The fleet, or part of it, was sent again to the north coast of Sicily³. On its voyage from Hykkara to Katanê the commercial business in hand had forbidden either warfare or diplomacy in the places which it sailed by. The present mission was to the Sikel allies of Athens. Nowhere should we have been better pleased with a full geographical description. Among the Sikel places on the north coast were Cepha-*lœdium* and Kalê Aktê, if the largely hellenized foundation of Ducetius is to count as Sikel. Not far off was King Archônidês of Herbita, the friend of Ducetius, whom we know to have been a firm ally of Athens, but of whose actions in that character we get no details⁴. For strictly

¹ See Holm, G. S. ii. 410, and Appendix X.

² See Appendix X.

³ Thuc. vi. 62. 5. The slaves are sold at Katanê, καὶ ἐς τοὺς τῶν Σικελῶν συμμάχους περιέπλευσαν. This can mean none but the Sikels of the north coast; of their southern fellows we shall hear more presently. So Holm, ii. 411.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 381. Thuc. vii. 1. 4; Ἀρχωνίδης . . . δὲ τῶν ταύτῃ Σικελῶν βασιλέων τινῶν, καὶ ὧν οὐκ ἄδύνατος, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν. There is a little difficulty in the geography, as ταύτῃ seems to refer to

Sicilian history the dealings of Athens with these native powers have an interest which they could not be expected to have either for Thucydides himself or for his modern commentators. Their eyes are naturally fixed on the greater struggle whose history just at this moment Nikias contrived to make more barren still. Just now there is nothing to tell at Syracuse. But we do know the object, though not the result, of this mission to the friendly Sikels. They were asked to send a contingent to the Athenian army¹. One at least of the inland Sikel towns was hostile; it may have had no love for Katanê or for the friends of Katanê. One half of the Athenian force went to besiege one of the chief seats of Sikel religion, the holy city of the Galeatic Hybla. The akropolis on the isolated hill was strong; the defence must have been valiant; for the besiegers had to withdraw in confessed failure². And so the season of warfare ended; a memorable summer, which, if Lamachos had had his will, would long before this have seen either the full success of the Athenian schemes or their utter failure in their first stage. Next to full success, utter failure would have been the best fate for Athens. Watching the strife from within the walls of Syracuse, we may rejoice that no such risk ever was run. But even an enemy may feel a kind of abstract wrath at the utter waste of means and opportunities. As it was, nothing had been done on the Athenian side but to fritter away on this and that petty enterprise the strength and reputation of the greatest armament that Greece had ever places nearer to Gela than Herbita. But there may be another explanation.

Unsuccessful attempt on Galeatic Hybla.

Summer of 415.

Waste of power on the Athenian side.

¹ Thuc. vi. 62. 5; στρατιάν κελεύοντες πέμπειν. On κελεύοντες see vol. ii. pp. 511, 512.

² Ib.; τῇ τε ἡμῶν τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἡλθον ἐπὶ Ὑβλαν τὴν Γελεάτιν, πολεμίαν οὖσαν, καὶ οὐχ εἰδον. See vol. i. pp. 160-162, 516. We shall hear of the town again in vi. 94. 3. See also vol. ii. p. 365. Its mention then falls in with its mention now. At both times it is hostile to the enemies of Syracuse.

CHAP. VIII. seen. What would one not give for a true record of the inner thoughts of the hero Lamachos, or even for an exact notice of his personal share in all these doings?

Winter,
415-414.

The winter followed. Reading the tale in Syracuse, on some bright day of the Sicilian winter, one wonders to find that season so often spoken of as the sabbath of the military year. One is tempted rather to think that the winter was the only time in which the toils of warfare could have been gone through. But the Sicilian winter has cold and rainy, as well as bright and sultry days; the east wind is powerful in Ortygia, and the swampy ground of Syrakô and Lysimeleia can sometimes put on the likeness of a lake. But in that particular winter it does seem to have been felt on both sides that something might be done.

Athenian
plans for
the spring.

The Athenians sat down at Katanê to make ready for an attack on Syracuse. When we come to what follows, this seems to mean an attack to be made at some time sooner than the next spring. Still we ask whether the mighty preparations which had been made before the fleet set out, the preparations which were to make the Athenian force, from the first moment of its landing, independent of all Sicilian help¹, had thus far gone for nothing. In Syracuse, at all events, men were eager for speedy action of some kind. They would no longer wait for the Athenians to attack; they would go themselves and strike the first blow². Things had indeed turned out as Lamachos had foretold. The Athenian power no longer struck fear into men's minds. The Syracusans had become familiar with the sight of Athenian triremes sailing by their coasts, sailing into their harbour, and then going away like harmless

Hope and
eagerness
at Syra-
cuse.

¹ See above, p. 103.

² Thuc. vi. 63. 1; τοῦ δ' ἐπιγεγομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς τὴν ἐφοδὸν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ Συρακούσας παρεσκευάζοντο, οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ὥς ἐπ' ἐκείνους λόγους.

merchantmen. Their spirits rose each day, as the invaders CHAP. VIII. altogether forsook their side of Sicily, and sailed to and fro along distant coasts¹. When the news came of the last action of the summer, how the force that had shrunk from attacking Syracuse had failed in attacking Hybla, how the enemy had gone back quietly to rest at Katanê, Syracusan confidence rose to its height². The people, in all the strength of a people's hopes, called on their generals to lead them forth to Katanê, that they might assail the foes who feared to assail them³. The generals had too much wisdom for this piece of rashness; but the Syracusan horsemen who were sent out to reconnoitre⁴ were bold enough to ride up many times to the Athenian camp by Katanê, and to jeer at the invaders of Sicily. Had the Athenians, they asked, given up all thoughts of restoring the Leontines to their own territory? Did they purpose instead to sit down quietly as colonists in a strange land, perhaps to enlarge the population of friendly Katanê with a new settlement of citizens⁵?

Mockery
of the
Syracusan
horsemen.

It was seemingly these taunts which at last stirred up the Athenian generals—that is, which stirred up Nikias;

¹ Thuc. vi. 63. 2: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον φόβον καὶ τὴν προσδοκίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπέκειντο, κατὰ τε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην προΐουσαν ἀνεθάρσουν καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλείοντες τὰ τε ἐπέκεινα τῆς Σικελίας πολλὰ ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐφαίνοντο.

² Ib.; ἐπειδὴ . . . καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ἑβλάν ἐλθόντες καὶ πειράσαντες οὐχ εἶλον βίᾳ ἐτι πλέον κατεφρόνησαν. Plutarch (Nik. 15) seems to follow; he describes Nikias as carrying Lamachos about—ἀγῶν ὑφ' αὐτῷ στρατηγικώτερον ὄντα—delaying, and wasting time; πρῶτον μὲν ἀνωτάτω τῶν πολεμίων ἐκπεριπλέον Σικελίαν θάρσος ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα προσβαλὼν Ἑβλὴν πολυχρόν μικρῶ καὶ πρὶν ἐλεῖν ἀποστὰς κομῇ κατεφρονήθη. But did not Plutarch despise Hybla a little more than Thucydides did?

³ Ib.; ἤξιον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ὅσον δὴ ὄχλος φιλεῖ θαρσύνειν ποιεῖν, ἄγειν σφᾶς ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐκείνοι ἐφ' αὐτοὺς ἔρχονται.

⁴ Ib.; ἐντὶς προσελάνοντες αἱ κατάσκοποι τῶν Συρακοσίων.

⁵ Ib. ἐφ' ὧν ἄλλοι ἄλλα τε καὶ εἰ ξυνοικήσοντας σφίσιν αὐτοὶ μάλλον ἤκειν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἢ Λεοντίνου εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν κατοικοῦντες. Plut. Nik. 16; εἰ Καταναῖοι συνοικήσοντας ἢ Λεοντίνου κατοικοῦντες ἤκουσι.

CHAP. VIII. for Lamachos surely needed no stirring—to do something, winter as it was. The war between Athens and Syracuse now begins. Or, more truly, both Athenians and Syracusans do a little military practice, and take one another's measure before the war really does begin. The first stage of the war—it does not as yet become a siege—has more likeness to a book or two of the Iliad than to the deadly warfare, carried on with all the military skill of the age, which we come to somewhat later. The Athenians sail into the Great Harbour; they occupy a site on Syracusan ground; they fight a battle; they win a victory; and then they sail away again. To do thus much and no more certainly did very little towards advancing the object in hand. Yet all military skill was shown in details, and it was by a cunning stratagem that the invading fleet was enabled to sail into the Great Harbour of Syracuse without let or hindrance¹.

The first
stage of
the war.

Winter,
415-414.

Stratagem
of Nikias.

The object was to march the whole Athenian force out of Katanê, and to occupy some suitable point of Syracusan territory, without the Syracusans knowing anything of their movements. It may again be noticed that, while Catania is not to be seen from the higher ground of Syracuse, the higher ground of Syracuse can be seen from Catania. But Nikias was minded to take every precaution. If Syracusan ships came out against him, he would not be able quietly to occupy the chosen post. On a march the horsemen of Syracuse might do great damage to the weaker division of an army unprovided with horse². He

¹ Thuc. vi. 64. 1; *οι στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων*, says Thucydides; that is Nikias and Lamachos. Polyainos (i. 40. 5), by a foolish confusion, attributes the trick to Alkibiadês.

² Ib.; *τοὺς γὰρ ἂν ψιλοὺς τοὺς σφῶν καὶ τὸν ὄχλον τῶν Συρακοσίων τοὺς ἱππέας πολλοὺς ὄντας, σφίσι δ' οὐ παρόντων ἱππέων, βλέπτειν ἂν μεγάλα*. The Syracusan horse would do damage to the light-armed and unarmed of the Athenian army. This is just what would happen on the flat ground of which there is so much on the way between Syracuse and Catania. In the

would therefore take his whole force on board the ships, and go to Syracuse by sea and by night. And here we get a valuable glimpse of the inner state of Syracuse, one of those glimpses which make us eager to learn more than we can learn. We learn that Syracuse was not altogether a city at unity in itself. We see now that there were Syracusan exiles who were ready to act against their own city; we shall presently see that there was even a party within the walls ready to open a treasonable correspondence with the enemy¹. As the Sikeliot commonwealths then stood, there was nothing wonderful in the presence either of Syracusan exiles without the walls, or of Syracusan traitors within them. Nikias was well served by both classes of the enemies of their own city. And besides Syracusan exiles, there were in Katanê men of such subtle policy that they were able to do the work of Nikias, while they were in the full confidence of the Syracusan generals. One of them was sent on a message to Syracuse. He professed to come from that party in Katanê which was friendly to Syracuse, a remnant which had not left the city when the Athenians entered it². He told the Syracusan generals the names of those on whose behalf he spoke, names which were well known to them³. The Athenians, he said, were in the habit of leaving their camp outside the walls of Katanê, and going unarmed to sleep in the town⁴. Let the whole

The Syracusan exiles.

Message of Nikias to the Syracusan generals.

retreat, when we get into the narrow passes, the Syracusan darters do more damage than the horsemen.

¹ I shall speak of this more fully when we come to the more direct action of the correspondents of Nikias within the city. See Appendix XXI.

² Thuc. vi. 64. 2; *πέμπουσιν ἄνδρα σφίσι μὲν πιστόν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῖς τῇ δοκῇ οὐχ ἥσσον ἐπιτήδειον· ἦν δὲ Καταναῖος ἀνὴρ.*

³ *Ib.*; *ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης ἦκειν ἔφη ἄν ἐκείνοι τὰ δνόματα ἐγίγνωσκον, καὶ ἠπίσταντο ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔτι ὑπολοίπους ὄντας τῶν σφίσιιν εὐνόων.* The more part of the Katannian friends of Syracuse had fled. See above, p. 152.

⁴ *Ib.* 3; *ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους αὐλίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων ἐν τῇ πόλει.* Not necessarily all; but the practice was so common that the camp was often left without proper defence. So Arnold's note, and Grote, vii. 297.

CHAP. VIII. Syracusan force come early on a given morning; they would be able to seize the almost empty camp without trouble¹. The friends of Syracuse in the city would shut the gates; they would set upon the defenceless Athenians in the town, and would set fire to the Athenian ships in the haven. Many men in Katanê were ready to help in the work, and those who sent him had made all things ready.

The Syracusan force marches to Katanê.

The Syracusan generals fell into the trap. The demands of the people already inclined them to a march on Katanê, and this plausible message determined them². They and the messenger agreed on a day; they proclaimed a general march of the Syracusans and their allies, and made every preparation. When the day came, they set forth.

Allies of Syracuse.

Of the allies of Syracuse, who have already begun to come in, we hear of two hundred horsemen from Gela and twenty from Kamarina, with fifty bowmen from the latter city. Of the temper in which this small Kamarinaian force was sent we shall hear again. A larger body of horse, the numbers of which are not given, had come from Selinous³. The Selinuntines were more directly concerned in the issue than the other allies; they therefore came in greater force. Their accession to the side of Syracuse was, besides a hundred and fifty talents added to the Athenian chest, the only visible result of the voyage of Nikias to the west. Whatever business he had done with regard to the quarrel between Selinous and Segesta, the practical

¹ Thuc. vi. 64. 3; *εἰ βούλονται ἐκείνοι πανδημεῖ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἔφ' ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἔλθειν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀποκλήσειν αὐτοὺς παρὰ σφίσι καὶ τὰς ναὺς ἐμπρήσειν, ἐκείνους δὲ ῥαδίως τὸ στράτευμα προσβαλόντας τῷ σταυρώματι αἰρήσειν*. Much has been said about this passage. I suppose one would not be allowed to construe it, "throwing—*hurling* seems the favourite word—the [Syracusan] army against the [Athenian] palisade." But *στράτευμα* and *σταύρωμα* are words so easily confounded that even a hater of guess-work may be tempted to do a little transposing.

² Ib. 65. 1; *ἐπίστευσαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πολλῶ ἀπερσκειτότερον*.

³ Ib.

upshot of it was that the Selinuntines, instead of having CHAP. VIII. to defend themselves against either Athenian or Segestan attack, were able to send a force to the defence of Syracuse. Syracusans and allies set forth. After a day's march they halted for the night by the banks of the Symaithos, in the plain which had once been the territory of Leontinoi, but which, notwithstanding the coming of the Athenian deliverers, was still part of the territory of Syracuse¹. The next day the horsemen rode on before the rest towards KatanĒ, but only to come back to their comrades with the news that there was no longer an Athenian army there. On these tidings the Syracusan host turned round and hastened to the defence of their own city.

Meanwhile the whole Athenian army had gone on board The Athenians sail from KatanĒ to Syracuse. the triremes and other vessels of the fleet. They were strengthened by some Greek and Sikel allies who had lately joined them—from Herbita, one may conceive, and from Naxos². A night's voyage, the night that the Syracusans spent by the Symaithos, brought them to the mouth of the Great Harbour. With the dawn they sailed in; the columns of the Olympieion, white in the early sunlight—no shattered pair but a perfect peristyle—showed them the goal of their voyage. They sailed by the city now empty of fighting men; they landed, and took possession of the spot which the Syracusan exiles had pointed out to them. Nikias wished to encamp at some point where the Syracusan horse would do him no harm. The ground best fitted for his purpose was, so the exiles told them, on the west side of the Great Harbour, hard by the temple

¹ Thucydides (vi. 65. 1) marks the place as ἐπὶ τῇ Συμαίθῃ ποταμῷ ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ.

² Ib. 2; ἀναλαβόντες τὸ τε στράτευμα ἔσαν τὸ ἐαυτῶν καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοις τις προσεληλύθει. A contingent from Archônides would be a very natural result of the voyage to the northern coast (see p. 158), and the warriors of Naxos and KatanĒ, who must surely have done something, may lurk in the ἄλλοις τις.

CHAP. VIII. that stood before them¹. It was a spot from which they could give battle at such time as they themselves might think good, and where the Syracusan horsemen could do the least amount of harm, whether before fighting began or in the fight itself².

The first
Athenian
camp;

at Daskôn.


The general position is clearly marked out by a few touches of Thucydides. It was south of the Anapos, at a point of the shore of the Great Harbour where cliffs are to be found. It was in part at least bordered by a marsh, and it was not far from the Olympieion³. This description at once leads us to the point of Daskôn. The cliffs are there close by the sea, with plenty of broken rocks in front of them; the marsh is there, perhaps in the shape of the present salt-works. The site of the camp was near the Olympieion, but distinct from it. The sacred precinct was not profaned by the invaders; the Helorine way, the hollow way just below the surviving columns, parted the holy place of Zeus from the camping-ground of Nikias⁴. That camping-ground was therefore south-east of the Olympieion, between the Helorine way and the Great Harbour; how far it may have stretched to the south it is hopeless to guess. The ships doubtless lay in the bay of Daskôn, to the south of the point. The sea has plainly encroached here, as in other places. There are many traces of a beach which may well have once been wide enough to allow the ships to be drawn on shore. On the point of Daskôn itself, on the small peninsular ridge between the present salt-marsh and the harbour, a fort was raised. Trees were cut down and dragged to the sea, at once to

¹ Thuc. vi. 64. 1; ἐδίδασκον αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τῇ Ὀλυμπείῳ χωρίου, ὅπερ καὶ κατέλαβον, Συρακοσίων φυγάδες οἱ ξυνείποντο.

² Ib. 66. 1; χωρίον . . . ἐν ᾧ μάχης τε ἀρξέειν ἐμελλον ὁπότε βούλουντο καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἥμισυ' ἂν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ λυπήσειεν.

³ Ib. 65. 2. See Appendix XI.

⁴ See Appendix XI.



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ENGLISH MILES.

supply a palisade for the protection of the ships, and to help in the building of the hasty defence of wood and stone which was raised on the spot most open to a joint attack by sea and land¹. The point commands a view of the whole range of Syracuse in the widest sense, from the furthest point of the Island to the neck of Euryalos. It is a view which, as a view over land and water—and land and water were both to be watched—outdoes the outlook from the Olympieion itself. Here, on the rocky surface, as on many of the forsaken sites of Syracuse, we see signs of occupation, wheel-tracks and cuttings in the native rock, which we are tempted to think may have formed the foundations of some of the walls and houses of which Thucydides speaks². To make their position safer against attack from the city, they took another step. Not far north from the higher ground on which Polichna stands the Helorine road was crossed by a bridge. At a point somewhat higher up the stream than the bridge at present in use³ the stumps of some early successor may still be seen. This bridge the Athenians now broke down⁴. They held themselves safe against attack, and hoped to be able to choose their own moment for an attack on their own part.

The military purposes and the religious scruples of Nikias were thus both satisfied. He had found an encampment for his army, and one that in no way profaned the sacred precinct of Zeus. He outdid the piety of the last invader who had encamped on nearly the same ground. The tyrant Hippokratês had respected the temple and its consecrated hoard; Nikias respected the very soil. The priest of Zeus might go on discharging his official duties, and there is no hint that he needed any such chastisement

¹ Thuc. vi. 66. 2; ὃ ἐφοδύτατον ἦν τοῖς πολεμίοις. See Appendix XI.

² See Appendix XI.

³ See vol. i. p. 361.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 66. 2; καὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀνάκτου γέφυραν ἔλυσαν.

Respect of
Nikias
for the
temple.

CHAP. VIII. at the hands of the general of the Athenians as his predecessor had received at the hands of the tyrant of Gela¹. In all this, the work of a day or two, the invaders met with no opposition from any one in the city; the general march to Katanê would have left but few to oppose. But when the Syracusan army came back, to find how cleverly they had been tricked, to find the enemy firmly established on Syracusan soil, first the horsemen and then the foot came out against them. The breaking down of the bridge seems to have caused no serious hindrance to their march. They came close to the camp, but the Athenians did not come out to meet them. The Syracusans then withdrew, it is said, beyond the road to Helôron². That is, they withdrew into the precinct of the temple, or at least into its immediate neighbourhood.

First attempt of the Syracusans; Nikias declines battle.

Sayings at the time.

The religious scruples of Nikias were seemingly blamed by some, as having allowed the Syracusans to occupy a post hard by his camp which he might have occupied himself. And Hermokratês, to raise the courage of his countrymen, is said to have mocked at the general who declined to fight, as if he had been sent across the sea for some other purpose than that of fighting³. But Nikias knew how to act well when he could be got to act at all⁴; the next day a battle followed, in which he showed that he and his army were quite capable of fighting, whenever they thought good to fight. It is the first battle

The first battle of the war.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 118.

² Thuc. vi. 66. 3; ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ διαβάντες τὴν Ἐλαρινὴν ὁδὸν ἡλίσσαντο.

³ Plut. Nik. 16. He puts the saying after the battle; but it clearly comes before; τοῦ δὲ ποταμοῦ διαφθείρων καὶ ἀποκόπτον τὰς γεφύρας παρέσχεον Ἑρμοκράτει λέγειν παραθαρρόνonti τοὺς Συρακουσίους, ὅτι γελοῖός ἐστιν ὁ Νικίας, ὅπως οὐ μαχεῖται στρατηγῶν, ὥστερ οὐκ ἐπὶ μάχῃ πεπλευκός.

⁴ This is well put by Plutarch, u. s.; πάντες ἠτιῶντο τὸν Νικίαν, ὅς ἐν τῷ διαλογίζεσθαι καὶ μέλλειν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὸν τῶν πράξεων ἀπολλύοντα καιρόν· ἐπεὶ τὰς γε πράξεις οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐμέμψατο τοῦ ἀνδρός· ὀρμῆσαι γὰρ ἦν ἐνεργὸς καὶ δραστήριος, τολμῆσαι δὲ μελλητῆς καὶ ἀτολμος.

between Greek and Greek on Sicilian ground of which CHAP. VIII. we have any full account. It must have been fought between the road to Helôron and the Harbour. The ground is apt to be swampy; but we hear nothing of its state at the time. A late writer has preserved a story of the Athenians strewing the ground with caltrops to lame the Syracusan horses¹; but the falsehood of the tale is at once shown by the circumstances of the battle.

The day after this march of the Syracusans, the Athenians and their allies came forth from their camp in battle Array of the Athenians. array. The right wing was the post of the allies from Peloponnêsos, Argeians and Mantineians; on the left were the dependent allies, the men of the islands²; the Athenians themselves kept the centre. One half of the army was ranged in front, eight shields deep in the military language of the time. The other half was placed as a reserve near the ships, in the same order of eight, but in the shape of a hollow square, with the baggage-bearers within³. They were to come to the help of any part of the army that needed it. The appearance of the enemy Surprise and confusion of the Syracusans. amazed the Syracusans. The confidence which had succeeded their first fright at the invasion had reached its height when Nikias refused battle the day before. That he would come forth to attack them never entered their heads⁴. Their imperfect discipline altogether vanished.

¹ Polyainos (i. 39. 2) has got this ridiculous story; but he marks the ground well; Νικίας στρατοπεδεύοντων Ἀθηναίων περὶ τὸ Ὀλυμπεῖον ἐς τὸ πρὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου χωρίον ὁμαλὲς ὃν ἐκέλευσε νύκτωρ τριβάλους κατασπείραι. We shall come to this trick ages after in the great fight by Troina.

² Thuc. vi. 67. 1; τὸ δὲ ἄλλο οἱ ξύμμαχοι οἱ ἄλλοι. That is, the ordinary ξύμμαχοι. But one wishes to hear something of the Korkyraians who show themselves later.

³ Ib.; τὸ μὲν ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἦν τεταγμένον ἐπὶ ὁκτὼ, τὸ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰναῖς ἐν πλασίῳ, ἐπὶ ὁκτὼ καὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένον. Cf. vii. 79. 1.

⁴ Ib. 69. 1; οἱ Συρακούσιοι ἀπροσδόκητοι μὲν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ ἦσαν ὡς ἦδη μαχομένοι.

CHAP. VIII. The whole force of Syracuse had been called out; but many, expecting no action, had gone to the city, whence some came back in haste at the last moment, taking their places in the line where they could¹. Our guide bears witness to their courage², and he enlarges on their special motives; they were fighting for their own safety, for their country and its freedom³. The Athenians on the other hand—it is their own historian who makes the comment—were fighting to make the land of other men their own. Defeat would do their country a damage; but it would not involve its bondage⁴. But no gallantry of spirit in the Syracusan army could make up for their utter lack of discipline, taken as they were by surprise. They formed however, they and their allies, from Gela, from Selinous, and from doubtful Kamarina⁵. The heavy-armed were sixteen shields deep⁶; the horse, twelve hundred in number, under the command of Ekphantos⁷, were placed on the right, opposite the islanders, and with them were the darters. To meet the horsemen Nikias seems to have had no mounted force whatever. Segesta might have furnished some; but at this time we hear of none from that quarter.

Their
array.

¹ Thuc. vi. 69. 1; *καὶ τινες αὐτοῖς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως οὐσης καὶ ἀπεληλύθεσαν· οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς προσβοηθοῦντες δρόμῳ ὑστέρηζον μὲν, ὥς δὲ ἕκαστός περ τοῖς πλείοσι προσμίξειε καθίστατο.*

² Ib.; οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἑλλικίεις ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμῃ, οὐτ' ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ οὐτ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρίᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς ὅσον ἡ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἑλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν βούλησιν ἀκοντες προὔδιδον. This is very nearly what Herodotus (ix. 62) says of the Persians at Plataia.

³ Ib. 2; Συρακόσιοι μὲν περὶ τε πατρίδος μαχομένοι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκαστος τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ μέλλον ἐλευθερίας.

⁴ Ib. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ τε τῆς ἀλλοτρίας οἰκίαν σχεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν μὴ βλάψαι ἡσώμενοι.

⁵ Ib. 67. 2.

⁶ Ib. See Arnold's note here and that on Thuc. iv. 93. The deeper array of the Syracusans was because of the inexperience and bad discipline of their heavy-armed.

⁷ I suppose one may accept Ἐκφάντος ὁ Συρακουσίαν ἑπαρχος from the story in Polyainos referred to in the last page.

The loss of their thirty talents may for a while have quenched their zeal in the cause of their deliverers. CHAP. VIII.

A speech from the general was a matter of course before a battle. We should have been well pleased to know what was said, or even what Thucydides looked on as likely to be said, by a Syracusan general other than Hermokratès. We should have liked to hear a word from the hero Lamachos, seriously reported and not in caricature. But it is Nikias alone to whom we are allowed to listen, and further to hear from him what the general on the other side must be saying¹. The inference, to be sure, was obvious. The invaders could not but know what must be in the minds of the defenders of their own soil. To Nikias, an invader against his will, it would suggest itself yet more acutely than to other men. But granting his unwilling position, all that we hear of Nikias is thoroughly characteristic of his anxious care, when he did act, to do his duty thoroughly, to leave nothing undone, nothing unsaid. He is described as going round the several divisions of the army, exhorting each as might be specially fitting, besides his general speech to all². In that harangue he reasonably enough foretells victory for such an army as theirs, picked men from Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and the islands³, over the general hasty levy of Syracuse⁴. The man of Old Greece cannot forbear his sneer at the men of the colonial land, the Sikeliots lifted up with pride, who scorned the enemy whom, in their lack of discipline, they

Speech of
Nikias.

His care.

¹ Thuc. vi. 68. 3 ; τὸνναντίον ἐπομυμήσκω ὑμᾶς ἢ οἱ πολέμοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εὖ ὅδ' ὅτι παρακλείονται.

² Ib. 67. 3 ; κατὰ τε ἔθνη ἐπιπαρὼν ἕκαστα καὶ ξύμπασιν, τοιάδε παρακλήετο. Cf. on a greater occasion, vii. 60. 5, 69. 2.

³ Ib. 68. 2 ; Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν οἱ πρῶτοι. He had to be specially civil to the Argeians and Mantineians now Alkibiadès was gone.

⁴ Ib. ; πρὸς ἀνδρας πανδημεῖ τε ἀμυνομένους καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς.

CHAP. VIII. would not be able to withstand¹. At such words Lamachos must have said in his heart that, had his counsel been followed, Syracusans would never have learned to despise Athenians. Nikias goes on to say, in the spirit of some of his speeches in the Athenian assembly, that they must remember that, while the Syracusans, as their generals were sure to be telling them, were fighting for their country, they were fighting far away from theirs². They had no country in Sicily but what they could win for themselves³; defeated, they would have no hope of escape; the horsemen would hinder them⁴.

The battle. Nikias lived to know the full truth of his own words; yet they sound somewhat strange as long as the Athenians had places of shelter at Katanê and Naxos, and had ships in abundance to take them thither. The immediate business of the invaders of Sicily was to overcome the confused host of its defenders which stood opposite to them. The fight began with the skirmishing of the darters, slingers, and bowmen, skirmishing which led to small defeats and advantages on both sides alike⁵. But heavy-armed, above all, heavy-armed under the command of Nikias, could not join battle without every becoming ceremony, military and religious. The prophets offered the usual sacrifices; the trumpet sounded to fight; and the spearmen of Athens, Argos, and Mantinea, pressed on to their work⁶. The

¹ Thuc. vi. 68. 2; *καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἱ υπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομενοῦσι δὲ σὲ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν*. See note 2, p. 170.

² Ib. 3.; *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος ἔσται ὁ ἀγών*.

³ Ib.; *παραστήται δὲ τινι καὶ τόδε, πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς γῇ οὐδεμὲν φίλῃ ἦντινα μὴ αὐτοὶ μαχόμενοι κτήσεσθε*. Cf. Brasidas in iv. 126. 2. It is instructive in every age to listen to the talk of the votaries of "empire."

⁴ Ib.; *ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι, ἐξ ἧς κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ βαδίζειν ἀποχωρεῖν οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς πολλοὶ ἐπικείμενοι*. Nikias was ever saying, like Dionysos (Frogs, 553), *ἱππῆας ὄρω*.

⁵ Ib. 69. 2; *τροπὰς, οἷας εἰκὸς ψιλοῦς, ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν*.

⁶ Ib.; *μάντιες τε σφάγια προῦφερον τὰ νομιζόμενα, καὶ σαλπικταὶ ξύνοδον ἐπάτρυνον τοῖς ὀπλίταις*. So at sea, Æsch. Pers. 395.

Syracusans were simply amazed when they felt the men CHAP. VIII. whom they had so despised, whom they had thought would never have dared to attack them, actually coming against them to the push of shield and spear. But they had their country to defend, and they put themselves in such order as they could. They took up their weapons and marched on to meet the strangers who were encamped on their own soil¹. Presently another cause of fear and wonder fell The rain and thunder. upon them. Thunder and lightning and heavy rain came on. To those who had any experience of warfare this seemed no more than was to be looked for at the time of year. But to the mass of the Syracusans, drawn up in battle array for the first time, the strife of the elements seemed something strange and threatening. All were struck with fear and amazement that the enemy whom they had expected to overcome went on fighting against them². The first honours of the day fell to the Argeians, Defeat of the Syracusans : the division of the Athenian army nearest to the shore, who drove the Syracusan left before them. The Athenians did the like in the centre, and the whole mass of the Syracusan heavy-armed gave way and fled. But they had protectors in the force in which Sicily was strong. The action of the horse. islanders had not overcome the Syracusan horsemen; they were still in order and ready for action; the Athenians therefore could pursue the flyers only for a very short space; if any risked themselves in advance of the main body, the horsemen were upon them³. The Athenians therefore soon came back in a body from their short pur-

¹ Thuc. vi. 69. 1; ὅμοι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφίσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προτέρους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διὰ τάχους ἀναγκάζομενοι ἀμύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα εὐθὺς ἀντεπῆσαν.

² Ib. 70. 1; τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας πολὺ μείζω ἐκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν.

³ Ib. 3; οἱ γὰρ ἐκτὴς τῶν Συρακοσίων πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἄρῃσῃτοι εἶργον, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τοὺς ὀπλίτας αὐτῶν, εἰ τινας προδιώκοντας ἴδοιεν, ἀνέσπελλον.

CHAP. VIII. suit, and set up their trophy. The Syracusans, defeated but not routed, came together in the Helorine road, and put themselves in marching order¹. A garrison was left in the Olympieion—they knew so little of Nikias as to fear a plundering of the holy treasures². The rest of the defeated army marched back to Syracuse.

Nikias
hinders the
spoiling
of the
temple.

We have already seen that, where the devout Nikias commanded, no damage was done to the holy place of Zeus. But there were those in his army who, as they had before blamed his scruples, were now eager for such sacrilegious spoil. It needed all his authority to keep them back from their purpose³. His own first thought was to do all that religion bade him for the men who had fallen on his side, fifty of the Athenians and their allies.

Burial of
the dead.

The bodies were gathered together; funeral piles were raised on the field of battle, and the army bivouacked around the fires⁴. In the morning came the usual message from the defeated side, asking for their own dead. The bodies, two hundred and sixty in number, were given back to them. Their spoils of course remained the prize of

¹ Thuc. vi. 70. 4; ἀθροισθέντες ἐς τὴν Ἑλωρινὴν ὁδὸν καὶ ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυνταξάμενοι. Cf. the mention of the Helorine road in c. 66. 3, and Appendix XI.

² Ib.; ἐς τε τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὅμοις σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακὴν, δέισαντες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν χρημάτων ἂν αὐτόθι κινήσωσι. Thucydides adds emphatically at the beginning of the next chapter, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον.

³ This comes from Plutarch (Nik. 16); τοῦ δ' Ὀλυμπιεῖου πλησίον ὅστος ἔρρηξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καταλαβεῖν, πολλῶν ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ χρυσῶν καὶ ἀργυρῶν ἀναθημάτων. ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐπίτηδες ἀναβαλλόμενος ὑστέρησε καὶ περιεῖδε φρουρὰν εἰσελθοῦσαν παρὰ τῶν Συρακουσίων, ἡγούμενος, ἔαν τὰ χρήματα διαρπάσωσιν οἱ στρατιῶται, τὸ μὲν κοινὸν οὐκ ὠφελήθησεν, τὴν δ' αἰτίαν αὐτὸς ἔχειν τοῦ ἀσεβήματος. There is nothing here that contradicts Thucydides. Plutarch, with Philistos before him, perfectly understood the state of the case, which Diodoros and Pausanias (see Appendix XI) did not. The only question is whether Philistos was as good an authority for what went on in the Athenian camp as he undoubtedly was for what went on within the walls of Syracuse.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 71. 1; συγχομίσαντες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὰν ἐπιθέντες ἠύλισαντο αὐτοῦ.

the victors, while the bones of the slain Athenians were brought together from the burning. The next step, the main act of the day after the battle, must, one would think, have amazed both friends and foes. Nikias had encamped on Syracusan ground; he had met the Syracusans in arms and had got the better of them. But he had no thought of pushing on his success; he had no thought even of remaining in his camp to watch the effect of his success on the defeated side. On the very day of the burial, the Athenian force, with the bones of their slain comrades and the spoils of the Syracusans, were put on board the ships, and all sailed back to Katané¹. We are not told what were the feelings of Lamachos; but the reasons which led Nikias to such a step are set forth at some length. It was winter, no time for carrying on war. And by the Great Harbour of Syracuse war could not be carried on with the force which he now commanded. Unless they were to be altogether trampled down by the Syracusan horse², a body of cavalry must be obtained from Athens and from the Sicilian allies of Athens. Money too, notwithstanding the sale of the Hykkarian captives, must be had from both those quarters. Further attempts must be made to gain allies, who would be more likely to join the enemies of Syracuse after their late success. Stores of corn and of all things needful must be got together, ready for the real attack on Syracuse which was to be made in the spring. Meanwhile the Syracusans were to be given full time for preparation against that attack when it should come. The Athenian fleet and army was to go on falling away from its freshness and vigour. All Sicily was to get more and more accustomed to the sight of the great armada sailing to and fro, its energies frittered

The Athenians sail back to Katané.

Reasons of Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vi. 71. 1; τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τὰ ὀστέα ξυνέλεξαν . . . καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων σκῦλα ἔχοντες ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς Κατάνην.

² Ib. 2; ὅπως μὴ παντάπασιν ἡποκρατῶνται.

CHAP. VIII. away on small and mostly unsuccessful enterprises, and, when it did strike something like a vigorous blow, not daring to follow it up.

Good hope
at Syra-
cuse.

When Athenian victory and Syracusan defeat led to no further results than this, it is in no way wonderful that such a defeat was looked on in Syracuse almost as a victory. A dark cloud had gathered over the city, but the cloud had rolled away of itself. Any tendency to be disheartened was swept away by the wise words of Hermokratês in the assembly which followed the funeral rites of the Syracusan dead. His countrymen, he told them, were in no way lacking in spirit; what had caused their defeat was lack of discipline and military practice¹. Their failure was really not so great as might have been expected under the circumstances. The words in which this position is laid down by Hermokratês are most remarkable. They show how everything goes by comparison; the Syracusan counsellor speaks of Athenians as an Athenian counsellor might have spoken of Spartans. Syracusans and Athenians did not meet on equal terms; it was a struggle between new levies and skilled soldiers—*war-smiths* our own forefathers would have called them—of greater experience than any others among all Greeks². It is somewhat singular that, among his topics of encourage-

Counsel
of Hermo-
kratês.

¹ Hermokratês is brought in (72. 1) by Thucydides a third time (cf. iv. 58; vi. 32) with some solemnity as *ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς τὰλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος, καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρία τε ἰκανὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἀνδρία ἐπιφανής*. His general position is, *τὴν γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἡσσήσθαι τὴν δ' ἀταξίαν βλάψαι*.

² *Wigamithas* we call ourselves in the song of Brunanburh. So there were plenty of *smiths* of other things. The parallel might perhaps have saved some disputing over the word *χειροτέχνης*. Anyhow Hermokratês could not have meant to say that the Athenians "are the first soldiers in Hellas" (cf. 80. 1). In the *δοσιμοὶ δοσιδων* Syracusans could not stand against Athenians; but neither could Athenians stand against Thebans (Thuc. iv. 96. 5). But he might truly say, as he did say, that the Athenians were *πρώτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐμπειρία*. No other people in Greece had the same experience and understanding of war in all its shapes.

ment, he does not mention that in one branch, that of CHAP. VIII. cavalry, they were themselves the *waremists*, while their invaders did not even attempt to rival them. They had no lack of courage, he said; what they wanted was good order; when they had got that, they would have a good hope of overcoming their enemies. And one chief means of bringing about good order would be to lessen the number of their generals, of whom they had as many as fifteen. They should choose a smaller number with full powers; they should bind themselves to them by oath to allow them to act at their own discretion¹. It would thus be possible to keep things secret which should be kept secret, and to carry on their preparations in a more orderly way without being swayed by momentary clamours². They ought to spend the winter in constant military practice under a few skilful commanders³. Above all, they should increase the number and improve the discipline of their heavy-armed. To those citizens who could not afford to find the needful array it should be given at the cost of the commonwealth⁴. If all this was done during the coming months, they would have every hope of overcoming the next Athenian attack.

The number of generals to be lessened.

At such a moment the wise adviser was listened to. A decree was passed that at the next election the number of generals should be cut down to three. And it was perhaps understood that, when that election came, Hermokratēs himself should be first among the three, perhaps further that

His reforms carried out; he is chosen general.

¹ Thuc. vi. 72. 3, 4; μέγα δὲ βλάψαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τὴν πολυαρχίαν [like πολυκαιραντή and πολυκαισαρή] (ἦσαν γὰρ πεντεκαίδεκα οἱ στρατηγοί) . . . τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας χρῆναι ἐλεῖσθαι, καὶ δοῦναι αὐτοῖς τὸ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴν εἰσεῖν ἀρχειν ὅπῃ αὐτοὶ ἐπιστάμενοι.

² Ib.; καὶ τέλλα κατὰ κόσμον καὶ ἀπροφασίστως παρασκευασθῆναι. Does not ἀπροφασίστως mean acting without listening to every suggestion which might be made to serve as a πρόφασις?

³ Ib. 3; ἢν δὲ ὀλίγοι οἱ στρατηγοὶ γένηνται ἐμπειροί.

⁴ Ib.; οἷς τε ὅπλα μὴ ἔστιν ἐκπορίζοντες. So with the Athenians, see above, p. 132.

CHAP. VIII. he should be the adviser of the generals till his turn came¹. During the winter diligent care was given to the work of preparation. This brings us to another stage in the growth of the Syracusan city. The Athenian invasion, like the earlier siege of Syracuse by its own citizens², led to a further extension of the fortified circuit. In the course of this winter the Syracusans fortified the Temenitês, and took it within the wall³. The Temenitês was the sacred precinct of Apollôn, which had hitherto been a detached outpost, like Achradina before Gelôn⁴, and which now, like Achradina, was taken within the general line of defence. But it is not easy to trace the exact bounds of the new quarter. It clearly took in the ground just above the theatre; but its extent to the north and south is uncertain. We may be sure that its western wall did not continue the western wall of Tycha, but that a gap was left between the two new quarters⁵. It is not clear whether it kept to the natural line just above the theatre, or whether it went some way down the hill-side, taking in the theatre, and meeting the wall of lower Achradina at some point further to the south⁶. Nor were the more distant outposts of Syracuse neglected. To the south of the hill Polichna was strengthened; so to the north was Megara, once an independent city, now only a garrison of Syracuse⁷. The

Fortifica-
tion of
Temenitês.

¹ Thuc. vi. 73; *οἱ Συρακόσιοι αὐτοῦ ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντό τε πάντα ὡς ἐκέλευε καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν τε εἰλοντο τὸν Ἑρμοκράτην καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ Σικανὸν τὸν Ἐξηκέστου, τούτους τρεῖς*. The most obvious meaning would be that the fifteen generals were deposed, and the three elected at once. But it must be as is said in the text; for in c. 96. 3 Hermokratês and his colleagues appear several months later as having only just entered on office; *ἀρτι παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν*.

² See vol. ii. p. 313.

³ See Appendix XII.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 142.

⁵ See Appendix XII.

⁶ See Appendix XII.

⁷ Thuc. vi. 75. 1; *καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα φρούριον καὶ ἐν τῇ Ὀλυμπίῳ ἄλλο*. Megara is assumed as an old-standing *φρούριον*, see above, p. 145, and vol. ii. p. 499. A *φρούριον* in the Olympieion was something new, dating only from the battle with the Athenians.

Syracusans looked also to their coast, specially, we may believe, to the shore of the Great Harbour, and defended by palisades all points where the enemy was likely to make a landing¹. For all these works Nikias and Alkibiadês had given their enemies time and opportunity. The city which they had come to attack was daily growing stronger and stronger, harder and harder to take, ever since the wise counsel of Lamachos had been thrown away. CHAP. VIII.

Besides these defensive works in the Syracusan territory, the winter season did not hinder some forms of military action, and it was before all things rich in diplomacy. The Athenians began with one of those expeditions in which a military and a diplomatic character was combined. Its object was Messana. Thither the Athenian fleet sailed from Katanê, in the belief that, when they appeared before its walls, the city would be betrayed to them by a party in their interest². This enterprise must have been planned before the short campaign before Syracuse, even before the voyage to western Sicily. It must have been one of the schemes of Alkibiadês. But before he left Sicily, he had taken care that no scheme in the interest of the country against which he had turned traitor should be carried out, if he could hinder it. His last act before leaving Sicily was to give warning to the Syracusan party in Messana of what was likely to happen³. They laid their schemes at once. The story is more darkly told than usual; but it is plain that Nikias and Lamachos, when they sailed from Katanê, knew nothing of this piece of treason on the part Athenian attempt on Messana.
Treason of Alkibiadês.

¹ Thuc. vi. 75. 1; καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν προεσταύρωσαν παταχῇ ἢ ἀποβάσεις ἦσαν.

² Ib. 74. 1; ὡς προδοθησομένην. He adds; ἀ μὲν ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο, words certainly hard to translate.

³ Ib.; μὴνύει τοῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων φίλοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ, ξυνειδὼς τὸ μέλλον. So Plut. Alk. 22; διέφθειρε τὴν πρᾶξιν, a less grave matter than τοὺς ἄνδρας διαφθεῖρειν.

CHAP. VIII. of their former colleague. And it would seem that the friends of Syracuse, the new allies of Alkibiadês, contrived, by some form of secret murder, to get rid of those with whom he had before plotted. Messana was professedly neutral; but there must still have been a strong Athenian party there; for, when the news came that the Athenians were coming, the partisans of Syracuse had to take to arms to hinder their reception¹. Nikias and Lamachos, seemingly knowing nothing of all this, appeared before Messana. They waited thirteen days; then, as nothing favourable to them happened, and as provisions failed and the weather grew stormy, they sailed away, not to Katanê, but to the nearer station of Naxos². There they encamped, most likely between the Naxian peninsula and the hill of Tauros. There they defended their camp with a palisade, leaving their former camp at Katanê empty, but not dismantled. News reached Syracuse that the Athenians were spending the rest of the winter at Naxos. They accordingly marched with their full force to Katanê; they harried the land; they burned the Athenian camp and its tents, and then marched home again³. This time they did not find the Athenians in the Great Harbour; nor does any blow seem to have been struck by Athenian or Katanaian to

The Athenians at Naxos.

The Syracusans burn the camp at Katanê.

¹ This must be the meaning of the rather dark words in Thuc. vi. 74. 1; *οἱ δὲ τοὺς τε ἄνδρας διέφθειραν πρότερον, καὶ τότε στασιάζοντες καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις ὄντες ἐπεκράτουν μὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι*. *Tôte* must mean when the Athenians were coming; *πρότερον* must mean some former time, and the *ἄνδρες* can be only the former allies of Alkibiadês. And as force was needed when the Athenians were coming, it would seem that their murder must have been secret.

² Ib. 2; *ὡς ἔχειμάζοντο καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκ εἶχον καὶ προύχοντες οὐδὲν, ἀπελθόντες ἐς Νάξον, κ.τ.λ.* Plutarch (Nik. 16), who tells the story of Alkibiades' action in his Life (22), seems to turn the days spent at Katanê and before Messana into days spent before Syracuse after the battle; *ὁλίγων ἡμερῶν διαγενομένων αὐτοῖς ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Νάξον*. Diodôros, on the other hand (xiii. 6), leaves out Naxos altogether, and makes the message at the end of c. 74 of Thucydides go from Katanê.

³ Thuc. vi. 75. 2; *τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων σκηνὰς καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσαντες*.

hinder the Syracusan enterprise. Everything tended to raise the hopes of Syracuse higher and higher. CHAP. VIII.

But the distinguishing feature of this winter was the number of embassies and messages which were going to and fro, between different parts of Sicily and between Sicily and Old Greece. First of all, a trireme was sent to Athens from the Athenian camp at Naxos, with a message from the generals. When the spring began, they were going to attack Syracuse; but they wanted money and horsemen. They asked for money and horsemen to be ready when the time should come¹. A lengthened comment is needless²; only one would like to know what were the feelings of the hero Lamachos. Winter,
415-414.
Embassies.

Nicias asks
for money
and horse-
men at
Athens.

The Syracusans also had their message to send to the old country, not indeed, like the Athenian generals, to their own fellow-citizens, but to their metropolis and to the head city of their race. We see the hand of Hermokratês, perhaps not yet general, but assuredly adviser of the generals³, in the embassy which now went from Syracuse to Corinth and Sparta. The language in which its object is described is remarkable. Alliance between Syracuse and the Peloponnesian confederacy seems taken for granted; a state of war between that confederacy and Athens seems more distinctly to be taken for granted. Sparta and Corinth are asked to give some practical proof of their alliance with Syracuse by sending her help in her need. They are asked to make war more openly and vigorously against Athens, and to assign the wrong done to Syracuse as the ground for this increased energy⁴. Syracusan
embassy to
Sparta and
Corinth.

¹ Thuc. vi. 74. 2; *τρήρη ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ τε χρήματα καὶ ἰπτεῖς, ὅπως ἂμα τῷ ἥρῃ παραγένηνται.*

² It may be found in Grote, vii. 304.

³ The embassy is recorded by Thucydides (vi. 73) in the same breath with the vote to lessen the number of generals.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 73; *ὅπως ξυμμαχία τε αὐτοῖς παραγένηται καὶ τὸν πρὸς*

CHAP. VIII. Whether Athens and Sparta were at that moment at war
 Relations between Athens and Sparta. it might puzzle an international lawyer to decide. They had met in arms more than once; but it would seem that their fifty years' alliance had not been formally dissolved¹.

Plea of the Syracusans.

The Spartans are described as of themselves inclined to an attack on Athens²; and now Syracuse sent a message to ask them to carry that purpose into action. Let them invade Attica; the Athenian force would either be withdrawn from Sicily, or at any rate no reinforcements would be sent thither³. We know not whether the Syracusans had any thought of the powerful advocacy which their embassy was to find at Sparta from a quarter neither Sicilian nor Peloponnesian. But, without any help from outside, their plea was one to which they might reasonably expect their friends in Old Greece to hearken. If Athens and Sparta were not formally at war, there were some of the allies of Sparta with whom Athens could not be said to be at peace⁴. Even without any application from Sicily, war in Greece itself might break out at any moment; and any Peloponnesian power that sought a quarrel with Athens could hope for no better occasion than an appeal from a Dorian city in Sicily against an Ionian invader. For Corinth to take up the cause of her injured colony was no more than her duty as a metropolis. To Sparta and the rest of her allies the prayer of Syracuse supplied an honourable pretext for a step which in every way suited her policy.

While messages were going to and fro along the shores

Ἀθηναῖοις πόλεμον βεβαίωτερον πείθωσι ποιείσθαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ὕπὲρ σφῶν τοῦς Λακεδαιμονίους.

¹ Thuc. v. 48. Cf. vi. 105. 1, 2.

² Ib. vi. 93. 1; οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, διανοούμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας.

³ Ib. 73; ἵνα ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπαγάγωσιν αὐτοῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Σικελίᾳ στήραμα ᾗσσαν ὠφελίαν ἄλλην ἐπιτέμνωσιν.

⁴ As with the Boiotians. See above, p. 86.

of the Ionian sea, busy efforts were making on both sides CHAP. VIII. to increase the number of their allies in Sicily. Kamarina, Position of Kamarina. it will be remembered, had refused the alliance of Athens¹, and had actually sent help to Syracuse². But the Kamarinaian contingent had been small, and it had been sent with no hearty good will to the Syracusan cause³. The ancient traditions of Kamarina would certainly be those of enmity to Syracuse, and Kamarina and Syracuse seem, like most states that march on one another, to have had border differences of more modern date⁴. The few horsemen and bowmen whom Kamarina had sent to the help of Syracuse had been sent mainly out of fear of the vengeance of their powerful neighbours in case Syracuse should get the better of Athens by her own resources⁵. The feeling of the men of Kamarina was on the whole in favour of Athens. But it was modified by the vague dread which the vastness of the Athenian armament had spread everywhere; they feared lest victorious Athens should bring all Sicily into bondage⁶. Things being in this case, the Athenian generals resolved to make another attempt to win Kamarina to their side. The answer which they had received to their earlier attempt had been that Kamarina would abide by the terms of the peace of Gela; they would receive one Athenian ship and no more⁷. The Athenian demand now was that Kamarina should fall back on an earlier relation, when, at the time of the expedition of Lachês, she had been actually

Athenian and Syracusan embassies to Kamarina.

¹ See above, p. 152.

² See above, p. 164.

³ Thuc. vi. 75. 3; ἦσαν γὰρ ὑποπτοὶ αὐτοῖς [Συρακοσίοις] οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προσέμεναι σφίσι μὴτ' ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι ἀξέμεψαν, ἕς τε τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ οὐκ ἐνὶ βοῦλῳ ἀμύνειν.

⁴ Ib. 88. 1; τοῖς Συρακοσίοις δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον διάφοροι.

⁵ Ib.; δεδιότες οὐχ ἦσαν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐγγὺς ὄντας, μὴ καὶ ἀνευ σφῶν περιγίνεσθαι, τό τε πρῶτον αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀλίγους ἱππέας ἐπέμψαν.

⁶ Ib.; τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις εὖνοι ἦσαν, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον εἰ τὴν Σικελίαν φέοντο αὐτοὺς δουλώσεσθαι. In 75. 3 we hear of ἡ προτέρα φιλία.

⁷ See above, p. 64.

CHAP. VIII. in alliance with Athens¹. The Syracusans, hearing of the Athenian design, were eager to hinder the desertion of Kamarina. They knew how lukewarm her zeal was on the side of Syracuse. And now that a Kamarinaian contingent had actually been a sharer in Syracusan defeat, they the more feared lest she should altogether go over to the side which had been so far successful². To hinder such a change, the foremost man in Syracuse was sent with unnamed colleagues to Kamarina to try to persuade her citizens to abide in the Syracusan alliance. Hermokratês headed the Syracusan embassy; the interests of Athens were entrusted to envoys whose leader was named Euphêmos. Both were, according to custom, heard in the Kamarinaian assembly, in the midst of the busy city which once stood where there are now only mournful sand-heaps³. We have a full report, possibly of their actual arguments, at all events of the arguments which the most discerning of contemporaries deemed to be in place in the mouth of each.

Speech of
Hermokratês at
Kamarina.

The relation to his
earlier
speeches.

The speech of Hermokratês at Kamarina should be compared with his earlier speeches at Gela and at Syracuse. It is his speech at Gela over again, so far as might be when alliance with powers in Old Greece was an essential part of his policy. He preaches the old doctrine of Sikeliot union against any power out of the island which seeks to meddle in Sicilian affairs. The Syracusan embassy had not, he said, come to Kamarina out of their own fear of the Athenian power or to keep the men of Kamarina from being struck with dread at it. He and his colleagues had rather come to answer beforehand the

¹ Thuc. vi. 75. 3; *πυνθανόμενοι [οἱ Συρακούσιοι] τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχηςτος γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς βεῦσθαι*.

² *Ib.*; *ὁρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ εὖ πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσιν αὐτοῖς*.

³ The assembly is described as *ξάλλογοι* = *colloquium*, *parliamentum*; that is, it would seem, a special assembly for the purpose. See above, p. 130, note 2.

arguments with which the Athenians were likely to be-
 guile those to whom he spoke. The Athenians made
 certain professions as to the motive of their coming to
 Sicily, but no one could believe that those professions were
 true¹. They gave out that they came to restore the Leon-
 tines to their homes; in truth they came to drive the
 Syracusans and all the Sikeliots out of theirs². What
 their boasted zeal for their Ionian kinsmen in Sicily was
 worth might be seen by the way in which they treated
 Ionian kinsmen nearer home. They talked of caring for
 the Leontines on account of their Chalkidian descent; Hollow-
ness of the
Athenian
pretences. meanwhile they held in bondage the original Chalkidians
 of Euboea, whose city was the metropolis of all the Chal-
 kidians of Sicily³. But their enslaving of Chalkidians in
 Euboea and their proposed zeal for Chalkidians in Sicily
 both sprang from the same source. Both came from Athe- Athenian
love of
dominion.
 nian longing for dominion⁴. Placed at the head of a
 confederacy of Ionians and others who were allied against
 the Mede, they had, by one pretence or another, brought
 all into subjection. The real result of the Median war
 had been that Athens had fought, not for the freedom of the
 Greeks, but to make the Greeks slaves to herself instead
 of to the Great King⁵. The other Greeks had simply
 exchanged the Mede for a master of greater understand-
 ing, but of understanding used only for mischief⁶.

¹ Thuc. vi. 76. 2; *ἤκουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν προφάσει μὲν ἣ πυνθάνεσθαι, διανοίᾳ δὲ ἦν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν.*

² *Ib.*; καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐ Λεοντίνους βουλόμενοι κατακίεσαι, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἐξουκίεσαι. ἡμᾶς, specially considering the construction of the last sentence, must take in more than Syracuse. ³ *Ib.* 76. 2.

⁴ *Ib.* 3; τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέῃ ἐκείνᾳ τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειράωνται.

⁵ *Ib.* 4; οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἄρα, οὔτε οὔτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδ' οἱ Ἕλληνες τῆς ἐαυτῶν, τῷ Μήδῃ ἀντίστησαν, περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσις ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσας. This passage illustrates the difficulty in the use of names which was spoken of in vol. ii. p. 179. Ἕλληνες here, strictly construed, shuts out the Athenians.

⁶ *Ib.*; οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δεσπότην μεταβολῇ, οὐκ ἀφνετωτέρου κακοφνετωτέρου

CHAP. VIII. But, Hermokratês goes on to say, his business as a Syracusan envoy was not to bring charges against Athens, easy as it was to bring them¹. He came rather to rebuke the Sikeliot body in general for not having learned all that they ought to have learned from the examples which had been set before them in Old Greece. They had seen how the Greeks there had been brought into bondage. They had heard the Athenian excuses for intervention in Sicily, their talk about their alliance with Segesta and their kindred with Leontinoi². They ought to join together with one consent to let the Athenians know that here in Sicily they would not find men like Ionians of the Hellespont or the islands, men used always to obey some master, be he the Mede or any other. Here they would find free Dorians from free Pelopônnêsos settled on Sicilian soil³. Would they wait, he asked, to be overcome city by city? That was the only way in which they could be overcome⁴, and that was the way in which the Athenians were striving to overcome them. Each city ought to hold that the overthrow of a neighbour was simply the forerunner of the overthrow which was next coming upon itself. It was a delusion to think that the Athenians were the enemies of Syracuse, and not of Kamarina or any other Sikeliot city. The men of Kamarina were not asked to fight for Syracuse

Exhorta-
tion to
common
Sikeliot
action.

δὲ. This is rather like *μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων* in Xen. Hell. v. 2. 36.

¹ Thuc. vi. 77. 1; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐκατηγόρητον οὖσαν πόλιν νῦν ἤκομεν ἀποφανοῦντες ὅσα ἀδικεῖ.

² Ib.; ταῦτά παρόντα σοφίσματα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενῶν κατοικήσεως καὶ Ἐγεσταιῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπικουρίας. The use of *σοφίσματα* should be noticed.

³ Ib. 77; δεῖξαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐκ ἴσους τάδε εἰσὶν, οὐδ' Ἑλλησπόντιοι καὶ νησιῶται, οἱ δεσπότην ἢ Μῆδον ἢ ἕνα γέ τινα δεῖ μεταβάλλοντες δουλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ Δωριῆς ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ' αὐτονομίας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὴν Σικελίαν οἰκοῦντες. The Sikeliots, as elsewhere they are *ἡπειρώται* (see vol. i. p. 2), are here denied to be *νησιῶται* (see above, p. 88). But the Kamarinaians, colonists of Gela, a colony of Rhodes, were as much *νησιῶται* as the Syracussans were Peloponnesians.

⁴ Ib. 2.

but with Syracuse. The man of any other city who fought against Athens on Syracusan soil was in truth fighting for his own city with Syracusan help¹. It was vain to say that it was the interest of any other cities that Syracuse should be, not destroyed, but so far weakened as no longer to be dangerous to her neighbours². That was not the way in which human affairs could be managed; none of them could undertake that Syracuse should lose just as much strength as suited him, and no more³. They must not be led astray by words. They might seem to be asked to strive on behalf of the power of Syracuse; they were really called on to strive for their own freedom. Kamarina above all, the city nearest to Syracuse, the one whose turn would come next⁴, should be ready to do for Syracuse all that she would have had Syracuse do for her, if Kamarina had chanced to be the first city to be attacked.

Hermokratēs then turns to another point. If the men of Kamarina talked about duties arising out of their alliance with Athens—the alliance concluded with Lachēs⁵ is, somewhat unexpectedly, assumed to be still in force—let them remember that they did not make their treaty in order to attack their own friends or to support Athens in attacks upon others. The treaty was simply one which bound Athens and Kamarina to mutual help in case either was attacked by an enemy⁶. The Rhegines themselves—

Case of
alliances
with
Athens.

¹ Thuc. vi. 77. 2.

² Ib. 78. 2; εἰ τις . . . τὰς Συρακοῦσας κακωθῆναι μὲν ἵνα σωφρονισθῶμεν βούλεται, περιγενέσθαι δὲ ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτοῦ ασφαλείας, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως βούλησιν ἐπιτίθει.

³ Ib.; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν γενέσθαι.

⁴ Ib. 4; μάλιστα εἰδὲς ἡμᾶς, ᾧ Καμαραῖοι, ὁμόρου ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύοντας.

⁵ Ib. 79. 1; λέγοντες ξυμμαχίαν εἶναι ἡμῖν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους. See above, p. 184, note 1.

⁶ Ib. 79. 1; ἥν γε [ξυμμαχίαν] οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐποιήσασθε, τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἥν τις ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἴη, καὶ τοῖς γε Ἀθηναίοις βοηθεῖν, ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ αὐτοῖς

CHAP. VIII. among the oldest allies, he might have added, of Athens
 Example of the Rhéginés. in the West—Chalkidians as they were, had declined to help Athens in the restoration of the Chalkidians of Leontinoi. To them the call to help in such a work must have had a fair show; but they had seen through the deception ¹. All the more strange then would it be if they, the men of Kamarina, should be led away by any winning pretext to join with their natural enemies in making war against their natural kinsfolk ². Justice was not on the Athenian side, nor was their power really to be feared, if only all who were threatened would hold together. It was to be dreaded only in case of those dissensions among the Sikeliots which it was the chief object of the Athenians to bring about ³. Even against Syracuse, a single enemy, they had indeed been successful in a battle; but, after the battle, they had gone away in haste ⁴. He adds that help will assuredly come from Peloponnésos, and that the Peloponnesians are far better in war than the Athenians ⁵. Let them not talk of neutrality, of treating both sides as allies ⁶. Let them stand forth to help the side whose cause was at once the righteous cause and their own cause. Let them not by standing aloof betray their Dorian kinsmen into the hands of their Ionian enemies ⁷.

ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς πέλας ἀδικῶσιν. He has the phrase τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νομίζειν (where πολέμος could hardly be used) in his mind. Still ἐχθρός marks that systematic enslavers of other cities were something more than πολέμοι. See above, p. 98. He gets stronger directly.

¹ Thuc. vi. 79. 2; ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ καλοῦ δικαίωματος ὑποπτεύοντες ἀλόγως σαρφρονοῦσι.

² Ib.; τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολέμους βούλεσθε ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον φύσει ἐυγενεῖς μετὰ τῶν ἐχθρίστων διαφθεῖραι.

³ Ib.; ἢν ὅπερ οὗτοι σπεύδουσιν, τὰναντία διαστῶμεν.

⁴ Ib.; μάχῃ περιγενόμενοι, ἔπραξαν ἃ ἠβούλοντο, ἀπῆλθον δὲ διὰ τάχους.

⁵ Ib. 80. 1; ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου παρεσομένης ὠφελίας, οἱ τῶνδε κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ πολέμα. See above, p. 176.

⁶ Ib.; τὸ μηδετέροις δὴ, ὥς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους, βοηθεῖν.

⁷ Ib. 3; ἐπιβουλευόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ Ἰώνων ἀεὶ πολέμιον, προδιδόμεθα δὲ ὑπὸ ἡμῶν Δωριῆς Δωριέων.

This clear setting forth of a strictly Sikeliot policy no doubt gives us the true mind of Hermokratês. The appeals to enmities of race seem merely thrown in to win the good will of those among his hearers who were not likely to rise to the height of his general argument. An answer to him was made by the Athenian envoy Euphêmos, a man of whom we do not hear elsewhere. His speech is one of the most remarkable in the whole collection of Thucydides. Its line of argument so exactly falls in with that put into the mouths of other Athenian orators that we may be sure that, whether it be characteristic of the man or not, it is at least characteristic of the people. Never was the doctrine of interest, and of nothing but interest—the doctrine of dominion, of what it has lately become the fashion to call “empire”—the doctrine of “expansion” in the form of “empire”—more clearly, more unblushingly, set forth. It simply comes to this. Athens seeks dominion, such dominion as she is capable of. Her conduct is ever that which is best suited to win and to keep such dominion. She will bring one kinsman into bondage, she will support the independence of another, if her interests are likely to be supported by such seemingly inconsistent doings. The Syracusan orator had said that Ionians were always enemies to Dorians. This the Athenian orator does not deny. But all such feelings spring out of interest and are modified by interest. In Old Greece Ionians were enemies to Dorians, because their Dorian neighbours were stronger than they, because they had to look out carefully lest they should be subdued by them¹. After the Median war, being strong at sea, they had cast off all dependence on the Lacedæmonians. For Lacedæmonians had no more right to command Athenians than Athenians had to command Lacedæmonians, except so far as might gave

CHAP. VIII.
Speech of
Euphêmos.

Doctrine
of interest
and em-
pire.

Athenian
policy
guided by
interest.

¹ Thuc. vi. 82. 2.

CHAP. VIII. them right¹. They, the Athenians, were now leaders of those Greeks who had formerly been under the King; they had strength to defend them against him, which the Peloponnesians had not, and, if they had turned their kinsmen and allies into subjects, they had good reasons for so doing². Athens owed them no thanks; islanders and Ionians had come with the Mede when he sought to enslave her³. Athens ruled, and had a right to rule, because she had the greatest naval power, and because she had used it most zealously against the common enemy⁴.

Athens
and her
subject
allies.

He then turned to more immediate questions. The interference of Athens in Sicily was not uncalled for; it was demanded by her own interests. If Kamarina could not of herself hold up against Syracuse, it was the interest of Athens to give her help, as thereby Syracuse would be hindered from sending help to the Peloponnesian enemies of Athens⁵. There was no inconsistency when Athens proclaimed the independence of Chalkidians in Sicily and kept their metropolis in Euboea as one of her subjects. To maintain the dominion of Athens in the seas and islands of Old Greece, it was needful that the Euboian Chalkis

¹ Thuc. vi. 82. 2; οὐδὲν προσήκον μᾶλλον τι ἐκείνους ἡμῶν ἢ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνοις ἐπιτάσσειν, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον ἐν τῷ παρόντι μίζον ἰσχυρον.

² Ib.; οὐδὲ ἀδίκως καταστρεψάμενοι τοὺς τε Ἴωνας καὶ νησιώτας οὐκ ἐυγρενεῖς φασὶν ὄντας ἡμᾶς Συρακοῖοι δεδουλώσθαι.

³ Ib. 3; ἦλθον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητρόπολιν, ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, μετὰ τοῦ Μήδου. He goes on to contrast their conduct with that of the Athenians; καὶ οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν ἀποστάντες τὰ οἰκεία φθεῖραι, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν, δουλείαν δὲ αὐτοῖς τε ἐβούλοντο καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπενεγκεῖν. Cf. the appeal to the Ionians which Themistoklēs cuts on the rocks, in Herod. viii. 22, and which was proclaimed by the voice of Leotychidēs in ix. 98. But it was convenient to forget that the Ionians of Asia had once revolted without getting much help from Europe.

⁴ Ib. 83. 1; ἀνθ' ὧν δέιοι τε ὄντες ἅμα ἀρχομεν, ὅτι τε ναυτικὸν πλεῖστόν τε καὶ προθυμίαν ἀποφάσιστον παρεσχόμεθα ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

⁵ Ib. 84. 1; διὰ τὸ, μὴ ἀσθενεῖς ὑμᾶς ὄντας, ἀντέχειν Συρακοῖοις, ἥσσαν δὲ, τούτων πεμφάντων τινὰ δύναμιν Πελοποννησίους, ἡμεῖς βλαπτοίμεθα.

should be unarmed and tributary. But in Sicily, where ORAP. VIII. Athens sought no dominion but only alliances, it was her Athens and the interest that Leontinoi and any other Sicilian enemy of Sikeliota. Syracuse should be independent and powerful¹. A city holding dominion was, so says the Athenian orator, like a man holding a tyranny. With such a man or such a city nothing is unreasonable that is expedient, and those only are kinsfolk who can be trusted². Enemies and friends are such according to circumstances. Here in Sicily Athens had no temptation to weaken her friends, but rather to strengthen them that they might help her to weaken her enemies. Even at home she treated her allies in different ways, as best suited her policy. The mass of them were tributary; but Chios and Méthymna simply supplied ships, Independent allies of Athens. and were in other matters independent. And she had other allies who helped her freely of their own will, islanders some of them and open to attack, but whose perfect independence it was the policy of Athens to respect, because they lay in such a position towards Peloponnēsos as to hinder any attempts on the part of Syracuse to support the Peloponnesian cause. Korkyra of course is the island mainly in the speaker's thoughts, but Kephallēnia and Zakynthos were there also³. On the perfect independence

¹ Thuc vi. 84. 2, 3; διόπερ καὶ τοὺς Λεοντίνους εὐλογον κατοικεῖν, μὴ βημεῖος ὥσπερ τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνατατάτους . . . καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς, ἐν ἀλόγως ἡμῶς φησὶ δουλωσαμένους τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἐλευθεροῖν, ξυμφορὸς ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ἂν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρον, τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε, καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι, οἱ μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι.

² Ib. 85. 1; ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἔχουσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὃ τι ξυμφέρων, οὐδ' οἰκείον ὃ τι μὴ πιστόν. Here the position of Dēmos as tyrant, asserted by Kleon in Thuc. iii. 37. 2 (τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν), is taken for granted. So in the Knights, 1111;

ὦ Δῆμέ, καλὴν γ' ἔχεις
ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἀν-
θρώποι δεδῶσι σ' ὥσ-
περ ἄνδρα τύραννον.

So he has the milder titles of μόναρχος and βασιλεὺς in 1330, 1333.

³ Ib. 2; ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλευθέρως ξυμμαχοῦντας, καίπερ νησιώτας

CHAP. VIII. of the continental and Peloponnesian allies of Athens, Argos and Mantinea, it was hardly needful to insist.

Relations
of Athens
and Syra-
cuse to-
wards Ka-
marina.

The Athenian orator ended with a practical appeal. The Syracusans were seeking the dominion of all Sicily, and, in the case of Athenian defeat, they were likely to win it. It was on the ground of the likelihood of such an event, and of the danger to Athens that would follow on it, that Athenian intervention in Sicily had been first asked for¹. It was not just to suspect Athens merely because the force that she sent might seem greater than was needful for the immediate purposes for which she professed to have sent it². They should rather distrust the Syracusans. Their real objects were shown in their treatment of Leontinoi. And they, starting from a great city in the island, could carry out such purposes. Athens had no such purposes, because dominion in Sicily, a land so far away, was for her impossible. She could help her friends against her enemies and theirs; that it was her interest to do; more than that she could not do, and without the help of her Sicilian allies she could do nothing³. He was not pleading before the Kamarinaians as before a court entitled to judge or to correct the conduct of Athens⁴. He simply called on them to consider whether, if Athens was the ceaseless meddler and busybody which men called her⁵, her tendency that way was always mischievous. Let them think whether her intermeddling had not done good

ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους, διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον.
For Kephallēnia and Zakynthos, and their special position as islands, see vii. 57. 7.

¹ Thuc. vi. 86. 1; τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἡμᾶς ἐπηγάγεσθε οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ προσείοντες φόβον, ἢ εἰ περισφόμεθα ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων γενέσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν.

² Cf. above, pp. 134, 135.

³ Thuc. vi. 86. 3; ἡμεῖς μὲν γε οὐτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ' ὑμῶν.

⁴ Ib. 87. 3; καὶ ὑμεῖς μήθ' ὥς δικασταὶ γενόμενοι τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων μήθ' ὥς σωφρονισταί.

⁵ Ib.; ἡ ἡμετέρα πολυπραγμοσύνη.

to many of the Greeks, and whether the men of Kamarina CHAP. VIII. were not likely to be among the number. Let them then not refuse the offer of so great a gain as Athens promised them. Let them join Athens against Syracuse as equal allies. They had nothing to fear from Athens, and Athenian success would relieve them from the need of being always on their guard against Syracuse.

If we look on this speech as shameless in its assertion of interest as the only guide in human affairs, it is none the less bold and ingenious. But a Kamarinaian speaker might have asked back again what security Kamarina and the other Sikeliot cities would have in case of Athenian success against Syracuse. As long as Syracuse was powerful, it was doubtless the interest of Athens to respect the independence of her Sikeliot allies; if Syracuse were overthrown, her interest in that matter would be less clear. The Athenian plea that Sicilian dominion on the part of Athens was impossible was one which it was hardly safe for Sikeliots to trust to; it was not unlikely that on such a point victory over Syracuse might open new lights to Athens. And the plea of danger to Athens from Syracusan help to her Peloponnesian enemies was transparent on the face of it. It admitted of a good diplomatic answer, namely that Athens had at that moment no Peloponnesian enemies, that she was at peace with Sparta and even in alliance with her. An Athenian might have rejoined that the alliance was nominal, and the peace likely to be broken at any moment. And an answer might have been made again that, if the peace was precarious, it had become so largely through the tendency to universal meddling on the part of Athens, meddling in Peloponnesos first and now renewed meddling in Sicily. But beyond all this was the simple fact that, from the beginning of the war, no Syracusan help had gone to the enemies of Athens, and that, at the moment which Athens chose for

*Fallacies
in the
speech of
Euphemos.*

CHAP. VIII. her invasion of Sicily, such help was not only unlikely, but actually impossible.

Difficulties
of the
Kamarina-
naians.

We are not admitted to hear the debates which must have followed among the Kamarinaians themselves; but we have a short and clear statement of the feelings which swayed them both ways. They were enemies of Syracuse, border enemies; the Kamarinaian state, it might have been added, had come into being only by a dismemberment of Syracusan territory¹. Syracusan success, if gained without their help, would most likely mean their own destruction. But their natural inclination towards Athens, as the enemy of Syracuse, was tempered by the fear that victorious Athens might be as dangerous to them as victorious Syracuse. And the late victory of Athens brought this danger more forcibly before them. That victory had been a victory over Kamarina as well as over Syracuse. But the small Kamarinaian contingent which had taken a part in the battle had been sent out of no love for Syracuse, but simply to give Kamarina some claim upon Syracuse, in case of final Syracusan success². They determined therefore to continue this policy and to give some slight help to Syracuse³. But for the present they voted to give the like answer to both sides. Athens and Syracuse, so the formal vote ran, were both allies of Kamarina. As war had broken out between them, it was the duty of Kamarina, as the sworn friend of both, to give no help to either against the other⁴.

Their in-
clination to
Athens.

Their
neutrality.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 318.

² See above, p. 183.

³ Thuc. vi. 88. 2; τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ὑπουργεῖν μὲν τοῖς Συρακούσαις μάλλον ἔργῳ, ὥς ἂν δύνωνται μετρίωτατα, ἐν δὲ τῇ παρόντι, ἵνα μὴδὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔλασσον δοκῶσι νείμαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐπικρατέστεροι τῇ μάχῃ ἐγένοντο, λόγῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἴσα ἀμφοτέροις. In the catalogue in vii. 58. 1 the Kamarinaians appear as allies of Syracuse, with the comment *ὅμοιοι ὄντες*.

⁴ Ib.; ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἀμφοτέροις οὐδὲ ξυμμάχοις σφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμος ὢν, εὖορκεν δοκεῖν εἶναι σφίσιν ἐν τῇ παρόντι μηδενίκοις ἀμύνειν.

The Syracusans spent the remainder of the winter in making ready for the expected campaign of the spring. ^{CHAP. VIII.} 414. The Athenians, from their camp at Naxos, were chiefly engaged in dealings with the Sikels, trying to win over as many as might be to their alliance. The Sikels of the inland parts of Sicily, who had always kept their independence, were mostly favourable to Athens, and gave her active support¹. They supplied men and corn, and some of them even money. But even among the independent Sikels this course was not universally taken; and of those who held the plain country nearer the sea, who lived as Syracusan subjects or dependents, few ventured to revolt². On those who refused to join them the Athenians made war. Some they brought over by force; their attempts on others were defeated by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons to their help. For all these purposes Katanê was a better centre than Naxos. They therefore came back to their old quarters for the rest of the winter, and set up again the camp which the Syracusans had burned³. Thence they sent round to all their Sikel allies, and to Segesta also. They asked for the greatest supply of horses that might be, and also for bricks, iron, and all things that were needful for a siege. All was to be ready by the spring; then the war was really to begin⁴. The Athenians return to Katanê.

¹ Thuc. vi. 88. 4; τῶν δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν ἔχόντων αὐτόνομοι οὔσαι καὶ πρότερον δαὶ αἱ οὐκ ἔσονται εἰσὶν, πλὴν ὀλίγοι, μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦσαν. The construction is hard and οὐκ ἔσονται is an odd word; but one is amazed at Arnold's note. Surely he had read the story of Ducetius and a thousand other things which show that the Sikels had got far beyond the stage when "their habitations had nothing in them approaching to civil union."

² Ib.; οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ πεδία μᾶλλον τῶν Σικελῶν, ἐπηκτοὶ ὄντες τῇ Συρακοσίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀφροσθήκεσαν. This last word so naturally means revolt from Syracuse that one is almost tempted rather to read οὐ πολλοί, as some do, than to understand it, with the Scholiast and Arnold, "stood aloof from Athens."

³ Ib. 5.

⁴ Ib. 6; ὡς δὲμα τῷ ἡμῖν ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου.

CHAP. VIII. Besides this action within the island, it was part of the Athenian policy of the moment to seek for barbarian help in other and more powerful quarters than among the barbarians of Sicily. Embassies were sent to the old foes of Syracuse in Africa and in Europe, to Carthage and to Etruria¹. Of the embassy to Carthage we hear nothing beyond the fact of its being sent; but it is certain that no Punic help came to the Athenian camp. In the present state of things at Carthage², in the present state of Carthaginian feeling towards Athens³, it was not likely that any should come. With the other ancient enemy of Syracuse the Athenian negotiations had better luck. Some of the Etruscan cities promised help to Athens⁴, and we shall see that some amount of help, small but effective, actually came⁵.

Syracusan embassy to Peloponnesos. But the main diplomatic interest of the time gathers round quite another quarter from Sikels, Carthaginians, or Etruscans. The Syracusan embassy despatched to Corinth and Sparta sailed as usual along the coasts of Greek Italy. They called on the Italiot cities not to sit quiet while Athens was engaged in schemes of aggression which would certainly sooner or later touch them as well as the Sikeliots⁶. We hear nothing of the answers which they received; but at a later stage we find some Italiots in the catalogue of Athenian allies, and none among those of Syracuse⁷. But if the Syracusan embassy gained but

¹ Thuc. vi. 88. 6; *ἔπεμψαν μὲν ἐς Καρχηδόνα τριήρη περὶ φιλίας, εἰ δύναιντό τι ἀφελεῖσθαι, ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς Τυρσηνίαν.*

² See above, pp. 17, 84.

³ See above, pp. 88, 112.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 88. 6; *ἔστιν ἂν πόλεων ἐπαγγελλομένων καὶ αὐτῶν ζυμπολεμῶν.*

⁵ Ib. vii. 53. 2; 57. 11.

⁶ Ib. vi. 88. 7; *ἐπειρῶντο πείθειν μὴ περὶ τὰ γυρόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥς καὶ ἐκείνοις ὁμοίως ἐπιβουλευόμενα.*

⁷ Ib. vii. 57. 11.

little on the road, all that they could wish for was found CHAP. VIII.
 in the ever watchful mother-city. Corinth gladly received
 the representatives of her threatened daughter, and listened
 with a ready ear to her call for help at the hands of her
 parent. The Corinthian assembly, not a democratic body Corinth
 like that of Syracuse, but still a real assembly, the promises
 assembly of all who enjoyed full political rights in the help.
 Corinthian state, at once voted to help Syracuse with all
 the power of Corinth¹. They voted further to send envoys
 of their own to Sparta in company with the envoys of
 Syracuse, to call on the Lacedæmonians at once to send
 help to Sicily and to put an end to the uncertain state of
 things at home by making open war upon Athens².

When the joint embassy of Corinth and Syracuse reached
 Sparta, they found a powerful helper on whom they had
 not reckoned. The Athenian Alkibiadēs was there, with Alkibiadēs
 some comrades in exile, ready and eager to do all that at Sparta.
 he could for the damage of his own city. He had never
 gone to Athens to take his trial on the charge of im-
 piety. He had made his way from Thourioi to Kyllênê
 in the land of Elis, and thence, on receiving a Spartan
 invitation and safe-conduct, he had come to Sparta itself³.
 At Athens meanwhile, as he had failed to appear for trial,
 he was condemned to death in his absence⁴. In this way
 dead to his own country, he did not scruple to become
 her active enemy, and to act as the counsellor of Sparta,
 Corinth, and Syracuse against her. He found the *ephoroi* His action
 and the other leading men of Sparta in a state of mind against
 thoroughly characteristic of Spartans. They were very Athens.

¹ Thuc. vi. 88. 8; οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ὥστε πᾶσι προθυμῶς ἀμύνειν.

² Ib.; τὸν τε αὐτοῦ [in Old Greece] πόλεμον σαφέστερον ποιῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀφελίαν τινα πέμπειν.

³ Ib. 9; αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεταπεμφάντων, ὑπόσπονδος ἐλθόν. Strangers were not often welcomed to Sparta so eagerly.

⁴ Ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ, says Thucydides, vi. 61. 7.

CHAP. VIII. willing to send an embassy to Syracuse to bid the Syracusans to come to no terms with the Athenians; they were less ready to send them the active help which was needful towards carrying out their bidding¹. The Athenian traitor wished to see some weightier blow than this dealt against Athens, and he spoke his mind in the Spartan assembly. He could not claim a hearing as the representative of any power friendly or unfriendly; he could have been allowed to speak only by special permission granted on personal grounds².

Speech of
Alkibiadēs.

Alleged
schemes of
Athens.

Of the speech which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Alkibiadēs we have in a manner heard a good deal already. It is here that we find the fullest setting forth of the vast plans of Athenian ambition to which we have already listened. Alkibiadēs spoke of Athenian designs for subduing, not only Sicily but Carthage, and for coming back to attack Peloponnēsos at the head of all the forces of the West³. In all this we have no need to believe that he was telling a purely fictitious tale for the purposes of the present moment. But he was assuredly taking schemes of his own, schemes which had taken a definite shape in his own mind but which he himself would hardly have ventured to set forth publicly in the Athenian assembly, and speaking of them as if they were the deliberate purpose of the Athenian people in general. With the mass of the people they could hardly have got beyond the stage of talk, earnest perhaps, but still vague and informal⁴. But on Lacedæmonian hearers such talk was likely to have its effect; the wild hopes of Alkibiadēs would be

¹ Thuc. vi. 88. 10; διασσευόμενον τῶν τε ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων πρέσβεις πέμπειν ἐς Συρακούσας κωλύοντας μὴ ἐμβάλλειν Ἀθηναίους, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐ προθύμον ὄντων.

² The formula in which he is introduced is emphatic; παρελθὼν δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης παράφυνέ τε τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἐξάρμησε λέγων τοιαῦτα.

³ Thuc. vi. 90. See Appendix VII.

⁴ See Appendix VII.

taken for the definite purposes of Athens. SYRACUSANS ORAP. VIII. too and Corinthians would welcome it as well fitted to bring the Lacedæmonians to the conclusion which they hoped for.

The defence which Alkibiadès pleads for his own treason, his picture of the "acknowledged folly" of democracy¹, touch Athens more than Sicily. What concerns us is the advice which he gave as to the carrying on of the war in Sicily and the beginning again of the war in Old Greece. His advice to Sparta. In the latter department it was his counsel which led to that Lacedæmonian fortification of Dekeleia which had so great Dekeleia to be fortified. an effect on the second part of the Peloponnesian War². In Sicily he told them, speaking with the authority of an Athenian general who had commanded there, that the Sikeliots were inexperienced in war, but that, if they all Syracuse to be helped. hung together, they might get the better of the Athenians. The Syracuseans alone, defeated in battle and hemmed in by the Athenian fleet, had no chance. Let Syracuse be taken, and all Sicily, all Greek Italy³, would fall under the power of Athens. That done, they would presently see at their own doors the dangers of which he had already spoken⁴. They must take counsel, not only for Sicily, but for Peloponnésos. They must send, and that speedily, a force strong both by land and sea, a force of men who could ply the oar on the voyage and who would be ready as heavy-armed soldiers when they landed in Sicily⁵. Above all, A Spartan commander to be sent. they must send a Spartan as commander; the presence of

¹ Thuc. vi. 89. 4, 5; ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγνωσκόμεν οἱ φρονούντες τι, καὶ αὐτοὺς οὐδένος ἂν χειρὸν ὅσῃ καὶ λουδορῆσαιμ· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο.

² Ib. 91. 6. So Plut. Alk. 23; τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ μέγιστον, ἐπιτειχίσαι Δεκείλειαν, οὐ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν διεργάσατο καὶ οἰκοφθόρησε τὴν πόλιν.

³ Ib. 91. 3; εἰ αὖτη ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, ἔχεται καὶ ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία, καὶ εὐθὺς καὶ Ἰταλία.

⁴ Ib.; οὐκ ἂν διὰ μακροῦ ὑμῖν ἐπιέσοι.

⁵ Ib. 4; οἵτινες αὐτερέται κομισθέντες καὶ ὀπλιτεύσουσιν εὐθὺς.

CHAP. VIII. such an one would be worth more than that of an army¹.

A Spartan leader would be able to improve the discipline of the Syracusan army and to constrain to their duty those who were unwilling². By such a course their friends in Sicily would be encouraged, and those who doubted which side to take would be more inclined to come over to them³.

Effects of
war in Old
Greece on
Sicily.

And besides direct support in Sicily, the immediate renewal of the war in Attica would have a most important effect on the war in Sicily. When the Syracusans saw that the Lacedæmonians were in earnest, they would hold out more manfully, and the Athenians would be less able to send reinforcements to Sicily. But neither work must be delayed. Let them strike at once while there was still time. They would then get rid of the Athenian power, present and future; they would live safely in their own land, and they would be the leaders of all Greece, not by constraint, but by the consent and good will of its people⁴.

Effects of
the speech
of Alki-
biadês.

Such counsel as this, in the mouth of an Athenian, was, from the Athenian point of view, the blackest treason. The Syracusans and their Corinthian allies must have listened with delight beyond words to so effective a pleading of their cause. This embassy to Sparta, and the presence of Alkibiadês at the assembly which received it, was in truth the turning-point of the whole war. It was clearly the counsel of Alkibiadês which determined Sparta to take the step which proved the deliverance of Syracuse. Events still to be recorded show that, without help from Peloponnêsos, without the particular form of help that was sent, all must have been lost, Syracuse must

This em-
bassy the
turning-
point of
the war.

¹ Thuc. vi. 91. 4; ὁ τῆς στρατίας ἐτι χρησιμώτερον εἶναι νομίζω, ἀνδρα Σπαρτιάτην ἀρχόντα.

² Ib.; ὡς ἂν τοὺς τε παρόντας ξυντάξῃ καὶ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας προαναγκάσῃ.

³ Ib.; καὶ οἱ ἐνδοιάζοντες ἀδείστερον προσίσαι.

⁴ Ib. 92. 4; τῆς ἀπάσης Ἑλλάδος, ἐκούσης, καὶ οὐ βίᾳ κατ' εὐνοίαν δὲ ἡγήσθαι.

have yielded. It was the coming of a single Spartan that CHAP. VIII. saved her, and he barely came in time to save her. For, though the Spartans adopted the counsel of Alkibiadēs, they paid little attention to his advice to do quickly what they did, at any rate as regarded Sicily. It was in truth his advice about Dekeleia which really touched them. A renewal of the war, and a renewal in this particular shape, was already in their minds. Hitherto they had delayed in the Spartan fashion; they were now stirred up to act by the words of the man whom they deemed to know most about the matter¹. About Sicily they were less hearty, at any rate less eager. They passed a vote in general Lacedæmo-
nian vote. terms that help should be sent to Syracuse. But nothing was done at once, save one step, really the most important of all, the choice of a commander. In accordance with the advice of Alkibiadēs, a Spartan was named to the post. He was bidden to confer with the Syracusans and Corinthians, and to concert such measures as might be of the greatest and speediest service towards the object in hand².

The choice made was indeed a happy one. The man GYLIPPOS
named to
the com-
mand. who was called to the great work of deliverance, the first of a long line of deliverers who passed from Old Greece to her western colonies, the man who will soon, for a short time, fill the foremost place in our story, was Gylippos, son Son of
Klean-
dridas. of Kleandridas. Of his father we have already heard at Thourioi³. Later accounts speak of the man who rescued Syracuse as not being of the true Spartan stock⁴. But

¹ Thuc. vi. 93. 1; *νομίσαντες παρὰ τοῦ σαφέστατα εἰδότες ἀπηκοῦναι.*

² Ib. 2: *ἐπέλεον μετ' ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων βουλευόμενον ποιεῖν ὅπῃ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μάλιστα καὶ τάχιστα τις ὠφέλεια ἦξει τοῖς ἐκεί.*

³ See above, p. 13.

⁴ Ælian, V. H. xii. 43; *Καλλικρατίδης γὰρ μὴν καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ Λύσανδρος ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι μύθους ἐκαλοῦντο· ὄνομα δὲ ἦν ἄρα τοῦτο τοῖς τῶν εὐπόρων δούλοις, οὗς συνεξέπεμπον τοῖς υἱοῖς οἱ πατέρες συναγωνιζομένους ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις.* So Athēnaïos (vi. 102), quoting the twenty-fifth book of Phyl-

CHAP. VIII. this version seems to be altogether set aside by the way in which Gylippos is first brought into the story and by the position which had been held by his father. Alkibiadēs had specially insisted on the need of sending a Spartan to command. As an immediate result of his speech, Gylippos was appointed; in the absence of any contemporary hint to the contrary, this seems enough to show that Gylippos was a full Spartan. The only reason for doubting his Spartan birth would be that his character is in some points not Spartan. He is quick, enterprising, full of resource, able to adapt himself to all men and to all circumstances, in a way that Spartans seldom were. Yet for a Spartan to show such qualities was not wholly without precedent; Brasidas had been all that Gylippos was, and more. Still it is just possible that the un-Spartan side of Gylippos may have come to him from another quarter. The rank that his father Kleandridas held at Sparta is shown by his acting as a special counsellor of the young King Pleistoanax in his invasion of Attica. It was in that character that he was convicted of taking Athenian bribes; he was sentenced to death, but escaped to Italy, to play the part which we have seen him play as a citizen of newly-founded Thourioi. It may therefore be that Gylippos was born in Italy, at Thourioi, of a non-Spartan, possibly an Athenian, mother; and we may if we choose, see in such half-foreign descent the origin of the tale which made him of inferior birth in Sparta itself. It has also been suggested that the choice of Gylippos for a Western command may have been partly owing to the reputation which his father held in those parts, and to his own possible knowledge of them¹. On the

The Mother at Sparta.

Character of Gylippos.

archos (see C. Müller, i. 347); σύντροφοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων . . . εἰσι δ' ἐλεύθεροι μὲν, οὐ μὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοί γε, μετέχουσι δὲ τῆς παιδείας πάσης. Lysandros, he adds, was one, but πολίτης γενόμενος δι' ἀνδραγαθίαν. The name is not found where one might have looked for it, in the list of the discontented classes at Sparta in Xen. Hell. iii. 3. 6.

¹ Grote, vii. 330.

other hand, to bestow the full rights of a Spartan on the foreign-born son of a condemned criminal could have been an act only of special favour, and Gylippos, if born at Thourioi, would have been young as a holder of Spartan command. It is therefore more likely that Gylippos was born before his father's condemnation, and that he kept his place at Sparta as having had no share in his father's guilt. In any case no acts of his are recorded till he was thus picked out to be the deliverer of Syracuse, to save her, as it turned out, at the very moment when danger gathered thickest around her. Pity that glory such as this should ever have been sullied by later shame. But in one point at least Gylippos was a true son of Kleandridas. Few Spartans, few Greeks of any kind, could withstand the temptation of a bait of gold thrown in their way, and Gylippos was not among those few ¹.

We leave the Spartan commander and his Corinthian allies debating as to the best means for the support of Syracuse against her invaders. Meanwhile the trireme which Nikias had sent home to ask for supplies and horsemen to act against her had reached Athens. The demands of the general were laid before the assembly. The people, sanguine and patient, voted his request, seemingly without a word of reproof or complaint for the delays which alone had made such a request needful. Horsemen and all that was needed were to be sent to Sicily in time for a spring campaign ².

Reinforcements were thus coming, if they were as yet hardly on the way, to both the besiegers and the defenders

¹ Plat. Nik. 28.

² Thuc. vi. 93. 4; καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν τε τροφήν πέμψειν τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἵππους. Thucydides makes no comment. Grote of course (vii. 304-309) makes the most of the case against Nikias; but it is a real one.

Horsemen
and money
voted at
Athens.
415-414.

CHAP. VIII. of Syracuse. But before aught came from Athens, long
 Beginning before aught came from Peloponnésos, as soon as the
 of the year 414. beginning of spring allowed of any military operations¹,
 the Athenians had opened the campaigning season of the
 Small new year. But it opened only with some small enterprises,
 Athenian examples of the way in which the strength of the great
 enterprises. armament was frittered away. Some of them help rather
 to raise than to gratify our curiosity as to the state of the
 ancient people of the island. With the spring the Athe-
 nian fleet set forth from Katanê, not to attack Syracuse,
 but to nibble at some of her outposts and allies. They
 first sailed to Megara; there they landed; they harried
 the country, and attacked, but failed to take, a Syracusan
 fort—something smaller, it would seem, than the head fort-
 ress at Megara². Then they marched northward, harry-
 ing the land and burning the corn as far as the river
 Têrias, which formed the boundary between Syracusan and
 Katanaian territory. There a skirmish took place with a
 small Syracusan force, which entitled the Athenians to set
 up a trophy³. After this they went back to their ships
 and sailed to Katanê.

Dealings
 with the
 Sikels.

There is more interest in the details of some dealings
 with the Sikel towns which were going on at the same
 time. Some of the Sikels, as we have seen, were hostile
 to Athens. Such, in the valley of the Symaithos, were

¹ Thuc. vi. 94. 1; ἀμα δὲ τῷ ἡμὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένην. This seems to imply an earlier time than usual.

² Thucydides had already twice mentioned Megara as a φρούριον of Syracuse in oc. 49, 75 (see above, pp. 145, 178). He now (94. 1) gives the fuller description which I have referred to in vol. ii. p. 499; παρέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Μεγάρων τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, οὗς ἐπὶ Γέλανος τοῦ τυράννου, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν μοι εἶρηται, ἀναστήσαντες Συρακοῖσι αὐτοὶ ἔχουσι τὴν γῆν. He must have forgotten his former mention of it. He goes on; ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐδῆσαν τοὺς τε ἀγροὺς καὶ ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ ἔρυμᾳ τι τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ οὐχ ἐλόντες, κ.τ.λ. This ἔρυμα is surely something smaller than τὰ Μέγαρα φρούριον in c. 75. And how have τὰ Μέγαρα become masculine? There is another reading, Μεγαρέων, which would be odd on other grounds.

³ Ib. 94. 2.

the Galeatic Hybla on its insular hill and Inessa on CHAP. VIII.
the ledge below Ætna. Athenian attempts on both of
them had failed, at Hybla very lately, at Inessa in the
earlier days of Athenian interference in Sicily¹. Cen- Centuripa
turipa, looking down on both from its loftier height, joins the Athenians.
seems to have halted between two opinions. The whole
Athenian force marched along the river to besiege it,
if needful. But no siege was needed; Centuripa joined
Athens on terms, and must have become an useful ally in
that part of the island². When we last heard of Inessa,
it was a Sikel commonwealth controlled by a Syracusan
garrison. We are not told what was its exact condition
now; it may still have had a Syracusan garrison, but it
clearly was not incorporated with the Syracusan territory.
The corn of both Hybla and Inessa was burned; but no Ravages at Hybla and Inessa.
attempt was made on the towns themselves³. After these
exploits, the army marched back to Katanê. There they
found reinforcements from Athens. They had come speedily,
horsemen to the number of two hundred and fifty, a small
body to cope with such a force of the same kind as Syra-
cuse could put into the field. Of their captain, Kallistratos
son of Empedokles, we shall hear when the fate of Athens in
Sicily has become no longer doubtful⁴. The horsemen Coming of the horsemen.
brought with them their accoutrements, but no horses;
those were to be bought in the land of horses⁵. There

¹ See above, pp. 35, 159.

² Thuc. vi. 94. 3; *ἔχουρον ἐπὶ Κεντόριπα Σικελῶν πόλιν, καὶ προσαγαγόμενοι ὁμολογίᾳ ἀπέβσαν*. Thucydides did not expect his readers to have heard of Centuripa, any more than of Hykkara in c. 62. 3. Most likely he had never heard of those towns himself till he heard of these particular facts about them. He therefore gives them no article. Inessa, which had played so great a part in Sicilian history, he knew even when writing his earlier books. To Inessa therefore he gave the article (see p. 34). Much of the life of a great original writer is lost when these delicacies are neglected in modern reproductions.

³ Ib.

⁴ His name is preserved by Pausanias, vii. 16. 4.

⁵ Ib. 4: *ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων, μετὰ σκευῆς, ὡς αὐτόθεν ἵππων πορισσομένων*.

CHAP. VIII. came also thirty horse-bowmen, of what nation we are not told, and three hundred talents of silver.

The at-
tacks now
planned.

Nikias had now at last, what he had so long talked of, something like a body of Athenian horsemen. For horses they had yet to wait a little while; but the news reached Syracuse that the Athenian horsemen were come, and that a real attack on the city was about to be made¹. Nikias could, for very shame, loiter no longer. The attack was at last to be made; and, after all, it was made without the help of the cavalry whose absence had been made the excuse for putting it off so long. It was indeed to be made in a shape in which the horsemen could give no great help. In short, as far as we can see, the original plan of Lamachos was at last to be carried out. It was to be carried out against Syracuse strengthened in her defences and made hopeful by Athenian delay. Did no one at Athens ask why it had not been carried out eight months before, when Syracuse had done nothing to strengthen herself, when she was still cowed by fear of the mighty armament with which her people had now grown familiar and which they had learned to despise?

§ 4. *The Athenian Siege of Syracuse.*

B.C. 414.

Spring, 414. In this second stage of the war, the first part of it that can be called a siege, the fighting-ground is altogether changed from the site of the short winter-campaign. We have just now little to do with the Great Harbour or with the ground to the west of it. There was the site of the first Athenian encampment and the first Athenian naval station; there the first battle had been fought between Athenians and Syracusans. Now the battle-ground is the

¹ Thuc. vi. 96. 1; ὡς ἐπύθοντο τοὺς τε ἱππείας ἔχοντας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μέλλοντας ἤδη ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἵέναι.

hill itself. It is on the height that the invaders and de- CHAP. VIII.
 fenders of Syracuse meet in arms; it is there that they The hill
 build their forts, that they raise their walls and their now the
 counter-walls, to hem in the city or to save it from being scene of
 hemmed in. The side too of the attack is changed. Syra- warfare.
 cuse is now assailed from the north. The Athenian ships The plan
 are moored, not in the Great Harbour but by the pen- of Lama-
 insula of Thapsos; the side by which the invaders make chos at
 their way on to the hill is now the northern side. All last car-
 this, we may be sure, was the original plan of Lamachos; ried out.
 only, after so long a time, it had become far harder to
 carry it out than when Lamachos first proposed it.

The extreme western part of the hill of Syracuse now Epipolai
 becomes for a while the centre of our military narrative. and Eurya-
 It is now for the first time that Thucydides uses the word los.
Euryalos at all, or the word *Epipolai* in the account of any
 military operation¹. The meaning of those words we de-
 fined long ago when fixing the general topography of
 Syracuse². Epipolai seems always to mean so much of
 the hill of Syracuse as had not yet, at the time spoken of,
 been taken within the fortifications of Syracuse. Eury-
 alos, as far as we are concerned, is the site of the future
 castle of Dionysios on the neck or isthmus between the
 hill of Syracuse and the hill of Belvedere. Its works,
 above ground and below, stretch on to the western part
 of the triangular hill, and thus enable us to fix the
 point with which we have immediately to deal³. We Hitherto
 noticed long ago⁴ the strange fact that this most im- unde-
 portant point was still open for either the invaders of fended.
 Syracuse or her defenders to take possession of. There
 is nothing to make us think that this end of the hill was
 as yet occupied at all; there is nothing to imply either
 fortress or dwelling west of the quarters which had been

¹ See vi. 75. 1.² See vol. i. p. 578.³ See Appendix XIII.⁴ See vol. i. p. 580.

CHAP. VIII. last taken within the walls of the city. It is amazing that it should be so. One would have expected that both the point of Euryalos and the hill of Belvedere beyond it would have been occupied as Syracusan outposts, at the very least as places for watchers. One might have thought that they would have been so employed from the first moment that the Corinthian settlers obtained possession of the hill. Or, if the Syracusans had failed to do so up to this time, one would have thought that they would, among their other preparations, have repaired this omission as soon as an Athenian attack began to be feared. We can only say that we find in our story no hint of anything of the kind. Neither invaders nor defenders are spoken of as having, up to this time, done anything on this most important site. In their first campaign of Polichna the Athenians had made no attempt on the hill at all, and the works of defence which the Syracusans had carried on during the winter had touched only those parts of the hill which lay nearest to the city. They had fenced in Tementès; they had done nothing to Euryalos.

The new
Syracusan
generals.

Name of
Sikanos.

Now at last the importance of the higher ground was, at the same moment, fully brought home to the minds of both sides. Lamachos, we may be sure, had marked the post from the beginning; but it was only now that he was enabled to make any practical use of his sharp-sightedness. His attacking instinct was met, somewhat slowly, by the defensive instinct of Hermokratès. The vote to lessen the number of generals had come into force. At the election lately held, Hermokratès himself had been chosen with two colleagues, Hêrackleidês and Sikanos¹. The last name is worth noting. It was not uncommon for a Greek to bear as his personal name

¹ The names are given, prematurely as I think (see above, p. 178), in c. 73. They appear now (96. 3) as having just come into office; *οἱ περὶ Ἑρμοκράτην στρατηγοὶ ἀρτί παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν*.

the name of some Greek people other than his own; Lake-
daimonios son of Kimôn was a type of a class. Here we
have a Greek bearing the name, not of some other Greek
people, but of barbarian neighbours. We shall hear again
of both the colleagues of Hermokratès, but it was clearly
himself who was the guiding spirit. He at least under-
stood the importance of Epipolai in general and of the
specially commanding spot of Euryalos. He understood
the likelihood that the next Athenian attack would be on
the hill, and that it would take the form of an attempt
to hem in the city by a wall¹. And the coming of the
Athenian horsemen made it plain that the attack was
not likely to be much longer put off. To meet a danger
of this kind, Hermokratès saw that a Syracusan occupa-
tion of Epipolai, and specially of Euryalos, was the only
means. It was not enough to have fenced in Temenitès;
the Syracusan occupation must be carried further west.
Early therefore in his term of office he began to take
measures to that end. On a certain fixed day the generals
called out the whole force of the city to a general
review and *weapons-show* to be held at daybreak in the
meadow by the Anapos. The whole military population
of Syracuse came together as appointed, and the first
act of Hermokratès was to tell off a chosen force for
the special service of guarding Epipolai, no doubt with
a view to its more thorough occupation. Six hundred
picked men of the heavy-armed were put under the com-
mand of Diomilos, an exile from Andros, an enemy doubt-
less of Athens in the home politics of his island. This

CHAP. VIII.
Hermo-
kratès the
leader.

Epipolai
to be oc-
cupied.

The Syra-
cusans
reviewed;

Diomilos
and the
six hun-
dred.

¹ Thucydides (vi. 96. 1) brings in the determination with some solemnity, and it is now that he gives the definition of Ἐπιπολαί which I have quoted in vol. i. p. 578; νομίσαντες, ἔάν μὴ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν κρατήσωσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . οὐκ ἂν βρόδιος σφᾶς οὐδ' εἰ κρατοῦντο μάχη, ἀποτειχισθῆναι, διανοῦντο τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν φυλάσσειν, ὥστε μὴ κατὰ ταύτας λάθωσι σφᾶς ἀναβάλλοντες οἱ πολέμοιοι· οὗ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλη γε αὐτοὺς δινηθῆναι. Λανθάνειν ἀναβάλλοντες was exactly what the Athenians did.

CHAP. VIII. chosen band was to undertake the guard of Epipolai and to stand ready for any special and pressing duty¹. Before they could reach the post for which they were destined, a special and pressing duty indeed called for their services and for those of every man in Syracuse who could bear arms.

The war was now at last really about to begin. Syracuse had now to test the strength of the preparations which she had so long been making in the teeth of enemies who, after the child's play of months, were now coming against her in earnest. We must never forget that Nikias, utterly unfit as he was for the post in which he was placed, was still a brave man and a good officer, one who acted with vigour whenever he could be got to act at all. And the hero Lamachos was there, to do, after so long waiting, what he had so wisely wished to do long before. Now that the work was to begin, it began with all spirit. While the Syracusans was being reviewed in the meadow, the Athenians were on their way². In the night before the day fixed for the weaponshow, the whole Athenian fleet, war-ships and transports, had set forth from Katané. Their course led them into the double bay which lies between the Xiphonian peninsula and the north side of Achradina. The Syracusan guards at Megara must have seen them as they sailed straight into the bay of Trôgilos, and landed near a point or place named Leôn, described as six or seven stadia from Euryalos³. Several landing-places on

The Athenians sail by night from Katané.

The land-force goes on shore at Leôn;

¹ Thuc. vi. 96. 3; ἐξέτασιν τε ὅπλων ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἐξακοσίους λογάδας τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐξέκριναν πρότερον, ὃν ἤρχε Διομόλος, φυγὰς ἐξ Ἀνδρου, ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἴησαν φύλακες, καὶ ἦν ἐς ἄλλο τι δέη ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγένησθαι.

² Ib. 97. 1; ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς τῇ ἐπιγεγομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ. That is, the Athenians reached the hill on the same morning as the review. See Arnold's two notes.

³ Ib.; ἔλαθον αὐτοὺς παντὶ ἤδη τῷ στρατεύματι ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης σκόντες

that flat coast might answer the description. At Leôn, CHAP. VIII. whatever and wherever it was, the army landed, and the the ships go back to Thapsos. ships sailed back to the station which had been fixed for them, the low peninsula of Thapsos with its lower isthmus. This last was fenced off with a palisade, and the ships were moored, perhaps on the north side of the isthmus, where there is something that might be called a harbour¹. This is the side away from Syracuse; but it seems better suited for the purpose than the open beach of the isthmus on the south side or than the cliffs on the south-eastern side of the peninsula itself. It is no less within full view of Syracuse; the voyage round Thapsos is not long; the ships could even be dragged across the isthmus without much difficulty.

The Athenian land-force, once on shore, did not loiter. The land-force goes up the hill by Euryalos from the north. With a swift pace, as though they were charging the Medes at Marathôn², they made their way over the low but somewhat rough ground, the present lands of Targia, between their landing-place and the path up the hill close by Euryalos. They reached a spot where, for some distance along the hill-side, the ascent over the small terrace between the first rise and the high ground above would, when there was as yet no wall or castle, be in no way specially hard. It is the very spot where the northern wall of Dionysios breaks off from his castle. Castle of Dionysios. It is a strange thought that the man who lived to build wall and castle must at this time have been an undistinguished soldier in the Syracusan ranks. He may even have been one of the

κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα καλούμενον . . . καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀποβιβάσαντες. On the position of Leôn see Appendix XIII.

¹ Thuc. vi. 97. 1; ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Θάψον καθορμσάμενοι . . . καὶ δὲ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Θάψῃ, διασταυρωσάμενος τὸν ἰσθμὸν, ἡσύχαζεν. It is here that he brings in the description of Thapsos which I have quoted in vol. i. p. 386.

² Ib. 2; δὲ δὲ πεζοὺς εὐθὺς ἐχώρει δρόμῳ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς. Cf. Herod. vi. 112.

CHAP. VIII. companions of Diomilos, and he may have learned the value of Euryalos to Syracuse in that day's work.

The Athenians, meeting with no hindrance, pressed up the hill. Before the Syracusans, busy with their review in the meadow, knew what was going on, the invading army was on Epipolai¹. Unless there were watchers on some part of the hill itself, they could make their way up without drawing to themselves any notice either in the Syracusan city or in the meadow where the forces of Syracuse had come together. One can even fancy that the first sign of their presence was their actual appearance on the south brow of the hill. The duty of the six hundred now was not to forestall an enemy, but to dislodge him. In that duty, or at least in the attempt to do it, they did not fail. As soon as they knew what had happened, they led the way to the rescue. The rest of the Syracusans followed as they could over a distance of five-and-twenty stadia². The ascent of the hill by Euryalos on the south side is easy enough; the actual height is higher than on the north side, but at this point the whole country sweeps gradually up to the hill on the south side. But by the time that men thus suddenly called to action could reach the scene of their work, they were naturally not in first-rate military order³. They had no chance of occupying the hill in the face of the force which had forestalled them from the other side. The struggle that followed was naturally an Athenian victory; Diomilos and three hundred men on the Syracusan side were slain. The Athenian loss—small doubtless, but there must have been some—is not recorded. The trophy was

The Syracusans go up the hill from the south.

Battle on the hill; Athenian victory.

¹ Thuc. vi. 97. 2; φθάνει ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον πρὶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους αἰσθανομένους ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως παραγενέσθαι. Diodōros (xiii. 7), misled by the night voyage and by the later night attack, fancies a night attack now.

² Ib. 3; ἐβοήθουν δὲ οἱ τε ἄλλοι, ὡς ἕκαστος τάχους εἶχε, καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόμιλον ἑκατόσιοι. On the distance see Appendix XIII.

³ Ib.; τοιοῦτη τρὸς ἀτακτότερον.

raised; the dead were given back, and the defeated army of Syracuse withdrew within the city. CHAP. VIII.

The next day the Athenians began their first attack on Syracuse itself. An attack indeed it hardly was. The invading force marched eastwards along the hill towards the city¹; but nothing came of their march. As no Syracusan sally followed the Athenian parade, the invaders marched back—was this the counsel of Nikias?—to the western part of the hill. When there, why did they not at once take advantage of this opportunity? Why did they not forestall the work of tyrants and kings?—we might even say, Why did they not follow the example of ancient Sikels?—and make Euryalos, if not Belvedere itself, an Athenian fortress²? They contented themselves with raising a fort at a point described as Labdalon, a point on the very top of the cliffs on the north side, looking out towards Megara³. This gives its general position; there is nothing further to mark it among many points on the hill which would answer the same description. Only, being close on the cliffs on the north side, it cannot be, as has sometimes been thought, the point now known as Buffalaro, one of the highest and most striking points of the hill. A safe place was needed for their money and stuff and all that they had brought with them, while they themselves went forth to fight with the enemy, or to hem in his city by a wall across the height which was now their own⁴. The Athenians march to the wall of Syracuse.
They fortify Labdalon.

The Athenians had now possession of Epipolai. Their presence there was a heavy blow and deep discouragement to the city which they now at last really threatened. From

¹ Thuc. vi. 97. 4; *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπικαταβάντες.*
See Appendix XIII.

² See vol. i. p. 580.

³ On Labdalon see Appendix XIII.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 97. 5; *ὅπως εἴη αὐτοῖς ὅποτε προΐεν ἢ μαχομένοι ἢ τειχιούντες, τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.*

CHAP. VIII. this time for a while the hopes of the invaders of Syracuse rise higher and the hopes of its defenders go down. What might not have happened, if Nikias and Alkibiadês had not actually saved the city which they came to attack from the hands of their wiser colleague? As it was, the success of the bold stroke which had won Epipolai had been the work of the general mass of the Athenian army, Lamachos, we may be sure, foremost among them. A little later the special arm for which Nikias had so long waited was at last organized. Besides the two hundred and fifty unmounted horsemen from Athens, there now came in three hundred from Segesta, and a hundred from Naxos and other unnamed quarters, some of them Sikel. The horsemen from Segesta had seemingly horses to spare; for the Athenian knights were at last mounted, on horses partly supplied by them and the Katanaïans and partly by purchase¹. The whole cavalry on the Athenian side now reached the number of six hundred and fifty. We shall presently hear of them fighting on the hill; we should have liked to hear by what road they found themselves there.

Reinforce-
ments of
horse.

But the first work to be done on the Athenian side was one in which the horsemen could have no great share. When the invading armament left Athens, it had brought with it carpenters and masons and workmen of every kind that could be needed for wall-building and siege-work in general. They had had a little practice in the camp by Daskôn; they were now called on to exercise their skill on a greater scale. The real work of war now began. We have seen sailings round about Syracuse, and plunderings and encampings on her soil; we have seen several skirmishes, and one battle. But Syracuse herself has as yet been untouched; she is now to be touched very nearly indeed. We now at last come to a siege. A siege, in the

¹ Thuc. vi. 98. 1.

minds both of Athenians and of Syracusans, meant the hemming in of the city by a wall. If such a wall were built right across the hill, and carried down to the sea on each side, to the bay of Trôgilon and to the Great Harbour, nothing could go in or out of Syracuse by land. It was the business of the fleet, now at Thapsos, but ready at any moment to sail into the Great Harbour or anywhere else, to hinder anything from going in or out by sea. To the work on the hill the Athenians now gave themselves with energy. They had to choose a place where they could hem in the city with the least amount of wall-building. They had to find at what point, among points available for them, the distance was least from the northern sea which they commanded to the Great Harbour¹. The line intended, so far as it lay on the hill, must have lain between the point now called *Scala Greca*, the steep ascent on the north side, not far westward from the wall of Tycha, and the easier climbing-place of *Portella del Fusco*. This last is a deep combe on the south side, hard by the temple of Héraklès, famous at a later stage of the war. Between these two they chose a central point called *Syka* or the Fig-tree, a name perhaps kindred to that of Achradina. Here with all speed they built them a round fort—*kyklos*—of considerable size, strengthened further in front—that is towards the city—by a long outwork². From this central point the wall was to stretch northward and southward across the hill and down its sides, till it reached the sea on each side of the hill.

The fear of being shut in now struck deep into every heart in Syracuse. We may suspect that it was rather through somewhat of popular compulsion than by any judgement of his own that Hermokratès allowed the main force of the city to go forth to stop the threatening work

CHAP. VIII.

The Athenian wall.

The Syracusans go out to stop the building.

¹ On the walls, see Appendix XIII.

² See Appendix XIII.

CHAP. VIII. by giving battle to the invaders. Here, as in every case, we mark how inferior in military discipline the Syracusan infantry was as compared with that of the Athenians. This time, while both sides were forming for the battle, the Syracusan generals were so struck with the disorderly trim of their own men¹ that they ordered them back into the city. They left only a body of horse to hinder the Athenians from carrying stones to any distance from their fort². But one tribe of the Athenian heavy-armed, together with the newly-come cavalry, set upon them and put them to flight with some loss. Nikias had got his horsemen, and they had done something; they were entitled to set up a trophy over the renowned cavalry of Syracuse³. For this their first exploit we have been waiting a long time; their first exploit was not quite their last; but their share in the strife is certainly not frequent or striking.

Battle
of the
horsemen;
Athenian
victory.

The Athe-
nians
begin to
build to
the north.

First
Syracusan
counter-
wall; on
the hill.

The next day the Athenians began the northern part of their wall, bringing stones and wood for the work. The fight of the day before had taught Hermokratēs that his wisest course was, not to try to hinder the work of the enemy by force, but to counterwork it by a wall of his own⁴. He determined therefore to avoid all general actions. His main object now was to build a wall south of the fort at Syka, at right angles to the Athenian wall, which might hinder them from ever bringing down their works to the Great Harbour. It must have started from the wall of the new quarter of Temenitēs, seemingly from a small gate in it⁵. It was meant of course to stretch to some point west

¹ Thuc. vi. 98. 3; *ὡς ἴδον σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα διεσπασμένον τε καὶ ὀβριδίως ξυττασόμενον*.

² Ib.; *ἐπέλυνον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λιθοφορεῖν τε καὶ ἀποσκίδνασθαι μακροτέρων*.

³ Ib. 4; *ἀπέκτανόν τε τινας καὶ τροπαίων τῆς ἵππομαχίας ἔστησεν*. So Plut. (Nik. 17), though he cuts the story very short, makes the comment; *τρήφασθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἵππον τῶν πολέμιων ἀμαχον εἶναι δοκοῦσαν*.

⁴ Ib. 99. 2.

⁵ *Ὁ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλῖδα comes in 100. 1.*

of the southern wall of the besiegers; and it was at least CHAP. VIII. desirable to carry it to some good point on the edge of the cliff, so as to make it less easy for the enemy to turn it. If the Athenians were aiming at the *Portella del Fusco*, the Syracusans would naturally plan their wall so as to reach the cliff at some point to the west of it. The object of the counter-wall is set forth at some length. If the defenders of the city should be able to complete it without hindrance from the enemy, the whole object of the Athenian works would be thwarted; the wall could never reach the Great Harbour. Even failing this, they might do something. If the Athenians attacked them in their work, they might send out a part of their force against them; meanwhile they might be able at least to defend with palisades the points which the enemy were most likely to attack. This would draw out the whole Athenian force, and would make them leave off their own work¹. The Syracusans then began at the end by Temenitês. They built; they palisaded; they crowned their wall with wooden towers. To find timber for these uses, they did not scruple to cut down the olive-trees in the holy precinct of Apollon². And they worked on unhindered. The Athenians did not wish to divide their force; moreover it was of more importance to them to finish their own wall to the north of the fort at Syka than to hinder the Syracusan wall to the south of it. The northern wall was needed to command their communications with the fleet at Thapsos. The ships there had not stirred; the Syracusans had full command of their own immediate sea³. But, as they did not attempt any naval action and as no help came to them

¹ Thuc. vi. 99. 2; καὶ ἅμα ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμψειν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατίας καὶ φθάνειν ἂν τοῖς σταυροῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους, ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι.

² Ib. 3; τὰς τε ἑλίας κόπτοντες τοῦ τεμένους.

³ Ib. 4; ἔτι οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπύκνουν τῶν περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν.

CHAP. VIII. by sea, there was no present cause for the Athenian ships to stir. As yet all things that were needed by the Athenians on the hill were brought to them by land from Thapsos¹.

The Syracusans meanwhile went on with their wall and palisade. They carried it, perhaps not to the furthest point that they aimed at, but as far as they thought needful for the moment, while the Athenians, engaged on their northern wall, gave them no hindrance². But, if the besiegers did not hinder the wall-building, they struck another serious blow at the besieged. Like Vitigis before Rome, they had the command of the elaborate system of underground aqueducts which supplied Syracuse with water; these they cut off³. And all this time they were also watching the Syracusan works, looking out for a favourable moment to attack them. Such a moment came before long. The failure of the Athenians to hinder the building of the counter-wall had stirred up the Syracusan tribe that guarded it to a very groundless measure of confidence. One day at noon some of the guards of the wall had gone into the city, others were taking their ease in their tents; a few only were at the palisade itself, and those keeping but careless watch⁴. The Athenian generals saw their opportunity. They picked out three hundred chosen men of the heavy-armed, and with them some of the light-

The Athenians cut the water-pipes.

Successful attack on the Syracusan counter-wall.

¹ Thuc. vi. 99. 4.

² Ib. 100. 1; *ἐπειδὴ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀρκούντως ἰδοῦσι ἔχειν ὅσα τε ἐσταυρώθη καὶ ὤικοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτειχίσματος, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἦλθον κωλύσαντες φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι δίχα γιγνομένοις ῥῆον μάχωνται, καὶ ἓμα τὴν καθ' αὐτοὺς περιτείχισιν ἐπειγόμενοι.* The Syracusan wall east and west is *ὑποτείχισμα*, the Athenian wall north and south is *περιτείχισις*.

³ Ib.; *τούς τε ὀχετοὺς αὐτῶν οἱ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑπονομήδην ποτοῦ ὕδατος ἡγμένοι ἦσαν, διέφθειραν.* Cf. Proc. Bell. Goth. i. 19 (vol. ii. p. 95). These *ὀχετοί* form the text of Schubring's treatise on the *Bewässerung*.

⁴ Thucydides (Ib.) gives the noontide picture; *τούς τε ἄλλους Συρακοσίους κατὰ σκηπὰς ὄντας ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ, καὶ τινας καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀποκεχωρηκότας, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ σταυρώματι ἀμελῶς φυλάσσοντας.*

armed put for the nonce into the full array of the phalanx. CHAP. VIII.
 This party was bidden to go at once with all speed against the Syracusan works. Meanwhile the rest of the army was divided between the two generals. One part was sent to watch against sallies from the city; this must mean from Tycha. The other division marched straight to the point where the Syracusan counter-wall started from the gate in the wall of Temenitês¹. The three hundred went straight at the palisade and took it; its defenders sought shelter within the wall of Temenitês. The pursuers—seemingly some of the other detachment as well as the three hundred—made their way in with them; the besiegers were actually within the wall, though only the newest wall, of Syracuse. In this exploit the men of Argos Exploits
of the
Argeians. are specially mentioned; they still joined in the war against their fellow-Dorians, even though the leader by whose influence they had been led to take a share in the expedition was now on the Dorian side. But they were driven out again by force, and with some loss, more, it would seem, of Argeians than of Athenians². To take Syracuse by storm was not the destiny even of Lamachos, much less of Nikias. But the work immediately in hand was done, and done thoroughly. The whole besieging army hastened to the Syracusan work, they broke down the wall, they tore up the palisade, and carried off the stakes to use in their own works. They then set up a trophy. It is to be supposed that they recovered the bodies of the slain Argeians and others by force. For we hear nothing of any burial-truce being granted by the Syracusans, and indeed the burial-truce, a sign of defeat, seems inconsistent with the setting up of the trophy, the sign of victory.

This passage of arms taught the Athenian generals that

¹ Thuc. vi. 100. 1; πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τῆς πυλίδας. See above, p. 178.

² Ib. 2; τῶν Ἀργείων τινὲς αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοί.

CHAP. VIII. after all the southern part of their work was more important than the northern. The next day they began to build again

The
Athenians
fortify the
cliff at
*Portella
del Fusco.*

on the south side of the round fort. The place of their work is described with some care. "They began to fortify the cliff above the marsh, which on this side of Epipolai looks out towards the Great Harbour, at the point whence, when they had once gone down the hill, would be the shortest space for their wall to reach the harbour across the level ground and the marsh¹.' The point is surely that of the *Portella del Fusco*. On the cliff above that rocky combe are manifest cuttings and smoothings of the rock, some of which we may fairly take to mark the position of the fort now raised by Nikias. The building of the Syracusan counter-wall had clearly impressed the Athenian generals with the necessity of occupying a point on the southern cliffs with all speed, even before the wall setting out from the central round fort had reached that point.

The Hêra-
kleion.

The position was near the temple of Hêrâklês, most likely with the short combe of Fusco between the two. As with the Olympieion below, so with the Hêrâkleion above, Nikias forbore to occupy the sacred precinct; but it seems that the neighbourhood of the enemy was made at least an excuse for defrauding the god of much of his accustomed worship². From this fort on the cliff they must have built both ways, backwards towards the Round Fort and down the hill-side towards the Great Harbour. The wall would go down from the cliffs; it would cross the lower level, and would come down into the marshy ground, most likely near the burial-place of Fusco, now crossed by the road. The next stage in our story shows that on this latter side at least the work was pressed on with great speed.

Second
Syracusan
counter-

The besieged now made a second attempt to stop the works of the enemy by a Syracusan counter-work. The

¹ Thuc. vi. 101. 1. See Appendix XIII.

² See Plut. Nik. 32. We shall come to this again.

Athenian wall had advanced so far to the south that this new work was made, not on the hill, not from Temenitēs as its starting-point, but on the lowest ground of all, starting from Gelōn's wall of Achradina. It was in short to go across the swamp. The Athenians must by this time have carried their wall down to the middle level¹, the level of the present road from Syracuse to Tremilia and Florida. Otherwise the Syracusans would surely have chosen that level for their new work rather than the marsh itself. Being forced to work in the swamp, they did not attempt to build a wall; they were satisfied with digging a trench, which would soon be filled with water, and defending it with a palisade². Thus the place of struggle was again changed. It had shifted back from the heights to the low ground, the marshy ground between the great hill of Epipolai and the smaller hill of Polichna. It had shifted to ground which had come within the range of the pursuit, if not of the actual fighting, of the battle of last year.

The object on the Athenian side was now to master this new hindrance, and to carry on their own besieging wall down to the water. As a help towards this end, orders were sent to the fleet to sail round from Thapsos into the Great Harbour. Nikias was now disabled by sickness, by a disease of the kidneys³, from any active military work. The command of the army was left with Lamachos alone. Before dawn the Athenians came down from the heights. They crossed the middle level of Galera and Fusco, and came down to the actual marshy ground. They carried doors and broad planks of wood to help them in crossing the treacherous surface, picking out as far as

¹ See vol. ii. p. 142.

² Thuc. vi. 101. 2; ἀπεσταύρουν αἰθῆς, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἔλους καὶ τέφρον ἕμα παρέρυσσον.

³ Ib. 102. 2 he is simply διὰ δασθέειαν ὑπολειμμένος. In the letter in vii. 15. 1 he himself speaks of νόσοι νεφρῆτις.

CHAP. VIII.
work
across the
marsh.

Renewed
struggle on
the low
ground.

Sickness of
Nikias;
Lamachos
leads the
army down
the hill.

CHAP. VIII. they could such parts as were merely muddy and not altogether swamp¹. At day-break they reached the Syracusan trench and palisade; the greater part of the defences gave way at the first assault; the rest yielded to a second². By this time a Syracusan force had come forth from the town, and, strengthened doubtless by the garrison of Polichna, had formed between the counter-work and the river Anapos. The bridge by which the road to Helôron crossed the river, broken down by the Athenians the year before, had now been set up again³. The Syracusans now formed, with their right wing towards the harbour, and the left, where the horse were placed, towards the road. On the Athenian side the general took his post on the left, opposite the Syracusan right. The fight began; the Syracusan foot seem to have given away at once. The right wing fled towards the city; the left made its way alongside of the river, hoping to reach the bridge and so find shelter in the fort on Polichna⁴. To cut off their retreat, Lamachos sent the same chosen three hundred who had taken the Syracusan wall on the hill⁵. Where the combined cavalry of Athens, Segesta, Naxos, and the Sikels were just now we are not told. But the Syracusan horse were there, ready almost to win back the day that had been

Battle
in the
swamp.

¹ Thuc. vi. 101. 3; αὐτοὶ δὲ περὶ ὄρθρον καταβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐς τὸ δμαλὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔλους ὃ πηλῶδες ἦν καὶ στεριφώτατον θύρας καὶ ξύλα πλατεῖα ἐπιθέντες καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν διαβαδίσαντες. Here the δμαλὸν, the lower terrace of Fusco, and the ἔλος are again clearly distinguished. Nothing can be better than πηλῶδες καὶ στεριφώτατον, the most solid thing to be had, mud as opposed to actual water. This comes from an eye- or rather foot-witness.

² Ib; αἰρουσιν ἄμα ἐκ τῶ σταύρωμα πλὴν ὀλίγον καὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν εἶλον.

³ See above, p. 167.

⁴ So I understand vi. 101. 4; οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ εὐωνύμῃ παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν. The fighting is between the harbour and the Helorine road, not far from the mouth of the Anapos. To reach the bridge they have to skirt the left bank of the river.

⁵ Ib.; οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριακόσιοι λογάδες. See 100. 1.

lost. They not only drove off the three hundred; they charged the right wing of the Athenians, and threw the tribe that stood furthest to the right into confusion¹. Lamachos, seeing all this from his post on the left, hastened to their relief with some bowmen and with the Argeians, a contingent which is again specially mentioned². And now the hero was to deal his last blow against the enemy after a fashion more worthy perhaps of a hero than of a general. With a few comrades Lamachos crossed a ditch, and stood exposed to a body of the Syracusan horse³. A later account gives the story a thoroughly Homeric turn. The foremost, perhaps the captain, of the horsemen was a valiant Syracusan named Kallikratês. In answer to the challenge of Lamachos, the two met in single combat. They were an ill-matched pair, if the Athenian, apart from the body of the heavy-armed, had to meet the mounted Syracusan with his single spear or sword. As the tale goes, the two champions met face to face; each gave and each received a blow; and, as before Ilios or beside Regillus,

CHAP. VIII.
Death of
Lamachos.

Alleged
single
combat
of Lama-
chos and
Kalli-
kratês.

"Side by side those chiefs of pride
Together fell down dead⁴."

With Lamachos were slain five or six of his comrades; the Syracusans hastily seized on their bodies and carried them

¹ See Arnold's note. I suppose we must accept φυλή for φυλακή. Cf. the φυλή μία of the Syracusans in 100. 1.

² Thuc. vi. 101. 5; ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Λάμαχος παρεβόηθει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου τοῦ ἐαυτῶν μετὰ τοξοτῶν τε οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβών.

³ Thucydides (ib.) says simply, ἐπιδιαβὰς τάφρον τινα καὶ μονωθείς μετ' ἄλλων τῶν συνδιαβάτων ἀποθήσκει αὐτοῖς τε καὶ πέντε ἢ ἑξ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ.

⁴ This version, which after all does not contradict the account in Thucydides, comes from Plutarch (Nik. 18), who unluckily does not quote his authority. It is clearly from some Sicilian source; but it makes a difference whether it is from Philistos or from Timaios. It runs thus; ἀπομονωθείς ὁ Λάμαχος ὑπέστη τῶν Συρακούσιων τοὺς ἰππεῖς ἐπιφερομένους. ἦν δὲ πρῶτος αὐτῶν Καλλικράτης, ἀστὴρ πολεμικὸς καὶ θυμοειδής. πρὸς τοῦτον ἐκ προκλήσεως καταστὰς ὁ Λάμαχος ἐμονομάχησε, καὶ λαβὼν πληγὴν πρότερος, εἶτα δοὺς, καὶ πεσὼν ὁμοῦ συναπέθανε τῷ Καλλικράτει. Anyhow we accept Kallikratês as an addition to the small stock of Syracusans whom we know by name.

CHAP. VIII in safety beyond the river. The rest of the Athenian army pressed on, and the Syracusan horse withdrew, seemingly towards Polichna¹.

We may be allowed to doubt whether Lamachos really did throw away his life in an actual single combat at such strange odds. But even in the more sober contemporary account he would seem to have risked a life most precious to Athens somewhat rashly. A general could hardly be in his right place when he found himself, with a few comrades only, on the side of a trench away from his army and where the enemy's cavalry had possession. If he was in his place, simply leading on his men, the Athenians and Argeians must have followed their general somewhat less heartily than was their wont. Be this as it may, his death was a loss to Athens which could not be made good. Syracuse might keep on her defence without Kallikratês; Athens could not hope to keep on her attack without Lamachos. The energy shown in every Athenian action of the last few days was clearly his work. It was the spirit of the hero at whom the comic poet jeered in his life-time, but whom after his death he learned to rank with Patroklos and Teukros and the other worthies of legendary times. With his death all abiding energy passed away from the Athenian camp. The one general now left in that camp was Nikias. Little was likely to be done in the hour of sickness by a general who in health had shrunk from energetic action and thrown away every opportunity. But let us do justice to him.

Effects
of the
death of
Lamachos.

Nikias
in sole
command.

¹ Thuc. vi. 101. 6; *καὶ τοὺτους μὲν οἱ Συρακούσιοι εὐθὺς παρὰ τάχος φέρονται ἀπώσαντες πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπιόντες ἦδη καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεχώρου.* All this local precision is lost in Plutarch's account; he does not distinguish between those Syracusans who withdrew to Polichna and the other Syracusans who came out of the city at the beginning of the next chapter of Thucydides. On the other hand, did the fighting in this quarter suggest to Diodoros (xiii. 7, see Appendix XI, and above, p. 174) or his informant the wild notion about the Athenians occupying Polichna and carrying on siege operations from thence?

The fault of Nikias was not incapacity to act; it was CHAP. VIII. simply that, when sent on an errand which he loathed, he found it hard to screw himself up to the point of action¹. And at this most trying moment, he acted with the energy which he always showed when he acted at all.

Before the Athenians had come back from the field of battle to their camp on Epipolai, the news of the death of Lamachos had been brought to Syracuse. The news raised the spirits of that part of the Syracusan army which had found shelter within the walls. Some of them put them- Fighting on the hill. selves in array against the part of the Athenian army which was near them. This would be the main body of the Athenian left, which had remained in its station after Lamachos had led his small party of bowmen and Argeians towards the right². The fight was renewed, and the Syracusans were again driven back³. Another division of the fugitives The Syra- who had thus taken heart attempted a more remarkable cusans exploit. They seized the opportunity to attack the round attack the fort of the Athenians⁴. It was defended only by a small κύκλος. garrison under a sick commander; but its assailants expected to find it altogether empty⁵. They succeeded so far in their attempt as to take the defences in advance of the circle⁶; and Nikias feared that, in the absence of the main army, he might not be able to withstand an attack on the circle itself. He bethought him of another resource. Much timber had been brought together for the

¹ Thuc. vi. 102. 1. They are pointedly distinguished as *οἱ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον καταφυγόντες*. Now they come forth *ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀναβαρσάσαντες*.

² *Ib.*; *ἀντετάξαντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς Ἀθηναίους*. See above, p. 223, note 2.

³ *Ib.* 3; *ἀποδιεξάντων τοὺς ἐκεῖ*.

⁴ The story is told fairly well (save in one point) by Polyainos, i. 39. 3. He knew what the *κύκλος* was. Plutarch (*Nik.* 18) says vaguely, and of the weary Syracusans, *ὁρόμῃ ἐφέροντο πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων*.

⁵ Thuc. vi. 102. 1; *ἡγούμενοι ἐρήμον αἰρήσαν*.

⁶ *Ib.* 2. See Appendix XIII.

CHAP. VIII. building of the wall; there were engines also, whether engines for the direct attack of the city, of which we have as yet heard nothing, or merely such as were needed for the wall-work¹. To all these Nikias ordered fire to be set. The flames and the smoke kept off the assailants till the Athenians who had been fighting below the hill came back from the pursuit of the Syracusans who had come out against them from the city². They came; but Lamachos was not with them, living or dead. The sight of those who had just defeated themselves and their comrades struck fear for the second time into the hearts of the Syracusans who had come out to assault the fort. At the same moment another sight of dread met their eyes. The Athenian fleet, which, while all this was going on, had been sailing round Achradina and Ortygia, was now seen by friends and foes making its unhindered way into the Great Harbour. The hearts of the Syracusans now wholly gave way; for the second time they fled within the city. On the hill and in the plain the Athenians had possession of the place of slaughter. It was for them to set up their trophy, and to grant the burial-truce. Its terms of course implied the restoration of the bodies of Lamachos and the few comrades who were slain with him³. Small are the chances that the funeral urn of the hero of Athens can ever have been brought back to his own city.

The Syracusans now gave up all further attacks on the Athenian works. There seemed no longer any hope of their being able by their own strength to hinder the

¹ Thuc. vi. 102. 2; τὰς μηχανὰς καὶ ξύλα ὅσα περὶ τοῦ τείχους ἦν καταβεβλημένα.

² Ib. See p. 225, note 3, and Appendix XIII. As the ships from Thapsos came the next moment, Polyainos fancies the army was there, and turns this βοήθεια into ἡ ἀπὸ Θάψου δύναμις.

³ Ib. 103. 1; τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδωσαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Λαμάχου καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκομίσαντο.

besiegers from hemming in the city from sea to sea¹. CHAP. VIII. Now that the whole invading force by land and sea was gathered together before Syracuse, the wall-building could go on without further hindrance. It was only by help from without that Syracuse could be saved. The besieged perhaps hardly knew how much they had gained by the single blow dealt by the arm of Kallikratēs in the struggle by the trench. The besieging works could now go on without hindrance, if the besiegers chose to force them on; but the spirit within the camp which had pressed on this and every undertaking on the Athenian side was gone. While Gylippos lingered, perhaps was constrained to linger, a negative advantage only second to his speedy coming had been gained for Syracuse by the death of Lamachos. Now he was gone, the besieging works presently began to linger. But as yet, while the north side of the wall was altogether neglected², the work south of the fort at Syka went on. The wall advances south-wards. A double line of wall, a miniature of the Long Walls of Athens, was making its way from *Portella del Fusco* to the Great Harbour³. The besiegers meanwhile had free intercourse with Italy for bringing in all that they needed, and reinforcements were coming in from several quarters. Many of the neighbouring Sikels, who had been kept back by fear of Syracuse and who had thought Athenian success hopeless, joined the side to which they were most naturally inclined, now that it seemed to be the winning side⁴. And not only the land-force, but the fleet of Athens was strengthened by barbarian help. As was to

¹ Thuc. vi. 102. 4; νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς παρουσίας σφίσι δυνάμεις ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι κολλῶσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τειχισμὸν.

² This appears from Thuc. vii. 2. 4.

³ See Appendix XIII. The fact is brought in (103. 1) with some emphasis; παρόντος ἤδη σφίσι πάντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ . . . ἀπετείχιζον.

⁴ Thuc. vi. 103. 2; ἦλθον δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν πολλοὶ ἐγὼμαχοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἱ πρότερον περιεμῶντο. They come (vii. 57. 11) κατὰ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίαν.

CHAP. VIII. be looked for, nothing had come of the embassy sent to Carthage. But of the Etruscan enemies of Syracuse some fulfilled their promises to Athens. Three ships of fifty oars came from Etruria to swell the besieging navy¹. Pindar had prayed that the Phœnician might keep aloof from Syracuse, and that the shout of the Etruscan might never be heard beneath her walls². The Phœnician did for a while keep aloof; the shout of the Etruscan was heard in company which Pindar could not have reckoned on.

Despond-
ency at
Syracuse.

We have now reached the turning-point of the whole struggle. The darkest hour of Syracuse had come. All hope seemed to have passed away from her defenders. Everything seemed to be going on according to the best hopes of the invaders. The Syracusans felt that by their unassisted strength they could never bear up against the besieging force. Help from Peloponnêsos had been promised; but of help from Peloponnêsos there was as yet no sign. Men looked forth from the besieged city—now at last really besieged³—only to see the Athenian army encamped on their heights, to see the Athenian fleet moored in their harbour, to see land-force and sea-force moving freely on any needful errand. Meanwhile no message of help was brought to their gates; no friendly sail could be seen upon their waters. The hearts of the men of Syracuse altogether sank; there was no spirit left in them. They began to turn against one another, to lay the blame on one another⁴. The generals were of course the readiest victims. What had come of the exhortations and professions of Hermokratês? He and

Charges
against the
generals;

¹ Thuc. vi. 105. 2. See above, p. 196.

² See vol. ii. p. 234.

³ Thuc. vi. 103. 4; *οἱ αἰεὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων*.

⁴ *Ib.*; καὶ γὰρ τινα καὶ ὑποψίαν ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐς ἀλλήλους εἶχον.

his colleagues had done no better than their despised predecessors. The former generals had indeed been defeated in battle; but in their day of power the city was at least not hemmed in by the enemy's walls. Hermokratês had been no more victorious in battle than those against whom he had spoken; and, with him for general, Syracuse had been put in fetters like a prisoner. Either the generals were traitors, or else they were pursued by an ill luck which made them unfit to command. An assembly was held; Hermokratês and his colleagues were deposed¹. But the people did not fall back on their former fashion of a large college of generals. The number fixed at the last election was followed. Of the three who were now chosen one bore the same name as one of those whom he succeeded. They were Hêracleidês, Euklês, and Tellias.

But things went further than this. We must remember that there had all along been in Syracuse a party favourable to Athens². Its members must now have grown bolder, and must have spoken their mind openly. And not a few others came over to their mind. It was the common saying throughout Syracuse that there was no hope of safety except in making terms with the besiegers³. It would be well to make them before the city was wholly hemmed in⁴. Messages were sent to Nikias, messages informal perhaps, but still avowed⁵. It would seem that he made some definite proposal to which Yea

Hermokratês and his colleagues deposed, and other generals chosen.

Negotiations between Nikias and the Syracusans;

¹ Thuc. vi. 103. 4; τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐφ' ὧν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ξυνέβη ἔπασσαν, ὥς ἡ δυστυχία ἢ προδοσία τῇ ἐκείνων βλαπτόμενοι. See Appendix XIV.

² See above, p. 163.

³ Thuc. vi. 103. 3; καὶ γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πολέμῳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐνόμιζον ἂν περιγενέσθαι, ὥς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὠφελία οὐδεμία ἦκε, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐν τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐποιούντο ξυμβατικούς καὶ πρὸς τὸν Νικίαν.

⁴ Plut. Nik. 18; πρὶν ἢ παντελῶς ἀποτειχισθῆναι τὴν πόλιν οὐ μέντοι δεῖν γενέσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις. This important remark is surely from Philistos.

⁵ Thuc. vi. 103. 4; κύρωσις μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγένετο . . . πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρὸς τε ἐκείνους καὶ πλείους κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.

CHAP. VIII. or Nay might be said. A day at least was fixed for the holding of an assembly formally to discuss the question of capitulation¹.
 an assembly called to treat.

Effects of success.

It has been remarked over and over again that few Greeks could bear sudden success; such a prospect as this turned even the sober head of Nikias. His thoughts were perhaps not so much of the glory of receiving the submission of Syracuse as of the higher good luck of being able to bring back fleet and army to Athens without having undergone any serious damage. But he forgot that that blissful result could not be had without some effort on his own part. After all, the utter despair of the Syracusans was premature. The city was not hemmed in; the besiegers' wall was not finished on either side. The southern wall was all but built; but it was still not built, but only in building. Of its full length, of about a mile across the lower level and the marsh, only a small space close to the sea had yet to be finished; but that was enough². On the north side of the round fort still less had been done. That side had been neglected while the works to the south, more important as they seemed at the time, had been going on. Part of the northern wall was finished; part was half-done, in the more part the stones were laid ready and no more³. As the southern wall did not reach to the sea, the northern wall was still further from reaching to the brow of the hill; towards reaching the sea at Trôgilos it had made no way at all. Syracuse then was not really shut up. An active and wary deliverer

State of the wall-building.

¹ Thuc. vii. 2. 1. Gongylos (see below, p. 237) is spoken of as καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάζειν. This can hardly have any other meaning. So Plutarch, Nik. 18; παρήγγελτο μὲν αὐτοῖς ἐκκλησία περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Νικίαν ὁμολογιῶν. See last page, note 4.

² Ib. 4; Gylippos came, ἐν ᾧ ἐπὶ μὲν ἡ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη ἀπετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχὺ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν· τοῦτο δ' ἔτι ψικοδόμεον.

³ Ib. 5. See Appendix XIII.

might still come to its help. And Nikias knew that such a deliverer was on his way. He could not have failed to hear of the conference at Sparta, the speech of Alkibiadēs, and the preparations that followed. Later news told him that a fleet charged with the relief of Syracuse was actually afloat. He heard it, but he heeded not. The numbers of the relieving force were very small; it was the enterprise of a freebooter, not any real putting forth of the strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy¹. Presently he heard of the nearer approach of a small detachment. It was but four ships; four Athenian ships would be enough to check them or to watch them, and four Athenian ships were sent². But more than this, he altogether neglected the immediate work which he had in hand, the hemming in of Syracuse by the completion of the wall which had already so far advanced. The truth is that Nikias came under the general law that, when anything draws a man into a state of feeling or a line of conduct which is unlike his usual habits, he is carried further and more swiftly in his new direction than other men³. When the heart of Nikias was for once lifted up, it was lifted up very high indeed⁴. Hitherto, if he had been unenterprising, he had at least been cautious. If he had done but little, it was because he had kept guard against every danger. In his present frame of mind he did no more than he had done

False confidence of Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vi. 104. 3; ὁ δὲ Νικίας πυνθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέοντα ὑπερείδε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν . . . καὶ ληστικώτερον ἔδοξε παρσκευασμένους πλεῖν, καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακὴν ποιῆσαι.

² They are mentioned casually in vii. 1. 2; τῶν Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν . . . ὅς ὁ Νικίας ὄμει πυνθάνομενος αὐτὸν [Γούλιππον] ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶναι, ἀπέστειλε.

³ Compare the story of King Stephen's treatment of the bishops of Ely and Lincoln; Norman Conquest, vol. v. p. 289.

⁴ Plutarch (Nik. 18) brings this out well; ὁ δὲ Νικίας εὐθὺς αὐτὸς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίμης καὶ τύχης ἀνατεθαρρηκίης . . . οὐδένα τοῦ Γούλιππον λόγον ἔσχε προσπλέοντος οὐδὲ φυλακὴν ἐποιήσατο καθαρὰν, ἀλλὰ τῷ παντελῶς ὑπερορᾶσθαι καὶ καταφρονεῖσθαι λαθὼν αὐτὸν ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰσέκλειυσε, κ.τ.λ.

CHAP. VIII. before, and he kept no good guard against anything. He had once shrunk from action through simple dislike of the errand on which he had been sent. He now shrank from action, because he had come to think that the fruits of victory were to be had without further action. A few more days of work as men had worked while Lamachos was living, and no help from without could have saved Syracuse from his grasp. Those few days were wasted, and Syracuse was saved.

Plans of
Gylippos.

We must now go back to follow the course of Gylippos and the other helpers of Syracuse from the moment of the Lacedæmonian vote which appointed him as commander at Syracuse and bade him concert measures with the Corinthians¹. The language in which his appointment is recorded shows that it was taken for granted that the officer sent by Sparta would, as such, naturally take the command of the local forces of Syracuse as well as of those which might be sent to her help². He begins by giving his orders to the Corinthian envoys at Sparta³. They were bidden at once to send him two ships to Asinê, the Dryopian town on the west side of the Messanian gulf. They were to fit out as many more ships as they thought of sending—the number seems to be left to themselves—and, when the time came, to have them ready to sail⁴. Somewhat later we hear of two Laconian ships as taking part in the enterprise. It might almost seem as if these were the two ships sent to Asinê, manned, under the care of Gylippos, by maritime subjects of Sparta⁵. The Corinthians and Syracusans now left Sparta. Of the return of

¹ See above, p. 261.

² Thuc. vi. 93. 2; Γύλιππον . . . προστάζωντες ἄρχοντα τοῖς Συρακούσις.

³ Ib. 3; δύο μὲν ταῦς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἐκέλευέν οἱ πέμψειν εἰς Ἀσίνην.

⁴ Ib.; τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παρασκευάζεσθαι ὅσας διανοοῦνται πέμψειν καὶ ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, ἐτοίμας εἶναι πλεῖν.

⁵ In c. 104. 1 we have two Laconian ships distinct from the Corinthian.

the Syracusan envoys to Sicily we hear nothing; but CHAP. VIII. doubtless they did return, and took with them the news that help for Syracuse was at least voted at Sparta.

The next thing we hear is that a fleet is assembled at Gathering of the fleet at Leukas. Leukas, a fit place for the centre of the enterprise, a city daughter of Corinth and sister of Syracuse. The number of the ships charged with the deliverance of the threatened member of the household was not large. Except the two from Laconia, all came from different branches of the Corinthian family. Corinth herself gave twelve; her colonists at Leukas gave two and Ambrakia three ¹. They met at Leukas about the time of the events which followed the death of Lamachos, when the Syracusans began to fall into utter despair. Their purpose was to sail to Sicily with all speed ². But news came which made them change their purpose. Rumour was busy everywhere in the western Rumours of Athenian success. seas. Men spoke of the successes of Athens; they spoke of the Athenian general, the wise leader, the chosen favourite of fortune, whom none could hope to overcome ³. Reports reached Leukas that the Athenian walls were thoroughly completed and that Syracuse was hemmed in without hope ⁴. To Gylippos this news sounded as if all Gylippos despairs of Sicily, but will save Italy. Sicily was lost; it would be labour in vain to strive to do aught for Syracuse. But the danger was not confined to Syracuse or to Sicily. Athenian ambition—so Gylippos had learned from Alkibiadēs—went on from Sicily to Italy and to more distant lands. The Greek cities of Italy might still be saved ⁵. On that errand, the only hope that

¹ Thuc. vi. 104. 1.

² Ib.; *βουλόμενοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν διὰ τάχους βοηθῆσαι.*

³ Plut. Nik. 18; *μεγάλη ἡ δόξα διεφύτα τοῦ κρατεῖν πάντα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ στρατηγὸν ἔχειν ἀμαχὸν δι' εὐτυχίαν καὶ φρόνησιν.*

⁴ Thuc. vi. 104. 1; *ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δεινὰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐφεισμέναι, ὥς ἤδη παρτελῶς ἀποτεταχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαι εἶσι.*

⁵ Ib.; *τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπὶδα σῶσθαι εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι.*

CHAP. VIII. seemed left, Gylippos made up his mind to set forth in person with a small force, leaving the other ships to follow.

Voyage of
Gylippos.

With four ships then, the two Laconian and two Corinthian, under a captain named Pythên, the Spartan commander ventured on a voyage which among Greek sailors passed for a piece of unusual daring. He crossed straight from Leukas to Taras¹. The usual course along the coast was specially to be avoided, as it would have led him by Korkyra, the

His stay
at Taras;
his vain
negotia-
tions with
Thourioi.

estranged member of the Corinthian household. Taras was friendly to Sparta and to Syracuse, and he was able to make it a centre of action. He first sent envoys to Thourioi, the city which had sheltered his banished father, and where he claimed to take up the citizenship which he had inherited from him². Thourioi, a colony either of Athens or of Apollôn³, was tossed to and fro by factions; the party of Athens sometimes prevailed, sometimes was defeated. A little later we shall find Thourioi strongly Athenian⁴.

Just now it is not quite clear whether friends of Athens thought Gylippos too weak to hurt them, or whether enemies of Athens thought him too weak to help them. Four ships, the Thourians thought, could do nothing either way, and the Spartan embassy came to nought⁵. He then sailed southward along the coast of Italy, but was presently driven back by a fierce storm to Taras⁶. His ships were damaged, and he had to wait a while to refit.

He hears
truer re-
ports at
Lokroi.

Then he set forth again and reached Lokroi, where he heard a truer account of the state of things at Syracuse. The city, he now learned, was not fully hemmed in; the north wall of the Athenians was altogether unfinished;

¹ Thuc. vi. 104. 1; *ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπεραιώθησαν τὸν Ἴόνιον ἐς Τάραντα.*

² Ib. 2; *προσβευσάμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ποτε πολιτείαν.*

³ See above, p. 12.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 33. 5.

⁵ Ib. vi. 104. 2.

⁶ Ib.; *ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τερναῖον κόλπον ὃς ἐκπνέει ταύτην μέγας.* See Arnold's note.

it was still possible for an army to be led into Syracuse CHAP. VIII. by way of Epipolai¹. Something then might still be done to save Syracuse and Sicily. Still Gylippos did not think of at once sailing to Syracuse with his small force. Whatever was to be done by way of relief to Syracuse by sea he left to the Corinthians, more experienced than he in maritime warfare. He himself would make his way into Sicily in a less threatening sort; he would gather a land-force, and come at its head to the relief of Syracuse by the path which was pointed out to him.

He sails for Sicily.

The news that Gylippos was at Lokroi was brought to Nikias. It was at this stage that he did at last take so much heed to what was coming as to send four ships to look after the doings of the freebooter². But the freebooter was too quick for him. The Athenian ships were to watch for him at Rhêgion; but before they got there, Gylippos and Pythên, with their four ships, had made their way through the strait, and were sailing along the north coast of Sicily. The first point at which they touched was Himera, a city favourable to their cause, and well out of the reach of the Athenians and their Sikeliot allies. There the ships were drawn on shore³, and Himera became for a while the head-quarters of Gylippos. While there he concerted measures with the Himeraians for getting together whatever land-force, Greek and barbarian, could be gathered for the relief of Syracuse. We now incidentally learn that the advice of Alkibiadês that the force to be sent should consist of men ready both to ply the oar at sea and to act as heavy-armed troops by land⁴ had been at least partly carried out. The men of Himera, who had long ago refused to

Four ships sent by Nikias.

Voyage of Gylippos along the north coast.

Accession of Himera.

¹ Thuc. vii. 1. 1; *πυνθανόμενοι σαφίστερον ἤδη ὅτι οὐ παντελῶς καὶ ἀποτετε-
χισμένοι αἱ Συράκονσαι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι οὐκ ἂν κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾷ
ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν.*

² See above, p. 231.

³ Thuc. vii. 1. 3; *τὰς αὐτὰς ἀνείλκυσαν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ.*

⁴ See above, p. 109.

CHAP. VIII. help Athens, were now won over to help Syracuse. They engaged to send their own force to the work, and they gave panoplies to such of the crews of Gylippos and Pythên as had not brought any with them ¹. Messages were sent to various parts of Sicily to ask or demand help. It is to be noticed that we do not hear a word of any dealings, friendly, hostile, or diplomatic, with Carthage or with any Phœnician place in Sicily. As for the Elymians, the horsemen of Segesta were serving under Nikias, and to chastise or threaten their city would have taken more time than could be spared. But from Sikels as well as Greeks help was freely sought. A message was sent to the enemy of Segesta, in which Gylippos, as commander-in-chief by Spartan nomination, ordered ² the Selinuntines to send their whole force to a certain point unnamed. This command they obeyed but imperfectly, sending some horsemen and light-armed. The Geloans also sent a small force. We are surprised to hear that Sikel feeling in northern Sicily was turning against Athens. King Archônidês, the friend of Ducetius, who had zealously supported the Athenian side, was lately dead, and, from whatever cause, the alliance of Sparta, as represented by Gylippos, more strongly attracted the fancy of those who came after him ³. A thousand Sikels joined the force of Gylippos. The largest contingent was that of Himera, a thousand foot, heavy-armed and light, and a hundred horse. The crews of the four ships and the soldiers who had come with them, all now in the full array of the heavy-armed, numbered seven

Contingents from Selinous and Gela.

Sikels join Gylippos.

¹ Thuc. vii. i. 3; καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τῶν σφετέρων ναύταις, ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὅπλα παρασχεῖν.

² Ib.; τοὺς Σελινουντίους πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἀπαντῶν πανστρατιᾷ εἰς τι χωρίον.

³ Ib. 4; τῶν Σικελῶν τινὲς, οἱ πολλὰ προθυμότερον προσχωρεῖν ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν ταύτῃ Σικελῶν βασιλεύοντιν τινῶν καὶ ἂν οὐκ ἀδύνατος, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν. See above, p. 158, and vol. ii. pp. 381, 386.

hundred. With this force Gylippos set forth on his march CHAP. VIII. for the deliverance of Syracuse.

The news of his coming went before him. The ships Voyage of
Gongylos. that were gathered at Leukas were now at sea; but one of them, though by some chance the last to set sail, reached Syracuse before the rest. We must suppose that, while the others took the usual course, this one, by a still bolder effort than that of Gylippos, dashed right across the open sea¹. Its captain was Gongylos, a Corinthian officer, specially zealous in the cause. He took on himself the task of bearing to his straitened brethren the message of coming deliverance. It was the very day which had Here reaches
Syracuse
on the day
fixed for
the assem-
bly. been fixed for the discussion of the Athenian terms in the Syracusan assembly. Men were already gathering in the *agora*, when a ship was seen drawing near, a ship not manned by the enemies of Syracuse but sent on an errand of good will by her own mother-city. She must have made her way into the Little Harbour; the Great Harbour was an Athenian possession, part of the Athenian dominion of the seas². If the Syracusan fleet was in the Great Harbour at all, it must have been cooped up in the docks. But that a ship of an enemy of Athens could enter even the Little Harbour seems to show that the Athenian guard-ships must have kept a very careless watch. The ship of Gongylos reached the shore in He brings
the news
of help. safety, and its captain and his crew were soon on Syracusan ground. Men flocked to the shore; the assembly was forsaken or forgotten; instead of listening to speeches for or against acceptance of the Athenian terms, the men of Syracuse hearkened to the good news which made it needless to give any Athenian terms a thought.

¹ Thuc. vii. 2. 1; Γόγγυλος, εἰς τῶν Κορινθίων ἀρχόντων, μὲν νηὶ τελευταίῳς ὁρμηθεὶς πρῶτος μὲν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸ Γυλίππου.

² lb. v. 56. 2.

CHAP. VIII. Gongylos spoke; and he told all men that a Corinthian fleet and a Spartan commander were on their way to help them ¹.

No further
thought
of terms
with the
besiegers.

Continued
vain con-
fidence of
Nikias.

One would be well pleased to know whether, after the sudden coming of the Corinthian captain with his glad tidings, the formalities of a Syracusan assembly were still gone through. We are not told whether any vote was passed, whether any answer was given to the proposals of Nikias, or whether, in the universal tumult of joy, all such matters were simply forgotten. In any case, a practical, if not a formal, vote of the people of Syracuse decreed that no Athenian proposals should be hearkened to, and that Syracuse, with the help of her friends and kinsfolk, would still hold out. And, either through a formal message or through the lack of any message, Nikias must have known that it was so. Strange to say, even now his eyes were not opened. The Corinthian fleet was coming; the Spartan commander was coming; but the vain confidence of the general of the Athenians was not shaken. The enterprise of which he heard still seemed to him the mere rash undertaking of a freebooter, which he might safely despise. The northern wall might, even at the last moment, have been pressed on to its completion. Failing^{*} this, such an Athenian guard might have been kept at both ends of the hill as would have hindered any ally of Syracuse from making his way into the city, at any rate without a struggle for life and death. Nothing of the kind was done. The southern wall, all but finished, still remained all but finished ². On the north side it is plain

¹ Thuc. vii. 2. 1; καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσας, διεκάλυσε τε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε, λέγων ὅτι νῆες τε ἄλλαι ἐτι προσπλέουσι καὶ Γύλιππος ὁ Κλεανδρίδου, Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστειλόμενος, ἄρχων. So Plut. Nik. 19. Diodóros leaves out this striking incident. See p. 223, note 4.

² Thuc. vii. 2. 4; ἐτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο καιροῦ ἐλθὼν, ἐν ᾧ ἔπτα μὲν ἡ ὀκτώ

that no guard was kept against the coming even of a free-CHAP. VIII. booter, and by that path more than a freebooter came in.

§ 5. *The Defence of Syracuse by Gylippos.*

B. C. 414-413.

It is hard to say how much of the movements of Gylippos could have been known to Gongylos when he brought his welcome news to Syracuse. Gongylos sailed straight from Leukas; he could hardly have known what had been going on since Gylippos had landed in Sicily. But some tidings must have reached Leukas later than the time when Gylippos and Pythên had sailed for Italy with their four ships. For they left Leukas in the belief that it was no use trying to do anything more for Sicily; their object now was to save or to gain the Italiot cities¹. The Corinthians at Leukas must have heard the later news of the coming of Gongylos. which reached Gylippos at Lokroi, the news that Syracuse was not wholly hemmed in; otherwise they would not have come at all². Gongylos would therefore be able at least to tell the Syracusans that Gylippos and Pythên had sailed for Sicily on their behalf; he could hardly have told them anything more. But this was enough to raise their spirits and to make them give up all thought of surrender. Not only was their metropolis helping them, but the great need of all, the Spartan commander, had been sent; that, as Alkibiadês had said, was worth more than an army³. Presently further tidings came that the Spartan commander was in Sicily, that he was on his march towards Syracuse, that he was drawing near to the city⁴. And the commander had an army with him. It

σταδίαν ἤδη ἀπετετέλειστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχὺ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν.

¹ See above, p. 233.

² See above, p. 234.

³ See above, p. 200.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 2. 2; ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ᾤσθάνοντο αὐτῶν.

CHAP. VIII. was not a very large one, perhaps not a very choice one, but a force which numbered more than three thousand men¹ went for something according to Greek notions of numbers. But, many or few, the Spartan leader was with them. Whether the Syracusans at all knew what a leader was coming, we cannot tell; but the coming of any Spartan satisfied the need of the moment. When the tidings came that Gylippos was actually drawing near, the whole military force of Syracuse went forth to meet him². They could have done this only by marching between the north brow of the hill and the unfinished Athenian wall. But not a blow seems to have been struck, not a step of any kind to have been taken, to hinder either Gylippos from coming or the Syracusans from going forth. The freebooter was now very near indeed. Did Nikias so trust in his own good luck³ as to think that the enemy had come simply to be delivered into his hands by some power favourable to Athens, while he and his army reposed peacefully by their round fort at Syka?

The Syracusan force goes forth to meet him.

March of Gylippos.

The exact line of march of Gylippos from Himera, or rather from the unnamed trysting-place where the forces of Selinous were to meet him, is not very clear. But its later stages must have led him by some of the inland roads between the steep of Thymbris and the western point of Epipolai. Having taken an unknown Sikel post on his way⁴, he came to the north side of the Syracusan hill.

¹ There were 700 of his own, 1100 from Himera, horse, heavy-armed, and light-armed, 1000 Sikels; also (vii. 1. 4) *Ξελινουρτίαν τινὲς ψιλοὶ καὶ ἰσθῆς καὶ Γελίων ὄλιγοι*, who must surely have mustered 200 among them. Let us hope it is a copyist or editor, and not Diodóros himself, to whom we owe the words *τῶν Ἱμεραίων καὶ Σικανῶν τρισχιλίου* (xiii. 7, 8).

² Thuc. vii. 2. 2; *οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῷ Γυλίππῳ ὡς ἀπατησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον*.

³ His *εὐτυχία*. See above, p. 233.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 2. 3; *ὁ δὲ ἴετας τό τε [al. τότε] τεῖχος ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν Σικελῶν ἰλάν*. The forms of the name are endless and the place is quite unknown. I therefore follow Holm (G. S. ii. 40, 413) in leaving it nameless. *Ἰεραὶ* is

He reached it at the point just east of the neck of Euryalos, CHAP. VIII. the point where, not so very long before, Lamachos had led the besieging army to the occupation of the hill. The same path which had brought the first real danger to Syracuse was now to bring her deliverance. Where the whole host of Athens had climbed up on the errand which was to bring Syracuse so near to her overthrow, the despised freebooter, with his hastily gathered force, Greek and barbarian, was to climb up to save her. Had Lamachos been there, Gylippos might haply not have found the ascent so easy. But with Nikias in sole command, Nikias too pressed down by sickness on one hand, lifted up by vain confidence on the other, no more heed seems to have been taken against the approach of Gylippos than Syracuse had taken against the approach of Lamachos. Gylippos and his following toiled up the path, and clearly found Euryalos itself undefended. The fort on Labdalon was not near enough to stand immediately in the way of their ascent; it kept watch over the sea by Thapsos and Megara, rather than over the inland passes. Nor does Gylippos seem to have met with any opposition from the garrison of Labdalon in his march along the hill. As the Athenian wall to the north was unfinished, the course along the edge of the hill was open; he went on unchecked, till the Syracusans, equally unchecked, met him. The deliverer had come, and he was not one to let the grass grow under his feet. It was as a deliverer that he came; but he could be a deliverer only by acting as a master; and it was as

He goes
up by the
same path
as the
Athenians.

He meets
with no
opposition.

The Syra-
cusans
meet him.

a real place, being quoted by Stephen as *φράγμα Σικελίας* from the sixth book of Philistos—I wish it was a “fragment,” as Arnold calls it—that in which he dealt with the Athenian siege. But we cannot be sure that this is the place. Anyhow it is not the Iato of Count Roger. See vol. i. p. 121.

Diodoros (xiii. 8) says at this stage—it has an odd sound after the mention of Sikans just before—*πυθόμενοι δ' οἱ Σικελοὶ τὴν παρουσίαν αὐτῶν, ἐπιθέμενοι τοὺς ἡμίσεις ἀνέλκον*. This has really nothing to do with Gylippos; it is the story in Thuc. vii. 32. 2.

CHAP. VIII. a master that Sparta had sent him¹. We may picture to ourselves the welcome with which he was greeted; but Gylippos had no time or mood for ceremonial receptions or for a joyous entry into Syracuse. At once, fresh from his march and climb, the Spartan commander-in-chief relieved Hérakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias of their duties. He took the command of the whole force, and straightway led both the Syracusan army and his own following right up to the invading lines². The besiegers, who had thought Syracuse a prize within their easy grasp, were challenged to come forth and fight with those who had come to its defence.

Gylippos
takes the
command;

Amaze-
ment of
the Athe-
nians.

Amazement and confusion took possession of the camp of Nikias. Sudden, unlooked-for, unhindered, a new enemy had come upon them. The freebooter was come, but in a guise somewhat beyond that of a freebooter. He had brought with him, not only a large reinforcement to the Syracusan army, but what counted for more, the great name of Sparta in his own person. Astounded as they were, the Athenians still summoned up courage to set themselves in battle array³. Before the two armies met, Gylippos sent a herald to the Athenian general. His message was to offer a truce, a truce to allow the whole Athenian army to leave Sicily with bag and baggage

Proposals
of Gylip-
pos.

¹ See above, p. 201.

² Thuc. vii. 2. 3; ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἦπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐχώρει μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

³ Ib. vii. 3. 1; οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, παρετάξαντο δέ. Plutarch (Nik. 19) leaves out the march and climb of Gylippos. But they are implied when he sends a message to the Syracusans to meet him; οἱ δὲ θαρρήσαντες ἐξαπλίζοντο καὶ προσήγεν εὐθὺς ὁ Γύλιππος ἐξ ὁδοῦ παρατεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. Diodôros (xiii. 7, 8) gets into utter confusion. Gylippos δὲ τῆς μεσογείου [that is a good point] παρήγεν εἰς Συρακοῦσας καὶ μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐξήγαγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. A battle then follows; but it is that in which Lamachos is killed.

within five days¹. Such a message was not exactly CHAP. VIII. mockery; but it was assuredly sent without any thought of its terms being accepted. It was in truth meant for Syracusan rather than for Athenian ears. It was meant to stir up Syracusan hearts, to make the defenders of Syracuse feel how much might be done now they had a Spartan to their leader. Nikias, as might be looked for, No answer given. sent the herald away without an answer²; a less decorous general might have charged him with some cutting message back again. Indeed, according to some reports, when the general refused an answer, there were men in the Athenian ranks who volunteered one. Had the coming of one cloak and staff given such fresh strength to the Syracusans that they could afford to despise Athens? Had not the Athenians kept in bonds three hundred men stronger than Gylippos and with longer hair³? But this tale reads rather like a transfer to Athenian mouths of gibes which are likely enough to have been uttered in Syracuse a little later.

The Spartan leader of Syracusans did not fail, on this Bad array of the Syracusans. his first day of command, to mark the military shortcomings of the Syracusan foot. To a Spartan these shortcomings would be far clearer, far more provoking, than to a reforming Syracusan. When the two armies formed for battle, Gylippos saw that the trim of the Syracusans

¹ Thuc. vii. 3. 1; ὁ δὲ θέμενος τὰ δπλα ἐγγὺς, κήρυκα προπέμπει αὐτοῖς λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται ἐξίεναι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας πέντε ἡμερῶν, λαβόντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἐτοίμοι εἶναι σπένδεσθαι. Plutarch (Nik. 19) is to the same effect.

² Ib.; οἱ δὲ ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τε ἐποιούντο καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀπέπεμψαν. The plural number clearly makes the act of the general the act of the army also.

³ Plut. Nik. 19; ὁ μὲν οὖν Νικίας οὐδὲν ἤξιωσεν ἀποκρίνασθαι· τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν τινες καταγελῶντες ἤράτων εἰ διὰ παρουσίαν ἐνδὲς τρίβανος καὶ βακτηρίας Λακεδαιμονίης οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ τὰ Συρακουσίων ἐξαίφνης γέγονεν ὥστ' Ἀθηναίων καταφρονεῖν, οἱ πολλοὶ βωμολογιώτεροι Γυλίππου καὶ μᾶλλον κομῶντες τριακοσίους ἔχοντες ἐν πύλαις δεδεμένους ἀπὸ δουκὸς Λακεδαιμονίων. See p. 245, note 1, and compare the Syracusan mockery in p. 245.

CHAP. VIII. was so bad that he did not venture to meet the Athenians in the narrow space between their fort and the city walls ¹. He led his forces out into some wider ground, where, it is to be supposed, the Syracusan horse would come into play. But such wider ground could have been found only to the west of the Athenian wall; and this involves a march forwards and backwards to the north of the Athenian fort. In any case Nikias declined battle, and kept himself within his defences. Gylippos then spent his first night of command at Syracuse, his first night at Syracuse in any shape. He bivouacked within the last built wall of the city, in the new quarter of Temenitês ². Things had indeed turned about. A day or two back the defenders of Syracuse were trembling within their walls, deeming that no hope of safety was left to them, save in coming to terms with the invaders. The hopes of the besiegers were so high that they scorned to keep common watch against the enemy whom they knew to be coming. And now the enemy of Athens, the deliverer of Syracuse, had come. From the moment of his coming all had changed. He was marching freely to and fro before and behind the besieging lines, and the besiegers refused to leave their lines to meet them.

Nikias
declines
battle.

Effects of
Gylippos'
coming.

Before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war a Corinthian orator had pictured the Athenians as ever active and adventurous, the Spartans as slow and unwilling to act ³. In the persons of Nikias and Gylippos, Athenian and Spartan might seem to have changed places. On those points neither commander represented the usual characteristics of his own city. The good genius of Syracuse had sent her in her need a leader who, to the name and authority

¹ Thuc. vii. 3. 3; ὁρῶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ βρόδους ἐντασσομένους, ἐπαγγεῖ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον.

² Ib.; ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιάν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄεραν τὴν Τεμενίτην καλουμένην, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡλίσσαντο. See Appendix XII.

³ Ib. i. 68-70.

of Sparta, added an energy and power of resource more than CHAR. VIII. Athenian. But Gylippos was a Spartan none the less, Character of Gylippos. Spartan in his garb and ways, Spartan in some of his faults. The Syracusans, used to Sikeliot pomp and luxury, are said to have mocked at the simple figure of the man who had come to lead them. They scorned his Spartan cloak, his Spartan staff, his hair worn long after the Spartan fashion. At a later time they are said to have found him out in meanness and love of gain¹. But however either friends or enemies may have mocked at Gylippos, his friends obeyed him, and his enemies soon learned to fear him. The supreme command of the forces of Syracuse and her allies had already passed into his hands as a matter of course. He was the Spartan, and that was enough; it is plain that the Syracusan commanders put themselves under his orders from the first moment of his appearance on the hill. We need not trouble ourselves with the blundering story of a late writer which makes him gain the first place by a base stratagem². With Gylippos Renewed confidence of the Syracusans. to leader, men pressed eagerly to be led to battle. They came about him, we are told, though with a different

¹ Plut. Nik. 19; *Τίμαιος δὲ καὶ τοὺς Σικελιώτας φησὶν ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν Γύλιππον, ὕστερον μὲν ἀσχροκέρδειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ μικρολογίαν καταγρόντας, ὥς δὲ πρότερον ἑφῆθη, σκώπτουστας εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα καὶ τὴν κόμην*. This comes immediately after the Athenian retort in p. 243. Plutarch seems hardly to believe the present story, perhaps with reason; but it is at least more credible than the other, which doubtless grew out of it.

² One is really ashamed to refer to the silly story in Polyainos, i. 42. 1. 2. Gylippos wishes to be commander-in-chief (*αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς ἐν Συρακούσαις δυνάμεως*). He tells the Syracusan generals that they ought to occupy a certain hill (*λόφος*)—one would like to know where—between the city and the Athenian camp. He sends a message by night to the Athenians, who occupy it first. Then he complains that his secrets are betrayed, and he is made sole general (*ὁ πρόεδρος τῶν Συρακουσίων ἐνὶ καὶ μόνῃ Γαλίττῃ τοῦ πολέμου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπέτρεψεν*). He gets possession of the hill by another trick, which seems to be mixed up with the sea-fights to which we shall come presently. Did Timaios stoop to such rubbish? Philistost assuredly did not.

CHAP. VIII. purpose, like small birds thronging round an owl¹. And he found work for all who offered themselves from the first day of his coming.

That day's work had been to climb up Epipolai, to meet the Syracusan force, to defy the Athenians, to enter the city which he was sent to deliver. The morrow saw him no less busily at work. By some strange chance his force had been allowed to pass the Athenian fort on Labdalon; but he saw that such a post as that was not to be left in the hands of the invaders. The one thought of the Syracusans had been to hinder the building of the Athenian wall. Gylippos went on with that work more vigorously than they had done, and at the same time he gave himself diligently to take full possession of the western part of the hill. In his view the two objects were the same. A wall running east and west was to be built to hinder the wall of the Athenians north of the round fort from ever reaching the brow of the hill². But this wall was to go on further to the west, and to be joined on to a system of Syracusan outposts which should guard the approach of Euryalos and the whole western part of the hill. He who had come up that way knew its importance. To this end the Athenian fort at Labdalon had to be taken. A general march thither might have called out the whole Athenian force, and that might be dangerous till Gylippos had put a little Spartan discipline into the Syracusan foot. In order therefore to draw off the attention of the Athenians, he drew up the main part of his force in front of their lines, while a smaller body was sent to do the work at Labdalon. That post was out of sight of the Athenian round fort³, and the party sent thither did their work without the knowledge of the main Athenian force. The fort on Labdalon was taken, and its garrison

Wall-
building of
Gylippos
at the west
end of the
hill.

He takes
Labdalon.

¹ Plut. Nik. 19; εἶτα μέντοι φησὶν αὐτὸς [Τίμαιος] ὅτι τῇ Γυλίππῳ φανέντι καθάπερ γλαυκὴ πολλοὶ προσέπησαν ἐτοίμοι στρατευόμενοι.

² See Appendix XV.

³ See Appendix XIII.

slain¹. The same day was marked by the first Syracusan success at sea. An Athenian trireme watching over the mouth of the Great Harbour was taken². Of this exploit we should gladly hear something more. Syracuse had ships, whether in the Great Harbour or elsewhere; they may now have been encouraged to make a sally from the docks. This success, happening at the same moment as the taking of Labdalon, was at least a happy omen. It helped to raise the hopes of the besieged as well by sea as by land.

The success of the attack on Labdalon—one would like to know to what division of the force of Gylippos the credit of the exploit belongs³—laid the ground open for him to carry out his whole scheme. That is, if only he could hurry on the building of his counterwork so as to stop the Athenian wall which was now advancing towards the northern cliff. Nikias, with Gylippos in his near neighbourhood, had put on somewhat of the energy of his enemy, energy of which he himself always had a store lying hid, but which needed some strong pressure to bring it to the front. The southern wall, the double wall, was now pushed on vigorously; it was at last completely finished. It now reached the Great Harbour, and those who had been employed in building it went up to their stations on the hill⁴. But, in face of the present schemes of Gylippos, the southern wall was of less moment than it had been. The wall north of the round fort was therefore eagerly pressed on. Gylippos saw that he had two things to do, and that speedily. He set to work at once to build his own wall, and thereby to hinder the Athenians from finishing theirs.

A race between two sets of builders, with its interest heightened by the chance of handstrokes at any moment,

¹ Thuc. vii. 3. 4.

² Ib. 5.

³ μένος τε νέμειν, says Thucydides, vii. 3. 4.

⁴ Ib. 4. 3; οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναβιβήσαντες ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσης τεύχος ἐπιτελείσαντες. See Appendix XIII.

CHAP. VIII.
Taking
of an
Athenian
trireme.

The Athenian wall finished towards the south.

The northern wall pressed on.

CHAP. VIII. now began. The new Syracusan counterwall, at right angles to the Athenian wall and nearly parallel to the northern edge of the hill, was now begun. It started from the city, that is, from the wall of Tyche, as the first Syracusan wall had started from the wall of Temenitês¹. The wall was doubtless built by day; at night Gylippos planned an attack on a weak point in the Athenian wall near the round fort². But this time Nikias was ready for him. The Athenians were bivouacking outside their fortress³; when the enemy drew near, they made ready to attack him. Gylippos had no mind to expose his ill-disciplined troops to the chances of a night-battle with men whom he could not take by surprise. He therefore drew off his force. The lesson was not lost on the Athenians. They pressed on the building of the wall, the wall begun so long before, and of the unfinished state of which we have already had a picture⁴. The work was now diligently carried on, specially the raising of the wall where it had been begun. A careful watch too was now kept. The part near Syka, the most threatened part of all, the Athenians watched themselves. Along the rest, as far, it is to be supposed, as the Great Harbour, the allies were posted at various points. Meanwhile the Syracusan counterwall went on, the more vigorously perhaps while the besiegers, if we can call them so any longer, struck a blow in another quarter.

The wall of Gylippos running east and west.

Vigorous wall-building on both sides.

The loss of the trireme that was taken off the mouth of the Great Harbour may have suggested to Nikias that the mouth of the Great Harbour was a point to be carefully looked to. It had become specially so in the changed

¹ See Appendix XV.

² Thuc. vii. 4. 2; καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος (ἦν γὰρ τι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενέας) νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπῆγε πρὸς αὐτό.

³ Ib.; ἔνυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι.

⁴ See above, p. 230.

state of things. The Athenian fleet was now, not in its old station at Daskôn¹, but much further to the north and nearer to the city. The new station was in the north-western corner of the harbour, near the swamp of Lysimelaia and the scene of the battle in which Lamachos fell. Here the ships could lie close to the Athenian walls which had now reached the harbour; they seem indeed to have been cooped up along the piece of shore which those walls immediately defended. Now that the Syracusans were beginning to stir by sea, such a position gave them no command of the harbour in general; it was even dangerously near to the older Syracusan docks, those in the Great Harbour². Moreover since the coming of Gylippos, it could hardly have been possible to bring in provisions and whatever was needed by land from the north. Everything now had to come by sea, at a great disadvantage, as long as the Athenians had no command of the mouth of the harbour. It is significantly added that Nikias, beginning, since Gylippos came, to have less hope of success by land, was disposed to give more heed to enterprises by sea³. He determined therefore to occupy the headland of Plêmyrion, directly opposite Ortygia, the northern point of the peninsula—now known as Maddalena—of which the low ground south of the harbour forms the isthmus. It is a point so important for the command of the harbour that one wonders, just as in the case of Euryalos, that neither side had occupied it already⁴. But there is no mention of any Syracusan garrison there, no mention of any opposition being met with when Nikias sent his whole fleet

CHAP. VIII.
The Athenian ships in the Great Harbour.

The Athenians occupy Plêmyrion.

¹ See above, p. 166.

² See vol. ii. p. 143, and Appendix XVI.

³ Thuc. vii. 4. 4; προσείχεται τε ἤδη μᾶλλον τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμῳ, ὁρῶν τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφίσιν, ἐπειδὴ Γύλιππος ἦεν, ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα.

⁴ The position is marked by Thucydides, vii. 4. 4; ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα ἀντιπέρας τῆς πόλεως, ἥπερ προβήκουσα τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰ τειχισθεῖη, ἄξιον αὐτῇ ἐφαίνετο ἢ ἐσκομδῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων εἶσεσθαι. See vol. i. p. 347.

CHAP. VIII. and part of his army to take possession of the headland, and to turn it into an Athenian fortress and naval station. The southern horn of the Great Harbour, the southern pillar of its entrance, thus fell into the hands of the besiegers, the last marked success of the Athenian enterprise.

Character
of Pl  m-
myrion.

The headland of Pl  mmyrion is wild and rocky, pierced by small inlets, and with small rocks and islands scattered in front of it. The cliffs are tossed into fantastic shapes ; in one place on the outer side of the point a deep inlet shelters a grotto where the boatman can ply his oar under the natural arch, and where the devout mind of Nikias, if he cherished the poetic side of his own creed, might have

Tombs.

ventured to look for a vision of the Nereids. At this point prim  val tombs are hewn in the rock close by the landing-place, as other such tombs are scattered over various points of the cliffs and of the rocky surface of the hill. Some of these traces of the earlier folk of the land are presently to have a place in our story. The surface of the ground too shows signs of later occupation in wheel-tracks and in cut foundations. But at present, save the light-house and a modern house or two, Pl  mmyrion is desolate, and it most likely never formed so much as a suburb of

Nikias
builds
three forts.

Syracuse. On this headland Nikias built three forts, a greater and two smaller. One can only guess at their sites ; but one might fancy the main fortress on the higher ground of the peninsula, while of the two smaller, one might command the point itself, the site of the present light-house, and another might look directly towards the har-

View from
Pl  mmy-
rion.

bour. The view from Pl  mmyrion is a special one, and of no small moment for a besieger of Syracuse. The extent of the city is seen in its widest sense, and it seems vaster than it does from any point within the harbour. From the harbour we look along the whole western line of Ortygia to its southern point ; in this view from Pl  mmyrion

the east side of the island comes into sight, as well as CHAP. VIII. part of the eastern side of Achradina. The two are indeed huddled together into a single mass; nothing would suggest that Ortygia was an island; but we better see its relation to the hill. From no one point could the whole range of operations be better watched than from the part now newly occupied.

But the immediate object of the occupation of Plémmyrion was to provide a new station for the ships. This was found in the little bay of Carrozza, immediately within the harbour. There the ships of war and the more part of the ships of burthen took their place. Some were drawn ashore; and the forts became Athenian store-houses¹. The new station, standing apart from the constant fighting which went on around the walls on Epipolai, was thought to be a safer resting-place for provisions and stuff generally, for the sails of the ships, for the money of Athenian soldiers and even of Athenian merchants². We must remember that, besides the men of mere traffic who had followed the army, not a few of the fighting men had hoped to do some buying and selling as well³. But the place had its bad side; there was no water near, and fodder and fuel had to be sought by the sailors where they might be found⁴. Value of the new quarters. Moreover the occupation of Plémmyrion led to a counter-stroke on the Syracusan side. To guard the southern shore of the Great Harbour from the plunder of the garrison of Plémmyrion, a third part of the whole cavalry of Syracuse was planted in Polichna. The Syracusan horse at Polichna. They had complete command of the country by land; and they constantly

¹ Thuc. vii. 4. 5; *ἔφερείχισε τρία φρούρια· καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ τε σκεύη τὰ πλεῖστα ἔκειτο καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἤδη ἐκεῖ τὰ μεγάλα ἔρμυι καὶ αἱ ταχέϊαι νῆες.* The difference in the size of the forts appears in c. 23. 1.

² This again comes out in c. 24. 2; *ταμείω χρημένω τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τεύχεσι, πολλὰ μὲν ἐμπόρων χρήματα καὶ σίτος ἐπὶν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τριηράρχων, καὶ ἱππία.*

³ See above, p. 112.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 4. 6; *ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρημένοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν.*

CHAP. VIII. cut off the Athenian stragglers and foragers¹. From this time, it is noticed, the strength and order of the crews of the Athenian ships, which left Peiræus in such stately array, began to go down².

Nikias
sends ships
to meet the
Corinthian
fleet.

The whole of the besieging fleet did not stay in its new station by Plëmmyrion. Nikias heard that the remaining part of the Corinthian ships were coming. He accordingly sent twenty of his own ships to watch off Rhêgion and Lokroi and to lie in wait for them³.

Meanwhile Gylippos went on building his wall, using for that purpose the stones which the Athenians had brought for the building of theirs⁴. Over and over again he led up his force in battle array before the Athenian fort⁵. Its defenders came out in order; but they did not attack; nor did Gylippos for a while think it prudent to attack them. It was much as it had been at the very beginning of the war, when the Syracusans got familiar with the sight of the Athenian fleet going to and fro before their eyes, but doing nothing against them.

Fight on
the hill.

When Gylippos thought that his men had seen enough of the enemy who seemed to shrink from attacking them, he one day led them to the assault. But he must have chosen his ground with less skill than we might have looked for. A network of walls had now arisen on the hill, and the fight seems to have taken place on ground hemmed in by walls on at least three sides. There was the wall of the Athenians running north and south; there was the newest wall of the city, the defences of Temenitês,

The various
walls.

¹ Thuc. vii. 4. 6; τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων, διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Πλημμυρίῳ, ἵνα μὴ κακουργήσαντες ἐξίεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῇ Ὀλυμπίῳ Πολίχνῳ ἐτετάχθητο.

² Ib. 6; τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο.

³ Ib. 7.

⁴ See Appendix XV.

⁵ Thuc. vii. 5. 1; ἐξάγων δὲ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος τοὺς Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους.

running perhaps nearly parallel to it, and there was the wall of Gylippos to the north. In such a narrow space there was no room for the horsemen of Syracuse to act, nor yet for the light-armed¹; and the Syracusan heavy-armed were as sure to give way before an Athenian charge as the heavy-armed of Athens were to give way before a Spartan charge. The Syracusans were driven back with some loss. And among their dead they had to mourn the chief of the men whom their metropolis had sent to help her colony in its time of need. He who had brought the good news at the right moment lived but to see the beginning of deliverance; Gongylos of Corinth died for Syracuse, as Timoleôn was one day to live for her². The dead were given back under truce, and Gylippos called the military assembly together. Of his speech we have only a summary; but it is plain that no speech could have been more to the point, and that Gylippos knew well how to adapt himself to his hearers. The blame of the late defeat lay, he said, not with them but with himself. It was all his own fault; he had led them to fight on ground where the horsemen and light-armed could not act. He would lead them out again, and they would do better. Their force was equal to their enemies; that they could be their inferiors in spirit and courage was not to be thought of. Those to whom he spoke were Dorians, children of Peloponnêsos. It was for them to overthrow and drive out of the land these Ionians and islanders and the motley crowd that had been brought together along with them³.

CHAP. VIII.
Defeat of
the Syra-
cusans;

death of
Gongylos.

Speech of
Gylippos.

¹ Thuc. vii. 5. 2; ἐν χειρὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μεταρὶ τῶν τευχισμάτων, ἢ τῆς ἰσχύος τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐδεμίᾳ χρήσις ἦν.

² Plut. Nik. 19; ὀλίγους τινὲς ἀπέκτειναν καὶ Γόγγυλον τὸν Κορινθιον. This is surely from Philistos.

³ Thuc. vii. 5. 4; οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐσόμενον εἰ μὴ ἀξιώσουσι, Πελοποννήσιοι τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριεῖς, Ἴωνας καὶ νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγελεύδων ἀνθρώπων κρατήσαντες ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας. Gylippos speaks as suited his purpose, just as Alkibiadês spoke in exactly the opposite way for his purpose. See above, p. 97, and vol. ii. p. 326.

CHAP. VIII. The Syracusan wall, steadily advancing westward, had now all but reached the point where it would finally cut off the Athenian wall from ever reaching the northern brow of the hill. When that had once been done, it was all one, says the Athenian historian, to fight and win or not to fight at all¹. Nikias therefore determined to risk one more fight before it should be too late. When Gylippos led up the Syracusan forces to attack him, he marched out ready for battle. He had not repeated his former mistake. He led his troops round into the open space west of the Athenian lines². The horsemen and darters were placed so as to take the Athenian left in flank. At the right moment the horse charged the enemy's left wing, which gave way before them. The rest of the army was thrown into confusion; the Syracusan heavy-armed, after so many defeats, had at last the satisfaction of driving the invaders before them in open battle. The Athenian army was saved only by retreating within its own defences³. The battle was won, a victory enough to lift up the heart of every Syracusan. Nikias, according to the reckoning of the contemporary Euripidês, had beaten them eight times⁴; now, with Gylippos at their head, the tide of success had turned in their favour. But the winning of the battle was not enough without carrying out the object

Advance of the wall of Gylippos.

Fight on the hill;

Syracusan victory.

Victories of Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vii. 5. 6; *καὶ εἰ προέλθοι, ταῦτόν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντός καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι.*

² Ib. 2. 5; *κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ἥ τῶν τευχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἐλγρον.* Plutarch (Nik. 19) makes the comment; *εἰς τὴν ἐπιούσαν ἡμέραν ἐδείξεν ὁ Γύλιππος οἷόν ἐστιν ἐμπειρία.*

³ The phrase of Thucydides (vii. 6. 3) is emphatic; *νικηθέν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατηράχθη εἰς τὰ τεύχεσμά.*

⁴ Plut. Nik. 17; *ὁ μὲν γὰρ Εὐριπίδης μετὰ τὴν ἦτταν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν ὀλεσθρον γράφων ἐπικήδειον ἐποίησεν*

*οἶδε Συρακοσίους διὰ τὴν νίκην ἐκράτησαν
ἄνδρες, ὅτ' ἦν τὰ θεῶν ἐξ ἴσου ἀμφοτέροις.*

That is, before Gylippos came. Plutarch holds that the victories of Nikias were more than eight; but some must have been very small.

to secure which the battle had been fought. Under their new leader men did not shrink from crowning a day of victory with a night of toil. While the defeated Athenians remained disheartened within their fortress, the victorious Syracusans worked all night at their wall. By the morning the work was done; the Syracusan wall had been carried westward beyond the Athenian wall running north and south. This last could now never be carried on even to the brow of the hill, much less down to the sea at its foot. The object of all the engineering work of the Athenians was altogether baffled. They might yet win battles; but they could no longer hem Syracuse in¹. If we cannot say that Syracuse was as yet delivered, yet a great step had been taken towards her deliverance. The Syracusans had again possession of the eastern part of the brow of their own hill. They were presently to win back the western part also.

Work at the wall; the Athenian wall turned.

There is something remarkable in the way in which these besieging walls are assumed on both sides as hindrances which could not be overcome. Let the invaders finish their wall, and Syracuse would be hopelessly hemmed in. Let the defenders of Syracuse finish theirs, and the Athenian blockade is no less hopeless. Yet, as the walls of strong cities have sometimes been stormed, so surely might a besieging work. The Athenians had themselves mastered two such Syracusan walls in earlier stages of the war, and the Syracusans had more lately mastered the outworks of the Athenian round fort. But an enterprise of this kind against walls well finished and guarded would be something quite unlike the fighting and blockading which had hitherto gone on. It would call for new efforts and new means, for which perhaps neither side was ready at the moment. And even now the whole object of the

Importance attached to the walls.

¹ Thuc. vii. 6. 4; *ἰσχύοντες τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀνεσπερημέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ δὲ ἐν ὅπῃς ἀποταχίσαι*. See Appendix XV.

CHAP. VIII. moment. The object now in hand was to connect the
the wall to forts and the whole western end of the hill with the wall
be carried that was already built. As soon as that wall had secured
eastward. its first object by being carried westward of the Athenian
wall, the obvious course was to begin the work again at the
west end. By that means a smaller extent of ground was
left exposed while the wall was building, and the important
hold on Euryalos was secured.

The allies
work at
the wall. At the moment then of the coming of the new allies,
the Syracusans were beginning to carry their wall east-
ward from the neck of Euryalos to meet the wall which
had started from Tycha and which had already hindered
the Athenian wall from reaching the northern brow of the
hill. At its building the new-comers from the kindred
cities, Corinthian, Ambrakiot, and Leukadian, worked
gladly along with their Sikeliot kinsfolk. All had but
one thought, to make Syracuse safe from all enemies.
Garrisons
of the
forts. The work was done, and each of the three forts was en-
trusted to a garrison of its own. One was guarded by
native Syracusans, another by Sikeliots of other cities.
The third was held by the true allies from beyond sea
who had worked so zealously at its building¹. Pity that
the whole family was not united. One undutiful child
had sent help to the invaders. While Corinth, Ambrakia,
and Leukas, worked side by side with Syracuse as members
of one household, the men of her twin-sister Korkyra took
their place in the ranks of Athens.

Importance
of the third
counter-
wall. The finishing of the third Syracusan counter-wall marks
a distinct stage in the war, and it was clearly felt as such
at the time. We have seen, first the time of aimless going
to and fro on the part of the invaders, broken only by the
short campaign waged by their fleet and army from the
415.

¹ Thuc. vii. 43. 4; ἐν μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἐν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Σικελιωτῶν, ἐν δὲ τῶν συμμάχων.

position of Daskôn. After another interval of several months, we have seen the real beginning of serious warfare in the occupation of Epipolai according to the plan of Lamachos, so boldly conceived at first, but delayed in execution till half its virtue was gone out of it. Then came the first stages of the campaign on the hill, the time of Athenian success, till Syracuse, on the point of treating with the besiegers, had a new heart put into her by the coming of Gylippos. Since that moment the tide has turned. Syracuse, all but hemmed in, has been saved by the Spartan deliverer from being quite hemmed in, and the Athenians have become the besieged rather than the besiegers. At the present moment they still hold the round fort by Syka; the wall stretching northward from the fort has been made useless by the counter-wall of Gylippos which now guards the whole north side of the hill, stretching from the wall of Tycha to the new fort near the western point of Epipolai. But the southern wall of the Athenians stretches, in its lower part in the shape of a double wall, down to the shore of the Great Harbour, securing for the besiegers free communication with the sea on this side. Though Syracuse, thanks to Gylippos—or to Nikias—was not blockaded, yet the Athenian works on this southern side must have been a great annoyance to its inhabitants. All communication through the gate of Achradina must have been stopped; the Olympieion and the other temples outside the walls could have been reached only by most roundabout and dangerous roads. Plêmmyrion is occupied by three Athenian forts, and the Athenian fleet has its station beneath them, just within the Great Harbour. As a counter-post to this, Polichna is occupied by the Syracusan horse. The Athenians thus command the southern part of the hill, and reach down to the Harbour, with their detached forts and naval station at Plêmmyrion.

CHAP. VIII.

414.

Present
position
of the
Athenians.

Effects
of the
southern
Athenian
wall.

Plêmmy-
rion and

Polichna.

CHAP. VIII. their inhabited city, enlarged since the war began by the addition of Temenitès, command the northern and western part of the hill, and keep their detached post of cavalry at Polichna. The hill therefore is thickly covered, and the Great Harbour is largely surrounded, by the military works of besiegers and besieged. To the north of the hill, on the waters of Megara or on the low coast of the bay, nothing seems to be going on. That side of the hill is altogether commanded by the Syracusan walls and forts, and there is no Athenian force on either the land or the sea beyond it.

Syracusan
posts on
the hill.

No
Athenian
force on
the north
side.

Sicily the
centre of
a general
Hellenic
war.

The
original
objects of
the war
forgotten.

Objects of
the great
powers.

Thus the original interference of Athens in the local affairs of Sicily, her appearance to defend Segesta against Selinous and the Leontines against Syracuse, has grown into a gigantic struggle in which the greater part of the Hellenic nation is engaged. The elder stage of the Peloponnesian war has begun again, with the addition of a Sicilian war on such a scale as had never been seen before. In that elder stage Sicilian warfare had been a mere appendage to warfare in Old Greece. Now Sicily has become the centre of the struggle, the head-quarters of both sides. What is done in Old Greece is secondary. And the original objects of the war in Sicily have become secondary too. Segesta, Selinous, Leontinoi, were now pretty well forgotten as separate objects; they were simply numbered among the allies of the great powers in the gigantic strife in which they were now engaged. Athens and her allies were striving to overcome Syracuse. Corinth was really seeking to deliver Syracuse; Sparta was rather seeking to overthrow Athens beneath the walls of Syracuse. The unprovoked attack made on Syracuse by Athens had led to a struggle in which the aggressor had to strive, if not as yet quite for life and death, yet at least for greatness and dominion.

Thus had the character and objects of the struggle changed and widened. But as yet the forces on the Syracusan side, now growing into the Peloponnesian side, were altogether too small for the work that was laid upon them. Setting aside the priceless gift of Gylippos himself, the amount of Lacedæmonian help had been very small, and even the succours of Corinth were not on a great scale. On the other hand, the Athenian force was no longer what it had been when it left Athens. It had nearly brought Syracuse to despair, but it had been weakened by the long earlier time in which the great force had been frittered away in marches and voyages after petty objects. It had been weakened most of all by those last days in which the ships of Athens had taken their repose in the haven of Syracuse and the land-force of Athens had taken theirs on the hill of Syracuse. To take Hykkara, to fail to take Inessa and the Galeatic Hybla, to explore the emptiness of the hoard at Segesta, to sail to Syracuse, to encamp, to fight, and to sail away again, to keep quiet during the season of rest at Katanê or at Naxos, to keep hardly less quiet during the season of action on the soil or in the waters of Syracuse itself—all this had worn away the force of Athens as it would hardly have been worn away even if the first daring scheme of Lamachos had been tried and had failed. In the whole space of a year and a half the great fleet and army had done nothing. Yet worse, it had been for a moment on the point of doing everything and had failed to do anything, because the soberest of mankind had for once in his life let his heart be lifted up by vain-glory. One mighty armament had been worn out by the ceaseless strain of doing nothing; if anything was to be done, another armament no less mighty must be sent out to do it. Such was the tidings which Nikias, sent by his master Dêmos on a certain errand, had to report to his master as to the way in which his errand had been done.

CHAP. VIII.

Inadequate
forces on
both sides.Weaken-
ing of the
Athenian
force.Small re-
sults of
this inva-
sion.Athenian
need of
reinforce-
ments.

CHAP. VIII. For the coming winter, like the winter before it, was to be a winter of diplomacy, a season of embassies and messages going to and fro. Gylippos had already gone on an errand which none could do so well as himself. As soon as the immediate work had been done which cut off the besiegers from completely hemming in the city, the deliverer set forth to gather fresh forces by land and sea from the friendly cities of Sicily, and to use his powers of persuasion on those that were lukewarm or that stood altogether apart¹. He spent the winter in this work, and in the early spring he came back with the force which he had got together². Unluckily we have no details either as to the amount of the reinforcement which he brought or as to the cities from whence it came. But it is plain from later notices that at Akragas all the efforts of Gylippos were wasted. If the second of Sikeliot cities could not bring herself to join the Ionian invaders of Sicily, neither could she bring herself to fight for her Dorian rival against them³. But Kamarina was persuaded, either now or later, to throw aside her neutrality, and to take the side of Syracuse⁴. And we may gather that Selinous and Gela and more zealous Himera were all stirred up to greater exertions. The Syracusan cause was gradually coming to be acknowledged as the Sikeliot cause. Of all the Greek cities of the island, Naxos and Katanê were the only two that were openly enrolled as allies of the invaders. From the point of view of Hermokratês, speedily becoming the dominant view of Greek Sicily, they were traitors to a national cause.

Meanwhile fresh embassies were sent to Peloponnêsos.

CHAP. VIII.
Negotiations of
the winter
414-413.
Action of
Gylippos
in Sicily.

He comes
back in
the spring.
413.

No effect
on Akragas.

Kamarina
joins Syra-
cuse.

Selinous,
Gela, and
Himera.

The Sy-
racusan
cause be-
comes Si-
keliot.

Position of
Naxos and
Katanê.

¹ Thuc. vii. 7. 2; *προσφεύμενος εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος ᾖν ἢ παρτάσσιν ἐτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ πολέμου.*

² Ib. 21. 1. The second Athenian fleet sets sail τοῦ ἤρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου (20. 1), and Gylippos comes ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ ἤρος.

³ Ib. 32. 1; 33. 2; 36. 1; 50. 1; 58. 1.

⁴ Ib. 33. 1.

Again Syracusan envoys went to Corinth; again Syracusan and Corinthian envoys went together to Sparta, to impress more strongly than ever on the minds of the Dorians of Old Greece the need of giving more vigorous help to the Dorians of Sicily. The forces formerly sent had come wholly in the triremes. But the trireme, itself a mighty engine of warfare, was not well suited for the transport of land forces. The friends of Sicily in Peloponnâsos were urged to send men, to send them in any vessels that they could get, merchant-ships or any other¹. Such help was needed by Syracuse, and it would presently be more keenly needed still, as it was known that the Athenians were sending home for reinforcements². Meanwhile the Syracusans were busily strengthening themselves in every way, making preparations of every kind. Above all, they gave their minds to their naval force. Men were beginning to look forward to a day when they might attack the enemy on his own element, and deal a blow to the fleets of Athens in the waters of Syracuse³. Ships were manned and their crews were exercised. Skilful Corinthian officers⁴, the elder among whom would have had experience of Athenian naval warfare in the days of Phormiôn, trained the ill-disciplined forces of Syracuse by sea, while the Spartan guided them by land. Their teaching prospered. Syracuse in the end, amid so many and so faithful helpers, largely owed her deliverance to the hearts and hands of her own sons. But it was the hearts and hands of her own sons nerved and trained by Gylippos and his fellow-workers from Corinth. The daughter-city came at last to do not a little by her own strength; but it was the strength of the daughter-city guided by the teaching of the mother.

CHAP. VIII.
Embassies
to Pelopon-
nâsos.

New forces
asked for.

Strengthen-
ing of
the Syra-
cusan fleet.

Action
of the
Corinthian
officers.

Joint
action of
Syracuse
and
Corinth.

¹ Thuc. vii. 7. 3; *ὅπως στρατιὰ ἔτι παλαιωθῇ τρόπῃ ᾧ ἐν ἐλασίῃς ἢ πλοίοις ἢ ἄλλῃς ὅπως ἐν προχωρῇ.*

² Ib.; *ὅτι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων.*

³ Ib. 4; *οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀναπειρῶντο, ὅτι καὶ τοῦτῃ ἐπιχειρήσασσες, καὶ ἐς τὰλλα πολὺ ἐπύρρωντο.*

⁴ Ib. 36. 2; 39. 1.

CHAP. VIII.

Despondency of the Athenians.

Nikias sends a written despatch to Athens. Such a course unusual.

Little writing in Greece in this age.

Increase in the next.

Early range of writing.

The Syracusans and their allies were not mistaken in their belief that the besiegers, if they can now be any longer called besiegers, had sent, or would shortly send, to Athens for reinforcements. They had no other chance. While the hopes of the Syracusans and their friends everywhere were rising, despondency reigned in the Athenian camp, and above all in the heart of its commander. It was but for a moment, at the most unlucky of all moments, that the heart of Nikias had been lifted up. He had now a sad tale to tell to his master at Athens. And his way of telling it was a new one; he sent a written despatch of considerable length¹. To us it seems amazing that such a course should have seemed a novelty, a novelty indeed so striking that the historian himself thought it needful to set forth the motives of Nikias at some length, and with a startling degree of solemnity². Shallow writers and speakers of our own time are fond of declaiming on the backward state of those ages which had no printing. They are apt to forget the far more important difference between our times and the times which had very little writing. And this is a difference which not only distinguishes the age of Nikias from ours, but also distinguishes the age of Nikias from periods of Greek history which, as we are apt to reckon the ages, are not very distant from it. In the days of Nikias there was comparatively little writing in Greece; a hundred years later there was a vast deal. Now this change is no doubt largely owing to ordinary causes, to the way in which any useful art will naturally develop itself and extend its range. But it is also largely owing to special circumstances in the political history of the time. Writing was not then so easy a business as it is now; it kept much of the character of a special art, traditionally employed for certain special and solemn purposes. Prose writing for other

¹ Thuc. vii. 11-15.

² Ib. 8. 11. 1.

purposes than those of official records was still young. And official records mainly took the shape of inscriptions graven on the hard stones. On such stones it was natural to grave the text of the law or the treaty which was to be remembered for ever or for a season, and to whose exact words future generations might have need to refer. But in the publicity of Greek political life—and within the favoured order there was publicity in the aristocratic as well as in the democratic commonwealths—much that seems natural to us to commit to writing was left to that power of human memory which writing has gone so far to destroy. A statement that was designed to inform and influence a particular assembly, and then to pass away and be remembered only in its results, did not seem to call for the formality of writing. A trusty messenger was better and safer. He could speak more truly to the minds of hearers at home than any written despatch could do. And, as regarded the accidents of war, he could keep his counsel, while a written document might fall into the hands of the enemy. So it happened to the written despatches of the Great King¹; so it happened to more than one Spartan *skytala*². It almost looks as if Sparta, the Greek city which made the least use of writing for other purposes, was actually the first to use it for official despatches. Such a practice, specially in the peculiar form of the *skytala*, naturally followed from the secrecy of all Spartan administration. But in the course of the next century, while the spread of literary taste gave one spur to the increased use of writing, the needs of a new political state of things gave another. Sicilian tyrants succeeded by Macedonian kings needed to do their diplomacy in a different way from either the Athenian democracy or the Corinthian aristocracy. Such controversies

CHAP. VIII.

Records take the form of inscriptions.

Effects of the publicity of Greek political life.

Written and verbal despatches.

The Spartan *skytala*.

Growth of despatch-writing under kings and tyrants.

¹ Thuc. iv. 50.² Xen. Hell. i. 1. 23; Plut. Alk. 28.

CHAP. VIII. as arose between the envoys whom Athens sent to the court of Philip could hardly have arisen among envoys Dionysios. whom Philip himself had commissioned. There was already within the walls of Syracuse one who lived to give a large start to the practice of official writing. Among those who profited by the teaching of Gylippos, still young, still unknown, unless as a gallant soldier in the Syracusan ranks, was Dionysios son of Hermokratês.

Nikias' first written despatch.

It is plain from the narrative that, while Nikias had sent many messages to Athens, they had all been sent by word of mouth; that which he sent now was his first written despatch. He sent his message because he saw what the Syracusans were doing, sending embassies to Peloponnêsos and strengthening themselves at home, because their power and the weakness of the Athenian force were both growing daily¹. He sent it, because it was his practice to report everything to the people at home², and because it was specially needful now, when the besieging force could be saved only by either calling it back or sending large reinforcements to support it³. And he sent it in writing, in order that the assembly should be sure to hear the exact truth. He puts full confidence in the honest purpose of his messengers; he does not hint at their deliberate betrayal of their trust as a possible chance. But he fears lest their memory should fail, lest their power of speech should fail, lest, when brought face to face with an excited and disappointed assembly, when cross-questioned by hostile orators, they should lack courage to declare un-

Reasons for sending in writing.

¹ Thuc. vii. 8. 1; ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὄρων καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδούσαν τὴν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

² Ib.; ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων. Ib. 11. 1; τὰ μὲν πρότερον πραχθέντα, ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴστε. The earlier ἐπιστολαί were clearly verbal messages.

³ Ib. 8. 1; μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅτι τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελεῖουσιν, οὐδενίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν.

pleasant truths in their fulness¹. He therefore wrote a formal letter to be read to the assembly; he also gave his messengers, by word of mouth, detailed instructions as to what they were to say². The messengers then set forth on their errand; the general turned himself to his duties in the camp, duties which, as he understood them, implied a careful watch, such as Nikias was now sure to keep, and the avoidance of every needless risk³.

The messengers made their way to Athens. The assembly met to hear them. They spoke according to the spoken instructions of Nikias; they answered as they could to such questions as were put to them; lastly they presented the written letter from the general, which the secretary of the commonwealth read aloud to the assembled people⁴. One wonders that what seems to us the more obvious order was not followed. For the letter as we have it, clearly stating, as it does, the real points of the case, does not go into any minute detail. It was an excellent brief for the messengers to enlarge from; it could not have given the people much fresh knowledge after the messengers' statement and cross-examination. But in any case it was not a cheerful document for the assembly to listen to. As a report from Nikias to his master, it has been harshly but justly commented on⁵; but as a simple statement of facts, it seems to deserve all credit. The general had a sad tale to tell; but, as far as we can see, his tale was strictly true; he certainly does not attempt to hide or to colour the grievous state of things which he has to describe. His

The message read to the Athenian assembly.

Nature of the letter.

No concealment on Nikias' part.

¹ Thuc. vii. 8. 2; φοβούμενοι μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν, ἢ καὶ γνώμης [αἰ. μήμηρ] ἑλλειπίαις γιγνόμενοι, ἢ τῷ ὀχλῷ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες, οὐ τὰ ὅσα ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν, κ.τ.λ.

² Ib. 3; φέροντες τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα εἶδει αὐτοὺς εἶπεν. So in c. 10.

³ Ib. 10; οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νικίου, ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἶρητο αὐτοῖς εἶπον, καὶ εἰ τίς τι ἐκτὸς ἀπεκρίνοντο, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδοσαν.

⁴ Ib.; ὁ γραμματεὺς δὲ τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω. On what was it written? Not yet on papyrus from Kyana.

⁵ Grote, vii. 384 et seqq.

CHAP. VIII. fault, if any, is that he does not tell his master how completely that grievous state of things was of his own making. But he may have thought that he might leave his master to find that out; or he may really not have been aware that the state of things which he had to describe was of his own making.

How far
have we
the origi-
nal text?

The letter
dealt with
like the
speeches.

The
general
matter
genuine.

Contents
of the
letter.

A point which more nearly concerns us is to know whether the letter, as it stands, is a real composition of Nikias, an accurate copy of an official document, or whether it represents the statements of Nikias only in that general way in which the speeches in Thucydides represent the statements of their alleged speakers. The banished Thucydides could not have heard the letter read. Was it preserved in the Athenian archives, and, if so, could the banished man have anyhow obtained a copy? The letter would not be graven on stone like a treaty. The letter is ushered in by the same formula as the speeches¹; there is no strong difference of style to mark the personality of Nikias. On the whole it seems most likely that Thucydides looked on the letter as a speech which happened to have been written down beforehand. That is to say, just as in the speeches, we have the matter of Nikias in the words of Thucydides. We should be glad of the original document, as of any original document; yet after all the practical difference is to us not great. The case is altogether different from that of the endless letters written in after times in this man's name and that, as mere rhetorical exercises. If what we read is the immediate language of Thucydides, we may be sure that it represents the general matter of Nikias.

He begins by saying that it has been his habit all along to send home reports of the progress of the expedition, and he adds that there has never been any stage of it in which it was more needful for those for whom he wrote to know

¹ Thuc. vii. 10; *δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε*.

the exact state of things. They needed to know it, in order CHAP. VIII. that they might consider what was to be done. His last message had seemingly been sent after the Athenian walls had been begun on the hill, but before Gylippos came; whether before he was expected, is not said. His coming Change wrought by the coming of Gylippos. is, truly enough, described as having changed the state of things much for the worse. Up to that time the Athenians had commonly defeated the Syracusans in battle, and they were engaged in building the walls which they still occupied¹. We are perhaps a little surprised at finding the change which followed Gylippos' coming attributed chiefly to the increased numbers of the besieged. Gylippos the Nikias' report of the battles on the hills. Lacedæmonian, says Nikias, has come, bringing a force from Peloponnêsos and from some of the cities of Sicily. In the first battle he was defeated by us; in a second we were driven within our lines by the multitude of the horsemen and darters. Through the numbers of the enemy we The walls. have been forced to leave off our wall-building and to keep quiet². Meanwhile they have built a cross-wall of their own, which makes it impossible for us to complete our wall which was to have hemmed the city in, unless we had a force great enough to attack and take their wall³. In truth, as The besiegers besieged. far as what is done is concerned, we who are supposed to be besieging others are more truly ourselves besieged; for we cannot venture to any distance from our camp because of the horsemen⁴. He goes on to say that envoys have Gylippos collecting fresh forces. been sent from Syracuse to Peloponnêsos, and that Gylippos is going round Sicily collecting fresh forces, persuading

¹ Thuc. vii. 11. 2; κρατησάντων ἡμῶν μάχαις ταῖς πλείοσι Συρακοσίους ἐφ' οὗς ἐπέμψθημεν, καὶ τὰ τεῖχη οἰκοδομησαμένων ἐν οἷσπερ νῦν ἐσμέν.

² Ib.; παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμού διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ἡσυχάζομεν (shall we say that ἡσυχάζειν = μελλονικῆν?). He is strong on the subject of numbers; ἰσχυροὶ τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς βιασθέντες.

³ Ib. 3; ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτοὺς, ἣν μὴ τις τὸ παρατείχισμα τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἔλῃ.

⁴ Ib. 4; ἐμβέβηκε πολιορκεῖν δοκούστας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν.

CHAP. VIII. those cities which had hitherto been neutral to give help to Syracuse.

This was a grievous tale enough; but it was not all. Nikias next comes to a point which was likely to touch the feelings of every Athenian to the quick. "I hear," he says, "that the enemy hope at once to assault our walls with their land-force, and to attack us by sea with their ships. And let it not seem strange to any of you that I have to speak of an attack by sea¹." An attack on the fleet of Athens by a fleet of Syracusans had certainly not been looked for when Nikias and his colleagues sailed forth from Peiræus. He goes on to explain how it has come to pass that such a thing is possible. He describes how different the state of the fleet is now from that in which it first set forth. Then everything about the ships and their crews was in perfect order; now the ships, from being so long at sea, have become leaky, and the crews are fallen away from what they were. They could not draw their ships on shore to dry them, as the Syracusans did, because they were ever looking for an attack by a superior force, and had therefore to be always ready and to keep constant watch. From that watch they could not relax for a moment; because, as their position was within the harbour, everything that was brought to them by sea had to pass by the hostile city. The crews had fallen away from many causes. Forage and water had to be sought for at a distance—this has been already pointed out as one of the disadvantages of the occupation of Plëmmyrion²—and many of the Athenian sailors had, while seeking for them, been cut off by the horsemen. Their attendant slaves had begun to desert, as soon as the balance of strength seemed at all to turn against their

Naval attack of the Syracusans expected.

Decay of the ships

and of the crews.

Desertion of slaves and mercenaries.

¹ Thuc. vii. 12. 3; καὶ δεινὸν μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξῃ εἶναι ὅτι καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

² See above, p. 251.

masters¹. As for the allies and mercenaries, those who served against their will were deserting like the slaves². Those who had been led to come by the hope of high pay, who had looked to do more of traffic than of fighting³, were, now that they saw that the enemies' force was at least equal to that of Athens, taking themselves off on this pretext and that to this point and that. "And Sicily," Nikias pointedly adds, "is a large country⁴." And one detail is added which carries us back to an incident of an earlier stage in the war. Some, whether Athenians or strangers, persuaded—possibly bribed—their trierarchs to allow Hykkarian captives to take their places on shipboard, while they themselves went about on their commercial errands⁵. A large part therefore of the living spoil of the unlucky Sikan town must still have been in the Athenian camp, bought by particular men in the camp as their personal slaves⁶. It is to be supposed that these abuses on the part of the allies and mercenaries were more prevalent in the fleet than in the land army. For it is certain that men of both those classes still did good service by land, and some of the insular subjects of Athens clung to her with touching faithfulness to the last⁷.

In all these ways, Nikias says, the strength and fullness of the armament is wasted away. He appeals to the seafaring experience of those who heard the story. They, Athenians, used to the sea, knew how short a time the

¹ Thuc. vii. 13. 2; οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι.

² Ib. οἱ ξένοι οἱ ἀναγκαστοί.

³ Ib.; οἱ ὑπὸ μεγάλῳ μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέοντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι. The opposite to Ennius'

"Non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes."

⁴ Ib.; πολλὰ δ' ἡ Σικελία.

⁵ Ib.; εἰσι δ' οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορεύμενοι, ἀνδράποδα Ἵκκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάζου ἐπὶ τῶν σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους.

⁶ See above, p. 157.

⁷ Thuc. vii. 82. 1.

CHAP. VIII. perfect order of a crew lasted, and how few there were who thoroughly knew the art of guiding a ship, how to set her off and how to keep the rowing in time. They knew too, Nikias' description of the Athenians. he tells them, with the licence allowed both to orators and to comic poets, how hard a task it was to command Athenians¹. He found it hard indeed as general to hinder these things, above all as he and his force had no means, such as their enemies had, of filling up vacancies and getting anything that they wanted. The army had to keep itself how it could on what it brought with it; the allies at Naxos and Katanê could do nothing. And if the enemy gained any advantage and if no further succour came from Athens, there was a fear that the Italiot towns from which they got provisions would turn against them. If this happened, the war would end successfully for the enemy without further struggle. The Athenians were now really the besieged party, and the siege would soon be decided against them².

Expected failure of supplies.

The letter winds up with a statement of the practical needs of the case, ushered in by another little lecture on the Athenian temper. Nikias knows the ways of his fellow-citizens, how they liked to hear pleasant news, but turned round and found fault if things afterwards turned out in another way³. He could now have told them a more agreeable story, but it was more useful and safer to tell them the exact truth, to state facts as they were, that the assembly might be better able to debate what should be done⁴. It shows the best side of Nikias when he begs them, in forming their decision, to bear in mind that the army, soldiers and officers—those, we may suppose, who had

¹ Thuc. vii. 14. 2; χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι.

² Ib. 3; ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων . . . διαπεπολεμήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεῖ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος.

³ Ib. 4; τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἡδίστα ἀκούειν, αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὑστερον, ἦν τι ὑμῖν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὴ ὁμοίον ἐκβῆ.

⁴ Ib.; εἰ δεῖ σαφῶς εἰδότες τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλευσασθαι.

kept to their duty—are not to blame¹. For the general himself he says nothing. The Athenians must make up their minds what they will do now that all Sicily is leagued against them², now that a new force is looked for from Peloponnêsos. The force now before Syracuse cannot bear up against the enemy even as the enemy now are, much less when new help shall have come to them. The people must choose between two courses. Either the fleet and army now before Syracuse must be brought home, or another armament, equal to the first both by land and sea and bringing an abundant stock of money, must be sent out to reinforce it. For himself he prays that another general may be sent out to relieve him of his command. He is unable from sickness, his painful and incurable disease, to command or to stay where he is³. He holds that he may rightly ask this favour of them; when in health he had done them good service in many commands⁴. But whatever they do they must do speedily; there is no time for loitering; they must act the first moment the season allows. The enemy's reinforcements from Sicily may be looked for very soon. Those from Peloponnêsos will of course be longer in coming; but unless the Athenian people gives good heed, they will escape their notice, as they did before, and will reach Sicily before help from Athens can come⁵.

CHAP. VIII.

The present force inadequate.

The two alternatives.

He asks his own recall.

Need of speedy action.

The letter of Nikias speaks for itself. It is an easy and a just criticism to say that, if things were as Nikias truly described them, it was almost wholly his own fault⁶. If

Nikias himself responsible.

¹ Thuc. vii. 15. 1; τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῶν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων.

² Ib.; ἐπειδὴ Σικελία ἅπασα ξυλίσταται.

³ See above, p. 221.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 15. 2; καὶ γὰρ ὅτ' ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα.

⁵ Ib. 3; τὰ μὲν λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὰ δὲ φθήσονται.

⁶ Grote, vii. 384.

CHAP. VIII. the counsel of Lamachos had been taken at the beginning, no such report as this could ever have been sent to Athens.

Probable results of the plan of Lamachos. In that case it is most likely that the victorious Athenians would—with what further results it is vain to guess—have entered Syracuse a year and more earlier. Failing such success, a defeated remnant would long ago either have perished in Sicily or have come back to Athens with the tale of its defeat. In neither case would an Athenian fleet and army, growing day by day more disheartened in spirit and less capable of action, have been encamped on the hill and lying in the harbour of Syracuse. Or if Nikias had pressed on his siege-works so as to have thoroughly hemmed in the city before Gongylos came with his glad tidings, he might still have entered Syracuse as a conqueror—with what results again we need not speculate. How far Nikias really felt that the blame was in truth his own we can never know; in his letter he neither takes the blame on himself nor attempts to throw it off his shoulders. He states the facts, and leaves the people to judge.

Athenian judgement of Nikias.

Was it "hard to command Athenians"? Effect of Nikias' own character.

And assuredly the Athenian people judged their general gently. Their treatment of him hardly bears out the character which he gives them, that it was so hard to command Athenians. We cannot help stopping to ask whether this charge was wholly just, specially with regard to the sea-faring part of his force¹. And we are tempted to ask whether Nikias, with his timid temper, his over-gracious demeanour, his constant desire to please, was not really less able to keep order than a man like Dêmosthenês, a thorough soldier, but who had not the same general position in the commonwealth to keep up. We know that Lamachos failed to gain influence by reason of his poverty; it may be that the wealth and personal position of Nikias, while they increased his personal influence, in some sort

¹ Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 19.

undermined his military authority. We can see that he was ever thinking of things at home, of opinion at home. Indisposed to harshness in any case, he never forgot that the men whom he commanded at Syracuse would have votes in the assembly when they got back to Athens¹. Men like Lamachos and Dêmostenês, whose position and reputation were purely military, were more likely to give themselves wholly to the work immediately in hand, without in this way looking to a possible future elsewhere.

There never was a debate in the Athenian assembly, not even that which voted two years before that Athenian help should be sent to Segesta and Leontinoi, of which we should be better pleased to have a full report than of that in which Athens learned the fate which had befallen those whom she sent on that errand. Of the turn of the earlier debate we know a good deal; of the turn of the present debate we know nothing. We are told only the result. Of the two alternatives which Nikias set before them, to recall the army before Syracuse or to reinforce it, the Athenian people chose the second. The conclusion to which they came is told in few, perhaps in formal, words. The Athenians, when they had heard the letter of Nikias, refused to relieve him of his command². But, lest he should suffer through commanding alone in his sickness³, they appointed two of the officers who were in Sicily, Menandros and Euthydêmos, to be his colleagues till the commanders of the new expedition could arrive there. For they voted a new expedition; they voted to send another force, Athenian and allied, both by land and sea, and they chose as its commanders Dêmostenês the son of Alkisthenês and Eurymedôn the son of Thouklês. Such was the resolution to which the Athenian people

CHAP. VIII.
Action
of the
assembly.

The
second
armament
voted,
under Dê-
mosthenês
and Eury-
medôn.

¹ See specially Thuc. vii. 48. 4, 5.

² Ib. 16. 1; τὸν μὲν Νικίαν οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς.

³ Ib.; ὅπως μὴ μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ταλαιπωροῖται.

CHAP. VIII. came after all that Nikias and his messengers could tell them as to the state of their fleet and army before Syracuse. By what process of argument was such a vote come to? Was the vote unanimous? Was the majority great? Did no one rise to speak against the second expedition, as Nikias himself had spoken against the first? Above all, among all the demagogues, among all the flatterers and deceivers of the people, so bent, we are told, on running down every man of birth or eminence, did none find anything to say against Nikias himself? Did no one hint that, if the expedition had failed, if the fleet and army were in evil case, it was the fault of the general, whether he knew it or not? Such questions concern the historian of Athens¹ rather than the historian of Sicily. But the historian of Sicily cannot wholly pass them by. For they belong to the general history of man as a political being.

No record
of the
debate.

§ 6. *The War by Sea and the Second Athenian Expedition.* B. C. 413.

Folly
of both
expedi-
tions.

Light
thrown
by them
on demo-
cracy.

The second Athenian expedition against Syracuse stands forth, like the first, among the most memorable instances of human folly. Both alike prove that democratic commonwealths are no more free from such folly than kings or oligarchs. But they prove no more. The fault which they reveal in the Athenian democracy is the exact opposite to that which is conventionally laid to the charge of Athens and of all democracies. We are told that democracies, as such, are fickle, wavering with every breath, hasty in decision, harsh in judgement. And a democracy, like a government of any other kind, may be any of these things. The Syracusan assembly which deposed Hermokratès was assuredly open to some or all of these charges. So perhaps

¹ See Grote, vii. 339.

was the assembly which voted to treat with Nikias while his work was still unfinished, while Gongylos was still on his way. But the Athenian assembly which decreed the second expedition against Syracuse erred in exactly the opposite way. The vote which followed the reading of the letter of Nikias was not the vote of either a harsh or an inconstant people. It was the vote of a people who obstinately claved to a purpose which they had once taken up, though its folly, its madness, had been fully proved. It was the vote of a people who kept on a blind confidence in a man whom they had once trusted¹, though his utter mismanagement of his trust had been proved under his own hand. That is to say, democracies, like governments of other kinds, are capable alike of any form of wisdom and of any form of folly. Athens was sometimes hasty, sometimes harsh; now she assuredly was neither. There have been chivalrous kings who, when they found that there was no hope of taking Syracuse, would have left off trying to take Syracuse, and might perhaps have gone off to try their hands on Carthage instead². There have been oligarchies, there were such within the ken of our present story, among whom Nikias might have ended his days on the cross. The fault of Athens in this case is that, having once set her heart on warfare against Syracuse, she went on with warfare against Syracuse when such warfare was clearly shown to be unprofitable as well as unjust. Her fault was that, having once put her trust in Nikias, she went on trusting him when he had himself proved his own unfitness, and continued him in the command in which he had so utterly failed, seemingly without a single word of formal rebuke.

If the second expedition was to be sent at all, there was nothing to be said against the choice of at least one of those

CHAP. VIII.

Blind confidence in Nikias.

Comparison with kings and oligarchies.

The new generals;

¹ Cf. Macaulay, *Hist. Eng.* i. 626.

² Cf. William Rufus, vol. i. p. 149; ii. p. 256.

CHAP. VIII. who were to command it. Dêmostenês, Dêmostenês of Dêmosthenês. Olpai¹ and of Pylos, was assuredly the best soldier that Athens had left to her. If any man could bring success after all the failures of Nikias, it was he. Of Eurymedôn Eurymedôn; as a soldier we know less; he had been in Sicily before, and he had done nothing memorable²; but then he had had very little chance of doing anything memorable. In his former action in Sicily; the censure pronounced on the Athenian generals after the peace of Gela, whatever the rights of the case were, he had been held by the people to be less blameworthy than Pythodôros and Sophoklês³. He must now have been fully restored to their favour. Against him, as against his former his doings at Korkyra. colleague Sophoklês, there was the guilt of complicity in one of the worst deeds of the whole Peloponnesian war, the treacherous massacre of the oligarchs of Korkyra. Out of a mean jealousy of their own officers, some of whom must have had the glory of taking the Korkyraian prisoners to Athens while they themselves sailed on to Sicily, they connived at the base intrigue by which the captives were put to death by their own countrymen⁴. We may feel sure that the hands both of Nikias and of Dêmostenês were perfectly clean from deeds like that. Eurymedôn was sent out at once about the middle of winter with ten ships and a hundred and twenty talents in money, to announce to the army before Syracuse that further help was coming, and that all their wants would be cared for⁵. He brought his message, and with it perhaps some little comfort to Nikias and his army. He then sailed away to join his colleague Dêmostenês, who stayed to make every preparation for the great expedition which was to sail in the spring⁶.

First
errand of
Eurymedôn.
414-3.

¹ See Thuc. iii. 107.

² See above, p. 65.

³ See above, p. 45.

⁴ See Thuc. iv. 46. 5; 47. 2.

⁵ Ib. vii. 16. 2; ὅτι ἔχει βοήθεια καὶ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῶν εἶναι.

⁶ Ib. 17. 1.

While the enemies of Syracuse were thus making ready CHAP. VIII. for a renewed attack, her friends were busy both in Peloponnêsos and in Sicily. The Corinthians answered the Zeal of Corinth for Syracuse. appeal of the second Syracusan embassy yet more zealously than they had answered the appeal of the first. They alone, it is mentioned afterwards, of all the allies of Syracuse, sent both ships and land-force to her help¹. The Gathering of Peloponnesian troops. ships had gone already; the land-force was now to follow. When the news came that the hopes of Syracuse were rising, the faithful parent rejoiced that she had already done somewhat, and pressed on to do more². By the exertions of Corinth, contingents were brought together from various members of the Peloponnesian alliance. She herself made ready a body of heavy-armed to sail in the ships of burthen³. The head of the confederacy gave help Help sent from Sparta; after her own fashion. Sparta had already sent one of her ruling order; but he had gone alone. So to send him was in some sort her wisdom. Gylippos alone was more precious than Gylippos hampered by equals who might take upon themselves to be his counsellors. But the physical force of the subjects of Sparta was placed at the command of the guiding mind. Helots, trained doubtless in Lacedæmonian discipline, and men of the intermediate class, the Helots and Neodamodes. enfranchised *Neodamôdeis*, were enlisted, to the number of six hundred heavy-armed, for the work in Sicily⁴. A Spartan, Ekkritos by name, was sent in command; one would like to hear something of his relations towards Gylippos. From Boiôtia came three hundred heavy-armed,

¹ Thuc. vii. 58. 3; Κορίνθιοι καὶ ναοὶ καὶ πεζῶ μόνοι παραγνόμενοι.

² Ib. 17. 3; οἱ Κορίνθιοι, ὅς αὶ τε πρῶτος αὐτοῖς ἦεν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ βελτίως ἡγγελλον . . . πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἐπύρραντο.

³ Ib.; ἐν ὁλοταῖς παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοὶ τε ἀποστελοῦντες ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν.

⁴ Ib. 58. 3, where he explains; δύναται τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλευθέρον ἤδη εἶναι. So 19. 3, where we get the numbers of the contingents and the names of the commanders.

CHAP. VIII. under the command of Xenôn and Nikôn from Thebes and
 Contingent of Hêgêsandros from Thespia¹. The first act of the spring,
 from Thebes and Thespia. as far as Sicily was concerned, was to assemble this force
 The Peloponnesians sail from Tainaron. at Tainaron, for the voyage to Sicily. The whole force
 413. was put on board the merchant-ships. One which carried
 The Thespians sail alone. a body of Thespians, started most likely from some other
 port of Peloponnêsos, and reached Sicily by way of Italy².
 The rest set sail from Tainaron, to make their way to
 Sicily by the open sea, but hardly by so long a road as
 that which in the end took them thither³. Soon after
 them the special force of the Corinthians came to the
 same trysting-place. Their own heavy-armed were raised
 to the number of five hundred by hiring mercenaries in
 Arkadia, to match the Mantineians in the Athenian camp.
 This joint force, Corinthian and Arkadian, was put under
 the command of the Corinthian Alexarchos⁴. To them
 were added a contingent of two hundred Sikyonian heavy-
 armed, under their captain Sargeus. These went against
 their will, for fear, it is said, of their Corinthian neigh-
 bours⁵. These too were put on board merchant-ships,
 and no convoy of triremes is spoken of. But twenty-
 five Corinthian triremes kept watch against twenty Athe-
 nian ships at Naupaktos, which were placed specially to
 hinder the voyage to Sicily⁶. Of the adventures of the
 force that sailed from Tainaron, the largest contribution
 made by Old Greece to the defence of Sicily, we shall
 hear again. Some of the most stirring scenes of
 the strife were to be wrought while they were still on
 their way.

The Co-
 rinthians
 watch the
 gulf.

Adven-
 tures of
 the fleet
 that sailed
 from Tai-
 naron.

¹ Thuc. vii. 19. 3.

² Ib. 25. 3.

³ Ib. 50. 2.

⁴ Ib. 19. 4; τοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς Κορίνθου, τοὺς δὲ προσμσθασάμενοι Ἀρκάδων.
 So 58. 3.

⁵ Ib. In 58. 3 they appear as Σικυνῖοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες, where
 see Arnold's note.

⁶ Ib. 19. 5.

While these reinforcements were coming from Pelopon- CHAP. VIII.
 nésos, the earlier deliverer of Syracuse had not been idle Gylippos
 in gathering together every nearer means for her defence. collects
 Gylippos spent the winter in going through various parts forces in
 of Sicily, and leading away from each city the greatest Sicily.
 force that his powers of persuasion could bring them to 414-413.
 send at once¹. Further succours, it is plain from what
 followed, were promised when the time of action should
 come²; but the story reads as if no very great increase
 was at this time made to the Syracusan strength. As
 soon as Gylippos came back in the early spring, he began Speech of
 the strengthening of the Syracusan naval force. He called Gylippos
 together the Syracusan assembly, and bade the citizens give about the
 their whole minds to the work of fitting out the greatest fleet.
 number of ships that they could. They must attack the 413.
 invaders by sea; a vigorous blow struck on that side might
 bring the whole war to a successful end³. The exhortations
 of the deliverer from without were followed by those of the
 great citizen whom Syracuse had deposed from his military
 command, but who was none the less ready to give his
 counsel as a private member of the assembly. Hermokratés Speech
 spoke at this turn of the war in the same tones in which he of Hermo-
 had spoken before the war began. He bade his countrymen kratés.
 not to flinch from the prospect of meeting the dreaded
 Athenians by sea. He called on them to do what the Example
 Athenians themselves had once done with less advantages. of Athens.
 Athens had not always been a naval power. The Athenians,
 he said most truly, had once been mere landmen, far
 more thoroughly landmen than the Syracusans. It hardly
 needs a glance at the topography of the two cities to bear
 out his saying. The Athenians, not so very long ago,

¹ Thuc. vii. 21. 1; ἀγον ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν ὅσην ἐκα-
 σταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο.

² Ib. 25. 9; 32. 1.

³ Ib. 21. 1; ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἀξίον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν
 πόλεμον κατεργάσασθαι.

Nature of the Athenian power.

CHAP. VIII. had been driven to become a naval power by the stress of the Persian invasion¹. The Syracusans, it is implied might do the like under the stress of the Athenian invasion. And he adds another source of hope, drawn from a deep knowledge of human nature. The strength of the Athenians lay not so much in their real power as in their daring. By that daring they surprised and frightened everybody. All that was wanted was to surprise and frighten them back again by a display of equal daring. When the two fleets met, the amazement which would come of such unexpected daring would tell far more on the side of Syracuse than the longer experience of the Athenians would tell on the side of Athens². Let them therefore set to work, let them make ready their fleet and use it, and not loiter or be afraid³.

Syracusan preparations for a sea-fight.

Other speakers in the assembly followed up the counsel of Gylippos and Hermokratês⁴. But, as soon as things pass from counselling into acting, Hermokratês, the private Syracusan, sinks out of notice, and we hear only of the Lacedæmonian commander. The Syracusans set to work with a good heart. They made up their minds for a sea-fight; they made ready their ships, and furnished them with crews⁵. Gylippos had long before chosen his point of attack by sea, and, now that he had a fleet to his hand, he did not delay in making use of it. The one

¹ Thuc. vii. 21. 3. Here come the words which I quoted at the beginning, vol. i. p. 2; but the whole passage is memorable; λέγων οὐδὲ ἐκείνους [Ἀθηναίους] πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδὲ ἀβίον τῇς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἡπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας, καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὡς ἐμὲν, ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι.

² Ib. This doctrine reminds one, though the case is not exactly the same, of what is said in Marryatt's novel of the advantage which the utterly ignorant fencer has, in a duel with a master of the art, over the man who knows only a little.

³ Ib. 5; λέγει μὲν ἐκέλευεν ἐς τὴν πείραν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκτεῖν.

⁴ Ib.; τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ εἰ τοῦ ἄλλου πειθόντων.

⁵ Ib.; ὁρμηγντό τε ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν.

the stress ing post of the invaders, their naval station and forts CHAP. VIII.
 implied Plêmyrion, had to be won back for Syracuse. To Designed
 in this end action was needed both by sea and land. The land attack on
 enterprise the Spartan naturally took to himself. We are Plêmyrion.
 not told who was the commander of the Syracusan navy.
 That navy, including, we must suppose, the contingents
 of the mother and sister cities, numbered eighty triremes.
 Of these thirty-five had been made ready in the docks The docks
 in the Great Harbour; forty-five were in the Lesser. in the two
 This Lesser Harbour is now for the first time distinctly harbours.
 mentioned in history, though at several points in our later The Lesser
 narrative it has suggested itself as the most likely scene Harbour.
 of action. It has been thought that it was only lately, per-
 haps during the present war, that this harbour was turned
 to purposes of naval warfare¹. The plan was that the
 one division should sail across the Great Harbour, while
 the other sailed round the Island, so as to attack the
 Athenian fleet unexpectedly on both sides at once². But
 the Athenians, though taken by surprise in the early
 morning, were able to man and put to sea sixty ships.
 Twenty-five went forth to meet the thirty-five Syracusan Sea-fight
 ships that crossed the Great Harbour; thirty-five went to in the
 the mouth of the harbour to meet the forty-five that harbour.
 sailed round the Island. In both divisions the fortune
 of war was at first on the side of the greater number.
 Within the harbour the Athenians gave way; even at First
 the mouth the Syracusans were able to force their way success of
 in in spite of the Athenian resistance. But even if the the Syra-
 Athenian ships and crews had fallen away somewhat from cusans;
 the perfection in which they had first set forth from
 Peiræus, they had still enough of their traditional sea-
 manship left to repair a defeat which was owing simply
 to the enemy's superiority in numbers. The very success

¹ Thuc. vii. 22. 1. See Appendix XV.

² Ib.; περιέλαον βουλόμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἐντὶς προσμίξαι.

CHAP. VIII. of the Syracusans in forcing their way into the harbour
 their
 defeat. had disordered their array. Their ships were driven against
 each other¹; both divisions of the Athenians formed
 again, this time with complete success. Eleven of the
 Syracusan ships were sunk with the loss of the more part
 of their crews; three were taken, crews and all; of the
 Athenian ships three were lost.

March of
 Gylippos
 to Plém-
 myrion.

The victors in this sea-fight did not forget to set up
 their trophy, according to immemorial usage. The cere-
 mony was gone through on one of the small islets off
 Plémmyrion; but it was the last act of the invaders on
 that side of the Syracusan harbour. Gylippos had set
 out in the night with his land-force to free the lost head-
 land from their presence. His course was a round-about
 one. All communication by the gate of Achradina or any-
 where else in the lower part of the city was cut off by the
 lines of the besiegers. He could have reached Plémmyrion
 from the hill only by going round the Athenian fort to the
 west, and then skirting the shore of the Great Harbour.
 There he doubtless took the horsemen stationed at the
 Olympieion into his company. In the morning they
 reached the Athenian forts on Plémmyrion, and found them
 almost forsaken. The sea-fight had begun, and the more
 part of the garrisons of the forts had gone down that they
 might see the battle². While they were thus employed,
 Gylippos came suddenly on the greatest of the three forts
 and took it; after this the defenders of the other two
 attempted no resistance. The time when the first fort was
 taken was just at the moment when the Syracusan fleet
 had the better in the harbour. Of the garrison some were
 slain, some were taken prisoners. Others contrived to run

He takes
 the Athe-
 nian forts.

¹ Thuc. vii. 23. 3; οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσέπλεον καὶ παραχθείσαι περὶ ἀλλήλας
 παρέδοσαν τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.

² Ib. 1; τῶν ἐν τῇ Πλημμυρίῳ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπιπατα-
 βάσαν καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τὴν γνῶμην προσεχόντων.

down to the sea, and—perhaps accompanied by their comrades who were looking on at the sea-fight—they got on board the ships of burthen and a merchantman that happened to be at anchor there. With some difficulty, for they were chased by a specially swift Syracusan trireme, they found safety on the other side of the harbour, between the two Athenian walls¹. By the time the two lesser forts were taken, the fortune of battle had changed in the harbour; the Athenian ships had the mastery, and the fugitives from these forts had no difficulty in getting across².

CHAP. VIII.
Escape of
part of the
garrison.

But the victorious fleet had soon to make the same voyage. The seamen of Athens had raised their trophy on a rock off Plémmyrion, but the coast of Plémmyrion itself was no longer to be their station. The besieging fleet, a besieging fleet no longer, had now to abide how it could on the small piece of coast which was still guarded by the Athenian double walls. The defenders of Syracuse now commanded the mouth of their own harbour; no provisions or anything else could be brought to the station of the invaders without a struggle with the Syracusan guardships³. By land, since the finishing of Gylippos' wall, the enemy could bring in nothing of any kind. Well might the taking of Plémmyrion be said to be a heavy blow and deep discouragement to the Athenian force before Syracuse⁴.

Effects
of the
recovery
of Plémmyrion.

¹ Thuc. vii. 23. 2; ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ἀλόγτος χαλεπῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πλοῖα καὶ ὁλόαδα τινὰ κατέφυγον, ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξεκομίζοντο· τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων ταῖς ἐν τῇ μεγάλῃ λιμένι ναυσὶ κρατούστων τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, ἐπὶ τριηρῶν μᾶς καὶ εἰς πλεούσης ἐπεδιώκοντο. Στρατόπεδον here means the space between the Athenian walls on the other side of the harbour.

² Ib.; ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ δύο τειχίσματα ἥλίσκετο, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Συρακοῖαι ἐτύγχανον ἤδη νικῶμενοι, καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν φεύγοντες βῆον περίπλευσαν.

³ Ib. 24. 3; οἱ γὰρ Συρακοῖαι ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμούντες ἐπέπλυνον, καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη ἐγίνοντο αἱ ἐσκομίδαι.

⁴ Ib.; μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐπέκρινε τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἢ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λόγῳ. The whole story of the taking of Plémmyrion.

CHAP. VIII. With better reason than the immediate victors in the late sea-fight when they raised their trophy on the small island, did Gylippos set up his three trophies, one for each fort, on the peninsula of Plêmmyrion itself. He had struck a second blow at the besiegers which, coming straight after the first blow of his coming, brought their hopes of final success very low indeed. He had thoroughly turned the scale in favour of the city which he had come to defend. And the immediate gain of the taking of Plêmmyrion in the way of mere spoil was not small. Three Athenian triremes which had been drawn on shore fell into the hands of the Syracusans. So did the sails of forty others which were laid up in the forts, as also a stock of money, corn, and stuff of all kinds¹. Not a few men also of the besieging army had been killed and taken prisoners in the capture of the forts. Of the forts themselves Gylippos garrisoned the greatest, the one which he had first taken, and one of the smaller. The third he slighted². What with these new Syracusan forts, with the garrison in the Olympieion, the ships in the naval dock, and the defences of Ortygia itself, nearly the whole circuit of the Syracusan harbour was again in the hands of its own people. The only exception was the small piece of shore where the ships of the baffled invaders were still huddled together between the walls which had failed to hem in Syracuse.

Spoil taken
in Plêmmyrion.

The Syracusans
command
the Great
Harbour.

The
Athenian
ships con-
fined to
the space
between
their own
walls.
Disad-
vantages
of their
new posi-
tion.

The new station of the Athenian ships added to its other disadvantages that of too near neighbourhood to the enemy. While they lay at Plêmmyrion, there might be a sea-fight between the two fleets, or an Athenian ship might sail forth against any Syracusan who tried to go in

myrion is told by Diodôros (xiii. 9) without any hint where it happened. It might have been on the hill.

¹ See above, p. 251.

² Thuc. vii. 24. 1; *κατίβαλεν*.

or out of the harbour. But then the two hostile fleets lay CHAP. VIII. on opposite sides of the harbour; now the Athenian ships lay almost close to the older naval docks of the Syracusans. Encounters between ship and ship were ever coming off; each fleet strove to hinder any action of the other. The Syracusans defended their station by a palisade, a system Defences and devices on both sides. of stakes driven into the sea¹. Their own ships could thus lie safely within the docks, and the enemy was hindered from sailing in against them. The new bulwark was subtly planned. Some of the stakes, the lines doubtless most in advance, were purposely placed so as to be wholly under water; a hostile ship might thus strike on them as it might strike on a hidden rock². The Athenians tried every device to overcome this new difficulty. They brought up a huge merchant-ship, provided with wooden towers and other defences³; this was laid, like a floating castle, to serve as a base of operations for attacks on the Syracusan palisade. Missiles were hurled against her from the roofs of the Syracusan boat-houses, and were met by counter-showers of missiles from the Athenian ship. Under cover of her fire, the Athenians were able to come near in boats, and to break or pull up the Syracusan stakes. Divers, tempted by high pay, risked themselves under water and sawed through those stakes which were wholly hidden⁴. In these ways the greater part of the Syracusan palisade was destroyed; but, as fast as the Athenians destroyed the stakes, the Syracusans replaced them. The Athenians further made a palisade of their

¹ Thuc. vii. 25. 5; ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν σταυρῶν ἀκροβολισμός ἐν τῇ λιμένι, ὅς οἱ Συρακούσιοι πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσείων κατέπηξαν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ.

² Ib. 7; χαλεπωτάτῃ δ' ἦν τῆς σταυρώσεως ἡ κρίσις ἥσαν γὰρ τῶν σταυρῶν ὅς οὐχ ὑπερέχοντας τῆς θαλάσσης κατέπηξαν, ὥστε δευρὸν ἦν προσπλεῦσαι, μὴ οὐ προῖδαν τις ὥστερ περὶ ἔρμα περιβάλῃ τὴν ναῦν.

³ Ib. 6; ναὺν μυμοφόρον, πύργους τε ξυλίνους ἔχουσαν καὶ καταφράγματα.

⁴ Ib. 6, 7; ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους κολυμβηταὶ δυνάμενοι ἐξέτριον μυσθοῦ. Forerunners of Cola Pesce.

CHAP. VIII. own in front of their ships, which, lying exposed along the shore, were in yet greater need of such a defence than the Syracusans within their docks¹. A constant inter-
 Constant skirmishes. change of attacks and skirmishes went on between the men of the two hostile fleets lying in this way side by side².

Embassies. Meanwhile embassies were going to and fro both in Sicily and out of it, and a certain amount of warfare was going on by sea outside the Great Harbour. It was understood that ships were coming with money for the invading fleet. The sea was still part of the dominion of
 Voyage of the Athenian treasure-fleet. Athens, and it seems as if the ships with their precious freight were coming without the protection of any vessels of war³. From Syracuse twelve ships sailed forth under the command of the Syracusan Agatharchos—it is now needful to explain that a defender of Syracuse was himself a Syracusan. One of these ships carried envoys to Peloponnésos to announce the late good luck of Syracuse and her good hopes. But on that very ground they were to insist yet more strongly on the need of vigorously carrying on the war in Old Greece to hinder the sending of fresh
 Syracusan embassy to Peloponnésos. Athenian forces to Sicily⁴. The commission of the other eleven was to waylay the Athenian treasure-fleet, as it sailed along the coast of Italy. The work was done successfully. The more part of the ships perished; did the gold and silver of Athens go to the bottom, or was any of it saved for the

¹ This comes in incidentally in c. 38. 2, where we hear of τὸ σφέτερον [Ἀθηναίων] σταδῶμα, ὃ αὐτοῖς πρὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀντὶ λιμένος κληστοῦ ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ ἐπεψήγει.

² Thuc. vii. 25. 8; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅσον εἰκὸς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐγγὺς ὄντων καὶ ἀντιτεταγμένων, ἐμχανῶντο, καὶ ἀεροβολισμοῖς καὶ πείραις παντοδαύς ἐχρῶντο.

³ Ib. 1; πυνθανόμεναι πλοῦα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέμοντα χρημάτων προσπλεῖν.

⁴ Ib.; οἷον τὰ τε σφέτερα φράσωσιν ὅτι ἐν ἱλπίσιν εἰσὶ, καὶ τὸν ἐκεί πόλεμον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐποτρύνουσι γίνεσθαι.

Syracusan hoard? A quantity of ship-timber which had been gathered together for Athenian purposes on the coast of Kaulônia was burned. And at Lokroi a welcome fellow was added to the fleet of Syracuse. That one of the Peloponnesian merchant-ships which had not made the longer voyage from Tainaron fell in here with her friends. She bore a memorable freight, a company of the gallant men of Thespia, the first-fruits of Boiôtia and of all the land-powers of Old Greece, who were presently to serve Syracuse indeed in an hour of danger¹. By this time Nikias had sent forth twenty ships to keep watch off Megara, between the peninsulas of Thapsos and Xiphônia. So large a squadron could still, it would seem, sail in and out of the Great Harbour without hindrance. One of the Syracusan ships coming back from Kaulônia was taken with its crew; the other ten escaped to Syracuse, perhaps into the Little Harbour².

Coming
of the
Thespians.

Ships sent
by Nikias.

The Syracusan envoys meanwhile were making the round of the Sikeliot cities, and not Syracusan envoys alone. The presence of colleagues from Corinth and Ambrakia showed how Syracuse had the good will of her mother and her sister; the presence of Lacedæmonians spoke with all the authority of the head of Dorian Hellas. We are not told who the Lacedæmonian envoys were, but, as the great deliverer is not named, it would seem that the guiding hand of Gylippos was deemed so needful in Syracuse herself that his persuasive tongue could not be spared elsewhere. The commission of the envoys was to announce the happy success at Plèmmyrion, to put the

The Peloponnesian
envoys in
Sicily.

Gylippos
stays at
Syracuse.

¹ Thirlwall (iii. 436) points out that those who came on this ship—*μία τῶν ἀλκίδων τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἄγουσα Θεσπιέων ὁπλίτας*—must have been the Boiotians who appear in c. 43. 7. This seems quite clear when we compare this passage, c. 25. 3, with c. 19. 3 and c. 50. 2.

There had been an Athenian party in Thespia not long before, but they had been effectually put down. See Thuc. vi. 95. 3.

² Thuc. vii. 25. 2-4.

CHAP. VIII. best face on the Syracusan defeat that followed it, to say that the failure was owing, not to the superior strength of the invaders but to the confusion of the Syracusan fleet at the time of their attack¹. They were to set forth the good hopes of the Syracusan cause, and to pray the other cities to send help by sea and land with all speed. A new Athenian armament was on the way; the work needed for Sicily was to crush the invaders of Sicily before their fresh reinforcements could come to their help.

To what cities this message was sent is not distinctly marked; but the result easily shows which they were. One Dorian city was still, if not the enemy, at least the rival, of Syracuse. Akragas was not so far gone in enmity as actively to combine with the invaders of Sicily against Syracuse. But she would give no help to Syracuse; she would allow no troops marching to the help of Syracuse to pass through her territory. There was only one city which this barrier directly touched. Gela and Kamarina lay between Akragas and Syracuse, and could send their succours without Akragantine leave. Kamarina, of whose searchings of heart and swayings to and fro we have heard so much, at last sent to the help of Syracuse the substantial contingent of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, and three hundred bowmen². Gela sent no heavy-armed; but besides four hundred darters, she sent five ships of war and two hundred of the horsemen who formed the strength of the city which held the renowned Geloan fields³. On the north coast Himera was zealous in the cause; but her only road by land lay through the territory of Sikel towns, many of which were in the interest of Athens, ever ready to do what

Action of
Akragas.

Contingents of
Kamarina
and Gela.

Himera.

¹ Thuc. vii. 25. 9; ἀγγέλλοντας τήν τε τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λήψιν καὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας πέρι, ὥς οὐ τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχύϊ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ταραχῇ ᾗσσηθείεν.

² Ib. 33. 1.

³ Ib.

they could against Syracuse and her helpers. The city whose course was directly barred by the Akragantine neutrality was Selinous. If her troops were forbidden to pass through the territory of Akragas¹, their only way was to strike inland, to make their way how they could through the middle of the island, perhaps to make a junction with the contingent of Himera, either at Himera itself or at some other point. It was clearly the forces of Selinous and Himera against which Nikias now planned a successful device. They had been the last cities visited by the Syracusan and Peloponnesian envoys, and the envoys were to come back to Syracuse along with the Selinuntine and Himeraian force. It was a large force, amounting in all to at least 2300 men, and it was highly desirable from the Athenian side to hinder them from ever reaching Syracuse. The work of barring their way was entrusted by Nikias to his Sikel allies, among whom the men of Centuripa seem now to have held the first place². They and their fellows watched the march of the relieving force; they laid an ambush, perhaps more than one³, at some favourable point on the upper course of the Symaithos. The relieving force seems to have encamped without due caution; in a sudden Sikel attack eight hundred were slain, among them all the envoys, save one Corinthian, whose name is not given. We hear nothing of the Selinuntine or Himeraian commanders; but in such a moment as this, the man from Old Greece, the fellow of Gongylos and Timoleôn, came naturally to the front. He rallied the scattered troops, and was able to lead fifteen hundred

CHAP. VIII.

Selinous
barred by
Akragas.Round-
about
march of
the Seli-
nuntines
and the
envoys,
Nikias
employs
the Sikels
to stop
their way.Successful
attack of
the Sikels.The
remnant
reaches

¹ Thuc. vii. 33. 4; Ἀκραγαντῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὁδῶν.

² Ib. 32. 1; ὁ Νικίας . . . πέμπει ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς τὴν ὁδὸν ἔχοντας καὶ σφίσι ξυμμάχους, Κεντόριπας τε καὶ Ἀλικυαίους καὶ ἄλλους, ὅπως μὴ διαφρήσουσι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ ξυστραφέντες καλύπτουσι διελθεῖν. On Centuripa, see above, p. 205. On this possible Sikel Halikyai, otherwise unknown, see vol. i. p. 121. There are several readings; but all seem corruptions of Ἀλικυαῖοι.

³ Ib. 2; ἐνέδραν τινὰ τριχῶ ποιησόμενοι.

CHAP. VIII. men in safety to Syracuse¹. This was assuredly not the least of the many services which the metropolis of Syracuse was able to work on behalf of her threatened child.

The blow which Nikias had dealt by the hands of his barbarian allies had not touched the military strength of Syracuse herself. Nor had it touched the whole of the confederate forces which were marching to her help. The slaughter of the men of Himera and Selinous in no way hindered the contingents of Gela and Kamarina, the ships of Gela, the land-force of both cities, from coming in safety to Syracuse. Their presence, and that of the remnant from Selinous and Himera, allowed the boast that all Sicily—all Greek, all Dorian Sicily that is—save only neutral Akragas, was united on the side of Syracuse². But the slaughter of the envoys, even if those only perished who had gone to the more distant cities, must have cost Syracuse the lives of some of the chief men both among her own citizens and among her helpers from Old Greece. Men may well have been thankful that neither Gylippos nor Hermokratēs had been sent on that embassy. The mishap did much, more even than we might have looked for, to dishearten the Syracusans. They were on the point of making a general attack on the besiegers; but they put it off for a while³. Presently the news came that the Athenian reinforcements were not only on the way, but were actually off the coast of Italy. When the danger was as near as this, men's hearts rose to meet it. The present besieging

Arrival
of the Ge-
loans and
Kama-
rinaians.

Effect
of the
slaughter
of the
envoys.

The
general
attack
put off.

News of
the coming
of the new
Athenian
force.

¹ Thuc. vii. 32. 2; *διέφθειραν . . . τοὺς πρέσβεις πλὴν ἐνὸς τοῦ Κορινθίου πάντας*. οὗτος δὲ τοὺς διαφυγόντας ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ἐκόμισεν ἐς τὰς Συρακοῦσας. If we take πάντας of all the envoys sent from Syracuse, Selinous and Himera must have been the last cities that they visited.

² Ib. 33. 2; *σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ Σικελία, πλὴν Ἀκραγαντίνων (οὗτοι δ' οὐδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων ἦσαν), οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων, οἱ πρότερον περιοράμενοι, ξυστάντες ἰβόσθουν*. Naxos, Katane, and the barbarians seem not to count.

³ Ib. 3; *οἱ μὲν Συρακοῖσι, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐν τοῖς Σικελοῖς πάθος ἐγένετο, ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν*.

force must be attacked at once before it was strengthened by the new-comers¹. It was no less the policy of the Athenians to avoid any decisive action till they were strengthened by the coming of Dêmôsthenês and Eury-medôn.

It was resolved to attack both by sea and land. The better to attack by sea, some changes had to be made in the Syracusan naval tactics, charges which we may suppose had been carefully studied and practised during the time of inaction. The unskilful Syracusan seamen found good masters in the men who had come from the mother city to help them. Aristôn and other steermen were there who had been used to meet the ships of Athens on the waters of the Corinthian Gulf. The object was to deprive the Athenians of all advantage from their special skill in managing their ships. In this the defenders of Syracuse had only further to improve advantages which local circumstances had given them in no small measure. The Athenian tactics needed ample sea-room; and it was at least a gain to have a friendly shore to which the ships, in the exercise of those tactics, might on occasion back and start again. The Great Harbour, crowded with the ships on both sides, allowed no room for the special Athenian manœuvres; moreover, since the recovery of Plêmmyrion, the invaders had no friendly coast at any point save in the narrow space where their camp came down to the water's edge². The fight would necessarily be very largely a direct meeting of ships, prow against prow. To the skilled seamen of Athens such a mode of fighting

Changes
in Syracu-
san naval
tactics.

Aristôn
and the
other Co-
rinthians.

Disad-
vantage of
the Great
Harbour
for the
Athenians.

¹ Thuc. vii. 36. 1; πυθόμενοι αὐτῶν τὸν ἐπίπλουν, αὐτοῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι ἐβούλοντο καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἥνπερ ἐς' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς φθάσαι βουλόμενοι, συνέλεγον.

² Ib. 5; τὴν γὰρ ἀνέκρουσιν οὐκ ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξαθουμένοις ἄλλοσε ἢ εἰς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ταύτην δι' ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἐαυτῶν τοῦ δ' ἄλλου λιμένος αὐτοὶ κρατήσιν. The whole chapter is full of technical detail.

CHAP. VIII. seemed the clumsiness of land-lubbers, and the build of their ships was not suited for it. Instead of meeting the enemy prow against prow, the Athenian trireme, itself a living weapon in the hands of Athenian oarsmen, watched the moment when some skilful guidance of its course could bring its beak against some other part of the hostile vessel. For this purpose a heavy beak was out of place; the Athenian beak was long and thin, and struck the enemy high above the water. The Corinthians, in their warfare with the Athenians in the narrow waters of Naupaktos, had learned the weakness of the Athenian build wherever there was no room for manœuvring, whenever things had to come to a direct charge¹. Ariston and his fellows now adapted the Syracusan vessels in the same way. The beaks were made short and heavy, and placed so as to strike but a little way above the water. They were further strengthened by heavy nozzles on each side made firm by spars within the ship on which they rested². Instead of acting like the thrust of a spear, the Syracusan prow was to do something more like the crash of a battering-ram. Against these devices the Athenian ships would have to strive face to face how they could. In so narrow a space, crowded by friendly and hostile ships, they would have no room for their skilled manœuvres; they would have no friendly coast to back into, while the Syracusans could back into any part of the harbour save that whose coast lay between the two Athenian walls.

The
Athenian
tactics.

Strength-
ening of
the Syracu-
san beaks.

Such were the hopes with which the Syracusans and their Corinthian teachers looked forward to a struggle with Athens in the waters of their own harbour. And now the time had come when, if the struggle was to be waged against the forces of Nikias only, the attack could

¹ Thuc. ii. 84, 91.

² Ib. vii. 36. 2. I hope I may be forgiven for not risking myself in the mysteries of *ἐναρίδες* and such like.

be no longer delayed. The twofold assault on the besiegers by land and sea began. The double wall of the Athenians was assailed on both sides. Gylippos led forth the main force within the city to the attack of the eastern wall, that fronting the western wall of Syracuse¹. The forces quartered at the Olympieion, horsemen and darters, and some heavy-armed as well, did the like to the western wall which looked towards them². The Athenians formed on both sides to withstand their attacks; but again we hear nothing of the Athenian and allied cavalry, for whose coming Nikias had been so eager at an earlier stage. They might, one would think, have been found useful in a sally against the assailants of the western wall. They did some service in that way in a later struggle³. Of the results of these skirmishes, for they could have been little more, we hear nothing distinctly; towards the end of the day the Syracusans withdrew from the wall without having made their way within the Athenian camp⁴. Yet the day's fighting, even by land, seems to have encouraged Syracusan hopes. But the land attack was of comparatively little moment; it was by sea that the great success was to be won, the first distinct victory of Syracuse over Athens on the special element of Athens. It did not come on the first day, though the first day's attack by sea was made under circumstances in every way favourable. The Athenians had not looked for the double attack by sea and land⁵. Their minds were given to the defence

CHAP. VIII.

Twofold assault, by sea and land.

Attack on the Athenian walls.

No mention of the Athenian horse.

First day's fighting by sea;

¹ Thuc. vii. 37. 2; Γύλιππος προεξαγαγὼν προσῆγε τῷ τείχει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ὤσεν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα.

² Ib.; καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπείου, οἱ τε ὀπλῖται ὅσοι ἐκεῖ ἦσαν, καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς καὶ ἡ γυμνητεία τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσῆγε τῷ τείχει. The Olympieion was the head-quarters of the horsemen and darters; the heavy-armed were mainly elsewhere.

³ Ib. 51. 2.

⁴ Ib. 38. 1; καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἄμα ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀπῆλθε.

⁵ Ib. 37. 3; οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὺς οἰόμενοι τῷ πεζῷ μόνῃ περιέσταν.

CHAP. VIII. of the wall, when they saw the eighty ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailing forth to the attack of their naval station. Much confusion followed. While some went on with the defence of the walls, others rushed down to the coast, and with all speed manned their ships, seventy-five in number, and sailed forth to meet their assailants.

its slight
result.

The ships on both sides skirmished, if one may so speak by sea, during the more part of the day without any remarkable success on either side. What little advantage there was was on the side of Syracuse; one or two Athenian ships were sunk¹.

Divided
feeling of
the Athe-
nian camp.

Even this slight success would further stir up the Syracusans and their allies to press on the attack before the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements. And it made it yet more clearly the obvious Athenian policy to avoid further action till those reinforcements came. On this head the feeling in the Athenian camp seems to have been divided. To Nikias the policy of inaction would naturally be acceptable, even if it had been less prudent. But a somewhat doubtful statement makes the trierarchs generally eager for battle², and a statement of better authority asserts the same of the new colleagues of Nikias in the generalship. Menandros and Euthydêmos were said to have been anxious to distinguish their command by some exploit before Dêmôsthenês and Eurymedôn came. It was not worthy, they said, of the fame of Athens to keep within their lines through fear of the Syracusans; they should rather go forth to meet them³. Still good defensive preparations

Eagerness
of the new
generals.

¹ Thuc. vii. 38. 1; οὐδέτεροι δυνάμενοι ξιφίων τι λόγον παραλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ ναῦν μίαν ἢ δύο τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Συρακούσιοι καταδύσαντες, διεκρίθησαν.

² Diodôros (xiii. 10) first describes the feeling on both sides as I have put it in the text, but adds that the second battle came off because of τινες τῶν τριηραρχῶν, οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι καρτερεῖν τὴν τῶν Συρακουσίων καταφρόνησιν.

³ Plut. Nik. 20; τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Μένανδρον καὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον ἀρτίως εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καθισταμένους φιλοτιμία καὶ ζῆλος ἦν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς στρατη-

were made, and when the battle did come on, it began through a stratagem on the Syracusan side which could hardly have been foreseen. Nikias, after the first day's indecisive fighting, felt sure that the enemy would attack again. He therefore constrained the trierarchs to see to any damage that had been done to their ships¹, and he spent the next day in causing ships of burthen to be moored in front of the Athenian palisade. They were moored at such a distance from each other as to allow a ship to pass in and out. But provision was made against the entrance of any hostile ship by the device of providing each of the ships of burthen with the engines called dolphins. These were beams armed with iron which were raised on high, ready to fall on any intruding vessel². By nightfall all was ready for the defence.

CHAP. VIII.
Defensive
prepara-
tions of
Nikias.

The
dolphins.

The next morning early³ the Syracusans again began the attack, both by land and sea. Of the assaults on the Athenian walls which we must suppose to have taken place we hear no details; the great work of that day also was by sea. The battle began, and went on for some hours with no more decisive results than the attack of two days earlier. At last the skilful Corinthian steerman Aristôn⁴ bethought him of a happy device. He persuaded the generals to send orders to the city for all who had any provisions to bring them down to the shore; the disobedient were to be con-

Second
twofold
attack.

Stratagem
of Aristôn.

γους, τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένην φθῆναι πρᾶξαντάς τι λαμβρόν, υπερβαλίσθαι δὲ τὸν Νικίαν. πρόσχημα δ' ἦν ἡ δόξα τῆς πόλεως, κ.τ.λ. This is perfectly likely, and it perhaps draws some small confirmation from the emphatic way in which Thucydides speaks of Nikias at this point.

¹ Thuc. vii. 38. 2; ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἰδὼν ἀντίπαλα τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας γεγόμενα, καὶ ἐλπίσαν αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπιχειρήσειν, τοὺς τε τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζεν ἐπισκευάζειν τὰς ναῦς, εἰ τίς τι ἐπερονήκει. This need of constraint falls in with some things in the letter. Holm (ii. 50) suggests that they wanted a day's rest for their men.

² The dolphins are not mentioned till c. 41. 2, when they play their part. See more of them in the scholiast on the Knights, 759.

³ Thuc. vii. 39. 1; τῆς μὲν ὕρας προφαίτερον.

⁴ Ib.; ἀριστος ἐν κυβερνήτῃς τῶν μετὰ Σικανασίων.

CHAP. VIII. strained¹. As soon as this was done, the Syracusan ships drew off from the attack on the Athenians, and sailed back into the docks. The object was twofold; the Syracusans were to be strengthened by a meal for a fresh attack, and the Athenians were to be lulled into the belief that no more attacks were to be made that day. The trick succeeded to perfection². The Athenians looked on the Syracusan retreat as a confession of defeat. They took for granted that there would be no more fighting by sea at least till the morrow. They disembarked; they began to make ready for their meal, and to do whatever was to be done³. It is strange that among such needful things the defence of the wall is not distinctly spoken of. Suddenly the ships of Syracuse showed themselves again, ready for a new attack. Their crews had refreshed themselves with their meal, and had sailed forth a second time. The Athenians, taken by surprise, most of them still fasting—their expected meal must have been sadly cut short—manned their ships in confusion, and barely contrived to put to sea⁴.

Second
Syracusan
attack by
sea.

For a while the two fleets remained simply watching one another. At last the Athenians—does the name here mean Nikias or his colleagues?—deemed that it was better to risk something than to weary themselves out by toil of which nothing came⁵. They sailed out and attacked the

¹ Thuc. vii. 39. 1; πάντας ἐκείσε φέροντας ἀναγκάσαι πωλεῖν.

² Here Plutarch (Nik. 20) directly refers to our main guide; καταστρατηγηθέντες ὑπ' Ἀρίστανος τοῦ Κορινθίου κυβερνήτου τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς εἴρηκε Θουκυδίδης. Ariston, ἄριστος among steermen, plans a trick περὶ τὸ ἄριστον. One is tempted to say,

τίς ποτ' ἀνόμαζεν ὁδὸν
eis τὸ πᾶν ἐτητύμως;

³ Thuc. vii. 40. 1; καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες τὰ τε ἄλλα διεπράσσοντο καὶ τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς τῆς γε ἡμέρας ταύτης οὐκέτι οἰόμενοι ἐν ναυμῇ χῆσαι.

⁴ Ib. 2; οἱ δὲ διὰ πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ ἄσιτοι οἱ πλείους, οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσβάντες μόλις ποτὲ ἀνταγγόντο.

⁵ Ib. 3; οὐκ ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ σφάν διαμέλλοντας κόπῃ ἀλίσκεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα. See Arnold's note on αὐτοῦ.

Syracusans, whose purpose was thus exactly suited. The heavy prows now came into use; they stove in many of the Athenian vessels; the darters on the decks kept up a shower of missiles to the great damage of the Athenian crews. And another advantage came of fighting in their own waters, by which yet more damage was done to the enemy. Like the English with the armada of Spain, a crowd of light boats gathered round the Athenian triremes. They broke the oars; they shot darts in through the port-holes¹. Under all these forms of annoyance Athenian skill and spirit gave way². The triremes turned in flight; they made for their station, and through the gaps left by the merchantmen which formed their wall of defence, they were able to sail in safely. The Syracusans followed; but the more part drew back when they saw the dolphins on high ready to fall on them³. Two only, in the full swing of victory, dared to push on within reach of the engines that hung over their heads. One ship was crushed by the dolphins; another was taken with her crew⁴. Thus much of comfort had Athens for the loss of seven ships sunk and an untold number damaged; of their crews some were slain, some were prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

CHAP. VIII.
Defeat of
the Athe-
nians.

Use of the
dolphins.

Thus it was that Syracuse, taught by Corinth, at last won an undoubted victory over the invading mistress of the seas on her own element. She had beaten her enemy. She now hoped, as the stronger by sea, to win back the

Effect of
the victory.

¹ Thuc. vii. 40. 4; πολλὰ δ' ἔτι μείζονα ἐν τοῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακούσιων, καὶ ἐς τε τοὺς παροῦς ἐποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν, καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς τοὺς ναύτας ἀκοντίζοντες. See Arnold's note.

² Cf. Knights, 758;

ἀλλὰ φυλάττου, καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνων προσκίεσθαι σοι, πρότερον σὺ τοὺς δελφῖνας μετεωρίζου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπὸν παραβάλλου.

³ Thuc. vii. 41. 1. The words are emphatic; τέλος δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ τρέπῃ κατὰ πρῶτος ναυμαχοῦντες οἱ Συρακούσιοι ἐνίκησαν.

⁴ Ib. 3; δύο δὲ νῆες . . . διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐάλει.

CHAP. VIII. full command of her own waters¹. Two trophies were set up, one for the undoubted victory of that day, the other for the smaller success of two days earlier². The hearts and hopes of Syracuse were rising high. Every preparation was making for another and more decisive attack which should complete the defeat of the invaders by sea and land³. The next day a sight was seen which thrust down all such hopes again for a moment. But the powers that watched over Syracuse had decreed that it should be for a moment only.

Beginning
of the re-
newed
war in Old
Greece.
413.

By this time it might seem to have become a small matter that Athenian and Corinthian ships were watching each other off Peloponnêsos to hinder help going to either side in Sicily⁴. It might even seem to have become a small matter that in Sicily itself the great fleet and army of Athens were lying, defeated and helpless, in the waters and on the coast of the Syracusan harbour. The great strife had begun again in Old Greece in all its fulness. Attica above all was, by the counsel of her own traitor, put in fetters by her Peloponnesian enemy. The Dorian war had come eighteen years before, and the plague had come with it⁵; now it came again in a more wasting and abiding form which hardly needed the plague as its ally. The commonwealth of Sparta had gone through a searching process of self-examination. The public conscience had awakened to the fact that the former part of the war, down to the peace of Nikias, had been unjust on the Peloponnesian side. Sparta and her allies had refused the Athenian proposal to refer their differences to arbitra-

Workings
of the
Spartan
conscience;
the first
part of
the war
unquiet.

¹ Thuc. vii. 41. 4; τὴν ἐλπίδα ἤδη ἔχοντες εἶχον ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὰ κρείσσους εἶναι.

² Ib.; τροπαῖά τε ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἔστησαν.

³ Ib.; ἰδὲκουν δὲ καὶ τὸν πρὸς χειρὸς εἶναι, καὶ . . . ὥς ἐπιθησόμενοι παρασκευάζοντο αἰεὶ.

⁴ Ib. 17.

⁵ Ib. ii. 54.

tion, according to the treaty. They had been at least accomplices after the fact in the treacherous attack of the Thebans on Plataia with which the war had begun. They now deemed that the Athenian occupation of Pylos and whatever else of evil had happened to them in the war had been the punishment of these wrongdoings¹. From the peace of Nikias till quite lately much had happened to stir up Sparta against Athens and Athens against Sparta. Each had given help to the enemies and done damage to the allies of the other; each in so doing had met the other side in arms. But neither state had directly invaded the territory of the other; the peace and alliance between Sparta and Athens was therefore held to be in some sort still standing. But a late act of Athens had taken away all scruples; the peace had at last been directly broken. About the time that Gylippos was on his voyage, the Lacedæmonians had invaded Argolis. Thirty Athenian ships had come to the help of their allies. And they had done more than defend their allies, they had sailed on and laid waste pieces of undoubted Lacedæmonian territory². After this all scruples were taken away. The fault was now wholly on the side of Athens; Sparta could take up arms with a clear conscience and a good hope³. There could no longer be any doubt as to the justice of returning the wrong by a direct invasion of Attica, and by carrying out the cunning suggestion of Alkibiadēs in the permanent occupation of a fortress on Attic soil.

With the spring the work began. First of all the land of Attica was laid waste as a kind of ceremonial beginning; then Dekeleia was occupied as the centre of more abiding havoc. Athens saw, but she did not hold her hand from the work which she had begun. While the enemy was at her

¹ Thuc. vii. 18. 2.

² Ib. vi. 105. 1, 2; vii. 18. 3.

³ The working of the Spartan conscience is strongly brought out by Thucydides in both the places (vi. 105. 1, 2; vii. 18. 3).

CHAP. VIII.

Action of
Athens in
Argolis.

414

A good
casus belli.

Invasion
of Attica
resolved
on.

Occupation of
Dekeleia.
Spring,
413.

CHAP. VIII. gates, while her fields were harried under her eyes, while the towns of Peloponnêsos, each in order, were giving their contingents to raise the destroying fortress on Attic ground¹, Athens changed not from her purpose. The work of the destroyers in Attica went on while she herself sent forth a second armada as mighty as the first to do battle in the distant island on which her thoughts were fixed. It is with some emphasis that the historian tells us that it was when the spring first began, at the moment of the occupation of Dekeleia, that Athens sent forth her fleets². First sailed Chariklê with thirty ships to Argos, to call on the Argeians to furnish yet more heavy-armed to go on board the Athenian ships³. Then sailed Dêmosthenês himself—Eurymedôn had not yet come back from his Sicilian errand—with sixty Athenian and five Chian ships. He took with him twelve hundred heavy-armed from the citizen-roll of Athens, and from the islands, it is somewhat vaguely said, as many as were to be got in each⁴. The other subject allies were made to contribute whatever they had that was useful for the war, whether men, it would seem, or anything else⁵. The whole number of heavy-armed grew in the end to five thousand, with not a few bowmen, darters, and slingers, Greek and barbarian⁶. One barbarian contingent that was meant for Sicilian service came too late. These were thirteen hundred Thracian peltasts, swordsmen of the independent and warlike tribe of the Dioi from the mountains of Rhodopê⁷, hired at the

Athenians
do not
give up
the Sicilian
war.

The
Argeian
contingent.

Dêmo-
sthenês
sets sail.
Amount
of his
force.

Contribu-
tions of
the allies.

The
Thracians
come too
late.

¹ Thuc. vii. 19. 1; Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον, κατὰ πόλεις διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον.

² Ib. 20. 1; ἐν τούτῃ . . ὅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῇ τειχισμῷ καὶ τοῦ ἥρου ἐβόης ἀρχομένου.

³ Ib.; κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρακαλεῖν Ἀργείων τε δπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς.

⁴ Ib.; νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἐκασταχόθεν οἶόν τ' ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι.

⁵ Ib.; ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἰ ποθὲν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ξυμπορίσαντες.

⁶ Ib. 42. 1. We shall see some of them come in on the road.

⁷ Ib. 27. 1; Θρακῶν τῶν μαχαιοφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους πελτασταί. So in ii. 96. They were αὐτόνομοι and followed Sitalkês for hire.

wages of a drachma daily¹. Sicily was well saved from them; it was they who on their way back to Thrace wrought that deed of blood at Mykaléssos which outdid all crimes of Greek against Greek, and sent a shudder through all Hellas².

The commission of Démosthénès reminds us of his former commission in the voyage when his present colleague Eury-medôn was so late in reaching Sicily³. The exploit of Pylos was to be renewed. He who did it twelve years before was bidden to meet Chariklès and join with him in warfare along the coast of Laconia⁴. He sailed to Aigina; he waited there for any of his immediate division that still lingered; he then met Chariklès with his thirty ships and his Argeian allies. These last were not for service in Sicily, but for work nearer home. They were taken on board the Athenian ships, and they joined in the harrying of the lands of the Laconian Epidauros, distinguished as Limêra from its more famous Argolic neighbour. Then came the renewal of the deed of Pylos. At a point on the Laconian coast opposite Kythêra, at a spot marked by a temple of Apollôn, Démosthénès marked a small peninsula that suited his purpose. It was to be, like Pylos, a spot where discontented Helots, and seemingly any others who had evil will to Sparta, might come together and ravage the Laconian land⁵. He left Chariklès to finish the work of fortification, while he himself sailed on towards Korkyra, which was to be again the trysting-place for those among the allies of Athens who had not yet come in. On his way, at Pheia

Voyage
of Démo-
sthenès.

His fort
opposite
Kythêra.

¹ Thuc. vii. 27. 2. The Ὀδομάτων στρατός in the Acharnians (156) wanted two drachmas daily.

² See the story of the massacre at Mykaléssos, vii. 29-30.

³ See above, pp. 38, 45.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 20. 2; εἰρητο δ' αὐτῷ πρῶτον μετὰ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἅμα περιπλέοντα ἐνστρατεύεσθαι περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν.

⁵ Ib. 26. 1; ἵνα δὴ οἱ τε Εἰλωτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτόσε αὐτομολῶσι καὶ ἅμα λησται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἀρπαγὴν ποιῶνται.

CHAP. VIII. on the Eleian coast, he found a heavy-armed transport-ship ready to take Corinthians to Sicily. The ship he destroyed, the men escaped to land, and sailed to Sicily in another vessel¹. He took in more heavy-armed from Zakynthos and Kephallênia; he sent for contingents to the Messenians of Naupaktos and to Alyzia and Anaktorion, dependencies of Athens on the Akarnanian mainland². He was met by Eurymedôn on his voyage back from his Sicilian errand, who brought with him the news which he had heard on his voyage, that Plêmmyrion had fallen into Syracusan hands³. Thither too came Konôn, who then commanded at Naupaktos, a man who lived to play a great part in the history of Athens, but who concerns not our story. Instead of bringing reinforcements for Sicilian warfare, Konôn took away ten of the best sailing ships in the fleet, to defend his own station against the Corinthians. Eurymedôn went on to Korkyra to demand and to receive fifteen ships and a proportionate body of heavy-armed, while Dêmosthenês collected darters and slingers from various places in Akarnania⁴.

The second invading fleet and army had thus got together all that was to be had on the eastern side of Hadria. The usual course was now followed. Dêmosthenês and Eurymedôn struck across from Korkyra to the southern point of Iapygia, and thence sailed to the islands known as Choirades, lying off the haven of unfriendly Taras⁵. While off these coasts, they took in a hundred and fifty Messapian darters. These were supplied by a prince Artas with whom they renewed an old treaty. This points to some of the earlier dealings of Athens in the West, like the two treaties

He collects
forces on
the way.

Return
of Eury-
medôn
from Sicily.

Konôn
to watch
the Co-
rinthians.

Euryme-
dôn and
Dêmos-
thenês col-
lect more
forces.

Voyage
from
Korkyra.

Contingent
and hospi-
tality of
the Mes-
sapian
Artas.

¹ Thuc. vii. 31. 1.

² Ib. 2; 'Αλυζίαν τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον, ὃ αὐτοὶ εἶχον. See iv. 49 for the Athenian occupation of Ἀνακτόριον, Κορινθίων πόλιν.

³ Ib. 31. 3; ἀγγέλλει τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι πύθοιτο κατὰ πλοῦν ἤδη ὄν, τὸ Πλημμύριον ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἑλαυνέσθαι.

⁴ Ib. 5.

⁵ See Appendix XVII.

with Segesta. The splendid hospitality with which the CHAP. VIII. Messapian king or tyrant received his Greek allies was handed down in the verse of a comic poet and of a later historian, and an easy play of words was found in the name of so bountiful a *blaford*¹. From Iapygia they coasted on till they reached the borders of Italy, as the word was understood in their day. The first Italian city that they came to received them friendly. Metapontion Contingent of Meta- was an ally of Athens, and she increased the fleet by two triremes and the land-force by three hundred darters². Thourioi pontion; of Thourioi. was yet more helpful. The colony of Apollôn had again remembered its mortal founders³. In some of the seditions of the city the party favourable to Athens had got the upper hand. They embraced the Athenian cause with a ready zeal; they pledged themselves to have the same friends and enemies as Athens, and they supplied the Athenian generals with the substantial reinforcement of seven hundred heavy-armed and three hundred darters. On Review of the fleet and army. the Thourian coast the fleet was reviewed. The ships, their numbers lessened here and increased there, now numbered seventy-three⁴. The land-force, the heavy-armed now reaching five thousand and the untold lighter troops, were also reviewed by the river Sybaris⁵. The fleet was sent on towards Krotôn; the purpose of the generals was to march by land through the Krotoniat territory. But on the banks

¹ See Appendix XVII.

² Thuc. vii. 33. 4; *πέϊσας κατὰ τὸ ζυμμαχικόν*.

³ See above, p. 12.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 33. 5; *καταλαμβάνουσι νεωστὶ στάσει τοῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίους ἐκπεπαιωμένους καὶ βουλόμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν αὐτοῖσι πᾶσαν ἀρροῖ-σαντες, εἰ τις ὑπολέλειπτο, ἐξετάσαι, καὶ τοὺς Θουρίους πέϊσαι σφίσι ξυστρα-τεύειν τε ὡς προθυμότατα, καὶ ἐπειδὴ περ ἐν τούτῃ τύχῃ εἰσὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζουσιν περιέμενον ἐν τῇ Θουρίᾳ καὶ ἐπρασσον ταῦτα*. The numbers of the contingent come from c. 35. 1 and the full tale of the fleet from c. 42. 1.

⁵ Ib. 35. 1; *αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸν ποτὸν πάντα ἐξετάσαντες πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῇ Συβάρει ποταμῷ*. Sybaris and Krathis have a joint mouth below Thourioi. Hyllis is the border-stream of Thourioi and Krotôn.

CHAP. VIII. of the border stream of Hylia, a message came from Krotôn forbidding the passage¹. The army therefore marched to the shore; they bivouacked at the river's mouth, and again embarked. They touched at each town on their way except hostile Lokroi; but no details are given². It is hard to see what towns are meant except Skyllétion and Kaulônia. Kaulônia at least was friendly, if not in Athenian occupation; Skyllétion might be more doubtful. They halted again at Petra in the territory of Rhégion. We hear nothing of their voyage along the Sicilian coast. We see them next at the mouth of the Great Harbour of Syracuse.

They reach Syracuse on the morrow of the Athenian defeat.

Entrance of the second fleet into the Great Harbour.

Dismay in Syracuse.

It seems to have been on the morrow of the day which saw the Syracusan victory by sea, when every heart in Syracuse was lifted up, when every heart in the Athenian camp was downcast, that things were for a moment altogether turned the other way by the coming of Dêmôsthênês and Eury-medôn. The threescore and thirteen ships made their unresisted entry into the Syracusan haven with every circumstance of military pomp. The troops in arms stood thick on the decks; the rowers kept their time to the voice of the steermen; the pipers sounded the notes of victory, as all Syracuse looked out on the new enemy with fear and wonder³. Their former toils had not, as they had fondly deemed, set them free from danger⁴. What might they

¹ Thuc. vii. 35. 2.

² Ib.; ἴσχυοντες πρὸς ταῖς πόλεσι πλὴν Λοκρῶν.

³ The fact of their entrance is recorded by Thucydides, vii. 42. 1. Plutarch (Nik. 21) has some details which may well enough come from Philistos; Δημοσθένης ὑπὲρ τῶν λιμένων ἐπεφαίνετο λαμπρότατος τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ δεινότητος τοῖς πολεμίοις . . . ὅπλων δὲ κόσμος καὶ παρασήμοις τριήρων καὶ πλήθει κελυστῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν θεατρικῶς καὶ πρὸς ἐκπληξιν πολεμίων ἐξησημένους.

⁴ Plut. Nik. 21; ἦν οὖν, ὡς εἰκός, αἰδῆς ἐν φόβῳ μεγάλη τὰ Συρακουσίαν εἰς οὐδὲν πέρασ οὐδὲ ἀπαλλαγὴν, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντας ἄλλως καὶ φθειρομένους αὐτοὺς μάτην δρᾶντων. This comes from Thuc. vii. 42. 2; κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρασ μὴδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου. The fear extended to the σύμμαχοι: did it touch Gylippus?

not look for, when Athens, with the hostile fortress of Dekeleia rising on her own soil, could still send forth against Sicily another armament as great and as well equipped as the former one¹. The spirits of the Athenians rose after their troubles²; hope and fear changed sides; things were again for a moment as they had been before Gongylos came with his glad tidings. Only yesterday the power of Athens had been worsted on her own element; the victorious Syracusans were planning the overthrow of the whole Athenian force. It was now again for a moment for Athens to attack, for Syracuse and her allies to defend.

Change of position by the two sides.

In Dêmôsthênês the Athenians had again a leader as bold and skilful and full of resource as Lamachos had been, as little likely as Lamachos to loiter and fritter away the force under his command as Nikias had done³. And if he had not the same commanding personal position as Nikias, he clearly stood far higher than Lamachos, whose great military qualities had been so strangely weighed down by his poverty. Generals and soldiers clearly listened to him as they had not listened to Lamachos. Dêmôsthênês now set forth again the obvious lesson which Lamachos had tried in vain to enforce on Nikias and Alkibiadês, the lesson that an army is most formidable on the day

Counsels of Dêmôsthênês.

His position.

¹ Thuc. vii. 42. 2; ὁρῶντες οὖτε διὰ τὴν Δεκείλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἥσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπεληλυθότα, τὴν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν φαινομένην.

² Ib.; τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐκ κακῶν, βόμῃ τις ἐγγένητο.

³ Ib. 3; ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν, οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὑπερ ὃ Νικίας ἔπαθεν. It is here that Thucydides goes on at some length to pass his strongest censure on the whole conduct of Nikias. But we must give the word φοβερός its true sense. Nikias was φοβερός in dreading results and responsibilities, in fearing the censure of others; no man was less so in actual action, when he did act.

Plutarch also takes up his parable, and contrasts Nikias with the Byzantine Leon who would rather die for his countrymen than with them. This is a little hard.

CHAP. VIII. of its first appearing¹. He saw that the great hindrance to Athenian success had been the cross-wall of Gylippos, now stretching westward from the wall of Tycha to the Syracusan forts at the west end of Epipolai. We have latterly heard but little of any action on the hill; but it must be remembered that the Athenian force still occupied part of it, so much that is as they could defend from their fort at Syka and from the walls which reached from Syka down to the Great Harbour². But the long northern wall and the forts at the western end had given the Syracusans the practical command of the hill as a whole. Dêmostenês saw that the only way to win back the position which the besieging force had held before the coming of Gylippos was either to make a direct attempt on the cross-wall from the south, or else to repeat the exploit of Lamachos and again to master Epipolai from the north by the path at Euryalos. The former was the most obvious course, and one is amazed that Nikias had never made the attempt. But now things looked more hopeful for the besiegers than they had done in his days of disheartenment. The coming of Dêmostenês had greatly increased both the numbers and the spirit of the army. For a moment indeed the Athenians seemed again to have the upper hand both by land and sea. The Syracusans and allies within the city no longer made any attacks on the besiegers, as they harried the lands by the Anapos both with their land-force and with their ships. The only opposition they met with was from the horsemen and darters at the Olympieion³.

Importance of the wall of Gylippos.

State of things on the hill.

The wall to be attacked.

Momentary advantage of the besiegers.

¹ Thuc. vii. 42. 3; ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης, καὶ γινώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ παρόντι τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μάλιστα δεινότητός ἐστι τοῖς ἑναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅτι τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει.

² See Appendix XIII.

³ Thuc. vii. 42. 6; τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, τῷ τε πεζῷ καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕτερα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξήσαν, ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεύσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου.

But notwithstanding this show of recovered power, Dêmosthenês knew thoroughly well the real state of affairs. In the attempt which he now designed the fate of the war would be decided. If he succeeded, he hoped to take Syracuse. If he failed, he would at once go home, and not wear out the army and the whole city any longer¹. Of his two alternative schemes he would first try the easier, that of attacking the Syracusan cross-wall from the south. The wall was a single one, and he hoped to take it by battering engines². It is strange that we have heard so little of engines of this kind during the whole war. They have not been mentioned except when Nikias used them as materials for a fire³. From some quarter or other engines were now brought up to the attack; but they were burned by the defenders of the wall, while the troops that guarded them were attacked at various points by the Syracusans and their allies⁴. The attempt failed; the lost ground was not to be won back in this way. Dêmosthenês was driven to his other alternative. It seems to have needed some persuasion on his part to win the consent of Nikias and his other colleagues to the hazardous adventure⁵. But in the end they agreed. Nikias remained within the Athenian lines⁶, while Dêmosthenês, Eurymedôn, and Menandros, set forth to renew the enterprise of Lamachos. They were to strive to win their way on the

CHAP. VIII.

The last chance for the Athenians.

The wall of Gylippos attacked from the south.

The attempt defeated.

The hill to be attacked from the north side.

¹ Thuc. vii. 42. 5; καὶ οἱ ξυνομοσάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμῃσιν ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας ἔξειν Συρακούσας ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν.

² Ib. 4; 43. 1; ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπλοῦν ὅν . . . ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς ἔδοξε τῷ Δημοσθένει πρότερον ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος.

³ See above, p. 226.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 43. 1.

⁵ Ib.; οὐκ ἐτι ἔδδοκει διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ πείσας τὸν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυτάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπεθεί. Plutarch (Nik. 21) puts this more strongly; ὁ Νικίας μὲν συνεχώρησεν ἐκ βίας θείας.

⁶ Ib.; Νικίας ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπελείπειτο. See Appendix XIII.

CHAP. VIII. north side by the path by which he had first made a lodgement for the invaders on the hill of Syracuse.

The attack made at the old point by Euryalos. The words of Thucydides imply that the attack was made at exactly the same point by which both Lamachos and Gylippos had already gone up¹. For both of them, coming as they did from the north, it was the obvious way. For an army encamped on the southern part of the hill and below the hill it implied a long march round the extreme point of the hill of Belvedere. An attempt on the southern side of Euryalos, nearer and easier of ascent, would have been in itself more natural. But things had altogether changed since the coming of Lamachos or of Gylippos. The ascent on the south side was now thoroughly guarded by the fort which ended the Syracusan wall to the west. The assailants were therefore driven to take a long and round-about course in order to make the attack at the old point on the north side, where they were now less likely to be looked for. And that too was now a harder task than it had been when the Athenian heavy-armed followed Lamachos at a run from Leôn, and climbed up the path with none to withstand them. The wall and the forts were there, and besides the guards of each, a special and tried body of men kept watch in this quarter, and would be ready to act on either side of the hill, north or south. The six hundred who had been first sent on that errand had lost their captain and many of their number on the day of the ascent of Lamachos². But they kept their continuous being as a regiment, and it would seem that the Andrian exile who had first led them had been succeeded in this special command by no less a native captain than Hermokratês himself³. In this state of things

Effect of the wall of Gylippos.

The regiment of six hundred.

¹ This is marked distinctly in vii. 43. 3; *ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς* [*Ἐπειλαῖς*] *ἦνερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη*. See above, pp. 211, 241, and Appendix XIII.

² They appear directly in c. 43. 4 as *οἱ ἑκατόσιοι τῶν Συρακοσίων, οἱ καὶ πρῶτοι κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῶν Ἐπειολῶν φύλακες ἦσαν*. See above, p. 209.

³ That is, if one may, with Grote (vii. 420), accept the one contribution

it was thought hopeless to make the attempt by day. It was essential to the scheme that the attempt should be unlooked-for by the defenders of the hill, and of this there could be no chance when the Syracusans could see them from the hill both in their ascent and on their march¹. The attempt was therefore to be made by night, a moonlight night in August. While men were in their first sleep², the three generals, Dêmosthenês, Eurymedôn, and Menandros, set forth, at the head of the whole Athenian army, save such as were left with Nikias as a garrison for the Round Fort and the wall. They took with them all the masons and carpenters and all things needed for wall-building; for they looked to have work of that kind to do in case of a successful ascent. They took also a stock of arrows, and provisions for five days³. So accompanied and burthened, the host of Athens set forth in the moonlight on the enterprise which their most discerning general believed to be their last hope of success or even of safety.

CHAP. VIII.
The Athenians set forth on the night-march. August, 413.

They made their roundabout march in safety, and without being discovered. They reached the spot by which many of them had climbed up more than a year before when Lamachos was among them. But with Dêmosthenês at their head even Lamachos would hardly be missed, and the man of Olpai and Pylos seemed at first to be strangely favoured by fortune. They climbed up the path without hindrance and without notice. Suddenly, in the dead of the night, the garrison of the most western of the Syracusan forts was startled by an assault of the enemy. The

First successes of the Athenians.

of Diodôros (xiii. 11) to the story; *ἔτι δ' Ἐρμοκράτους μετὰ τῶν ἐπιλείπων ἐπιβοηθήσαντος*. Diodôros is hopelessly confused as to walls and such matters; but this kind of personal notice he would copy straight from Philistos.

¹ Thuc. vii. 43. 2; *ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας τε καὶ ἀναβάντας*.

² *Ib.*; *ἀπὸ πρῶτου ὕπνου*.

³ *Ib.*; *τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονες πάντας λαβὼν καὶ ἄλλην παρασκευήν, τοξευμάτων τε καὶ ὅσα εἶδει, ἦν κρατῶσι, τειχίζοντας ἔχαιν*.

CHAP. VIII. assault was successful; the fort was taken by storm; some of its defenders were slain; the more part escaped and carried the news to the garrisons of the other three forts which lay along the line of the Syracusan wall¹. Of these, one, the most to the westward, was defended by the Syracusans themselves, another by the other Sikeliots, and a third by the allies from Old Greece². Among these last was the head of all, Gylippos himself, a sure sign of the importance which attached to the work that was to be done in this quarter. The news was also carried to the chosen six hundred under the command of Hermokratēs. They were perhaps the nearest to the scene of action; they were certainly the first to come to the rescue. The Athenians were now on the hill, north of the Syracusan wall, with a somewhat wide fighting ground, but rough and stony, with a considerable slope upwards towards the middle of the hill. At some points indeed the slope becomes more than a slope; it becomes a low wall of rock; one is tempted to say that the upper terrace is here inside, and that the wall of Dionysios was built on the lower one³. The six hundred could make no real resistance to superior numbers; they were driven back by a vigorous Athenian charge. The assailants, successful thus far, pressed on; time was precious for their object⁴. They reached the Syracusan wall; they drove away the guards; they got possession of the wall; some, the craftsmen most likely who had been brought for such works, began to break down the battlements⁵. To break down any considerable part of the wall

Resistance
of the six
hundred.

Athenian
attack on
the wall.

¹ On the *στρατόπεδα* and *παρτειχίσματα*, see Appendix XV.

² See above, p. 258.

³ Compare the fact (see above, p. 246) that Labdalon could not be seen from Syka.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 43. 5; εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν, ὅπως τῇ παρουσίᾳ ὁρμῇ τοῦ περαινέσθαι ἂν ἔνεκα ῥηθόν, μὴ βραδεῖς γίνανται. So Plut. Nik. 21; κρατῶν οὐκ ἔμενον, ἀλλ' ἐχώρει προσωτέρω.

⁵ Ib.; ῥρουν τε καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπέσυρον.

would have amounted to succeeding in their main object; CHAP. VIII. communications would again have been opened between the Athenian head-quarters and the north side of the hill. For a moment things looked as if they had turned about yet again; the night-attack seemed to be really successful, really destined to bring back the besiegers of Syracuse to the position which they had lost.

But while the invaders were still engaged in their attempt on the wall, the garrisons of the other forts came forth to attack them. Gylippos was among them; but even his presence failed for a while to put the needful spirit into them. They were utterly cowed by the startling boldness of the night-attack; they were brought up to the fight only to give way ¹. But this very success disordered the Athenian ranks. They pressed on with all eagerness, seeking to meet those parts of the Syracusan army which had not yet been in action. They feared lest, if they relaxed for a moment, the whole force of the defenders should turn and come together against them ². All this, it must be remembered, went on by the doubtful light of the moon, on rough and uneven ground, unfamiliar to a great part of the Athenian army. The first resolute check was likely to throw the whole army, already disordered, into utter confusion. And so it happened as soon as they were met by fresh troops who had had time to recover themselves from the amazement of the first moment. These men saved Syracuse in this hour of danger no less than Gongylos and Gylippos at earlier stages. This glory also belongs to no Syracusan or Sikeliot; it belongs to no Corinthian or Peloponnesian, but to men of the mainland of Greece. They are described as Boiotians, and the only men in the army to

Action of
Gylippos.

Disorder
of the
Athenians.

Syracuse
saved
by the
Thebians.

¹ Thuc. vii. 43. 6; ἀδοκῆτον τοῦ τολμήματος ἐν νυκτὶ σφίσι γενομένου, προσίβαλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπεληγμένοι.

² Ib. 7; προϊόντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν ἀταξίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ ὡς κεκρατηκότων, καὶ βουλομένων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μήπω μαχημένου τῶν ἑναντίων ὡς τάχιστα διελθεῖν, ἵνα μὴ, ἀνέντων σφῶν τῆς ἐφόδου, αὐτοῖς εὐστραφῶσιν.

CHAP. VIII. whom that name can apply are the warriors who came in the single ship which met the Syracusan fleet at Lokroi¹. The mass of the Boiotian helpers, like the mass of the Peloponnesian helpers, had not yet come. The honour of an exploit which did so much for the Syracusan cause belongs to one Boiotian city only. The men who stemmed the Athenian advance were the men of Thespia, perhaps descendants, certainly successors, of those faithful warriors of Hellas who stayed to die with Leonidas at Thermopylai². At some point which cannot be exactly fixed, some point most likely of the rough sloping ground to the east of the place where the enemy had come up, these gallant allies of Syracuse, better practised than the Athenians in the tactics of the phalanx, kept their shields and spears firm in the face of the eager Athenian charge. They drove back the assailants and put them to flight. The work was done; the firmness of these true allies from Thespia had again shattered every hope of Athenian victory on the hill of Syracuse.

The night battle.

Now that one part of the Athenian force had been driven back, all was confusion everywhere. Even in a fight by day, our guide tells us from experience, it is hard for any man to know what is happening in any part of the field save where he is himself immediately engaged³. In a night-battle, where the bright moonlight clearly showed the forms of men but did not clearly show the difference between friend and foe⁴, as soon as order had once given way, all was hopeless. A vast number of heavy-armed

¹ See above, p. 280.

² See Herod. vii. 222. But the Thespian blood must by this time have been a good deal mixed. See Herod. viii. 75.

³ Thuc. vii. 44. 2; *ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ σαφέστερα μὲν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα, πλὴν τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις εἶδεν*. Some sayings of the Duke of Wellington to the same effect are quoted, and it must have become truer still since his day.

⁴ Ib. 3; *ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ σελήνη λαμπρὰ, ἔωρον δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους, ὥς ἐν σελήνῃ εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν τὴν δὲ ὀρώσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι*.

soldiers on each side were crowded together in a narrow CHAP. VIII. space. Here the Athenians were falling back in defeat; Disorder of the there they were still pressing on in the full eagerness of Athenians. their first charge¹. Moreover the whole Athenian army had not yet reached the place of battle. Of the long line which had to make its way up the path, some had only just reached the height; others were still pushing up the hill-side. Each party, as it reached the top, knew not what to do or whither to turn; men found themselves behind a struggling mass of their comrades driven backwards and forwards in wild confusion. And the shouts of the now victorious Syracusans added to their fright and disorder. If every battle of the warrior is with confused noise, this night struggle was so beyond others. There was no means but the loud voice to give any orders, and every meeting of hostile parties was accompanied by the shout of battle², the interchange of the *pean*, on both sides. And, among The pean. the motley gathering of Greeks and barbarians who had come to the attack on Syracuse, there were not a few whose daily speech and whose shout of battle were the same as those of Syracuse herself. The Argeian, the Korkyraian, the Dorian from any quarter who had come, willingly or unwillingly, to fight for Ionians against Dorian Sicily, struck fear into Athenian hearts by a voice which was easily mistaken for that of the Syracusan or of the Lacedæmonian himself³. And as the war-shout led men astray, The watch- so did the watchword. The disordered Athenians, scattered about in small parties, not knowing whether those

¹ Thuc. vii. 44. 4; τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ μὲν ἤδη ἐνικῶντο, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ ἀήσθητοι ἐχώρουν.

² Ib. 4, 5; χαλεπὰ ἦν ὑπὸ τῆς βοῆς διαγινώσκειν. οἱ τε γὰρ Συρακούσιοι καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ κρατοῦντες παρεκλεούοντο τε κραυγῇ οὕκ ὀλίγη χρόμενοι, ἀδυνάτου δὲ ἐν νυκτὶ ἄλλῃ τῇ σήμῃ.

³ Ib. 6; μέγιστον δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἥμισυ ἐβλάψε καὶ ὁ παιανισμὸς· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσιοι δὲ ἀπορίαν παρείχον. οἱ τε γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ ὅσοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἦν, ὅποτε παιανίσκειαν, φόβον παρείχε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἱ τε πολέμοι δμοίως.

CHAP. VIII. whom they met were friends or foes, were constantly passing the word, many with one voice at the same moment¹. The Syracusans, keeping in larger companies, did not suffer in the same way. Knowing the watchword of the enemy and keeping their own secret, a Syracusan party was able to escape a stronger Athenian party and to cut in pieces a weaker one. At last all fighting was over; all was hopeless confusion, confusion heightened by the means which were commonly taken to hinder it. The whole assailing force, not only fleeing before the enemy, but fleeing from, and fighting with, allies and fellow-citizens whom they took for enemies², was driven over the rough and sloping ground to the edge of the hill. Some were driven wildly down the narrow path by which they had come up; others, in yet fiercer despair, threw aside their shields and leaped from the cliffs. When they had by any means reached the level ground—the flat ground between the hill and the bay of Trôgilos, the ground over which the army of Lamachos had sped with so bold a heart—they had to find means of escape how they could. The men of the first armament, who had learned the lie of the land on both sides of the hill, knew the roads, and contrived to make their way round to the Athenian quarters. Those who had newly come with Dêmosthenês and Eurymêdon were less lucky. They wandered hither and thither, and in the morning they were followed and cut down by the Syracusan horsemen.

Rout of the Athenians.

They are driven down the hill.

Slaughter of the newcomers.

The Syracusan trophies.

The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies. One was set, as in a kind of mockery, on the edge of the hill where the Athenians had come up, and where Gylippos at least might most worthily set up his trophy. The other was set up on the spot, further to the south-east, where the

¹ Thuc. vii. 44. 5; τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι τοῦ ξυνθήματος πυκνοῖς χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

² Ib. 7; φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο.

Thespians had made the resistance which had decided the whole struggle¹. The dead were given back under the burial-truce. The number, over two thousand, was not in proportion to the great number of spoils brought in. For those who leaped from the cliffs, both those who perished and those who escaped, alike left their shields behind them². And in the confused rush down the hill and in the wanderings in the ground below, no doubt many others did the same. But the victory was won, such a victory as Syracuse had not dared to hope for³. Every heart in the city now beat high with the thought of assured deliverance.

CHAP. VIII.
Number
of the
slain.

The immediate danger had now passed away. The work still to be done was utterly to crush the invaders. But to that end it was well to bring together, if possible, all the power of Greek Sicily, at least of Dorian Sicily, to share in the work. And for a moment it was thought that such a general union was possible; it was hoped that the city of Gélôn and the city of Thêrôn might again join in driving back a common enemy. If even in Syracuse there was a party favourable to Athens, much more might there be in neutral Akragas a party favourable to Syracuse. Sikanos, the former colleague of Hermokratês, was sent with fifteen ships to see if anything could be done at this last moment to bring over the rival city to the Syracusan alliance⁴. He sailed as far as

Attempts
at a gene-
ral Sikeliot
union to
crush the
invaders.

Fruitless
mission of
Sikanos to
Akragas.

¹ Thuc. vii. 45. 1.

² Ib. 45. 2. Thucydides gives no numbers of the slain. Plutarch (Nik. 21) reckons them at 2000, and adds, καὶ τῶν περνευμένων ὀλίγοι μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἐσώθησαν. Diodôros makes 2500 slain, and adds οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ τραυματίας ποιήσαντες, πολλῶν ὅπλων ἐκυρίευσεν. Both writers had Philistos before them; but Plutarch was likely to understand him better than Diodôros. His whole account substantially agrees with that of Thucydides; he adds one curious detail of the night-battle. The moon, as later, fought against the Athenians; τοὺς ἐναντίους δὲ πρὸς τὴν σελήνην τῶν ἀσπίδων ἀντιφωτισμὸς πολλὰ πλείονας ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ λαμπροτέρους ἐποίει.

³ Ib. 46. 1; ὡς ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτῃ εὐπραγίᾳ πάλιν αὐτὰν ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον.

⁴ Ib.; ἐς μὲν Ἀκράγαντα στασιάζοντα πεντεκαίδεκα ναυοὶ Σικανὸν ἀπέ-

CHAP. VIII. Gela; while he was there, a turn took place in Akragantine politics which made his further advance needless; news came that the party in Akragas that was favourable to Syracuse had just been driven out¹. That was the message that Sikanos had to take back to Syracuse. In the catalogue of all the cities and nations, Greek and barbarian, that took part in the last struggle, Akragas is still marked as neutral².

Forces
collected
by Gylip-
pos.

At the same time that Sikanos went on this errand by sea, Gylippos himself set forth on one by land of which a good deal more came. Now that the enterprise of Dêmosthenês had failed, Syracusan hopes turned to an attack on the Athenian lines, seemingly both on and below the hill³. To this end Gylippos set forth by land, to collect what force he could in other parts of Sicily and to come back at his head. With the exception of Selinous, we are not told what cities he visited; but his enterprise was successful; he gathered together a large Sicilian force⁴, and at Selinous he lighted on an important contingent from Old Greece which was meant to have been in Sicily long before. The troops, Peloponnesian and Boiotian, that had been sent from Tainaron in the merchant-ships in the early spring⁵ had only just reached Sicily. They were too late for the great work on the hill; the Boiotians would hear how great a part in

Coming of
the Pello-
ponnesians
and Boio-
tians.

στειλαν, ὅπως ἐπαγάγοντο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύνατο. On Sikanos, see above, p. 208.

¹ Thuc. vii. 50. 1; ἀμαρτὰν τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος, ἐν Γέλα γὰρ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις ἐς φίλια ἐξεπεπτώκει. 'Ες φίλια sounds odd; but the meaning is clear. I know not whether anybody has improved the text.

² Ib. 58. 1; Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχάζοντων.

³ Ib. 46. 1; ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὦν καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἰρήσειν βίη, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ὄντω ξυνέβη. The use of Ἐπιπολαῖς should be noticed. The name is driven westward with every occupation of ground on the hill, civil or military. In c. 96. 1 it took in the then future site of the Athenian fortifications; since they were made, it has retreated before them.

⁴ Ib. 50. 1.

⁵ Ib.; τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ ἤρος ἐν ταῖς ὁλοαῖς ὁπλίτας ἀποσταλέντας, ἀφικομένους ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Ξελινοῦντα. See above, p. 280.

the work had been wrought by a single contingent of their own name. Their voyage from Tainaron to Selinous had been a long and a strange one. They had come by way of Libya and of a good part of Libya. Whether through any accident or purposely to avoid Athenian ships¹, they had sailed from Tainaron to Kyréné. The outpost of Hellas in Libya, the granddaughter of Sparta, ruled no more by a Battos or an Arkesilas, joined the Dorian cause. She added two triremes to the fleet, and gave guides for the voyage to her allies². They sailed to Euesperitai and found its Greek citizens warring with Libyan enemies. Such a strife spoke yet more directly home than the strife between Syracuse and Athens. Like the Normans at Salerno, they successfully helped Hellas and Europe against the barbarians³, and then went on their way along the coast, clearly the neutral coast where Carthage ruled. At the Punic town which on Greek lips had become Neapolis⁴, the future conquest of Agathoklès⁵, the future colony of Rome, they found the shortest passage from Africa to Sicily. From its haven two days and a night carried them to the coast of Selinous⁶. Gladly, we may be sure, they marched at the bidding of the Spartan leader. They came, no longer, we may now say, to save Syracuse from her enemies, but to join with the men of Syracuse in crushing her already broken invaders beneath her already ransomed walls.

CHAP. VIII.

Their voyage to Kyréné.

Contingent of Kyréné..

The Peloponnesians help the Euesperitians.

They sail from Neapolis to Selinous.

¹ The words *ἀπερχόμενοι ἐς Λιβύην* in Thuc. vii. 50 have been understood in different ways. Holm (G. S. ii. 55) says "und, um den Athenern auszuweichen, den ungewöhnlichen Umweg über Afrika und Selinus eingeschlagen hatten." They have also been translated, "they had been driven to Libya by stress of weather."

² Thuc. vii. 50. 2; *τρίηρεις δύο καὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ἡγεμόνας*.

³ Ib. See L'Ystoire de li Normant. i. 17.

⁴ Ib. Here it is *Νέα πόλις Καρχηδονιακὸν ἐμπόριον*. This *νέα πόλις* of a *νέα πόλις* is like the New New York to be found very far west.

⁵ Diod. xx. 17.

⁶ Thuc. vii. 50. 2; *ὅθεν πρὸς Σικελίαν ἐλάχιστον δυοῖν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτὸς πλοῦν ἀπέχει*.

CHAP. VIII. The coming of these reinforcements had an important influence on the counsels of the already baffled invaders. These General despondency among the Athenians, last were indeed in evil case. They had failed; the deadening sense of failure had come upon the whole army; the general feeling was to tarry no longer in a place which brought them nothing but ill luck¹. Moreover the sickly season was coming on, sickly indeed to those who were encamped in the marshy ground. In the Syracusan marshes. For there, between the two walls that had come down from the cliff of Fusco, a large part of the army now had their dwelling². Hope passed away. Dêmosthenês counselled retreat. The keen insight of Dêmosthenês led to the same conclusion as the instinct of the soldiers; it was no longer a time to tarry before Syracuse. He had seen two possible chances of success; he had tried both, and both had failed³. It was time to go, while the season still allowed them to cross the sea, and while their fleet, strengthened by the ships that he had brought with him, was still stronger than any naval force that could be brought against it⁴. Above all, it was not wise to sit there before Syracuse, wasting the treasure of the commonwealth for nought. No Sicilian enterprise could succeed while the enemies of Athens held their fortified post in Attica, and were all but besieging Athens itself⁵. Such was the counsel of the man of

¹ Thuc. vii. 47. 1; τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἔωρον οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ. We must remember the older εὐτυχία of Nikias.

² See Appendix XVIII.

³ Thuc. vii. 47. 3; ὅπερ καὶ διασηθεὶς ἐς τὰς Ἐπιτολὰς διακινδυνεύσαι.

⁴ Ib.; ὥς ἐτι τὸ πέλαιος οἶόν τε περαιούθαι, καὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος ταῖς γούν ἐπελθούσας ναυὶ κρατεῖν.

⁵ Ib. 4; τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ σφῶν ἐπιτεχίζοντας. It is hard to give the full force of ἐπιτεχίζοντας in one word. Dekeleia was more than a Spartan fortress in Attica, like Pylos in Laconia from the Athenian side. It was a distinct ἐπιτεχισμός against Athens herself. See Thuc. i. 142, and Arnold's note.

The case is not badly put by Diodoros, xiii. 12; φάσκων αἰρετώτερον εἶναι πρὸς Λακεδαιμόνιους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος κινδυνεύειν ἢ καθήμενους ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ μηδὲν τῶν χρησίμων ἐπετελεῖν.

enterprise and daring, the man who had brought back the CHAP. VIII.
panoplies from Olpai and had made Pylos a thorn in the
side of Sparta. With his judgement of common sense the
other generals seem to have agreed; but they had the chief
of their own body to convince; they had to win over the
man of delay and caution, the man who shrank from every
risk that could be avoided. And that was a harder work.

Things might seem to have turned round in a strange Opposition
of Nikias.
way, when Nikias, who had condemned the enterprise from
the beginning, who had been forced into its command against
his will, was the one man who pleaded in favour of con-
tinuing the hopeless struggle. So to do was in truth but
another fruit of the same temper. It is said, and it would
seem truly, that in the press of battle it needs more daring
to run away than to push on. So it was with Nikias now.
It needed daring and energy to attack Syracuse; it needed
daring and energy to go away from Syracuse. Nikias,
when he was stirred up to act, could face death in battle
as gallantly as any man. But he shrank from responsi-
bility. He shrank from dangers at home which Dēmo-
sthenēs and his other colleagues were fully ready to meet.
Dēmosthenēs had once been afraid of his countrymen¹;
Eurymedôn had once undergone punishment at their hands²;
but Nikias, who had never lost the favour of the people,
feared their anger more than they. And he was able to
clothe his last form of shrinking from action with a show
of reason. They were, he allowed, in evil case; but it Argument
of Nikias.
would not do openly to proclaim the fact. Some oppor-
tunity would be found for departing privily; if such a
purpose were kept secret, they would be better able to im-
prove such an occasion when it came³. He knew too the

¹ Thuc. iii. 98. 6.² See above, p. 65.³ Thuc. vii. 48. 1; οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφισμένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίνεσθαι· λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν, ὅποτε βούλοιτο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῶ ᾔσσαν.

CHAP. VIII. state of the besieged city. Badly as they were off themselves, the case of the Syracusans was yet worse. They were failing for lack of money; they felt in everything the change that had come upon them through the renewed superiority of Athens by sea¹. They had to keep their allies, to pay their mercenaries, to keep up their fleet, themselves to serve in the outposts of their territory; they had already spent two thousand talents, and they owed a debt besides. All this, true or false, Nikias heard from the men within Syracuse who were in correspondence with him, and who exhorted him not to go away². He knew too, he said, the temper of his countrymen³; if they went back to Athens without an order of recall, their fate might be a hard one⁴. Their judges would not be eye-witnesses like themselves, who knew the real facts of the case. They would be judged by men liable to be led astray by every plausible speaker who might choose to bring a charge against commanders who had failed⁵. And the very soldiers who now cried out most loudly about their present sufferings would, when they got back to Athens, be the first to charge the generals with having given up the enterprise under the influence of bribes⁶. For himself personally, he had rather, if it need be, die in some hour of danger at the hands of the Syracusans, than be put to death by his own countrymen unjustly and on a shameful

The Syracusans worse off than themselves.

Danger from the people at home.

¹ Thuc. vii. 48. 1; ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων.

² See Appendix XIX.

³ Thuc. vii. 48. 4; ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις. See above, pp. 272, 274.

⁴ Ib. 3; εἰ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέξονται, ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισμένων ἀπελθεῖν.

⁵ Ib.; οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψηφιεῖσθαι τε περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὁρῶντας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλαν ἐπιτιμήσει ἀκούσαντας γινώσκειν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἧν ἂν τις εὖ λέγων διαβάλλοι, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι.

⁶ Ib. 4; τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλείους ἔφη, οἳ νῦν βοῶσιν ὡς ἐν δεινοῖς ὄντες, ἐκείσε ἀφικομένους τάναντία βοήσεσθαι, ὡς ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπῆλθον.

charge¹. So he spoke; in his own mind he still doubted and weighed the dangers on each side; but openly he gave his vote for remaining where they were. CHAP. VIII.

That Nikias judged his fellow-citizens harshly, far more harshly than they judged him, we have already learned by many signs. But on this head we may leave the special counsel against him to speak once more². Dêmostonês and Eurymedôn at least did not share his fears; they were ready to go home and run the risk. Dêmostonês argued strongly against abiding where they were even one day more³. If they must stay in Sicily till a vote of recall had passed the Athenian assembly⁴, let them at least leave the narrow space where they were hemmed in, and sail to Thapsos or Katanê. There they would have the open sea and all the advantages which the open sea gave to the Athenian tactics⁵. There they could carry on the war by land, and maintain themselves by harrying the territory of the enemy. On all these grounds Dêmostonês, with Eurymedôn consenting to what he said, gave his voice for instant departure. But Nikias still argued the other way. And the advocates of the better reason gave way through respect for his age and character, feeling also that his persistency in his conclusion might come of some knowledge of facts in which they had no share⁶. Dêmosthenes proposes to move to Thapsos or Katanê.
He and Eurymedôn yield to Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vii. 48. 4; οὐκ οὖν βούλεισθαι αὐτός γε . . . ἐπὶ αἰσχρῇ τε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκῃ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολείσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν πολέμων εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ. On the sense of ἰδίᾳ, which is certainly a little awkward, see Arnold's note.

² See Grote, vii. 428-431, specially p. 430.

³ Thuc. vii. 49. 2; περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο.

⁴ Ib.; εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσματος, ἀλλὰ τρίβειν αὐτοῖς.

⁵ Ib.; ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ ἢ πρὸς τῶν πολέμων μᾶλλον ἔστι τοὺς ἄνθρωπος ποθέσονται, κ.τ.λ. He goes on to speak of the ἀναχωρήσεις and ἐπιπλοῦς.

⁶ Ib.; ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὅσους τις καὶ μέλλουσι ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ἐπὶ νόμῳ μὴ τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζεται.

CHAP. VIII.
Gylippos
brings the
fresh
troops.

So things were in the Athenian camp when Gylippos came back with the Peloponnesians and Boiotians who had on their way seen so much more of the world than they had reckoned on. This considerable accession to the force of the besieged turned the scale even in the mind of Nikias. His colleagues again pointed out that the enemy were waxing stronger, while they themselves were daily waxing weaker. Sickness was wearing away the strength of the army. Bitterly they repented that they had yielded in the former debate¹; and now Nikias himself gave way. He would not indeed openly proclaim a retreat; but he gave secret orders to the officers to have everything ready to sail away when the signal should be given. So fixed was his purpose now to go that he sent orders to Katanê, whence supplies had hitherto come, that no more would be needed². Presently all was ready; the final order was given; the ships were manned; warning was given that he who loitered would be left behind³. The enemy, expecting nothing, kept no special watch. The fleet was on the point of starting by night, with the light of a full moon, when an eclipse of the planet struck terror into every heart⁴.

Nikias con-
sents to go.
Prepara-
tions for
going.

Eclipse of
the moon.
10 P.M.,
August 27,
B.C. 413.

Knowledge
of eclipses
in Greece.

One of our later guides remarks that in the days of Nikias and Dêmostenês the nature of an eclipse of the sun was already largely understood in Greece, but that an

¹ Thuc. vii. 50. 3; μετεμέλοντό τε πρότερον οὐκ ἀναστάντες.

² This appears from Thucydides, vii. 60. 2.

³ Ib. 50. 3; προείπον ὡς ἠδύναντο ἀηδέτατα ἐπελόν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πᾶσι καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὅταν τις σημήνῃ. Diodôros (xiii. 12) is here very emphatic and vivid; ὁμογνωμόνων δὲ ὄντων τῶν στρατηγῶν, οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐνετίθεντο καὶ τὰς τρήρεις πληρώσαντες, ἦρον τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ παρήγγειλαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοῖς πλήθεσιν, ὅταν σημήνῃ, μηδεὶς τῶν κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑστερεῖν, ὡς ἀπολειφθῆσόμενον τὸν βραδύνοντα. This is surely a piece from Philistos. The higher criticism might say that Thucydides and Philistos copied from a common source, as the words ὅταν σημήνῃ are found in both.

⁴ Plut. Nik. 23; ὡς ἦν ἐτοῖμα ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τῶν πολεμίων οὐδεὶς παρῆλθεν, ἅτε δὴ καὶ προσδοκῶντων, ἐξέλιπεν ἡ σελήνη τῆς νυκτὸς, μέγα δέος τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκπεληγμένοις τὰ τοιαῦτα.

eclipse of the moon was still shrouded in mystery and terror. A few philosophers knew the cause; but to the mass of mankind the phenomenon seemed a direct and fearful warning from the gods¹. This is not wonderful. The unscientific mind still finds it far easier to understand how the moon can cast her shadow on the sun than how the moon herself can be entangled in the shadow of the earth. An universal cry from the whole armament called on the generals to halt, and not to set forth in the teeth of such a warning². Dêmostenês and Eurymedôn seem to have been silenced. The pious Nikias, more anxious than any other man in the army, had in this matter altogether lost his usual good luck. He was ever surrounded by prophets, inheritors of the art of Kalchas³. But some power friendly to Syracuse had lately taken away his skilful prophet Stilbidês, and had left him only advisers who were not such masters as he of the technical rules of their science. Stilbidês could have told his patron that the omen was really a good one; the withdrawal of light boded success to those who were seeking to escape by stealth⁴. But the inferior professors to whom Nikias had now to listen told him to wait, perhaps three days only, perhaps a whole revolution of the moon. Till thrice nine days had passed, Nikias forbade the question of leaving Syracuse to be even brought under discussion⁵. The other generals seem to have shared his scruples, at all events they did not oppose his decision⁶. Fleet and army lay for a while inactive. The camp was given up to religious ceremonies⁷, till a

CHAP. VIII.
General
cry for de-
lay.

Nikias and
his pro-
phets;
loss of Stil-
bidês.

Answer of
the pro-
phets.

The army
to stay
twenty-
nine days.

¹ Plutarch goes on to explain at some length. See Appendix XIX.

² Thuc. vii. 50. 4; 'Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐνθόμῳ ποιοῦμενοι.

³ Æsch. Ag. 120; κενὸς δὲ στρατόμαντις, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ See Appendix XIX.

⁵ See Appendix XIX.

⁶ Diod. xiii. 12; ἡραγέσθησαν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην συγκατατίθεσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐλάβειαν.

⁷ Plut. Nik. 24; μεροῦ δὲ πάντων ἀφόμενος τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνε τε καὶ δεμαντεύετο καθήμενος ἕως ἐπῆλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ πολέμιοι.

CHAP. VIII. fierce attack by land and sea brought Nikias himself back to thoughts of the living world around him.

Effects of
the eclipse
and delay.

The doom of the invading armament had been pronounced by its own chief. The overshadowing of the moon wrought deliverance for Syracuse. The city could now hardly be said to be in jeopardy. The news, brought in, it is said, by deserters¹, that the Athenians had first made up their minds to go away, and then, under the influence of a religious scruple, had made up their minds to tarry, was news of joy and high hope in Syracuse. The purpose of sailing away stealthily was a distinct practical confession on the part of the invaders that their strength and their hopes were gone, that all

Athenian
confession
of defeat.

Danger of
their set-
tling else-
where in
Sicily.

chance of their taking Syracuse had passed away². The danger now was lest they should settle themselves in some other part of Sicily, and thence carry on a wearing war against Syracuse³. The hopes of the Syracusans and their allies rose higher than ever. They had escaped the immediate dangers of the siege; the work now was to hinder the other dangers which might arise out of the

Syracusan
hopes.

A sea-fight
designed.

failure of the besiegers. They were not to be allowed to go and be dangerous elsewhere; they must be smitten where they were, by land and by sea, on the waters and on the soil of Syracuse. They must be forced to a sea-fight as soon as may be; they must be overthrown on their own element, and not be allowed to sail away to the shelter of Naxos or Katanê. Nikias was still keeping his month of sacrifice and divination; so the Syracusans could afford some days of preparation before they led their ships to the

¹ Diod. xiii. 13; παρά τινων αὐτομόλων πυθόμενοι.

² Thuc. vii. 51. 1; ὥς καὶ αὐτῶν κατεγνωκότων ἤδη μηκέτι κρείσσονα εἶναι σφῶν μήτε ταῖς ναυσὶ μήτε τῇ πεζῇ, οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἐκπλοῦν ἐπιβουλεύσαι.

³ Ib.; καὶ ἔμα οὐ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσέ ποι τῇ Σικελίας καθέζομένους χαλεπωτέρους εἶναι προσπολεμῶν.

attack¹. When all was ready, the first attack was made by land on the Athenian wall, clearly on the outer side, by the horsemen and others from the Olympieion². Here we come to one of the very few moments in the whole story of the invasion when the Athenian horsemen whose lack Nikias had found so useful an excuse for delay really appear among our actors. Parties of both horsemen and heavy-armed sallied from posterns in the wall, only to be put to flight and chased by the horse of Syracuse. In that swampy ground the solid path was narrow, and so was the entrance to the Athenian camp. Most of the foot escaped; but of the knights of Athens, the high-born comrades of Alkibiadês, seventy, if they did not perish themselves, at least left their horses to become, by an odd irony of fate, the spoil of the Syracusans³.

The work of the next day was more serious. An attack was again made on the walls; but the chief scene of action was by sea⁴. The Syracusans had for a while, ever since the coming of Dêmôsthenês and Eurymedôn, shrunk from any naval encounters. They dreaded the superior numbers of the invaders, strengthened as they were by the newcomers⁵. But now, under the influence of their rising hope, they shook off all fears. Seventy-six ships of Syracuse

¹ Thuc. vii. 51. 2; τὰς οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν, καὶ ἀνεπερῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἰδόκουν ἰκαναὶ εἶναι.

² Ib.; ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, τῇ μὲν προτεραιᾷ πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον.

³ Ib.; οὗσης δὲ στενῆς τῆς ἰσόδου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπουν τε ἰβδομήκοντα ἀπολλύσασι καὶ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν οὐ πολλούς. I suppose that this odd phrase, whatever exact form we give to the verb, takes in both the death of the riders and the capture of the horses. So Holm, ii. 56; "70 Athenische Reiter kamen bei einem Ausfalle um."

⁴ Ib. 52. 1; τῇ δ' ὑστεραιᾷ ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐκπλέουσιν, οὕσας ἐξ καὶ ἰβδομήκοντα καὶ τῷ περὶ ἅμα πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη ἐχώρουν. So Plat. Nik. 24; τῷ μὲν περὶ τὰ τεῖχη καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον αὐτῶν πολιορκεῖντες, ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ κύκλῳ τὸν λιμένα περιλαμβάνοντες.

⁵ Ib. 55. 1; πρότερον γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας.

CHAP. VIII.

Attack on

the Athe-

nian wall.

September

2.

Defeat of

the Athe-

nian horse-

men.

Sea-fight in

the Great

Harbour.

September

3.

CHAP. VIII. and her allies were manned and sailed forth to battle.
 Order of battle on each side.

Eighty-six Athenian ships came forth to meet them. Eurymedôn commanded the right wing to the south side of the harbour. Against him was posted the Syracusan Agatharchos. To the north the Athenian left wing was led by Euthydêmos, to meet Sikanos on the Syracusan right. The centre was held on the Athenian side by Menandros, on the Syracusan by the Corinthian Pythên¹. Gylippos stayed on land; it was doubtless the calling of Dêmosthenes to guard against him. The Athenian fleet had the greater number of ships; their line therefore outstretched the Syracusans to the south, and Eurymedôn sought to practise the favourite Athenian tactic of taking the enemy in flank. To this end he led his ships into the bay of Daskôn, where the land was held by the Syracusans, that is by the garrison of Polichna. Meanwhile the Athenian centre under Menandros had given way before the skilful seamanship of Pythên. Two Syracusan divisions were thus able to unite against Eurymedôn. In the narrow space of the south-west corner of the Great Harbour there was no room for Athenian manœuvres; Eurymedôn was driven to the hostile shore, where he was slain, and seven of his ships were sunk. The waters of Syracuse had swept away another Athenian general not very far from the spot where Lamachos had fallen in the strife by land. When the news of the Syracusan success, the news of the death of one of the Athenian commanders, spread through the Syracusan fleet, its whole force pressed on the Athenian left under Euthydêmos. They gave way and were driven to the shore. They failed to reach that part of it which was protected by their walls and palisade; they were chased to the muddy shore and the shallow waters between it and the promontory of Daskôn².

Defeat and death of Eurymedôn.

General defeat of the Athenians.

¹ Thuc. vii. 52. 2; Diod. xiii. 13. See Appendix XX.

² See Appendix XX.

It is dangerous to assume that the state of the coast CHAP. VIII. then was exactly what it is now. In this part, as elsewhere, State of the coast. the sea has most likely encroached on the land. But the story seems to imply that there was then, as now, a certain space of more firm ground between the mud of the shore and the swamp of Lysimeleia, and it would further appear that a mole or causeway had been carried along it. The mole. Of this mole, so far as it lay outside the Athenian lines, the Syracusans had possession¹. It was to this piece of hostile shore that the Athenian ships had been driven in the battle. Gylippos therefore, who had been watching the sea-fight Gylippos driven back by the Etruscans. from the shore, led a detachment along the mole, in order to cut down any of the Athenians who should try to land from the ships and further to protect the Syracusans in dragging the Athenian ships to shore². But they were met by a watchful enemy. The Etruscan war-shout³ was heard beside the waters of Syracuse as a shout of victory over Syracusans and Lacedæmonians. The barbarian allies of Athens had been planted as a guard on this side, and they did their duty well. They pressed forward and charged the foremost ranks of the party of Gylippos, who were advancing in no good order; they put them to flight and drove them off the causeway into the marsh⁴. Gylippos himself was somehow saved from an end which would have been less heroic than that of Lamachos or Eurymedôn. The

¹ Thuc. vii. 53. 2. On this *χηλή* see Appendix XVIII.

² Ib. 1; *ὁρῶν τὰς ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων νικωμένας καὶ ἔξω τῶν σταυρωμάτων καὶ τοῦ ἱαντῶν στρατοπέδου καταφερομένας, βουλόμενος διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ῥῆον τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀφέλκειν τῆς γῆς φίλιας οὐσας.* That is the ground south-west of the outer Athenian wall. All that was *ἔξω τῶν σταυρωμάτων καὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατοπέδου* was *γῆ φίλια* to the Syracusans.

³ See above, p. 228.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 53. 2; *καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Τυρσηροὶ (οἳτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ταύτην), ὁρῶντες ἀτάκτως προσφερομένους, ἐπεκβοηθήσαντες καὶ προσπεσόντες τοῖς πρῶτοις τρέπουσι καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλουμένην.* We are thankful for this bit of topography and local nomenclature. See vol. i. p. 360.

CHAP. VIII. fight had begun; other bodies of men on both sides pressed to share in it. It became an Homeric battle by the ships, the Syracusans striving to seize them, the Athenians striving to save them from their hands. The invaders had the better. The Syracusans were driven back, though with no great slaughter, and the Athenians were able to save the more part of their ships and to bring them within the shelter of their own lines¹. Eighteen fell into the hands of the Syracusans, and their crews were put to death; but one more device that was tried against the rest of the Athenian fleet was baffled. Sikanos, whose division must have been the most closely engaged in the latter part of the struggle, sought to destroy the rescued ships by fire. He caused an old merchant-ship to be filled with branches and torches; fire was set to it, and, the wind being favourable to his purpose, the blazing mass was left to drift towards the Athenian ships². Sikanos hardly ran the same personal risk as Constantine Kanarès in his more famous exploit, and the Syracusan was less successful against the Athenian than the Psariot was against the Turk. The Athenians found means both to keep the burning vessel off and to put out the flames³. They thus escaped this last danger; but the burning of the whole Athenian fleet would hardly have been a heavier blow than the doom that was in store for them.

Battle by
the ships.

Failure of
Sikanos to
burn the
Athenian
ships.

The tro-
phies.

After the fighting of these two days each side set up its trophy. Each side had a formal right to do so. The Syracusans set up theirs for the sea-fight and for the fighting under the walls of the day before. The Athenians set up theirs for the driving back of Gylippos on the second

¹ Thuc. vii. 53. 3; οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . τὰς ναῦς τὰς πολλὰς διέσωσάν τε καὶ ἐντήγαγον κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον.

² Ib. 3. 4. Diodoros (xiii. 13) supplies the name of Sikanos. See Appendix XX.

³ Thuc. vii. 53. 4; ἀντεμυχαρήσαντο σβεστήρια κωλύματα.

day. But the setting up of an Athenian trophy was a mere form; it was almost a mockery. It must have been set up with a heavy heart, as a piece of traditional and religious usage which the scrupulous conscience of Nikias could not neglect. The Athenians were utterly broken in spirit. They repented that they had ever come to Sicily¹; their hopes had failed them; their special craft had failed them; they were beaten, as they had never looked to be beaten, on their own element, on the sea which they held to be part of the Athenian dominion. In other wars they had been able to appeal to the political feelings of some party in the city against which they had been warring. But Alkibiadês had indeed led them astray when he told them that Sicily would be an easy conquest, because no man in Sicily cared for the city which might be his own dwelling-place, but which had seldom been the dwelling-place of his fathers². In Syracuse Athens had met her match. It was not merely that Syracuse was a great and a mighty city, rich in ships and horses. She was something greater; democracy was pitted against democracy; men felt in Syracuse, no less than in Athens, the full strength of that binding and ennobling spirit which makes every man in a free city strive for the welfare of his city as for his own³. No chance was there here, as Athens had found in Old Megara⁴ and elsewhere, as she had found in Katanê⁵, of a revolution within the city which might bring a party

Despondency of the Athenians.

Effect of defeat by sea.

No hope of revolution in Syracuse.

Democracy against democracy.

¹ Thuc. vii. 55. 1; οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παρὶ δὴ ἀθύριας ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἐστὶ τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετὰ μελός.

² See above, p. 97.

³ Thuc. vii. 55. 2; πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη δημοστροφικοῖς ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἔχούσαις. The form of words takes in the Sikeliot cities generally; but the reference must be mainly or wholly to Syracuse. I am not called on to dispute about μεγέθη; but it does not badly express μεγαλοπόλεις Συράκουσαι. Cf. viii. 96. 5.

⁴ See Thuc. iv. 66.

⁵ See above, p. 151.

CHAP. VIII. favourable to Athens to the chief place in Syracuse¹. Surrender to the invaders had once been thought of in a moment of despair, as a way of saving mere life, when all beyond mere life seemed to have become hopeless. Now that those dark days had passed away, there was no hope for Athens within the walls of the city which she no longer besieged. A few traitors or strangers might, from whatever motive, still parley with Nikias; but from any acknowledged class or party among the Syracusan people Athens had nothing to look for but the vengeance which comes on an aggressor when his schemes of aggression have broken down. Gloomy indeed must have been the rite which commemorated the last shadow of Athenian success on the waters or on the shore of the Syracusan harbour.

Feelings
in Syra-
cuse.

Syracuse
saved, but
the inva-
ders to be
crushed.

With other feelings from theirs did the victorious Syracusans and allies sail, as in triumph, round the haven which they again felt to be their own². With other feelings did they dedicate their trophies to the gods who had fought for Syracuse. Their trophies were trophies of successes already won, and they were omens of successes still in store. The strength of the invader was broken; his pride was humbled; but he was still dangerous to Syracuse and to all Hellas. The work still left to be done was to crush him utterly. The men of Syracuse fought no more for the safety of their city. That was already saved³; no one now feared lest Syracuse should become a tribute-paying ally of Athens; no one feared lest the deeds of Mélos and Skiônê should be wrought again in the streets of Ortygia and Achradina. But the aggressor must not be allowed to go forth to carry on the war elsewhere; nor must he—for vengeance had a voice as well as prudence—be allowed

¹ Thuc. vii. 55. 2; οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὐτ' ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς.

² Ib. 56. 1; οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τὸν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς. See Grote's note, vii. 437.

³ Ib. 2; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σωθῆναι μόνον ἔτι ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο.

to escape the due reward of his deeds. Athens and the accomplices of Athens¹ must be smitten by land and sea², on the land and the sea of Syracuse. They must be so smitten that they could no longer do damage to Syracuse or to any other city of Hellas.

For we must ever remember that, in the eyes of the men of Syracuse, in the eyes of the mass of Greeks throughout the world, it was the common cause of Hellas that was at stake. The tyrant city³ which took tribute from a thousand commonwealths once as free as herself⁴, the city whose restless aggressions kept every Greek commonwealth in fear lest its own day might be coming next, must be for ever shorn of her power of mischief. The enemy was delivered into their hands, into the hands of Syracuse and her allies, with Syracuse standing forth in front of the whole company. To help in such a work, to be the leader in such a work, would indeed be glory for her among the whole Hellenic folk. Her place in the world, her strength and her fame, would be high indeed, when she, the colonial city planted on a barbarian shore⁵, stood forth as the peer of the greatest cities of the motherland to do the work for which Hellas now looked to her. It was Syracuse, that day the

CHAP. VIII.

General feeling of Greece towards Athens.

Great position of Syracuse.

¹ Thuc. vii. 56. 3; *καὶ ἦν ἄξιός ὁ ἀγὼν κατὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ Ἀθηναίων μόνον περιερίγοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλῶν συμμάχων*. Here is surely a certain outpouring of Syracusan feeling against Chalkidian Sikeliots, of Corinthian feeling against Korkyra, of Lacedaemonian feeling against Argos.

² Ib. 2; *εἰ δύναντο κρατῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν συμμάχων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καλὸν σφίσις ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα φανεῖσθαι*.

³ See above, p. 191.

⁴ Arist. Wasps, 707;

εἰσὶν γὰρ πάσις χίλιαι, αἱ νῦν τὸν φόρον ἡμῖν ἀπάγουσιν.

⁵ This feeling is not set forth by Thucydides in so many words; but something like it shows itself in the passionate yearning of Syracuse to be made something more of and be more talked of than she has been hitherto. Such words as *ἀπὸ τε τῶν παρόντων πολλὸ σφῶν καθυπέρτερα τὰ πράγματα εἶναι* (vii. 56. 2) have a force when applied to Syracuse which they would not have in the case of one of the cities of Old Greece.

CHAP. VIII. equal yoke-fellow of Corinth and of Sparta¹, going forth at the head of a crowd of allies, but with Syracuse herself the centre and object of the strife², that was called on to strike the blow that should free so many Greeks from bondage and so many more from fear of bondage³. That blow would make the name of Syracuse famous throughout the world; it would hand on the proud remembrance of her work as a memorial to perpetual generations⁴. So it has been of a truth; but that the memory of those days and hours is still a living thing is mainly due to its record at the hand of a banished citizen of the hostile city. He it is who has set down the deeds and thoughts of the men who played their parts in that great struggle as the deeds and thoughts of no other men have been set down before or after.

Effect of
the work
of Thucy-
dides.

The cata-
logue in
Thucy-
dides;

suggested
by Homer
and Hero-
dotus.

Well indeed might the historian of that great struggle, the man who trod the ground and spoke with the actors while its memory yet was fresh, feel half bowed down, half lifted up, by the greatness of the tale that he had to tell. His thoughts went back to the most famous struggles of bygone days, to the war which Greece waged on the soil of Asia, to the war which Asia waged on the soil of Greece. Homer had given men the Domesday of the empire of Agamemnôn; Herodotus had given them the roll-call of the six-and-forty nations which the Persian led to overthrow at Salamis and at Plataia. Thucydides, recording the greatest strife ever waged by Greek against Greek, felt the call to count up, as they had done, the cities and

¹ Thuc. vii. 56. 3; ἡγεμόνες γενόμενοι μετὰ Κορινθίαν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίαν.

² Ib.; τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐμπαρσχόντες προκινδυνεύσαι . . . ἔθνη γὰρ πλείστα δὴ ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν ταύτην συνῆλθε.

³ Ib. 2; τοὺς τε γὰρ ἄλλους ἑαυτοὺς μὲν ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φόβον ἀπολύεσθαι. He adds words which were true in the long run, but only in the long run; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατὴν ἵσσεσθαι τὴν ὑπόλοιπον Ἀθηναίων δυνάμει τὸν ὕστερον ἐπενεχθῆσόμενον πόλεμον ἐνεργεῖν.

⁴ Ib.; καὶ αὐτοὶ δέξαντες αὐτῶν αἷτιοι εἶναι ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἑπειτα πολλὰ θαυμασθήσεσθαι.

races which, at this last moment, fought for Syracuse and CHAP. VIII.
 which fought against her. He felt the call to paint the
 strange relations among the contending commonwealths,
 how many and various were the causes and motives which
 had brought them to those shores and to those waters.
 He had to point the contrast between those who came to
 share in the expected possession of the land, and those who
 came to share in the worthier toil of its defence¹. The
 catalogue is there, a living witness of the greatness of the
 struggle, a no less living witness of the keen insight of
 the man whom favouring gods called on to record it.

In the invading host only a small part came in any
 quarrel of their own or at the bidding of any tie of kindred.
 Chance, interest, sheer compulsion, brought not a few².
 Athens led thither the forces of her own Attic land; she led
 too her own immediate colonists of her own speech and law,
 the men whom she had planted at Lémnos and Imbros, at
 Aigina and Histiaia³. With them came the whole multi-
 tude of allies, subject and free, and the mercenaries who
 served for mere hire⁴. From Euboia and the islands of Variety of
motives
among the
invaders.
Athens
and her im-
mediate
colonists.
 the Ægean, from the coast of Asia, came tributary allies,
 serving at the bidding of their mistress, but still, it might
 be, gratifying some vague sentiment of race in the thought
 that they were Ionians fighting against Dorians⁵. But The tribu-
tary allies.

¹ Thuc. vii. 57. 1; τοῖς μὲν ξυγκτησόμενοι τὴν χώραν ἐλθόντες, τοῖς δὲ ξυνδιασώσαντες.

² Ib.; οὐ κατὰ βίαν τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν μετ' ἀλλήλων στάντες, ἀλλ' ὅς ἐκαστοὶς τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἢ ἀνάγκη ἔσχεν.

³ Ib. 2; τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ καὶ νομίμοις ἔτι χρώμενοι Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἰμβριοι καὶ Αἰγινήται οἱ τότε Αἰγίωαν εἶχον, καὶ ἔτι Ἑστιαῖς οἱ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ Ἑστιαίαν οἰκοῦντες, ἄποικοι ὄντες. There is something a little startling in the way in which these κληροῦχοι of Athens have grown into ἀποικοί, and taken the names of those whom they had supplanted. Of these Lemnians and Imbrians we have heard in B.C. 425. Thuc. iv. 28. 4.

⁴ Ib. 3; οἱ μὲν ὑπῆκοι, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι, εἰσι δὲ καὶ οἱ μισθοφόροι ξυνεστράτευον.

⁵ Ib. 4; ὑπῆκοι δ' ὄντες καὶ ἀνάγκη ὄμων, Ἴωνες γε ἐπὶ Δωριέας, ἱκαλοῦθον. See Arnold's note.

CHAP. VIII. Athens further brought Aiolians from Lesbos and elsewhere to fight against the Aiolians of Boiotia, colonists against their founders¹. Nay, she brought the Boiotian of Plataia to fight against the Boiotian of Thebes, to meet him on that distant soil with all the hearty good will of a border enemy². From Rhodes she brought Dorians to fight, not only against Dorian Syracuse, but against their own Dorian colonists of Gela³. From Kythêra she brought Dorians, colonists of Lacedæmon, to fight against their mighty parent on Sicilian ground⁴. From Kephallênia and Zakynthos came islanders, wholly independent of Athenian rule, but, as islanders, not insensible to the vague but powerful influence which belonged to the mistress of the seas⁵. But one island of the West needed no inducements of such a kind. The abiding hatred of the child towards the parent was enough to bring the warriors of Korkyra, Dorian and Corinthian as they were, to fight against the Corinthian mother and the Syracusan sister⁶. Messenians with no home but Naupaktos or Pylos came willingly to deal a blow Megarians at Sparta in any land⁷. A few exiles from the elder

Men
brought
to fight
against
their kin-
dred.

The
western
islands.

Korkyra
and
Corinth.

Messen-
ians.

¹ Thuc. vii. 57. 5; Αἰολῆς Αἰολεῦσι τοῖς κτίσασι Βοιωτοῖς τοῖς μετὰ Συρακοσίαν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐμάχοντο.

² Ib.; καταναγκρὲς Βοιωτοὶ Βοιωτοῖς μόνον εἰεῖτως κατ' ἔχθος.

³ Ib. 5; Ῥόδιοι δὲ, Ἀργεῖοι ὄντες, Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριεῦσι, Γελαίοις δὲ καὶ ἀποικοῖς ἐαυτῶν οὖσι, μετὰ Συρακοσίαν στρατευομένοις ἠναγκάζοντο πολεμεῖν.

⁴ Ib. 6; Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποικοὶ Κυθήριοι ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς ἅμα Γυλίππῳ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ὄπλα ἔφερον. The troops of Gylippos, Neodamodeis and Helots, were Λακεδαιμόνιοι in a wide sense, as the Kytherians had been before they became Athenian subjects.

⁵ The practical effect of a formally equal alliance between a stronger and a weaker power is well set forth in the words (c. 57. 7); Κεφαλλήνης καὶ Ζακύνθιοι, αὐτόνομοι μὲν κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτικὸν μᾶλλον κατειργόμενοι, οὗτοι θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυνείποντο.

⁶ Ib.; Κερκυραῖοι οὐ μόνον Δωριεῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ Κορίνθιοι σαφῶς ἐπὶ Κορινθίοις τε καὶ Συρακοσίοις, τῶν μὲν ἀποικοὶ ὄντες, τῶν δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐτρεποῦς, βουλήσει δὲ κατὰ ἔχθος τῶν Κορινθίων οὐχ ἥσσον εἴποντο. Yet Korkyra, as we have already seen and shall see again (see vol. ii. p. 119), could sometimes join with Corinth on behalf of Syracuse.

⁷ Ib. 8; οἱ Μεσσηνῖοι γὰρ καλούμενοι ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ καὶ ἐκ Πύλου, τότε ὅτε

Megara were led against their colonists of Selinous¹; no notice is taken of the fact that they were also led against the city which had brought down the younger Megara from the state of a free city to that of an outpost of her conqueror. Others there were who came more thoroughly of their own free will². Dorians of Argos joined themselves, not without some thought of personal profit, against the Dorians of Sparta whom they so deeply hated³. Arkadian mercenaries, ever ready to serve for hire in any cause, were this time led to fight against other Arkadians whom Corinth had won to her service by the same means of persuasion, and who thereby became for the time the enemies of their countrymen⁴. Hired Cretans came to fight against Gela in whose plantation Crete had a share. From Akarnania too some came for hire, but more out of good will to Athens and warmer good will to Dêmôsthênês. And strange comrades they found in Aitolians, once enemies of their chosen leader, but whom the gold of his city had tempted to its service⁵. From the western side of the Ionian

CHAP. VIII.

Argeians.

Arkadians.

Cretan
mercen-
aries.

Italians.

Ἀθηναίων ἱχομένης. One would have gladly had Thucydides' comment if the *Μεσσήνιοι* of Sicily had been there.

¹ Thuc. vii. 57. 8; *Μεγαρίων φυγάδες οὐ πολλοὶ Μεγαρεῦσι Σελινουττίοις οὖσι κατὰ συμφορὰν ἐμάχοντο*. Since Gelôn's day the intermediate halting-place between Old Megara and Selinous had passed away.

² Ib. 9; *τῶν ἄλλων ἑκούσιοι μᾶλλον ἢ στρατεία ἐγίγνετο ἡδῆ*. *Ἐκούσιοι* here is opposed, not only to actual compulsion, but to force of circumstances. Korkyra was in no sort subject to Athens; but its position and relations made it expedient for it to go along with Athens. Argos and Mantinea had a perfectly free choice in the matter.

³ Ib.; *Ἀργεῖοι οὐ τῆς συμμαχίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίῳ τε ἔχθρας καὶ τῆς παραντίκα ἕκαστοι ἰδίᾳ ὠφελίας*.

⁴ Ib.; *Μαντινῆς καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι, ἐπὶ τοὺς δεῖ πολεμίουσιν σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους εἰσθότες ἵνα καὶ τότε τοὺς μετὰ Κορινθίῳ ἐλθόντας Ἀρκάδας οὐδὲν ἦσαν διὰ κέρδος ἡγούμενοι πολεμίουσιν*.

⁵ Ib.; *Κρήτες δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μισθῷ καὶ οὗτοι πεισθέντες ξυνέβη δὲ τοῖς Κρησὶ, τὴν Γέλαν Ῥοδίοις ἐνγετίσαντας μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀποίκους, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποίκους ἔκοντας μετὰ μισθοῦ ἐλθεῖν* [on these words see Arnold's note]. καὶ Ἀκαρνάνων τινὲς ἅμα μὲν κέρδει, τὸ δὲ πλεόν Δημοσθένους φιλεῖ καὶ Ἀθηναίων εὐνοίᾳ ξύμμαχοι ὥστε ἐπεκοήσαν.

CHAP. VIII. sea came Thourians and Metapontines, urged by party strifes in their own cities¹. The old allies at Rhêgion were not there. Ionian Sicily was represented by the men of Naxos and Katanê, barbarian Sicily by the more part of the Sikels, and by the Elymians of Segesta whose local quarrel had grown into the world's debate². Of barbarians beyond the island, the Iapygians came for pay; with the Etruscans old enmity to Syracuse was a motive strong enough to bring them and to nerve them for good service³.

Sikels and Elymians.

Iapygians and Etruscans.

The allies of Syracuse.

The Sikeliots.

Absence of Akragas. Messana not mentioned.

Before Syracuse, as before Troy, the list of the invaders fills a longer space than the list of the defenders. But before Syracuse at least the list of the defenders is more compact, more united, brought together from fewer quarters, and under the influence of motives less strangely opposed. And it was more purely Greek. Among all the defenders of Syracuse the mass was Sikeliot; among the Sikeliots the mass was Syracusan. Sicily supplied heavy-armed and ships and horses and all else in abundance⁴. Syracuse, greatest of Sikeliot cities, most immediately threatened by the enemy, supplied the greatest share of all. Of Sikeliot allies, Dorian and independent⁵, her neighbours of Kamarina were there, with the men of more distant Gela and yet more distant Selinous. The neutrality of Akragas left a gap on the southern coast⁶; Messana does not appear as helping either side, nor is any notice taken,

¹ See above, p. 305.

² Thuc. vii. 57. 11; βαρβάρων δὲ Ἑγεσταῖοι, οἵ περ ἐπηγάγοντο.

³ Ib.; Τυρσηνῶν τέ τινες ὑπὸ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίων καὶ Ἰάπωνες μισθοφόροι. See above, pp. 228, 304, and Appendix XVII. One would have thought that the contingent of the friendly Artas might have come as Ἀθηναίων εὐνοία ξύμμαχοι.

⁴ Ib. 58. 4; οἱ Σικελιώται αὐτοὶ πλῆθος πλέον κατὰ πάντα παρέσχοντο, ἅτε μεγάλας πόλεις οἰκούντες, κ.τ.λ. Yet the greatest after Syracuse was lacking.

⁵ Ib. 3; Δωριεῖς τε καὶ αὐτόνομοι πάντες.

⁶ Ib. 1; Καμαριναῖοι μὲν ὅμοροι ὄντες καὶ Γελῶσι οἰκούντες μετ' αὐτοῦς, ἔπειτα, Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχάζοντων, ἐν τῷ ἐπείκεινα ἰδρυμένοι Σελινοῦντιοι. These filled up τὸ πρὸς Λιβύην μέρος τετραμμένον.

as in the case of Akragas, of her absence. From the north coast came the contingent of isolated Himera, not wholly Dorian, like her fellows¹. Of barbarians there were but a few of native birth, such of the Sikels as were not leagued with Athens². From Italy we hear of no helpers coming to Syracuse; the good will of Krotôn and Taras seemingly did not go beyond good will. From Old Greece, Corinth alone, the faithful mother, had sent both ships and land force³. Leukadians and Ambrakiots were drawn thither by the tie of blood⁴. The wealth of Corinth had hired Arkadians, and her dominion enabled her to compel Sikyonians⁵. Outside the immediate range of Corinthian influence came the free contingent of Boiôtia, the Thespians who had won the wreath of honour in the moonlight on Epipolai, the Thebans whom a strange fate had sent to fight in Libya instead. Sparta, head of all, had sent Helots and Neodamôdeis. Of her full citizens she had there but one; but he was Gylippos⁶.

Such was the tale on either side, the tale in all its fulness; the last struggle was at hand, and all who were to have their place in it were there⁷. But before blows

¹ Thuc. vii. 58. 2; Ἱμεραῖοι ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηγεῶν πόντον μορίου, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μόνοι Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσιν· οἱ τε δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνοι ἐβοήθησαν. This is not quite clear. Only Greeks seem to be thought of just now; otherwise one might ask where were the northern Sikels spoken of in vii. i. 4!

² Ib. 3; βαρβάρων δὲ Σικελῶν μόνοι, ὅσοι μὴ ἀφίστασαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. This would seem to shut out the independent Sikels.

³ Ib.; Κορίνθιοι καὶ ναυσι καὶ πεζῶ μόνοι παραγενόμενοι.

⁴ Ib.; Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμβρακιῶται κατὰ τὸ συγγενές.

⁵ Ib.; ἐξ Ἀρκადίας μισθοφόροι . . . καὶ Σικυῶνιοι ἀναγκαστοί. See above, p. 280.

⁶ Ib.; Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην παρεχόμενοι, Νεοδαμῶδεις δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ ἑλάσσας. He adds, δύναται δὲ τὸ Νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἦδη εἶναι. Had Ekkritos (see above, p. 279) gone back, or what!

⁷ Ib. 59. 1; τότε ἦδη πᾶσαι ἀμφοτέροις παρήσαν, καὶ οὐκίτι οὐδὲν οὐδέτεροις ἐπῆλθεν. One might reproduce these negatives in Old-English, but hardly in high-polite.

CHAP. VIII. were again dealt on either side, each army had a work to do. Those works are strangely, for the Athenian side sadly, contrasted in their kind. The one object of those whom we can hardly any longer call besiegers or invaders was now to escape from the soil and the waters where everything had turned against them. The one object of the citizens and allies of rescued Syracuse, the proud ambition which they looked to, was to hinder their escape, to cut off every outlet by sea and land, to win the glory of overthrowing, of slaying or leading captive, the whole Athenian host, mighty as it was¹. Their first thought after the victory by sea was to block up the mouth of the Great Harbour, so that no foe could escape by that most obvious road. In the space of three days the work was done². Vessels of all kinds, triremes, merchant-ships, boats, were anchored across the mouth of the harbour, from Ortygia to Plêmmyrion, with their broadsides facing the harbour and the outer sea. They were joined by bridges and bound together with chains, so as to form a strong wall, seemingly with only one narrow opening, itself of course guarded by chains and bridges³. Every other needful preparation for a possible sea-fight was made; nothing was left unheeded.

The mouth
of the
Great
Harbour
blocked.
September
6-8, 413.

The work done meanwhile by those who so lately were the besiegers of Syracuse was of a sadder kind. The Athenian generals met in council—Eurymedôn was no more among them—and called the *taxiarchs* to share in their deliberations. They were hemmed in by the shutting of the mouth of the harbour; provisions were failing, and, as they had stopped the supply from Katanê, the only hope of getting more was

¹ Thuc. vii. 56. 1; 59. 2.

² The purpose is recorded by Thucydides, vii. 56. 1; its execution in 59. 2, 3. It would be *καλὸν ἀγώνισμα σφίσιν ἐπὶ τῇ γεγενημένῃ νίκῃ τῆς ναυμαχίας εἰλεῖν τε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἅπαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοσοῦτον ὄν, καὶ μηδὲ καθ' ἕτερα αὐτοῦς, μήτε διὰ θαλάσσης μήτε τῷ πεζῷ διαφυγεῖν.*

³ See Appendix XX.

by a battle and a victory by sea¹. It was resolved therefore to make one more attempt with the ships. All further operations against Syracuse were to be given up; the siege, the whole invasion, had failed. As the most speaking outward sign of such failure, the Athenians were to leave the posts which they still held on the high ground. They were to keep their hold on no greater extent of the soil of Syracuse than just so much of the shore-between their two walls as was needful for the defence of the stuff and of the sick. This they fenced off, leaving the posts on the hill and the hill-side to the Syracusans². All, save so many as were needed to guard this narrow space, were to go on board the ships. All were to take their part, in some character or other, in the great and decisive sea-fight by which they hoped to break down the barrier at the mouth of the harbour and again to clear a path to the open sea³. If they succeeded in this attempt, they were to leave Syracuse and sail to Katanê; if they failed in their last effort on the waters, they were to burn their remaining ships, and march by land to some friendly point of Sicily, Greek or barbarian⁴. These points were settled at once; the further question of sailing home or of making Katanê or any other place in Sicily the centre of future warfare needed not to be discussed as yet.

CHAP. VIII.
One more attempt to be made by sea.

The posts on the hill to be forsaken.

Retreat the object in any case.

The resolutions of the generals and officers were at once carried out. The upper part of the Athenian fortifications, the round fort high on the hill, the post on *Portella del Fusco*, all save the ground close to the shore, was now

The upper posts forsaken.

¹ Thuc. vii. 60. 2; οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐμελλον εἶναι εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν.

² See Appendix XVIII.

³ Thuc. vii. 60. 3; ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι. This goes further than Diodoros, xiii. 14; τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ἡγεμονίαις τεταγμένους καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐμβιβάσαντες: but both mark the presence of combatants of all kinds.

⁴ Ib. 2; ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς, περὶ ᾧ συνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν, ἢ ἀνὰ χερσὶ μάλασι τινοῦ χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φίλου ἀντιλήψεσθαι.

CHAP. VIII. forsaken. The whole Athenian army came down close to the shore, to embark on board the ships or to guard the small piece of shore which still belonged to them. This speaking confession that the siege of Syracuse was over gave an opportunity for an impressive religious function on the Syracusan side. The Athenian lines on the hill had cut off the temple of Hêraklês¹ from the city, and the worship of the god had been interrupted. No enemy was now near the sacred precinct. And when the day for the great sea-fight came, it was a day sacred to Hêraklês. While the rest of the defenders of Syracuse were going on board the ships, priests and generals went up to the Hêracleion, and went through the prescribed rites of the morning in all due order². The victims gave their prophetic signs, signs of gladness and hope for those who had to defend themselves against aggressors. For the work of Hêraklês, in his earthly days the terror of evil doers, was ever to lead such to victory³. Even at this last moment, when all that the remnant of Athens sought was its own safety, Athens was still the aggressor and Syracuse the defender. The object of the Athenian fleet was necessarily to assault the work across the mouth of the harbour; the object of the Syracusan fleet was necessarily to defend it.

The Athenian force was now gathered by the shore; a hundred and fifteen ships⁴ stood ready to receive their crews and the rest of their human freight. In the conditions of the fight that was coming, a fight on waters surrounded by a hostile shore, there would be no opportunity

The temple of Hêraklês left free.

Feast of Hêraklês, September 9; its solemn observance by the Syracusans.

Good omens.

Favour of Hêraklês.

The Athenians still aggressors.

Preparation of the Athenian fleet.

¹ See Appendix XVIII.

² See Appendix XVIII. That the day was a feast of Hêraklês appears also from Thuc. vii. 73. 2.

³ Plut. Nik. 24, 25; *οἱ μάντεις τοῖς Συρακουσίοις ἀπήγγειλαν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν λαμπρότητα καὶ νίκην, μὴ καταρχομένοις μάχης ἀλλ' ἀμυνομένοις, καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἡρακλῆα πάντων κρατεῖν ἀμυνόμενον καὶ προεπιχειρούμενον.*

⁴ On the numbers see Appendix XX.

for the accustomed skilful tactics of Athens. The one CHAP. VIII. object was to force their way through a barrier; the means was to make the sea-fight as much as might be like a fight by land¹. To that end a crowd of darters and bowmen were to go on board. In a fight in the open sea, they would have been a mere weighing down of the vessels, but they would be a precious help in the land-fight which was to come off on the water². The Syracusan device of the strengthened prows had been met by a device of grappling irons, iron hands, which were to hold an attacking ship fast and to enable the soldiers on board to do their work³. Yet for all this the heart of the whole army was downcast. Nikias Speech of Nikias. brought them together as in military assembly⁴, and spoke to them words as cheering as he could find at such a moment.

The speech which is now put into the mouth of Nikias is partly taken up with a notice of the special precautions for the coming battle which have just been spoken of. But it contains much that is noteworthy on other grounds. That his soldiers, Athenian and allied, had seen too much of the ups and downs of warfare to be disheartened by past ill-success, was an obvious and becoming thing for the general to say. It comes more nearly home to the immediate state of things when he tells them that they, so far away from their homes, were as truly fighting for their safety and their country as the enemy who was fighting under his

¹ Thuc. vii. 62. 3; ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἡναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν.

² Ib. 2; ὅχλος, ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιοῦμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχράμεθα, διὰ τὸ βλέπειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἡναγκασμένη ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται.

³ Ib. 3; χερῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαί, αἱ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνέκρουσι τῆς προσπесούσης νεῆς, ἣν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται ἐπουργῶσιν. The dolphins (see above, p. 297) seem to have been meant to sink the ships; the hands, like the ravens of Gaius Duilius (Polyb. i. 22, 23), were to seize the ship and allow its deck to be turned into a battle-field.

⁴ Ib. 60. 5; ἐνγαλίεσας ἀπαρτας.

CHAP. VIII. own walls. On that day's struggle it depended whether any man should see his native city again. He enlarges on the peculiar conditions of the fight; he exhorts both the sailors and the heavy-armed who were to use both their own ships and those of the enemy as a battle-field¹, each to do their duty in their own way. He makes a special appeal to the allies of Athens, whose connexion with the ruling city had given them a higher position throughout Greece. They were treated everywhere as Athenian citizens, while at home they were defended from attack by the Athenian power². The Athenians themselves he calls on to remember that they were the last hope of Athens. There were no more ships in the docks like those on which they were to embark; there was no supply of heavy-armed to take the places of those to whom he spoke. Let them fail in this battle, and the victorious fleet of Syracuse will sail against Athens³. You here, he says, will be at the mercy of the Syracusans, and you yourselves know with what purpose you came against them⁴. Your countrymen at home will be at the mercy of the Lacedæmonians. You that are now going on board are the whole force of Athens by land and sea. Nay rather, Athens is here present; you

The land-
fight by
sea.

Appeal to
the allies.

The last
hope of
Athens.

¹ Thuc. vii. 63. 1; *εὐμπεσούσης νηὶ νεὸς μὴ πρότερον ἀξιοῦν ἀπολύεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου καταστρώματος ὅπλιντας ἀπαράχητε*.

² Ib. 3; *ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ἀφελεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολλὸν πλείον μετείχετε*. He adds *ὥστε κοινοὶ μόνου ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες, δικαίως αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδετε*. See Arnold's note, and Grote, vii. 442. I cannot think, with Arnold, that there is any special reference to *μέτριοι*, though they doubtless, as Grote says, come in among others. One would fancy a special reference to the Ionian allies, who—*τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μῆμσει*—would be taken for Athenians in a way that Korkyraians and Methymnaians could not. And the last words would refer to them as protected by Athens from the Persians. In these ways they were, though subjects of Athens, sharers in the dominion of Athens. Only in an address to *ἐπῆκοι*, what is the special force of *ἔς τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις*?

³ Ib. 64. 1; *τοὺς ἐνθάδε πολεμίους εἰθὺς ἐπ' ἐκείνα πλεουσומένους*.

⁴ Ib.; *οἱ αὐτοὶ ἴστε οὐκ ἡγώμην ἐπήλθετε*—a pithy way of putting it.

are the city; you are her great name¹; whatever any man can do on her behalf beyond another, let him do it now; no other such time will ever come again².

The hour of distress and danger called forth all the stronger qualities of the sick and weary general. Nikias on the shore or on the waters, on the eve of the last battle, was another man from Nikias in the camp on the hill, keeping no guard against the coming of the freebooter Gylippos. His stirring speech to the whole army was not all. The crews and fighting-men on both sides were now on board; the Athenian ships were on the very point of putting to sea, when the awfulness of the moment pressed yet more deeply on his soul. The danger that was now all but present, with all that hung upon it, came fully home to him³. He thought, as men do think at such moments, that he had not done enough, that he had not said enough⁴. He would make yet one more appeal. He went on board a boat; he sailed round the fleet, and spoke yet a word to each trierarch in turn⁵. Each of these officers would be well known to him in the camp and in the city. In the camp each would be a personal friend; in the city some may have been political enemies. He called on each by the formal style of an Athenian citizen, by his own name, by his father's name, and the name of his tribe⁶. The men of personal fame he called on to remember their own honour. The men of

Energy of
Nikias.

His last
appeal to
the trier-
archs.

¹ Thuc. vii. 64. 2; ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι, καὶ περὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηναίων. This cannot be translated; but the meaning seems to be much what I have put in the text.

² Ib.; οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῃ μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἀποδείξάμενος.

³ Ib. 69. 2; ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν ὅλος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγυὺς ἤδη ἦν.

⁴ Ib.; νομίσας, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσι, πάντα τε ἔργη ἐτι σφίσιν ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι καὶ λόγῳ αὐτοῖς οὕτω ἱκανᾶ εἰρῆσθαι.

⁵ See Appendix XX.

⁶ Thuc. vii. 69. 2; πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλῇν.

CHAP. VIII. illustrious birth he called on to remember the glory of their fathers¹. On all he called to remember their common country, freest of all cities, the city which meddled less than any other with the personal freedom of all its citizens².

Appeal to democratic sentiment.
Freedom of personal action in Athens.
It is noteworthy indeed, noteworthy now as well as then, that this special feature of the great democracy³ should be the one picked out at such an hour as this as the thing which had gone further than anything to endear Athens to her children. At such a time, the historian tells us, men do not shrink from any common-place of language; they are not afraid of repeating a thrice-told tale. At such moments as these men are open to the familiar appeal to wives and children and the gods of their fathers⁴. Nikias made the appeal as his last resource. Feeling that he had said all that he could say, but yearning to say more⁵, he left the other three generals to lead out the fleet, while he himself sailed back to his post. Then he marshalled the land-force on the shore in such sort that they might do most by way of encouragement to those who were to do battle on the waters⁶.

Devices of Gylippos. Meanwhile all was high hope among the citizens and allies of Syracuse. Gylippos had heard of the device of the iron hands. He or his Corinthian advisers met it by

¹ Thuc. vii. 69. 2; ϕ ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι μὴ προδιδόναι τινα καὶ τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετὰς, ἃν ἐπιφανέας ἦσαν οἱ πρόγονοι, μὴ ἀφανίζειν. All this is perhaps the more emphatic, from being thrown into the condensed shape of *οἰαίτο obliqua*.

² Ib.; πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν βίαντων ἐξουσίας.

³ Ib. ii. 37. 5.

⁴ Ib. vii. 69. 2; ἀλλὰ τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι, οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τινὶ ἀρχαιολογεῖν φυλαζόμενοι, εἰποιεν ἂν, καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων παραπλήσια ἐς τε γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ θεοὺς πατρίους προφερόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ἐκπλήξει ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες ἐπιβοῶντας. However we construe, here is one of the deeper facts of human nature.

⁵ Ib. 3; οὐχ ἰκανὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀναγκαῖα νομίσας παρηγήσθαι.

⁶ Ib.; ἀποχωρήσας ἤγε τὸν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ παρέταξεν ὥς ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐδύνατο, ὅπως ὅτι μεγίστη τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὠφέλεια ἐς τὸ θαρσεῖν γίγνεται.

a counter-device of covering the prows and the upper part of the ships with leather, that the hand, when it fell, might slip and take no firm hold¹. Presently they saw that the Athenians were embarking for the sea-fight. When all was ready, when the sacrifice was done to Hêraklêas, the army gathered round Gylippos and the generals of Syracuse, and listened to their speech or speeches. The recorded speech is surely that of a Syracusan speaker; it breathes the full spirit of Syracusan yearning for vengeance. He appeals to past victories as the earnest of victories to come. A power had arisen which had won a greater dominion than had ever before been seen in Greece; that power had come to enslave Sicily, meaning next to enslave Peloponnesos and every other Greek land². They to whom he spoke had been the first to withstand and to overcome the aggressor on his own element; they had already smitten him by sea; they were about to smite him yet again. His new devices were but imitations of theirs, and they had been met by devices yet newer. Small profit would come of heavy-armed soldiers set to wage a land-battle from the decks of ships. Small profit would come of the darters of Akarnania pressed on board, whom the least motion of the vessels would hinder from taking due aim with their javelins. Their presence on the other hand will no less hinder the ships that they are on from their proper action³. Cast down as the enemy is with his past ill luck, he will gain nothing from his greater numbers; in so narrow a field of battle his very numbers will tell against him. Let them then go on to certain victory; let them arise and glut their ire; let them enjoy all the delights of

Speech of
the Syra-
cusan
general.
Successes
already
won.

Prospects
of victory.

Disadvan-
tages of the
enemy.

Open ap-
peal to
vengeance.

¹ Thuc. vii. 65. 3.

² Ib. 66. 2. This may or may not take in the whole of the alleged schemes of Alkibiadês.

³ Ib. 67. 2; οἱ οὐδ' ὅπως καθυζόμενοι χρή τὸ βέλος ἀφείναι εὐρήσουσι, πῶς οὐ σφαλοῦσί τε τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς πάντες, οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ κινούμενοι, ταράσσονται;

CHAP. VIII. vengeance in a quarrel where vengeance is most righteous¹.

The men against whom they have to fight are the most hateful of enemies; they are men who came to bring every form of grief and shame and bondage upon Sicily and all her people². Let no man do the work deceitfully; let no man keep back his sword from blood; let no man deem it enough to let the foe get him away unscathed³. Do to them, he winds up, as they would have done to you; their chastisement will be a worthy work. Sicily was in the enjoyment of freedom before they came; their overthrow will make its freedom surer⁴.

He who spoke those last words saw not into the near
Feelings of the future; no man could be expected to see into it. But at
the army.

the moment we have to look only on the host which the fierce words of the Syracusan general stirred up to the near hope of vengeance. Those who heard him felt indeed that they at last had in their hands the enemy who had so long kept them from the possession of their own land and their own sea. And now began the great sea-fight, the last and greatest to be waged between Syracuse and Athens, between the free helpers of Syracuse and the motley followers of Athens. The waters of the Great Harbour were thick with ships. Seventy-four triremes of Syracuse and her allies were manned to meet the far greater force of the enemy⁵. They were the first to stand off from the shore,

The last
battle in
the Great
Harbour.
September
9, 413.

¹ Thuc. vii. 68. 1; *ὀργῇ προσμίζωμεν*, κ.τ.λ. Grote, vii. 44; 'This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.' Athenian orators do not scruple to invoke the *ὀργή* even of judges.

² Ib. 2; *ὡς δὲ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἐχθιστοὶ, πάντες ἴστε, οἳ γε ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμέτεραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι*, κ.τ.λ. The invaders are again something more than πολέμοι or ἐναντίοι.

³ Ib. 3; *ἀνθ' ὧν μὴ μαλακισθῆναι τίνα πρέπει, μηδὲ τὸ ἀκινδύνως ἀπελθεῖν αὐτοὺς κέρδος νομίσαι*.

⁴ Ib.; *τούσδε τε κολασθῆναι καὶ τῇ πάσῃ Σικελίᾳ καρπομένην καὶ πρὶν ἐλευθερίαν βεβαιωτέραν παραδούναι*.

⁵ On the numbers, see Appendix XX.

ready for the battle¹; then they waited, as Hêraklês had bidden them, for the first blow to be dealt by the invaders, invaders who now sought only to escape from the land which they had invaded. Some stood ready to guard the barrier which closed the mouth of the harbour. Others were placed round the whole circuit of the harbour itself, save only the small space which the Athenians still kept within their own walls. The land-force of Syracuse, say rather of the more part of all Greek Sicily, stood in order beneath the walls and on every part of the shore to be ready to give help to their countrymen on shipboard. The women and old men thronged the walls of Ortygia, the terraces of Achradina and Temenîtês, to look on the work which their kinsmen were that day to do before their eyes². And lads and boys too young to have their place among the crews or the fighting men rowed out in small craft of various kinds, trusting to be of some service in the work, longing at least to be near to the fight, and to cast forth words of scorn at the enemy³. Nikias meanwhile had gone his round of the ships; he had spoken his last word to the trierarchs; he had gone to his station between the Athenian walls. Two fleets ready for battle covered the face of the waters; two companies stood on land to gaze, to pray, to cheer, to comfort. The men of Athens and her allies fought under the eyes of their brothers-in-arms. So did the men of Syracuse no less; but they fought also under the eyes of those who were dearest to them in their own homes.

CHAP. VIII.
The Syracusans
await the
Athenian
attack.

The land-
army;

The spec-
tators in
the city.

Action of
the boys.

The pæan now sounded from the Athenian fleet, and the hundred and fifteen ships sped forward with a common rush against the barrier. The ships that guarded it were

Athenian
attack on
the barrier.

¹ Thuc. vii. 70. 1; *πρὸς ἀγῶμενοι*. See Arnold's note.

² Diod. xiii. 14. See Appendix XX.

³ Plut. Nik. 24. See Appendix XX.

CHAP. VIII. sunk or scattered; the Athenians attacked the barrier itself; they strove to break the chains that bound the moored ships together. The omen of Hēraklēs was fulfilled, the omen of victory for Syracuse. The first blow had been dealt by the enemy. The Syracusan ships now pressed on that enemy from every side of their own harbour; the Athenians were driven back from the barrier, some towards the shore, some towards the middle of the haven. The fight, the fiercest fight of the whole war¹, became general, not in the shape of two great fleets meeting each other in ordered array, but in that of a crowd of separate battles going on everywhere at once, over the whole surface of the Great Harbour. Never before, in any known battle, had so many ships come together in so narrow a space². Hemmed together as they were, friends and enemies, there was no room for skilful manœuvres to and fro. Beak seldom met straight against beak; far oftener the beak was dashed against the sides of the enemy's ship³. Sometimes the damaged ship went to the bottom; its crew, striving to escape by swimming, were picked off by the missiles of the enemy⁴. Sometimes men leaped from their own sinking ship on to the enemy's ship that had charged them; they got possession of the vessel and turned it to their own use⁵. Sometimes the iron hands fell; two hostile ships

They are driven back.

Separate fights.

Incidents of the battle.

¹ Thuc. vii. 70. 2; ἡ ναυμαχία . . . ἦν καρτερά καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν προτέρων.

² Ib. 4; ζυμπεσουσῶν ἐν ὀλίγῃ πολλῶν νεῶν, πλείους γὰρ δὴ αἶται ἐν ἐλαχίστῃ ἐναυμάχῃσαν.

³ Ib.; αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκτους ὀλίγαι ἐρίγοντο, αἱ δὲ προσβολαί, ὡς τύχοι ναῦς νηὶ προσπεσοῦσα ἢ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν ἢ ἄλλῃ ἐπιπλέουσα, πυκνότεραι ἦσαν. See Arnold's note on ἐμβολή and προσβολή.

⁴ Ib. 5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων τοῖς ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ λίθοις ἀφθόνης ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἐχρῶντο.

⁵ Diod. xiii. 16; πολλάκις δὲ τὰς ἰδίας ἔχοντες ναῦς συντετριμμένας, εἰς τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων μεταλλόμενοι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνοντες τοὺς δ' εἰς τὴν θάλατταν προωθούντες, ἐκυρίεον τῶν τριήρων. So Thuc. vii. 70. 5; οἱ ἐπιβάται εἰς χεῖρας ἰόντες ἐπειρῶντο ταῖς ἀλλήλων ναυσὶν ἐπιβαίνειν. But Diodōros is not copying the Athenian.

were locked close together, and their decks became a battle-field for the javelins of the darters and for the shield and spear of the heavy-armed¹. In the exchange of missiles the Syracusans had an advantage; they made use chiefly of stones, with which accuracy of aim was less needed, and which were likely to have some effect wherever they fell. But the motion of the water confounded the aim of the bowmen and darters on the Athenian decks². Sometimes a ship while charging was itself charged at the same moment by hostile ships on each side³. All was confusion; every ship, every man, fought as each had the chance, against the nearest enemy.

Such a scene as this must have been rich in personal incidents. We hear in a general way of combats waged close under the walls of Ortygia, of Syracusan ships sunk close under the eyes of those who were dearest to those who manned them⁴. In one tale only have names been handed down to us. One of the daring lads who had gone afloat, a son of noble parents, bearing the name of Hérakleidês, a name borne by two generals of Syracuse and a lucky name on that day of festival, ventured near to an Athenian galley with words of mockery. The Athenian gave chase; the lad's uncle Pollichos, commander of ten ships, sped to the rescue of his nephew. Others sailed to the rescue of Pollichos⁵; men fought at sea over the living Hérakleidês as men had once fought on land over the dead Patroklos.

Hérakleidês and Pollichos.

All this strife, we must remember, of human passion

¹ Diod. ii. 2.; *ἐνιοὶ δὲ σιδηρὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλοντες ἡράκλειον τοὺς ἀντιτεταγμένους ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν περὶ μαχεῖν.*

² Plut. Nik. 25. See Appendix XX.

³ Thuc. vii. 70. 6; *ζυνετίγχετο τε πολλοχοῦ διὰ τὴν στεροχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβλημένοι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβληθῆναι, δύο τε περὶ μίαν καὶ ἔστιν ὃ καὶ πλείους ναῖς κατ' ἀνάγκην ζυγηγῆσθαι.*

⁴ Diod. xiii. 15. See Appendix XX. One general of the name was now in command. See above, p. 229.

⁵ Plut. Nik. 24. See Appendix XX.

CHAP. VIII. and human action went on under the clear air of Syracuse, Conditions of old Greek warfare. with no cloud of smoke to shroud a single blow dealt on either side. The ceaseless crash of ships shivered in pieces and sinking beneath the waters was the only sound that could drown the manifold tones of the human voice rising from sea and shore in every note of hope and fear, of victory and defeat. All was seen; all was heard; all was heard and seen by those whose hearts and hopes were in the strife, by eager comrades in the struggle, by comrades and kinsfolk no less eager watching on the shore. It was as a show in a vast amphitheatre, in which the gladiators were no captives or hirelings, but the choicest comrades and kinsfolk of the spectators¹. The steermen shouted to one another and to their own men, so far as their voices could be heard for the crashing of the ships. The Athenian called on his comrades not to draw back from the last hope of again seeing their own land². The Syracusan and the Corinthian called on his comrades not to let their foes escape their vengeance, but to raise the glory of their own city by their overthrow³. The generals on each side kept their eyes on each ship that seemed to be falling back without need. They called to the captains by name⁴. Did the Athenian deem the land of the enemy more truly his own than the sea which Athens had won for her possession by so many toils⁵? Would the Syracusan flee from the enemy who was seeking for nothing but to flee away from him⁶? Meanwhile the play of human passion, its out-

Exhortations of the steermen;

of the generals.

¹ Cf. Diod. xiii. 16. See Appendix XX.

² Thuc. vii. 70. 7; ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοῖς προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι.

³ Ib.; καλὸν εἶναι κωλύσαι τε αὐτοὺς διαφυγεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐκάστους πατρίδα νικήσαντας ἐπαυξήσαι.

⁴ Ib. 8; ὀνομαστὶ τῶν τριηράρχων ἤρταν.

⁵ Ib.; εἰ τὴν πολεμωτάτην γῆν οἰκειοτέραν ἤδη τῆς οὐ δι' ὀλίγου πάσιν κεκτημένης θαλάσσης ἡγούμενοι ὑποχωροῦσιν.

⁶ Ib.; εἰ οὗτος σαφῶς ἴσασι προθυμουμένους Ἀθηναίους παντὶ τρόπῳ διαφυγεῖν, τοῦτους αὐτοὶ φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν.

ward signs by voice and deed, was, if anything, keener CHAP. VIII.
 and more highly strung among those who looked on The spec-
 from the shore, who for the most part were constrained tators on
 to look on idly, than among those who were giving and the shore.
 taking blows on the battle-field of the waves. Great Feelings of
 was the strain, many were the ups and downs of spirit, the Athe-
 among those who stood by the side of Nikias, pent up nians.
 within the narrow space still sheltered by the Athenian
 walls. The invaders—so their own historian calls them
 even at this last moment—trembled lest that day's work
 should make their present evil case yet more evil than
 it was¹.

It was characteristic of such a fight as this that no The battle
 general view of it could be had from any point of the shore. seen piece-
 Men standing near saw this or that incident of the battle. meal.
 They saw one of their own ships pressing on the enemy ;
 they saw another falling back before him. Within the
 Athenian walls, some were rejoicing in success and raising
 the shout of joy, while groans and wailing broke from
 others who saw their comrades yielding². Some, so it
 was said by the enemy, among the Athenians who kept
 the space between the lines, could not keep themselves
 from jeering and asking the men who fell back to the
 shore whether they thought the way to Athens lay by
 land³. And the same varied play of feeling and of
 utterance was marked among those warriors of Syracuse
 who lined the rest of the circuit of the haven. Some-
 times they were able to give active help to distressed

¹ Thuc. vii. 71. 1 ; φιλονεικῶν μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλείονος ἤδη καλοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες μὴ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι χεῖρα πράξωσι.

² Ib. 3 ; δὲ ὀλίγου ὀψης τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπεύοντων, κ.τ.λ.

³ Diod. xiii. 17 ; οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἀφισταμένους τῆς μάχης καὶ τῇ γῇ προσπλέοντας ἠρώτων εἰ διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰς Ἀθήνας πλεῖν νομίζουσιν. This may be a Syracusan invention ; but it is from Syracuse that it comes.

CHAP. VIII. comrades; sometimes by their words they drove men back to the fight, to try their luck once more even when wounded men had to do their best with a damaged vessel ¹.

The spec-
tators in
the city.

Such was the kind of help which armed men condemned to stand idle on the shore were able to give to their comrades who were busy in the sea-fight. But on the walls and heights of Syracuse stood another company, a company whose presence mattered not to the Athenian visitor in after days, but whose thoughts and words lived in the memory of the eyewitness and actor who first set down the record of that day's work ². They could take a wider view of the battle-field than the men who stood close to any point of the shore. They looked and beheld the deliverance of their city, but they often saw it purchased by the blood of their own dearest. But all that they could do for those whom they loved was to lift up their hands in prayer to the gods, to raise at one moment the hymn of victory ³, at another the wail of sorrow. Among that company we may call up some who will meet us in later pages of our story. The mother and the sister of Dionysios, the daughter of Hermokratēs, the kinswomen of Philistos who told the tale, were doubtless among those who gazed on the deeds of the men of their own households, men destined so soon to take such different parts in our long drama, but who in the work of that day did their duty side by side.

Final de-
feat of the
Athenians.

The fight was long and uncertain. In every corner of the harbour each side had seen momentary victory and momentary defeat. At last the tide of warfare distinctly

¹ Diod. xiii. 17; τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς στρατιωτῶν ἐνεδίδοντων τοῖς προσπλέονσιν, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς αἰγιαλοὺς ἀποφεύγοντες πάλιν ἀνέστρεφον, καίτις συντρεμμένας ἔχοντες τὰς ναῦς καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τραυμάτων καταβαρούμενοι.

² This comes in full in the sixteenth chapter of Diodōros. See Appendix XX.

³ ἑπαίνων is the word in Diodōros. See Appendix XX.

turned against the fugitive invaders. They were fully driven back from the barrier which they had striven to break down. The Athenian ships that were nearest to the walls of Ortygia were the first to give way¹; they fled; the Syracusans followed. The flight and the pursuit became general; the whole navy of Athens turned and sought shelter by that one piece of Syracusan soil which still was theirs. The deliverers of Sicily pressed after them with all zeal, and with loud cries. Some ships were taken at sea; others were chased to the shore. Some were hardly steered into the shallow waters, whence their crews could leap on to the land which was still sheltered by their own walls², the poor survivals of that long line which had once all but hemmed in all Syracuse as in prison.

The fight was over; a shout loud and long of victory and vengeance went up in Dorian notes from the rejoicing lips of Syracuse and Corinth. And yet a voice of mourning must have mingled with it. In the very last stage of the fight, at the moment when the whole fleet of Athens gave way, one precious life, the life of a true ally indeed, was given for ransomed Syracuse. Ariston of Corinth, the brave and skilful seaman, who had taught Syracuse to vanquish Athens, died in the moment of victory on the waters which he had freed³. Gongylos in the fight on the hill, Ariston in the fight in the Great Harbour, such were the gifts which the faithful mother could give to her faithful child. And she gave them not in vain. Their work was done; no Athenian conqueror should now

Flight and
pursuit.

The vic-
tory.

Death of
Ariston.

¹ Diod. xiii. 17; τῶν παρὰ τὴν πόλιν κινδυνεύοντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκβιασθέντων καὶ πρὸς φυγὴν ὁρμησάντων, οἱ προσεχείς δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐνέκλινον, αἰὲ κατ' ὀλίγον ἀπαντες ἐτράπησαν.

² See Appendix XX.

³ Plut. Nik. 25; Ἀρίστον δὲ Κορινθίος κυβερνήτης . . . παρὰ τὴν μάχην αὐτὴν ἀγωνιζόμενος προθύμως ἔπεσεν, ἤδη κρατοῦντων τῶν Συρακουσίων. Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus mentions this.

CHAP. VIII. march in by the gate of Achradina; the gazers who looked from the walls should not be sold into bondage like their Dorian sisters of Mélos. Héraklès, guardian of the Dorians, had indeed kept his pledge to the worshippers who, at the dawn of his high festival, had renewed his solemn worship in his ransomed temple.

The Syracusans and their allies had, in the phrase of our own Chronicles, possession of the place of slaughter. That place of slaughter was the waters of the Great Harbour, thickly strewn as they were with wrecks and dead bodies¹. Sixty Athenian ships—it is a Syracusan reckoning—were lost, while on the Syracusan side eight had utterly perished, and sixteen were greatly damaged². All that was left to the escaped Athenian crews was to get to land how they could with the help of their comrades who stood there to succour them. Others of the land-force went to guard the walls; some gave themselves up to simple grief and wailing; the thoughts of most went forth to devise means of safety for themselves³. Never before had men been so utterly cast down; never had the end of a great expedition turned out so utterly unlike its beginning⁴. The distress and despair were overwhelming. Even the devout Nikias forgot his paramount duty to the slain. Once he had given up the honours of victory rather than leave two of his soldiers defrauded of their funeral rites⁵. Now—by a neglect unparalleled in the whole story of Thucydides—no Athenian herald went to ask for the funeral-truce

Loss on
each side.

Despair
of the
Athenians.

The burial-
truce
forgotten.

¹ Diod. xiii. 17; δ δὲ λιμὴν πλήρης ἦν ὄπλων τε καὶ ναυαγίων. So Æschylus, Pers. 425;

θάλασσα δ' οὐκ ἔνι ἦν ἰδεῖν
ναυαγίων πλήθουσα καὶ φόνων βροτῶν.

² Diod. xiii. 17. See Appendix XX.

³ Thuc. vii. 71. 6.

⁴ Ib. 75. 6; ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἷας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχμήματος τοῦ πρῶτου ἐς οἷαν τελευτήν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφίκετο.

⁵ Ib. iv. 44. 6.

which even rejoicing Syracuse would not have refused¹. CHAP. VIII.
 The thoughts of all men were with their living selves rather than with their dead comrades. The victors meanwhile sailed over the waters; they took up their own slain for a public funeral; they drew on shore such of their ships as were seaworthy, and gave themselves up to the joy which befitted the evening of such a day.

Well indeed might they rejoice. The great deliverance for which they themselves had striven, the deliverance to which Gylippos and Aristôn had come to guide them, had now been wrought. Syracuse no longer feared an Athenian storm or an Athenian blockade. And it was more than deliverance. It was victory, victory of a kind such as few had ever seen or heard of. The invaders had been overthrown beneath the walls of the city which they had hoped to make their own; they had been overcome after a long and hard-fought struggle; the masters of the sea had been smitten and crushed to pieces on their own element. Such success as this was enough to turn the heads of the dullest of mankind. Words would fail to paint its effect on the minds of excitable Greeks, of men who had been so long bearing up, often against frightful odds, whose hearts had been so long rising and falling between hope and fear, and who at last saw their most daring hopes more than fulfilled. There was still work to be done, and under the iron discipline of Rome or Sparta that work might have been done. But in rescued Syracuse the one feeling of the moment, the overwhelming joy of the great deliverance, shut out every other thought.

Rejoicing
in the city.

Greatness
of the vic-
tory.

No more
action that
night.

¹ Thuc. vii. 72. 2; οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ μεγέθους τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, νεκρῶν μὲν περὶ ἢ ναυαγίων οὐδὲ ἐπενδύον αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν. Plutarch (Nik. 25) adds a practical reason, as far as the dead are concerned; ἀτε δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀταφίας τὴν τῶν νοσούντων καὶ τετραμμένων ἀπόλειψιν οἰκτροτέραν οὖσαν ἢ τὴν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχοντες. But the question of the ναυάγια, so important after Arginousai, remained.

CHAP. VIII. The need of improving the victory was forgotten, the very thought of vengeance was forgotten, in the wild delight of the night that followed the day of that great salvation.

The feast of Héraklès. On that high festival, a festival which the stern toil of the morning had raised to a higher place than ever in the Syracusan kalendar, the evening at least must be freely given to sacrifice and thanksgiving and pious revelry. It was the holy day of Héraklès; it was Héraklès who had taught them the way to victory; it was he who had fought for them in their hour of trial; what thanks, what offerings, could be great enough for the power who had so openly befriended them? No more plying of oars, no more pushing of spears and shields, no more marching along weary paths, at least not till the morrow. Man had done his work; he had done it by the grace of the favouring gods. And the favouring gods must have their due, before man girded himself afresh for the toil of another day¹.

Gylippos and Hermokratès.

But in this general tumult of joy and devotion, two men at least kept their heads clear. Gylippos and Hermokratès both saw that the Athenians could hardly fail to make an attempt to escape by land. The chances were that they would do so at once, that they would set out that very night, and try to seize some strong post from

The Athenian retreat to be stopped.

which they could not easily be dislodged². They saw further the paramount importance of hindering such a plan from being attempted. The Athenian fleet was no longer

¹ The belief in the interposition of Héraklès was in every way natural; but we may doubt whether many at the moment went so deep into the motives of the god as Timaios did afterwards. Héraklès loved the Syracusans, because Persephoné had helped him to lead away Kerberos. He who had taken Troy to avenge his own wrongs at the hands of Laomedon hated the Trojans of Segesta, and the Athenians as their allies. See Plut. Nik. 1; Tim. fr. 104; C. Müller, i. 219.

² Thuc. vii. 73. 1; Ἑρμοκράτης . . . ὑπονόησας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ νομίσας δεῖν εἶναι, εἰ τοσαύτη στρατιὰ κατὰ γῆν ὑποχωρήσασα καὶ καθέσμενῃ ποι τῆς Σικελίας βουλήσεται αὐθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιῆσθαι.

to be feared; but there were still forty thousand men in the Athenian camp. They were not indeed likely to make another immediate assault on Syracuse; but, if they were allowed to set forth without hindrance, they might march to some point in Sicily, to some friendly town either of Greeks or Sikels, and might thence wage a new war against Syracuse. Perhaps Gylippos, certainly Hermokratés¹, went at once to the Syracusan generals, and laid the case before them. They ought at once to lead out the whole force of Syracuse, and secure every path by which the enemy could make their way to any friendly quarter. The roads should be blocked; the narrow passes among the hills should be occupied and guarded². The Syracusan generals saw the needs of the case as clearly as their advisers. The course that was pressed on them was the course that ought to be followed; but at that moment there was no hope of following it. In the present mood of the people of Syracuse it was vain to talk of any military enterprise that night. No one would turn out to block roads or to guard passes, at all events till the next day. The thing was hopeless; no appeals from Hermokratés could persuade the generals to attempt it³. Again, as ever, we see the difference between the armed citizens of Greece, swayed by every momentary passion of the citizen, and the trained soldiers of Macedonia, Rome, and modern Europe. Yet one almost wonders that, among

CHAP. VIII.
Fear of their occupying some post in Sicily.

Hermokratés' advice to the Syracusan generals.

The generals approve; but judge the attempt hopeless.

Professional and citizen soldiers.

¹ Neither Thucydides nor Diodōros makes any mention of Gylippos at this stage. In Plutarch (Nik. 26) he tries in vain to call the Syracusans to action; it is not distinctly said whether he went with Hermokratés to the Syracusan generals, τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσι in Thucydides, τῶν στρατηγῶν in Diodōros, xiii. 18. We must remember that Hermokratés was not in office himself. The trick that follows was, by all statements, Hermokratés' own.

² Thuc. vii. 73. 1; τὰς τε ὁδοὺς ἀποικοδομήσαι καὶ τὰ στενόνερα τῶν χωρίων προφθάσαντας φυλάσσειν.

³ Ib. 2; Diodōros (xiii. 18) adds another reason, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν τραυματίας εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

CHAP. VIII. those who came nearer to a trained force than any native Syracusan, among the allies from Old Greece, above all among those gallant Corinthians who seem to have loved Syracuse better than her own children, no volunteers were found to attempt the toilsome service of the moment. It was as the Syracusan generals said. The counsel of Gylippos and Hermokratês was wise; but it was vain to think of carrying it out.

Device of
Hermo-
kratês.

But the resources of Hermokratês did not fail him. He resolved to play off on the Athenian generals the same trick which Nikias had played off on the Syracusans nearly two years before¹. He found the same advantage in the fact that there was a party in Syracuse favourable to Athens which Nikias had then found in the fact that

Dealings of
Nikias
inside
Syracuse.

there was a party in Katanê favourable to Syracuse. The dealings of Nikias with his Syracusan correspondents had done him nothing but mischief during the whole war; at its latest stage they were to do him greater mischief than ever. Hermokratês knew perfectly well that such dealings were going on; he perhaps knew who the actual intriguers were. At dusk² he sent some of his own special friends, accompanied by some horsemen, to the Athenian camp. The horsemen rode up within earshot, and called to some of the Athenians to listen³. They were used to such communications from their friends within the city. When therefore the messengers of Hermokratês did their errand, it was taken as a friendly message sent in earnest⁴. The Athenians to whom they spoke were bidden to tell Nikias that the roads were already guarded. It would

False mes-
sage to
Nikias.

¹ See above, p. 163.

² Thuc. vii. 73. 3; *πέμπει τῶν ἑταίρων τινὰς τῶν αὐτοῦ μετὰ ἰσπείων πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡνίκα ξυνησκόταξεν.*

³ Ib.; *προσελάσαντες ἐξ ὅσων τις ἔμελλεν ἀκούσεσθαι καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας.*

⁴ On the correspondents of Nikias within the walls of Syracuse, see Appendix XXI.

be vain to set out by night; he would do well to wait till the morrow, and then set out with more preparation.

The messengers went away, and their message was carried to the Athenian generals. Nikias and Dêmostenês fell at once into the trap; they accepted the invention of Hermokratês as a genuine fact kindly announced to them by their friends ¹.

While Hermokratês was striving to persuade the Syracusan generals, those of Athens had been debating as to the best course to follow in the present distress. And they had come to exactly the conclusion to which Hermokratês had assumed that they would come. It had in truth been forced on them in much the same way in which that night's rest from military toil had been forced on Hermokratês himself. On the evening of the great overthrow by sea, Dêmostenês, still keeping up a stouter heart than any other man, proposed that in the morning the remnant of the army should again put themselves on board the ships which they had left, and make yet another attempt to force their way out by sea ². Their numbers were even now greater than those of the enemy—sixty to fifty, according to the Athenian reckoning ³—and the barrier across the mouth of the harbour was actually broken ⁴. They had therefore every hope of making their way out. Nikias was inclined to a retreat by land, but he yielded to the arguments of Dêmostenês ⁵, and orders were given for the renewed naval action in the morning. But the matter was taken out of the hands of the generals by the

The Athenian generals deceived.

Debate among the Athenian generals.

Dêmostenês for risking another attempt by sea.

The sailors refuse.

¹ Thuc. vii. 74. 1; νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀπάντη εἶναι. Plutarch (Nik. 26) comments; ὑπομένον δ' ψευδῶς εἰδέναι ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀληθῶς παθεῖν.

² Ib. 72. 3. So Diod. xiii. 18.

³ See Appendix XX.

⁴ Diodóros adds λελυμένον τοῦ ζεύγματος.

⁵ Thucydides (vii. 72. 3) says, ἐνγχωροῦντος Νικίου τῇ γνώμῃ, as if rather willingly. Diodóros says; Νικίας δὲ συνεβούλευσε καταλιπόντας τὰς ναῦς διὰ τοῦ μεσσηγίου πρὸς τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις ἀναχωρεῖν.

CHAP. VIII. positive refusal of the sailors to go on board. They were utterly downcast; they had had enough of the sea; they had no longer any hope of success. They crowded round the tents of the generals, bidding them to take no more heed to the ships, but to think of the safety of the men who were left¹. It was accordingly determined to tarry no longer in a spot where they had already suffered so much, but to set out that very night². They began accordingly to make such preparations as they could for the night march. Just at this moment came the false message from Hermokratês. It was fully believed. It put an end to all thought of attempting the retreat that night. And as they must tarry some while, it was deemed best to abide yet another day, to look through the stuff, to settle what to take with them and what to leave behind³, and to put themselves in better order for the march. They inferred from the false message that the march would not be made without fighting; and so far the false message was a true one.

Resolution
to set out
by land
that night.
Septem-
ber 9.

The re-
treat de-
layed.

§ 7. *The Retreat of the Athenians.*

September, B.C. 413.

Amidst all the stirring events which had happened since the memorable eclipse of the moon, the resolution of Nikias to abide thrice nine days must have wholly passed out of memory. It was now much more than three days since

¹ Thucydides says simply, οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν διὰ τὸ καταπεπληχθαι τῇ ἡσση καὶ μὴ ἂν εἴ τι οἴεσθαι κρατῆσαι. Diodôros says, perhaps a little out of place, at the beginning of c. 18, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι συνδραμόντες ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων σκεπὰς ἐδέοντο τῶν στρατηγῶν μὴ τῶν νεῶν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φροντίσειν σωτηρίας.

² Thuc. vii. 72. 3; οἱ μὲν ὥς κατὰ γῆν ἀναχωρήσοντες ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον. That they were to set out that night is implied in the whole story, and specially in the words in 74. 1, ἐπέσχον τὴν νύκτα. It is more distinct in Diodôros xiii. 18, φανεροῦ ὄντος ὅτι τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναξέουσιν.

³ Ib. 74. 1.

the eclipse, and certainly much less than twenty-seven. CHAP. VIII.
 As near as we can reckon, about half another revolution The
 of the moon had passed¹. But the whole object of the twenty-
 last battle, the attempt to renew the old purpose of escaping seven days'
 by sea, shows that all thought of waiting for the twenty- stay quite
 seventh day had even then been cast aside. The actual forgotten.
 need overrode all such scruples; the prophets had perhaps
 by this time found out that three days was all that the
 rules of their own science ordered. From the day of the
 last battle the order of time is minutely laid down. The
 next day was employed by the Athenians in making ready Septem-
 as well as they could for their retreat. One part of their ber 10.
 purpose was to burn their ships. They were no longer of
 any use for their purpose, and they did not wish to leave
 them to strengthen the Syracusan navy. On the Syra-
 cusan side there was a twofold work to be done, work
 nearer and more distant, by sea and by land. The design
 of burning the ships was so natural that it was suspected
 in Syracuse. In order to hinder it, one Syracusan party The Athe-
 went on board their own ships, and, on the morrow of nians burn
 the day of Hêraklê's, they again showed themselves on some of
 the waters of the Great Harbour in warlike array. They their ships,
 sailed to the piece of coast which was still held by the and the
 Athenians, and began to drag away the ships which were rest are
 drawn up on the shore. The Athenians still contrived carried
 partially to carry out their purpose. A few ships were away by
 set fire to²; but the Syracusans seized on the more part the Sy-
racusans.

¹ On the order of days, see Appendix XXV.

² Thucydides (vii. 74. 5) says; *ἐνέπρησαν δὲ τινες ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ διανοή-
 θησαν, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι.* This comes in the middle of the Syracusans
 carrying off the rest. Diodôros (xiii. 18) puts the burning earlier, as soon
 as it is settled to retreat by land; *ᾧ πάντες ὁμογνώμονες γενόμενοι τῶν νεῶν*
τινὲς ἐνέπρησαν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν παρεσκευάζοντο. If this was the
 right time, one does not see why all should not have been burned. For
 Athenian intentions Thucydides is better authority than Philistos; but
 there is always the chance that Diodôros may have confused something in
 Philistos.

CHAP. VIII. without trouble or hindrance. They fastened them by ropes to their own vessels, and towed them, a brilliant trophy and a precious spoil, to the city¹.

The Syracusans had thus again full possession of their own harbour. Not an Athenian ship was floating there, save those which they were themselves towing off as badges of victory at the sterns of their own victorious triremes. Their own damaged ships they had drawn on shore, their own dead they had taken up and duly honoured. But the waters and the shore of the Great Harbour were still thickly strewn with relics of the sea-fight of yesterday, with broken pieces of Athenian ships, with those lifeless bodies of Athenian warriors on whose behalf the devout Nikias himself had forgotten to ask for the burial-truce². With these last, by a chance unparalleled or nearly so in the annals of Greek warfare, the victors could deal as they thought good. And the discoveries of very recent times have taught us how they did deal with them. Syracuse was not called on to pay the same rites to her slain enemies which she had just paid to her own slain citizens and allies. But to leave the bodies of her slain enemies, the crews of sixty perished triremes, on the waters or on the shore, as a prey to dogs and vultures, would be to infect the air of the Great Harbour and its coasts with the plague of pestilence. A way was found to bury the dead out of sight, if without honour, yet without special insult. The soil of Plêmyrion, as we have already seen³, is thickly honeycombed with primæval tombs. Many, hidden till lately, were dug below the ground, and roofed with that *quasi*-cupola which we have seen so often among the works of both Sikel and Greek. The old resting-places of the older folk stood open or were forced open. Where the primæval

The Athenian dead unburied.

The bodies thrust into the tombs on Plêmyrion.

¹ Thuc. vii. 74. 5; καθ' ἡσυχίαν, οὐθενὸς καλύποντος.

² See above, p. 356.

³ See vol. i. p. 362, and above, p. 252.

dead lay in honour, with their weapons of primæval days, the slain of the late battle were thrust in without order, without heed, wherever room might be found for them. The mouths of their strange sepulchres were fitted with new doors, and there, for two and twenty ages, lay the slain comrades of Nikias and Dêmostenês. At last modern research has brought their frames to light, and has found a way to prove their date by the contemporary coins of Syracuse which lived on when the flesh and the raiment of their owners had crumbled away¹. CHAP. VIII.

Meanwhile a more serious work, as it seemed at the moment, was in doing by land. From this time, as long as action only and not debate is the need, Hermokratês drops out of sight. He is the native adviser; it is the stranger Gylippos who is the doer of everything. When the day of victory and of festival was over, the Syracusans in general recovered their powers of thought and action. All could now see, not only Hermokratês and a few who hearkened to him, that there was still something to be done to make deliverance fully secure. The Syracusans and Gylippos—such is the formula—set forth to block the roads. The undertaking was a large one, as there were several ways by which the defeated invaders might attempt to escape. Their most obvious course, if there were any means of carrying out such a scheme, would be to try to make their way to Katanê². That city would undoubtedly be the best centre for any future warfare against Syracuse. At Katanê they would have a considerable Greek city, thoroughly friendly to their cause, as the starting-point of their operations. And the

No more present mention of Hermokratês.

Gylippos the leader.

The road to be blocked. Choice of roads.

Design to reach Katanê.

¹ See the letter of Sig. Paolo Orsi, describing the researches on Plèmmyrion in July 1890 (since I was last in Sicily) in Cavallaro's *Appendice alla Topografia Archeologica di Siracusa*, Turin and Palermo, 1891.

² See Appendix XXII.

CHAP. VIII. march thither, if unopposed, would be the easiest of any.

No high mountains or difficult passes stood in the way; we have seen with what ease armies had marched to and fro between Syracuse and Katanê earlier in the war¹.

The usual
road to
Katanê.

But by this way it was hardly needful to block the roads; it might almost be said that they were blocked already.

The road to Katanê was simple for men on the north side of Epipolai; it was another business for men on its south side. Another direct attack on the hill, this time from the south, was not to be thought of. To reach the city of refuge, the retreating army would have to do, as it had done in the night attack, to skirt the southern side of the hill, then to go round its western point, the modern Belvedere, and so to march between Epipolai and Mount Thymbris into the low ground by the bay of Trôgilos. Every step of this course would have to be taken in full view of the Syracusan forces on both sides of the hill. The low ground too between Epipolai and Megara would be just such a field as the Syracusan horsemen would wish for to annoy a retreating enemy. It would seem that the proposal to attempt to reach Katanê by this comparatively direct road was actually debated in the Athenian council of war. That it was rejected is not wonderful. But it would seem that in the eyes of the Athenian generals Katanê was still the final goal to be aimed at. The Greek allies could not be got at at once. The immediate object must be to try to reach the friendly Sikels of the inland country. From thence, after needful rest and reinforcement, some path or other might be found to the old head-quarters. Athenian generals could not have wholly turned away their thoughts from the eastern coast. They had no thought of finding an abiding home among the Sikel mountains².

Katanê to
be reached
by a round-
about road
through
the Sikel
country.

The south-
eastern
Sikel land.

The Sikels to whose land the generals determined first to make their way were those who held the high ground of

¹ See above, p. 161.

² See Appendix XXII.



(Jardines) Pecos (1111)



south-eastern Sicily, the region west and south of Syracuse, which reaches its highest point in the heights now called Monte Lauro, so rich in the sources of rivers¹. Motyka and the Heraian Hybla may have been looked to as cities of refuge, whence, after a season of rest, some roundabout road might be found to Katanê. The Syracusan outposts of Akrai and Kasmenai, founded specially to watch over this region, would doubtless be dangerous; but to face them would be less dangerous than to abide in the marshes of Syracuse or to attempt a direct march to Katanê in sight of the Syracusans on Epipolai. The high ground of the Sikels had to be reached by paths very different from a march by León and Thapsos. There was a choice of roads; but all the roads lay through narrow and stony combes in the hills, where what was a road one day might be a mountain-torrent the next. The path would often have to be painfully picked over stones underfoot, and the heights on each side would give every opportunity for archers, darters, or slingers, to aim at the weary wayfarers below. Among paths of this kind two chief choices were offered. The more direct course would make the entrance into the difficult country at a point only a few miles from the Great Harbour, while still almost under the western point of Epipolai. This is the road which leads from Syracuse to the modern Floridia. The other way would be to keep for some time along the road near to the sea, the Helorine road, and to reach the high country up the bed of one of the rivers which run into the sea on the coast below the modern Noto². By the care of Gylippos all these ways were occupied sooner or later; the roads were blocked; guards were set at the fords of all the streams. It is possible that, when the course taken by the Athenians was fully known, the guards of one point may have moved to another. It is certain that,

CHAP. VIII.
 Nature of
 the paths.

Two roads;

by the
 modern
 Floridia

and the
 modern
 Noto.

The roads
 blocked by
 Gylippos.

¹ See vol. I. p. 80.

² See Appendix XXII.

CHAP. VIII. whatever way the Athenians turned, the care of Gylippos had provided enemies to block their further advance.

Beginning
of the re-
treat.

The beginning of the retreat is painted by the great master of contemporary history with all the fulness of his powers. Never in the long record of human sorrow which history unfolds was there a sadder scene. It was not merely the baffled hopes of an army and a commonwealth; it was not merely that of the two great fleets that Athens had sent forth to Sicily not a ship remained to her; it was not merely that danger to themselves and to their city tracked every step of the retreating army. The saddest forms of human wretchedness were there at hand, the wretchedness of friends and comrades who prayed for help, but to whom no help could be given¹. The dead had to be left without funeral rites; men looked on the lifeless bodies of friends and kinsmen, and fear for themselves mingled with their grief². And sadder than the case of the dead, more grievous to the heart to look upon, was the case of the living who had to be left behind, the men who had been smitten down with the sickness of the Syracusan marshes, the men who had been maimed and wounded in the fights on the Syracusan waters. Left to the mercy of the enemy, they groaned, they besought, they clung to their comrades and kinsmen, praying in vain not to be left behind, following as far as their feeble strength would let them, and giving up the vain task with wailing and appeals to the gods³. The host was full of weeping, full of despair; all hearts were downcast; men turned to repentance and blaming of themselves that their voices had helped to bring themselves and their city to

The sick
and
wounded
left be-
hind;

their at-
tempts to
follow.

Despair of
the army.

¹ Thuc. vii. 75. 2; δεινὸν οὖν ἦν οὐ καθ' ἐν μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅτι τὰς τε ταῦς ἀπολωλεκότες πάσας ἀνεχώρουν καὶ ἀντὶ μεγάλης ἐλπίδος καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύοντες· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολείψει τοῦ στρατοπέδου ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὀφείλει ἀλγεῖν καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι.

² Ib. 3; ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο.

³ Ib. 3, 4. Cf. Æsch. Pers. 575; λειφθέντες πρὸς ἀνάγκαν, κ.τ.λ.

such a case¹. It was from hostile ground that they were setting forth; yet they lingered as if they were called on to leave their own soil². The forty thousand men of every class who now set forth from the Athenian camp, were like the people of a whole city, and that no small one, driven forth to seek new homes where they might find them. Had he who made that comparison seen or heard of the sad processions which a few years later went forth from Akragas and from Gela³? The change in condition which many of the Athenian army now underwent was only less than that of a wealthy Akragantine driven forth homeless and penniless. Horsemen and heavy-armed, many of them men of wealth, all of them men used in peace and war to have all wearisome drudgery done for them by slaves, were now driven to carry their own provisions, to do every menial service for themselves. The slaves of some had deserted already; the slaves of others could not be trusted. Before long all were gone; the knightly companions of Alkibiadês had to tend their Sicilian horses with their own hands. One part of their burthen indeed was not heavy; they carried such food as they had, but there was little left in the camp⁴. Yet to many there was one small comfort; democracy had reached the level of equality; the sorrows and sufferings of all were equal⁵.

Grievances
of the
march.

¹ Thuc. vii. 75. 5; κατήκειά τέ τις ἄμα καὶ κατὰ μεμψίς σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλή ἦν.

² Ib. 4; ἀπορία τοιαύτη μὴ βλάβος ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καί περ ἐκ πολέμιας.

³ Ib. 5; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πύλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένη ἐτίκεσαν ἵποφειγούσῃ καὶ οὐ σμερῇ. Surely this comparison is suggested by such scenes as those described by Diodoros, xiii. 89, 111, to which we shall come in our next chapter.

⁴ The words of Thucydides (vii. 75. 5) mark how unusual this was on the part of both horsemen and heavy-armed; οἱ τε ἄλλοι πάντες ἔφερον δ τί τις ἐδύνατο ἑκαστος χρῆσιμον καὶ οἱ δὲ πλῆται καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ σφέτερά αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς δούλοις. "A burthen," says Thirlwall (iii. 452), "which a Roman would not have felt, but to which the Greek was unused."

⁵ Thuc. vii. 75. 6; ἡ ἰσομοῖρία τῶν κακῶν, ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως, τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν, κοίμῃσιν.

CHAP. VIII. Never indeed had men, so their own historian tells us, fallen from such a height of splendour and boasting to such a depth of humiliating sorrow¹. No Greek army had ever before gone through so great a change. They had come forth to enslave others; they now feared leading into captivity for themselves². They had sailed forth amid prayers and pæans; they had now to toil along by land amid voices opposite indeed³. And yet all that they had to bear seemed such as might be endured in the face of the heavier dangers that hung over them⁴.

Zeal and
energy of
Nikias.

But there was one heart in the host that failed not, one man who showed himself at his best when things were at their worst. Nikias, often a loiterer, never a coward, whose head had once been turned by good fortune but whom ill fortune nerved to the highest point, stood forth to exhort and to cheer the downcast host. By one of those strange victories which mind can win over matter, the strong will was master of the feeble body. Bowed down as he was by hopeless sickness, the general passed up and down the line, speaking his words of encouragement, lifting up his voice, as the voice may be lifted up at pressing moments, shouting in his zeal that all might hear and all be stirred by the hearing⁵. His harshest censor becomes gentler as he listens⁶; from that day to the last hour of his darkened life we have nought to tell of Nikias but what is noble.

The stirring words which Thucydides now puts into the

¹ Thuc. vii. 75. 6; ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἷας λαμπρότητος καὶ αἰχμήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἷαν τελευταίην καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφίκτο.

² Ib. 7; ἀντὶ μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἤκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι.

³ Ib.; ἀντὶ δ' εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ' ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι.

⁴ Ib.; ὁμοῖ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπικρεμαμένου ἔτι κινδύνου πάντα ταῦτα αὐτοῖς οἰστὰ ἐφαίνετο.

⁵ Ib. 76; βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον γεγονάνισκον ἀφελεῖν

⁶ Grote, vii. 458.

mouth of Nikias, whether his very words or not, are at least thoroughly characteristic of the man. They may well have been remembered by some of those few among the thousands who stood around him who lived to tell the tale at Athens or elsewhere. Or, if we simply look on them as the words that Thucydides thought that Nikias was likely to speak at such a moment, their value is hardly lessened. It is a fitting speech for the devout man in distress, the man whose faith in the gods has not passed away, even when their hand seems so heavy on him and his army. Nikias bids them still keep hope; others have been saved out of depths even lower than they were now in. Let them not despair or blame themselves¹. Let them look at himself, whom his sickness made worse off than any other man in the army. He had once been famous for his good luck in private and public; now he was in the same danger as the meanest². Yet he had ever done his duty to gods and men; he had been pious, righteous, and bountiful. With a conscience void of offence, he still had hope for the future; even such ill luck as theirs did not frighten him as otherwise it might³. Their sorrows had now reached their height; they were therefore likely to lessen. The gods were said to envy great good luck on the part of men. If they had ever envied the Athenian host, the penalty was already paid. The enemy was now more likely to be the object of such envy. Others had invaded land of their neighbours, and had both done and suffered as men may do and suffer. So had they; the gods would now look more kindly on them; they would deem them worthy, not of envy but of pity⁴. And they

CHAP. VIII.
Speech of
Nikias.

His faith
and hope.

Envy of
the gods.

¹ Thuc. vii. 77. 1; μηδὲ καταμέμψασθαι ἑμᾶς ἄγαν αὐτούς.

² Ib. 2; οὐτ' εὐτυχία δοκῶν που ὑστερός του εἶναι, κ.τ.λ. On the εὐτυχία of Nikias see above, p. 233.

³ Ib. 3; αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι. For several possible meanings, see Jowett, i. 541, ii. 453.

⁴ Ib.; τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ λαφύσειαν· ἰκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ

CHAP. VIII. still had human hopes. Such a host of armed men mar-
 The army shall in their array would be at once a city wherever
 still strong; they sat down¹. No town of Sicily could withstand them
 no town in they as invaders or turn them out when they had once fixed
 Sicily could as themselves on any spot. As for the march, it was for
 resist them. themselves to make it safe by keeping good order. On
 Orders for the march. whatever spot they might be constrained to fight, let each
 man look on it as a country and a castle, which, if he wins,
 he may keep as his own². The march must be speedy,
 by night as well as by day, as their stock of provisions was
 small. But as soon as they reached any friendly spot of
 Friendly disposition of the Sikels. Sikel ground, they would be safe. Fear of Syracuse made
 the Sikels firm friends of Athens³; messages had been
 already sent to them to meet the army and bring pro-
 visions. And to wind up all, he added, remember that to
 Last exhortation. be valiant men is now for you a matter of utmost need;
 there is no place near where a coward can find shelter⁴.
 But if ye now escape your enemies, the rest of you may
 again see the homes that they long to see, and those who
 are Athenians will be able to raise again the mighty power
 of Athens, fallen as it is. For it is men that make a city,
 not walls or ships empty of men.

The march When the general had finished his speech, he and the
 begins. army set forth from their camp. They forsook the last
 Septem- spot of Syracusan ground which they still held, that piece
 ber 11, 413.

εἰ τῷ θεῶν ἐπιφθονοὶ ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα . . . οἴκετον γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου. The doctrine set forth by Amasis in Herod. iii. 40 is here taken for granted.

¹ Thuc. vii. 77. 4; *λογίζεσθε δὲ ὅτι αὐτοὶ τε πόλιν εὐθύς ἐσθε, ὅποι ἂν καθέζησθε.* So more emphatically at the end of the speech; *ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλιν καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.* Cf. the passages of the poets collected by Mr. Jowett, ii. 454.

² Ib. 5; *μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡγησάμενος ἕκαστος ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ χωρὶς μάχεσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πατρίδα καὶ τεῖχος κρατήσας ἔχειν.*

³ Ib. 6; *οἷτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ Συρακοσίων δέος ἐτι βέβαιοι εἰσὶ.*

⁴ Ib. 7; *ὥς μὴ ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθῆιτε.*

of the shore of the Great Harbour which lay between their double walls. The possession of those walls gave them the command of all the roads that started from the gate of Achradina, subject to the danger that they might find all alike blocked at convenient points by Syracusan guards. Of the two roads open to them, the Helorine road by the sea, that part of it at least which lay near to Syracuse, was open to the obvious objection that it would at once lead them to the Syracusan post at the Olympieion. The other and somewhat higher road by the present Florida might turn out to be blocked at this post or that; but there was no such certain and immediate obstacle awaiting them. The Helorine road too led directly to quite other parts of Sicily, from which any road to Katanê would be roundabout indeed. The path by Florida would sooner bring them to the hills from which they looked for their help, or at all events to the rough passes by which those hills might be reached. The upper road therefore was chosen.

CHAP. VIII.

The two roads.

The road by Florida chosen.

The early part of the road by which they were to march is neither a dead flat nor does it cross any considerable height. It goes down to the Anapos, and thence rises again to the town of Florida. But the Anapos had to be crossed; it was certain that it would have to be crossed in the face of an enemy; the ground too afforded plenty of opportunities for the Syracusan horsemen and darters to annoy the march of the Athenian heavy-armed. To that kind of force the great mass of the retreating army belonged; we do once, at the very last stage of all, get a moment's glimpse of the Athenian horsemen¹; but that is all. They marched in the shape of a hollow oblong, the unwarlike following with the baggage being placed in the middle². Nikias led the van, while Dêmostenês com-

First day's march.

Order of the march.

¹ Thuc. vii. 83. 1, and below, p. 389.

² Ib. 78. 2; τοὺς δὲ σκευοφόρους καὶ τὸν πλείστον ὄχλον ἐντὸς ἄχρον οἱ ὀπίσσω. These, whatever their race or condition, are distinct from the personal slaves of the horsemen and heavy-armed.

CHAP. VIII. manded the rear. The energy to which the elder general
Continued had been kindled by the strait in which he found himself
energy of Nikias. was not spent in his words of exhortation. In spite of his
toils and griefs and his grievous sickness, Nikias kept his
eye on his whole line. If any part seemed out of order, he
was there at once to marshal the line and to do all that a
younger captain in full health could have done at such a
moment. Dêmostenês did the like; but throughout the
march better order was kept under the command of Nikias
than under that of Dêmostenês.

First fight- The first time that the army came to actual fighting
ing at with any enemy was when they reached the Anapos.
crossing Where the present road crosses it, it is a narrow stream
the An- with steep banks. There they found their advance checked
pos. by the Syracusans and their allies who defended the pas-
sage. Those who were employed on this particular service
could have been only a small part of the Syracusan army.

The Athe- In anything like a regular fight the Athenians still had
nians the advantage; they forced the passage, and put its de-
always the fenders to flight. What wore out the strength of the
better in retreating army was not actual encounters, in which blows
actual fighting. could be given and returned. It was the constant harassing
They force warfare of the horsemen and darters, who seized every
the pas- occasion on the march to make desultory attacks, which
sage. the heavy-armed had no means of returning. The attacks
Action of of the horsemen went on wherever the ground made it
the Syra- possible, as it was during the whole of the first day's
cusan march. This carried them about five miles from their
horsemen starting-point. For the night they encamped, we are told,
and darters. on a hill, perhaps at the top of the ascent immediately
above the Anapos, before Florida is reached¹.

First night. The immediate object of the retreating army now was
The to reach a rocky height known as the Akraian cliff, which
Akraian doubtless took its name from the Syracusan settlement
cliff.

¹ Thuc. vii. 78. 4; *ἡλίσσαντο πρὸς λόφῳ τινι.*

at Akrai. Could they once reach and master that point, CHAP. VIII. they would be on the high ground, within reach of their Sikel allies. With them they might rest awhile, and devise the means of reaching Katanê by some roundabout path. But the approach to the cliff was no easy matter. The road to it lay through a most rough pass, which The pass. begins just below the present town of Floridia, and is now known as *Cava Spampinato* or *Calatrella*, the latter a name that speaks of Saracen occupation. The cliff itself, the end of the lands now known as *Monasterello*, stands at the point of junction of this combe and another of the same kind¹. As soon as the Syracusans were certain of The Syracusans build a wall across the pass. the point at which the retreating force was aiming, a party was sent on to build a wall across the pass. Meanwhile the second day's march of the Athenians had led them only over twenty stadia. This implies ceaseless harassing on the part of the Syracusan horsemen and darters, though it is not directly mentioned. The place of their second Second night. September 12. night's encampment was on a rough piece of ground to which they had to go down. This, though there may be some difficulty as to the exact distance, seems to agree very well with some of the ground immediately below Floridia to the south, ground now crossed by a modern viaduct². The present town seems to have had a fore-runner of some kind; for one object in the choice of the encampment was to take food out of the houses, and water³. This last was not likely to be plentiful in their march up the rugged combe. On the third day the Third day's march. September 13. Athenians set forth to attempt their hard march to the cliff. They were annoyed on their way by the horsemen and darters; the darters would have every opportunity all

¹ Thuc. vii. 78. 5; ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερός καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν χαράδρα κρημνώδης ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Ἀκραῖον λέγας. See Appendix XXII.

² See Appendix XXII.

³ Thuc. vii. 78. 4; βουλόμενοι ἐκ τε τῶν οἰκῶν λαβεῖν τι ἐδάδιμον (ψικεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος) καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι αὐτόθεν.

CHAP. VIII. along the line, and there are points where the sides of the pass sink so low that the horsemen also could get at the struggling heavy-armed. The Athenians made fight for a while; but at last they lost heart and went back to their camp of the night before. There they again spent the night, but with a smaller stock of provisions; the horsemen hindered their leaving their camp to plunder or forage¹.

Third
night.

Fourth
day's
march.
Septem-
ber 14.
The pass
blocked
and
guarded.

It was no slight task for forty thousand men, armed and unarmed—less indeed by so many as had been killed or had strayed away or had sunk from mere weariness during the three days' march—to make their way, and to keep some kind of order in making it, along a frightfully rugged path, with darts every moment hurled down on their heads, and with occasional charges of horse on their flanks. But they still struggled on through the fourth day's march, striving against all hindrances, till they at last came in sight of the point for which they were striving. But a wall had arisen between them and the cliff, and behind the wall was a body of Syracusan heavy-armed, ranged in the narrow pass. They were, in the military language of the time, not a few shields deep². And on the rock itself was posted a large body of darters, who, from their high place, could take good aim at the men who were struggling on below. Yet the Athenians attacked the wall, and strove to carry the position by force³. Whatever may have been the strength of the hasty barrier in itself, they failed to storm it in the face of the thick ranges of shields and spears behind it, and under the ceaseless shower of missiles falling from above. When the attempt was found to be hopeless, they turned round; they marched some way from the barrier, and halted to rest awhile. During this halt of

The Athe-
nians turn
back.

¹ Thuc. vii. 78. 6; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οὐδὲν τε ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

² Ib. 79. 1; εὗρον πρὸ ἐαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποτειχίσματος τὴν πεζὴν στρατιὰν παρατεταγμένην οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἀσπίδων. See above, pp. 169, 170.

³ Ib. 2; προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτειχομάχουν.

the Athenians the rain and thunder common in the autumn season came on. To men already disheartened by toil and failure the ordinary course of nature seemed something strange and terrible; the rain and thunder were surely sent by the gods for their destruction¹. Their spirits sank yet lower; yet they still had heart to strike a blow when they were all but hopelessly hemmed in within the fatal pass. For, while they were halting, Gylippos sent on a party by some side path—it would be easy to find such—to throw up another wall between their halting-place and their camp of the night before. Even now, when it comes to actual fighting, the Athenians have the better. A party was sent on in advance which succeeded in hindering the Syracusans from carrying out their work. The rest followed; they seem to have made their way out of the pass at the end near Florida. On the fourth night they encamped on the plain; that is, no longer in the bottom below Florida, but in the more level ground above².

The fifth day's work was the result of a certain change of plan. The generals now gave up the thought of forcing their way to that particular cliff by that particular pass. Their object seems now to have been to find some other road, some other pass, in the same neighbourhood; which might lead them to the high ground, and which the Syracusans might not have occupied³. On this errand they now set forth. But, now that they were on more level ground, the attacks of the Syracusans, now above all those of the horsemen, became more galling than ever. Horsemen and darters pressed on them from every side; they were surrounded by enemies; if the Athenians advanced, the assailants gave way; if they fell back, the

¹ Thuc. vii. 79. 3; ἐνόμισον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ τὰυτα πάντα γενέσθαι. The feeling had been the other way at an earlier stage. See above, p. 173, and Grote, vii. 465.

² Ib. 5; πρὸς τὸ πεδὶον ὑψίσαντο.

³ See Appendix XXII.

CHAP. VIII. assailants pressed upon them. They specially harassed the rear, the division of Dêmostenês, hoping that, if they could put one part of the army to flight, a general panic might seize on the whole¹. But though many were wounded, the army still kept its order. The attacks however had been so ceaseless that, in the course of the whole day, they had advanced only five or six stadia, a good deal under a mile. At that distance they halted, still on the level ground². The Syracusans also withdrew for the night to their camp, of the place of which we have no hint.

Fifth
night.

Change of
plan.

The night that followed was spent by the Athenian generals in debates as to the course now to be followed. The discussion led to a complete change of plan. The design of reaching the Sikel country by the road by which they had thus far striven to reach it, or by any other road in what we may call the region of the Anapos, was altogether given up. The scheme had broken down; there was no hope of success in that quarter. Provisions too had nearly failed, and the number of those who had been wounded in the ceaseless attacks of the enemy was very great³. Nikias and Dêmostenês therefore determined to attempt their escape by a wholly different path. They gave up the thought of reaching Katanê, even by the most roundabout and rugged of roads⁴. The new march was to be towards Kamarina and Gela, and the other towns, Greek and barbarian, in that quarter. If they could make their way from their present position into the Helorine road, at some point well out of reach of the garrison of the Olympieion, they had a reasonable chance of escape. The very care with which the Syracusans had

March
by the
Helorine
road to the
south-east.

¹ Thuc. vii. 79. 5; *μάλιστα τοῖς ὑστάτοις προσπίπτοντες, εἰ πως κατὰ βραχὺ τρεφόμενοι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα φοβήσειαν.*

² Ib. 6; *προελθόντες πέντε ἢ ἑξ σταδίων, ἀνεπαύοντο ἐν τῇ πεδίῳ.*

³ Ib. 80. 1. Where their state is set forth with some emphasis.

⁴ Ib. 2. See Appendix XXII.

occupied the passes by which the Athenians were expected to march gave them some hope. Some distant point of this road might be found unguarded, and they might be able to reach the Sikel hills from that side without further hindrance. CHAP. VIII.

The district to which we have now to turn our thoughts is that which lies round the modern towns of Noto and Avola, where a number of rivers empty themselves into the eastern sea of Sicily. All of them are necessarily crossed by the road from Syracuse to Helôron. These streams are largely of the nature of *fiumare*, stony beds; the amount of water in them depends largely on the weather and on the time of the year. What is a mere expanse of stones one day may be a rushing torrent the next. It was the rainy season of the year, as the Athenian army had lately felt; there is further every reason to think that, before Sicily was so cruelly shorn of its woods, the average amount of water in these beds was much greater than it is now. The rivers then, when the retreating army had to cross them in the time of autumn, may well have been found greater hindrances than they seem to a modern traveller who passes them at an earlier time of the year. The south-eastern rivers.

The first in the series, the one most to the north, is that which in our narrative is called Kakyparis, that is, there can be no reasonable doubt, the modern *Cassibile*. The Kakyparis or Cassibile. This stream runs through a deep combe among the mountains, the *Cava Cassibile*, which would form an approach to the Sikel lands in that quarter far easier than that by which the Athenian army had tried to reach the Akraian cliff. The road is far less rough, and, though the windings of the stream may cause it to be crossed several times, it could not, as its course lay within the gorge, become any hindrance to the march of an army by that road. The combe gradually opens into the more level ground by the

CHAP. VIII. sea, into which the Kakyparis makes its way by a wider mouth than might have been expected from its present size only a little way inland. But at the point where it was crossed by the Helorine road¹, at a very slight distance from the sea, its crossing could present no difficulty now, and it would seem from the story to have presented none then. The new plan of the Athenian generals was to make their way into the Helorine road at a point not very far north of that where it crossed the Kakyparis. They hoped that the Syracusans would not have occupied these more distant passes. And if Kakyparis could have been reached and found undefended, a march up the pleasant combe through which his stream flows would, in its earlier stages at least, have been a holiday undertaking after the fearful toil of the struggle along the stony gorge between Florida and the Akraian cliff.

The passage of the Kakyparis guarded by the Syracusans.

But Gylippos and Hermokratês were not men to be easily deceived. They had most likely already secured the passages of the rivers as one of the possible ways by which the Athenians might attempt to escape. It is mentioned that the Athenians looked for their Sikel allies to meet them at the point where the road crosses the Kakyparis. If any such had been waiting there all these days since the despatch of the first message of Nikias², they had gone away in despair or had been driven away. Most likely a new message had been sent after the partial change of plan on the night of the fourth day³; a more thorough change of course had now become possible. And the watchful eyes of Gylippos and Hermokratês had doubtless marked the chance also. In any case the Syracusans were beforehand with their retreating enemies. On the

¹ See Appendix XXII.

² Thuc. vii. 77. 6. See above, p. 372, and Appendix XXII.

³ See Appendix XXII.

morning which followed the debate of the fifth night in the Athenian camp, the ford of Kakyparis was held, not by Sikel allies of Athens, but by a Syracusan detachment busily employed in defending the passage with a wall and palisade ¹.

The resolution of the Athenian generals was no sooner taken than it was carried out. And it was carried out so skilfully as for the moment to deceive the Syracusans, and so to gain at least the advantage of time. The Athenian army left its post while it was still night, having lighted a number of fires to make the enemy believe that they were still there². They then set out in the same order as before, Nikias commanding the van and Dêmostenês the rear. But the two divisions presently parted asunder. A retreat by night in the neighbourhood of an enemy was not a hopeful work or one favourable to discipline. Panic and superstitious dread came upon the army. So, our guide remarks, it is apt to happen to all armies, and the greater the army the greater the danger of this kind³. The rear, under Dêmostenês, was specially smitten in this way. The rear is in any case the part of the army most likely to fall into confusion, and whatever was left of the unwarlike centre of the original square⁴ was likely to lag behind with the rear rather than to speed on with the van. The division of Dêmostenês now fell altogether out of order and lagged behind, while the van, under Nikias, now spoken of as a separate army, kept their ranks better, and marched on with greater speed. It was the object of Nikias to press on as fast as might be. He thought that safety was most likely to be had, not by

CHAP. VIII.

Sixth day's
march ;
towards the
Helobrine
road.
September
16.

The two
divisions
part
asunder.

Panic in
the divi-
sion of
Dêmo-
sthenees.

¹ Thuc. vii. 80. 5; *εδρον και ενταυθα φυλακήν τινα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἀποτεχιζουσάν τε και ἀποσταυρούσαν τὸν πόρον*. See Appendix XXII.

² Ib. 1; *πυρὰ καίσαντες ὡς πλείστα ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν*.

³ Ib. 3; *ὅσον φιλεῖ και πᾶσι στρατοπέδοις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς μεγίστοις, φόβοι και δέσματα ἐγγίγνεσθαι . . . ἐμπίπτει παραχῇ*.

⁴ See above, p. 373.

CHAP. VIII. stopping to fight, but by escaping with all haste, fighting only where fighting could not be avoided¹. By daybreak this front division, far in advance of that of Dêmostenês², had reached the Helorine road, the road by the sea, as distinguished from the inland hills which had been the scene of their earlier march³. Along this road they marched till they came to the point where it goes down with a steep descent to the ford of the Kakyparis. No Sikels were there to help and guide them up the combe; they saw the Syracusan detachment on the other side still busy with their fortification. The spirit of the Athenians was not yet worn out with their toils; once more, when it comes to actual fighting, they have the better. The ground gave them some help; they charged down the steep bank of the stream; they crossed the ford, and drove away the Syracusans from their works on the lower ground on the right bank⁴. Even in this last stage of their struggles, they had thus much of success to cheer them.

Nicias in advance.

The Athenians pass the Kakyparis.

The way by the Kakyparis given up.

They march on to the Erineos.

But the fact that no Sikels had come to help them and that a Syracusan party was there to withstand them put an end to every thought that the Athenian army could reach the hill country of the Sikels by way of the gorge of the Kakyparis. They might reasonably expect to find the pass occupied and fortified against them; they may likely enough have seen Syracusan soldiers actually posted on the lower hills which command its entrance. Their Sikel guides, guides who had doubtless led them through the whole of the march, counselled them to go on to another

¹ Thuc. vii. 81. 3; *θᾶσσον ὁ Νικίας ἦγε, νομίζον οὐ τὸ ὑπομένειν ἐν τῇ τοιοῦτῃ ἐκόντας εἶναι καὶ μάχεσθαι σωτηρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς τάχιστα ὑποχωρεῖν, τοσαῦτα μαχομένους ὅσα ἀναγκάζονται.*

² Ib. 80. 3; *τὸ μὲν Νικίου στράτευμα, ὥσπερ ἡγεῖτο, ξυνέμενέ τε καὶ προύλαβε πολλῶ.* See Appendix XXII.

³ Ib. 4. See Appendix XXII.

⁴ Ib. See Appendix XXII.

river, the Erineos¹. There was of course the chance that they might find some undefended way among the mountains. There was the chance that the Syracusans whom they had driven from the ford of the Kakyparis were the most distant of Syracusan outposts, and that now their course in any direction that they might choose might be uninterrupted. In any case pressing on was less dangerous than falling back. They marched on therefore as far as the Erineos. They reached this point late in the day, and Nikias settled his army for the night on some high ground near the river². The topography here is somewhat more difficult than in the case either of the Kakyparis, the first river in this part of their march, or of the last, namely the Assinaros. Both these are clearly marked; it is less easy to fix which of several streams is the Erineos. North of the town of Avola is a small stream called the *Elanici*, a name which might possibly stand to *Erineos* in the same relation in which *Cassibile* stands to *Kakyparis*. Between the towns of Avola and Noto there is one most picturesque narrow gorge on a small scale, with steep banks and signs of primæval burrowings, known by the name of *Maralidi*. Further on there is a wider and gentler dip, called *La Cavallata*, dry certainly at times, but seemingly full of water at others. Just beyond it is the end of a range of hills, which would very well serve the purposes of Nikias as a shelter and as an outlook³. On one of these hills or on some other point along the line of way, the army abode for the sixth night of their retreat. In the morning they were startled by the appearance of their Syracusan enemies, who had, by the mouth of a Syracusan herald, a frightful tale to tell them. The division of Nikias was now the only representative on Sicilian ground of the two great

CHAP. VIII.

Sixth night.

Question as to the Erineos.

Seventh day, September 17.

News of the other division.

¹ Thuc. vii. 80. 5; ταύτη γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐκίλευον. See Appendix XXII.

² Ib. 82. 4; Νικίας καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀφικνοῦνται ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν, καὶ διαβὰς πρὸς μετέωρον τι καθύπερθε τὴν στρατίαν. See Appendix XXII.

³ See Appendix XXII.

CHAP. VIII. armaments which Athens had sent forth to win the mastery of Sicily and the western seas.

Sixth day. On the morning of the day before, as soon as it was
September known that the Athenian force had decamped in the night,
16. there was great wrath in the camp of Syracuse. Syra-

Gylippos
and the
Athenians.

cusans and allies joined in a general cry against Gylippos, charging him with having allowed the enemy to escape¹. This suspicion is one of several signs that the feeling towards the Athenians, and specially towards Nikias, which was felt by or attributed to the Lacedæmonian was wholly different from that either of the native Syracusans or of the kinsfolk who had thrown themselves heart and soul into the Syracusan cause. When we think of the earlier career of Nikias, his long friendship for Sparta and his negotiation of the peace which bears his name, it seems likely that he and Gylippos may have been personal acquaintances; they may even have been personal friends. At any rate Nikias and his army would be to Gylippos simply men whom his duty to his own city made his enemies in war. There was nothing to fill his mind with that fierce call to vengeance which stirred the heart of every Syracusan, and which would be fully shared by Corinthians and Leukadians who came to help their daughter or sister city in time of danger. It was only natural that the charge of showing undue and even treasonable favour to the invaders, if brought against any man, should be brought against Gylippos. The story almost reads as if the Syracusan army hardly waited for orders to pursue the fugitives. There could be little doubt as to the road by which they had gone, and the pursuit was made with all speed². The division of Dêmôsthenês, once

The Syra-
cusans
pursue.

¹ Thuc. vii. 81. 1; *οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι . . . ἐν αἰτίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν Γύλιππον εἶχον ἐκόντα ἀφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.*

² Directly after the last note follows; *καὶ κατὰ τάχος δάκοντες, ᾧ οὐ χαλεπῶς ᾔσθάνοντο κεχωρηκότας, καταλαμβάνουσι περὶ ἀρίστου ὁδου.* This looks almost like popular action.

the rereward of the whole force and containing more than half the army¹, had not with daylight fully shaken off the panic terrors of the night. Their march was so much slower and so much less orderly than that of the division of Nikias, that of the two parts of the army neither knew anything of the fate of the other. We cannot suppose that Dêmostenês did not fully share the wish of Nikias to press on with all speed; but, placed in the rear, exposed to the first attack of the enemy, and commanding a disheartened and now disordered force, he could not keep up with his colleague². When therefore the Syracusans caught him up, about the hour of the morning meal, seemingly before he had reached the Helorine road, he was more than six miles behind the division of Nikias³. At this point the last fight of the best soldier that Athens had left to her was to begin.

The division of Dêmostenês overtaken.

It was against hard odds that the man of Pylos had to strive the last time that he met a Lacedæmonian enemy face to face. The fight was of the kind of which we have seen so many in these few days, a fight in which the heavy-armed, wearied and disheartened, could do nothing against the ceaseless desultory attacks of the horsemen and darters⁴. Dêmostenês and his men were at last surrounded in a difficult piece of ground. A space thick with olive-trees, fenced in by a wall, was crossed by a road from one end to the other⁵. It had been the estate of Polyzélos, son of Deino-

Last fight of Dêmostenês.

Olive-yard of Polyzélos.

¹ Thuc. vii. 80. 3; τὸ ἥμισυ μάλιστα καὶ πλέον.

² Ib.; ἀπεσπύσθη τε καὶ ἀτακτότερον ἐχώρει. 81. 2; προσέμειψαν [οἱ Συρακούσιοι] τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους, ὑστέριοι τε οὖσι καὶ σχολαίτερον καὶ ἀτακτότερον χωροῦσιν, ὥς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν.

³ Ib. 3; τὸ δὲ Νικίου στρατεύμα ἀπεῖχεν ἐν τῇ πρόσθεν καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίοις. See Appendix XXII.

⁴ Ib. 81. 2, 3; οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακούσιων ἐκυκλοῦντό τε ῥῶαν αὐτοὺς ὄψα δὴ ὄντας καὶ ξυνήρην ἐς ταῦτό . . . ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης . . . οὐ προύχωρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦνταί τε ἐπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορόβῳ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν.

⁵ Ib.; ἀνελθόντες ἐς τι χωρίον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἑνθεν

CHAP. VIII. *menês*, brother of three tyrants, but himself no tyrant.

It still bore his name, a name doubtless still honoured in Syracuse¹. Some chance or heedlessness must have led the retreating force into so untoward a spot; when they were in it, the Syracusans knew how to make the best of their advantage. They shrank from any general attack, from any near fighting. They thought that it might still be dangerous to risk a struggle face to face with desperate men. Their own superiority was now so clear that it was not wise to jeopard it at the last moment by any untoward chance². And with this was now mingled another feeling, that by which the thought of success gradually softens into something like the thought of mercy. Men began to feel that the leading into captivity of the invading host would be a more striking symbol of Syracusan victory than their slaughter³.

Message of
Gylippos
to the
Ægean
islanders.

When therefore the whole day had been passed in harassing attacks on the Athenians on every side, when the strength of the enemy was clearly failing through wounds and weariness and hunger, towards evening a herald was sent to the Athenian army—it was sent to the army rather than to the general—bearing a message in the name of Gylippos and the Syracusans and their allies⁴. An appeal

καὶ ἐνθεν, ἑλλάς τε οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν. On *ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν* see Arnold, iii. 423; Grote, vii. 469. I go with Grote.

¹ Plut. Nik. 27; *ἄχρι οὗ Δημοσθένης ἑάλω καὶ τὸ μετ' ἐκείνου στράτευμα περὶ τὴν Πολυζήλειον αὐλὴν ἐν τῷ διαμάχεσθαι καὶ ὑπολείπεσθαι κυκλωθὲν.* See Appendix XXII. Plutarch is not describing the march of *Dēmosthenēs* in any detail; but he preserves this bit of topography in the words of one who could take it for granted. The memories of *Polyzēlos* concerned *Philistos*; they did not concern *Thucydides*.

² Thuc. vii. 81. 3, 4; . . . *ἐβάλλοντο περιστάδον. τοιαύταις δὲ προσβολαῖς καὶ οὐ βυσταδὸν μάχαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐχρῶντο· τὸ γὰρ ἀποκινδυνεύειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀπονενοημένους οὐ πρὸς ἐκείνων μᾶλλον ἦν ἔτι ἢ πρὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων.*

³ Ib. 4; *καὶ ἅμα φοιδῷ τέ τις ἐγίγνετο ἐπ' εὐπραγίᾳ ἥδη σαφεῖ μὴ προσαναλωθῆναι τῷ, καὶ ἐνὸμζον καὶ ὅς ταύτῃ τῇ ἰδέᾳ καταδαμασάμενοι λήψεσθαι αὐτούς.*

⁴ Ib. 82. 1; *κῆρυγμα ποιοῦνται Γύλιππος καὶ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ῥόμμαχοι.*

was made to that part of the Athenian army which might be supposed to be serving against its will. Athenian citizens, hired mercenaries, allies who had taken the Athenian side of their own free will, must all take the consequences of their voluntary acts. But the islanders of the *Ægean* were guiltless of any evil will towards Syracuse or her allies; they were there simply at the bidding of a haughty mistress in whose ambitious designs they had no real interest. The proclamation of Gylippos promised safety and freedom to all the islanders who would come over to the Syracusan side¹. The contingents of a few islands—the names are not given—accepted these terms. But the great body of the class to whom the tempting offer was made declined to forsake their Athenian comrades². It must be remembered that the general feeling among the subject allies of Athens towards the ruling city was not one of active hatred. The Athenian supremacy offended the Greek instinct which demanded full independence for every city, great or small; but it was not a rule of heavy oppression. It was in most cities preferred to the rule of the local oligarchs³. But perhaps stronger still was the feeling of military honour and comradeship. Soldiers of Athens, by whatever means they had become such, they would not forsake Athens in her distress.

General
faithful-
ness of the
Athenian
allies.

After the first message of which so little had come a second followed. Its result was a capitulation by which the whole remaining army of Dêmostenês surrendered themselves to Gylippos and the Syracusans. They surrendered on the simple promise that no man should be

Surrender
of the
division
of Dêmo-
sthenês.

¹ Thuc. vii. 82. 1; *πρῶτον μὲν τῶν νησιωτῶν εἰ τις βούλεται ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ ὡς σφῶς ἀπέναι*.

² *Ib.*; *ἀπεχώρησάν τινες πόλεις ὁ πολλαί*. They acted by cities, which almost suggests a vote in each division.

³ I need not point out that Grote has much to say on this head in several places. See also the account of the affairs in Samos; Thuc. viii. 63-76.

CHAP. VIII. put to death by violence or by bonds—that is by such imprisonment as would amount to a lingering death—or by lack of necessary food¹. The terms were harsh and vague; they would not be broken if every man were sold in the slave-market; but they were at least less harsh than the measure which Athens had dealt out to enemies who had given far less provocation. And the general himself was not included in them. The lofty spirit of Dêmôsthênês, having secured some small measure of mercy for his soldiers, disdained to make any terms for himself. His day was over; life had no more charms for him, least of all life as a captive of victorious Syracuse. And death at the bidding of victorious Syracuse was a more hateful prospect than death by his own hand. As soon as the agreement was made, Dêmôsthênês drew his sword and sought to slay himself; but the enemy gathered round him and hindered his purpose². Lamachos had died fighting by land and Eurymedôn by sea; the fate of their renowned colleague was harder.

He makes
no terms
for himself.

He tries
to kill
himself.

Number
of the
prisoners.

The division which he commanded had been so thinned by the ceaseless toils of so many days that, out of a full half of the whole host of forty thousand that had set forth from before Syracuse, the men who came under the terms of the capitulation numbered six thousand only³. Wearied, wounded, helpless, the Athenian heavy-armed, still more the horsemen of whom we have as yet heard so little, even now

¹ Thuc. vii. 82. 2; πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μετὰ Δημοσθένους ῥητορική γίνεται, ὥστε ὅπλα τε παραδοῦναι καὶ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν μηδένα μήτε βιαίως μήτε δεσμοῖς μήτε τῆς ἀναγκαιοτάτης ἐνδείᾳ διαίτης.

² Plut. Nik. 27; αὐτὸς δὲ Δημοσθένης σπασάμενος τὸ ξίφος ἐπληξε μὲν αὐτὸν, οὐ μὴν ἀπέθανε. τάχῃ τῶν πολεμίων περσυχόντων καὶ συλλαβόντων αὐτόν. Whence this comes we might guess; we learn for certain from Pausanias, i. 29. 12; γράφω δὲ οὐδὲν διάφορα ἢ Φίλιστος, ὃς ἔφη Δημοσθένην μὲν σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὡς ἤλσκετο, αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνειν. Cf. Grote, vii. 470; Thirlwall, iii. 456. They knew the nature of evidence.

³ Thuc. vii. 82. 3.

kept something of worldly wealth about them. They were bidden to give up their money by throwing it into shields held with the hollow side upwards. Four such shields were filled with the coins¹. The captive remnant of one division of the Athenian army, with their renowned general, the victor in so many gallant enterprises, were then led with all speed as prisoners to Syracuse². The other division, too far ahead of them to know anything of their fate, were still encamped in Syracusan territory. The object of the victorious Syracusans was now to bring them too into the city in the same case as their comrades.

CHAP. VIII.

His division led prisoners to Syracuse.
Division of Nikias.
Sixth night.

The news of this day's work was brought the next morning, the morning of the seventh day since the beginning of the retreat, to the ears of Nikias and his army. They were still on their post by the Erineos when the Syracusan herald came to announce to the general that his colleague and all his division had become prisoners of the Syracusans. Let him, the message added, surrender in the same sort³. Nikias at first refused to believe the tale. A short truce was agreed on, in order that an Athenian horseman⁴ might go and bring word whether it were so or not. The horseman went. He must have overtaken the sad procession of his countrymen on their way to Syracuse; he came back to announce that the tale of the herald was true. Nikias then sent his herald to Gylippos and the Syracusans. He did not offer a surrender—he still commanded several thousand men with arms in their hands, which they could still use with effect whenever the enemy came to close

Seventh day.
September 17.

The surrender of Dêmôsthênês announced to Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vii. 82. 3. See Grote, vii. 460. According to the reckonings of Mr. Arthur Evans (Syracusan Medallions, 132), the sum would be about 333,333 drachmas. He suggests that the military chest was carried in this way by the men.

² Thuc. vii. 82. 4; εὐθὺς ἀπεκόμζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

³ Ib. 83. 1; κελεύοντες πακύνον τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶν.

⁴ Ib.; ἑνὲς πέμψαι σπεύόμενον. It is plural in the Syracusan version. Plut. Nik. 27.

CHAP. VIII. quarters. He proposed terms of peace, at all events terms of ransom for his own division; of those who had already surrendered nothing was said. He asked that the remnant of the Athenian army should be allowed to go free, on condition that Athens should repay to Syracuse the whole costs of the war, and till payment should be made, should give hostages, an Athenian citizen for each talent¹. As a confession of defeat, such terms were humiliating enough to Athens, and they promised a welcome contribution to the Syracusan hoard. They were of course open to the objection which applies to all conventions of the kind made between military commanders. Nikias had no authority to bind the Athenian people to any terms². And the terms which he proposed did not fall in with the immediate frame of mind of the Syracusan people and their leaders. Above all temptations of money, even above the longing for a bloody revenge, came the yearning for one special and symbolic form of Syracusan triumph, the leading of the captive host of Athens and her captive generals as bondmen into Syracuse. Gylippos too, as we shall presently see, had his own personal wish on the matter, which would be disappointed if Nikias were allowed to lead away a ransomed but not a captive army³. The Spartan commander therefore agreed with the Syracusans in refusing the terms proposed by Nikias. Shouts of threatening and reviling spoke the general mind of the army. The struggle, if we can call it so, the hurling of darts from the Syracusan side, at once began again⁴. Parts of two more fearful days were yet to pass before all was over.

Nikias' proposal of peace.

His terms refused.

During the rest of the day which followed the surrender

¹ Thuc. vii. 83. 2; Plut. Nik. 27.

² See above, p. 66.

³ See below, p. 404.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 83. 3; *οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καὶ Γύλιππος οὐ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ προσπεισόντες καὶ περιστάντες πανταχόθεν ἔβαλλον*. Plut. Nik. 27; *οἱ δ' οὐ προσείχον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὕβριν καὶ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀπειλοῦντες ἔβαλλον*. Here is another little touch from the eye-witness.

of the division of Dêmôsthênês, the day on which that sur- CHAP. VIII.
render was announced to Nikias, the Athenians still kept Their stay
their post on the hill which they had occupied near the by the
Erineos. They were now well nigh worn out with lack of Erineos
food and of all things needful ¹. But they bore up till the rest
evening, while the Syracusans stood around and hurled of the day.
their missiles at them from every side ². With nightfall, Seventh
as usual, the struggle ceased; the plan of Nikias was to night.
wait till all was still ³, and again to make the attempt
which he had once before made successfully, of escaping
by night. His men took up their arms, and formed for Failure
a march: but the Syracusans heard what was going on, of the
and raised the pæan for battle ⁴. The Athenians then, attempt to
finding that all chance of getting away by stealth was escape by
now hopeless, again laid down their arms and waited for night.
the morning. Three hundred men only, of what class or Escape of
people we are not told, forced their way through the Syra- three
cusan guard, and got off under cover of the darkness, each hundred.
man whither he could ⁵.

And now the day dawned, the eighth and last day of Eighth day,
this frightful struggle. With the early morning Nikias September
led forth his army. Even now there seems no thought of 18, 413.
a direct attack face to face; the Athenian army marches Last march
on as before under the now familiar shower of missiles from of Nikias.
every side. Their line of march was along the Helorine
way. Soon after this stage of the journey that ancient
path no longer coincides with any modern road. The road The road.
now turns inland to reach the modern town of Noto, but

¹ Thuc. vii. 83. 4; εἶχον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ποτὴρως σίτου τε καὶ ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορία.
Plut. Nik. 27; ἐβαλλον ἥδη πάντων ἐνδεώς ἔχοντα τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.

² Thuc. u. a.; ἐβαλλον καὶ τούτους [as they had before done to the
division of Dêmôsthênês] μέχρι ὀψέ.

³ Ib.; τῆς νυκτὸς φυλάξαντες τὸ ἥσυχάζον.

⁴ Ib.; οἱ Συρακόσιοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ ἐπαύνησαν.

⁵ Ib. 5; ἀὰ τῶν φυλάκων βιασάμενοι ἔχουσιν. We shall hear of them
again.

CHAP. VIII. the ancient track can still be followed. It sometimes coincides with lesser pieces of road, and in many places the wheel-tracks worn deep in the rock show that we are treading a path which had doubtless done service for ages before the time of Nikias¹. We may conceive that the object of the retreating army was to reach the Helôros, and then to turn inland by the valley through which it flows. There was doubtless danger through the neighbourhood of the Syracusan town of Helôron; but, could that be avoided, either the Helorine dale or the coast beyond Helôron offered an easier means of reaching a friendly Sikel country than any that had yet offered itself. Kasmennai might be dangerous, like Helôron; but they had a chance of making their way either to Motyca or to the Heraian Hybla². Before the Helôros could be reached, one more stream had to be passed. This is the river called in our history Assinaros, which we may safely set down as that which is now known as the *Falcomara* or *Fiumara di Noto*³. From the hills that surround the elder Neaiton, this stream flows down close to the modern Noto, and joins the sea at a distance of somewhat more than four miles from that town.

The Assi-
naros or
Falco-
mara.

The retreating army now pressed on to reach the stream, partly, it is said, because they hoped that, if they could cross it, their march would be easier⁴. This perhaps simply means the vague hope of better things after overcoming any obstacle, and, the Assinaros crossed, there was at least no natural obstacle likely to be met with on the flat ground between it and the Helôros. It can hardly mean that the bed of the Assinaros or some path on its right bank was looked on as a possible way to the friendly region. For that purpose the valley of the Helôros was better

¹ I went over this ground with Mr. Arthur Evans in March, 1889.

² See Holm, G. S. ii. 399.

³ See Appendix XXII.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 84. 1; *ολόμενοι ἥκόν τι σπλίαν ἔσεσθαι, ἣν διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν.*

fitted. The valley of the Assinaros is much shorter than CHAP. VIII. that of the Helôros, and it led directly to the Syracusan Valley and bed of the river. fortress of Neaiton. Lower down, the bed of the river is wide, with banks of different heights in different parts. Along that bed the stream, in spring at least, wanders freely from side to side, and it has doubtless often changed its exact course. At the point to which the Helorine way would lead from the camp by the Erineos, a point nearer to the sea than to the present town of Noto, the bed, though still wide, is narrower than in many other parts. The banks on each side are steep; on the right bank the zigzag ascent of the ancient road may easily be traced. Here was the spot which stood ready to be the last stage of the attempted retreat of Nikias and his army. It was to witness the last scene of the great two-years' struggle, the hour in which Syracuse, now at last free from fears and dangers, was to take her final revenge on the Athenian invader.

The march from the Erineos to the Assinaros would be longer or shorter according to the stream which is chosen as the representative of the Erineos. Long or short as was The Athenians at the Assinaros. their course, the Athenians were harassed at every step and on every side by the attacks of the Syracusan horsemen. These attacks were now, it would seem, shared in by the Syracusan force generally; the weary heavy-armed was no longer feared even in close attack¹. The fugitives pressed on with such speed as was left to them, eager above all things to reach the stream at any cost. They were driven well nigh wild by intolerable thirst; their post by the Erineos was cut off from water by the enemy; the waters of

¹ Thuc. vii. 84. 2; ἅμα βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἰππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου. He had just before (1) said; οἱ Συρακούσιοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ ὅμαχοι προσέκειντο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πανταχόθεν βάλλοντές τε καὶ κατακοντίζοντες. I seem to see in the ἄλλος ὄχλος a more general action of the Syracusan army than before. Hitherto it was only horsemen and darters. Now the rest of the army did not shrink from coming to close quarters with wearied men.

CHAP. VIII. the Assinaros offered them the first chance of relief¹. When they reached the left bank and saw the longed-for stream flowing beneath them, all thought, not only of discipline but of self-preservation, was forgotten². It must have been a form of danger on which they had not reckoned when they saw the steep right bank of the river guarded by a Syracusan detachment, the levies, it may be, of Helôron and Neaiton³. But the fugitives, goaded on alike by thirst and by the pursuing enemy, hardly heeded this new hindrance. They rushed without order down the banks into the river-bed; each man pressed on as he might, eager to cross, eager to drink, a confused multitude falling on one another and trampling one another under foot. Each man struggled, not to save himself, still less to deal a blow at the new enemy, but to get a draught of the precious water, if it were his last moment⁴.

The Syracusans on the right bank.

Slaughter of the Athenians.

Meanwhile the Syracusans on the right bank kept up a shower of missiles on the unhappy men who were thus huddled together in the bed of the stream beneath them. Many were slain by each other's spears; some were entangled in their own baggage; some were swept away by the stream⁵. And presently a yet nearer form of destruction fell upon them. The pursuing enemy followed them into the bed of the river, and began a merciless slaughter.

¹ See Appendix XXII.

² Thuc. vii. 84. 2, 3; ἀμα δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τάλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πείνῃ ἐπιθυμῶν. ὡς δὲ γίγνεται ἐπ' αὐτῷ [τῷ ποταμῷ], ἐσπίπτουσιν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ πᾶς τὲ τις διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος.

³ Ib. 4; ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακούσιοι (ἦν δὲ κρημνώδης) ἔβαλλον ἀναθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. These must have been a detachment who were there already. The force of Gylippos appears just before (3) as οἱ πολέμοι ἐπικείμενοι.

⁴ Ib.; ἔβαλλον . . . πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους, καὶ ἐν κοίλῃ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς παρασσομένους. Thucydides had seen the place. Did Philistos guide him thither or the young Dionysios?

⁵ Ib. 3; ἀθρόοι ἀναγκάζομενοι χωρεῖν ἐπέπιπτόν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ κατεπάτουν, περὶ τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν οἱ μὲν εὐθὺς διεφθείροντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλασσόμενοι κατέρρεον.

This was the special work of the Peloponnesian allies. To CHAP. VIII. them the Athenians were simply enemies; the Peloponnesian allies of Athens were perhaps something more than enemies. The allies of Sparta were quite ready to cut the Argeians and Mantineians in pieces, if such was the duty laid upon them by the fortune of war. And they would not share the special desire of the Syracusan for the entrance of another band of captive Athenians into the city which the Athenians had hoped to enter as conquerors. The Peloponnesians then smote and slew at pleasure¹. They met with no resistance; if the Athenians fought, it was with one another, as new comers pressed into the stream, each striving for the first draught of water. The stream was now muddy with the trampling of thousands, and bloody with the slaughter of not a few of them. But to the raging thirst of the worn-out victims the polluted water was still tempting. Men drank and fought for their drink, while they were falling without a struggle beneath the darts of the Syracusans on the right bank and the swords of their nearer Peloponnesian destroyers². The river and its bed were now choked with dead bodies, crowded thick on each other. If a few contrived to escape from the valley of death, they were presently cut down by the horsemen³.

All this confusion and slaughter went on under the eyes Nikias of Nikias, a general who loved his soldiers, and who had surrenders himself to Gylippos. always done all that he could for their welfare. In this last extremity he turned himself to Gylippos. He thought, and truly, that he could better trust him than the Syracusans. To him then, in the guise of a suppliant, he made a personal appeal, a personal surrender. For himself he made no terms, he asked for no mercy. With him let

¹ Thuc. vii. 84. 5.

² Ib. ; τὸ ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦσαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τε ὁμοῦ τῷ πληθὺ ἡματωμένον, καὶ περιμάχοντες ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς.

³ Ib. 85. 1.

CHAP. VIII. Gylippos and the Lacedæmonians deal as they thought
 He en- good ; only let them stop the slaughter of unresisting men¹.
 treats for And it may be that, in such words as he could command at
 his men. such a moment, he called on Gylippos to remember that he,
 his suppliant, had once been renowned for honour and good
 fortune, to remember too that Athens, in her day of success,
 Nikias and had not dealt harshly with Sparta. This last plea must
 Sparta. mean, first of all, that Athens had not committed the use-
 less crime of slaughtering the men from Sphaktéria. It
 must further mean that he, Nikias, had always been, as far
 as his duty allowed him, a friend of Sparta, that he had
 been foremost in making the treaty which bore his name,
 the treaty which had made Athens and Sparta friends, and
 which had given Sparta her long wished-for captives back
 again². These were special claims of Athens and of Nikias
 on Sparta as a single city; towards the allies and colonies
 of Sparta Athens could certainly not boast of having used
 special mildness. Gylippos hearkened; he felt some touch
 of pity towards Nikias himself; he saw in him the man
 who had given his name to the famous treaty. He looked
 for the glory of carrying the generals of Athens as captives
 to his own city³. He gave the word; as his command
 was gradually understood, slaughter ceased, and leading into
 End of the captivity began⁴. The last blows of the strife in which
 Athenian Athens was to have avenged the wrongs of Segesta and
 expedition. Leontinoi on Selinous and Syracuse were dealt in the river-
 bed of Assinaros. They were dealt by Peloponnesian and
 Syracusan hands against Athenians and allies who had lost
 the power, and almost the will, to strike a blow in return.

¹ Thuc. vii. 85. 1. See Appendix XXII.

² Plut. Nik. 27. See Appendix XXII.

³ Thuc. vii. 86. 2; Plut. Nik. 27. See Appendix XXII.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 85. 2; *καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος μετὰ τοῦτο ἄρχειν ἤδη ἐκέλευε*. It is doubtless from Philistos that Plutarch (Nik. 27) notices that the order was not at once carried out; *βραδείας τοῦ παραγγέλματος δίκνουμένου*, *κ.τ.λ.* Some still escaped; see n. p. 399.

The military career of both the Athenian generals is now over. Dêmôsthenês and Nikias are both captives in the hands of the conquerors. With modern notions we admire the last act of each, when each alike thought more of his soldiers than of himself. And of the two we see a deeper pathos in the last act of Nikias, who leaves his fate in the hands of the gods whom he had served so faithfully, than in that of Dêmôsthenês who strove to forestall the sentence of destiny by his own hand. We are of course not surprised at pagan moralists taking another view from ours of his attempt at self-slaughter; we are surprised at the harsh view which contemporary Athens took of the last act of Nikias; we are most surprised of all when his very biographer turns against him. Athens graved on a funeral stone the names of the generals and soldiers who had fallen in the Sicilian war. Among them Lamachos and Eury-medôn must have held an honoured place; of Menandros and Euthydêmos we have no tale to tell. But we distinctly read that the name of Dêmôsthenês was there in honour; for he had striven to die rather than fall into the hands of the enemy; the name of Nikias was not there, for he had become a voluntary captive, an act unbecoming a soldier's honour¹. And his biographer so far forgets his allegiance that he speaks of him as one who made his death shameful by having thrown himself into the hands of the enemy through a base and inglorious love of life². To us the judgement seems harsh. There are

Last acts
of the
Athenian
generals.

Athenian
estimate of
Nikias.

Estimate of
Plutarch.

¹ Pausanias, describing the monuments and inscriptions in memory of various Athenian worthies, comes (i. 29. 12) to those who had fought in Sicily; γεγραμμένοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ πλὴν Νικίου καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὁμοῦ τοῖς ἄστοις Πλαταιαῖς. Νικίας δὲ καὶ τῷδε παρίσθη. Then comes the passage quoted in p. 388 about Dêmôsthenês. Then he goes on; Νικίᾳ δὲ τὴν παράδοσιν ἑθελοντῇ γενέσθαι. τοῦτον ἔνασα οὐκ ἐνεγράφη Νικίας τῇ στήλῃ, καταγνωσθεὶς ἀλχημῶτος ἑθελοντῆς εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνὴρ πολέμῳ ᾔριστον.

² Plut. Comp. Nic. cum Crass. 5; ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἀσχυρᾶς καὶ ἀλεοῦς ἐλπίδι φετηρίας ὑποπεισὼν τοῖς πολέμοις ἀσχύλινα ἑαυτῷ τὸν θάνατον ἐποίησεν.

CHAP. VIII. many moments in the career of Nikias in which we wonder to see the Athenian people in the character of one in whose mouth are no reproofs. But on this count the sick and helpless man who had toiled so bravely through the eight days of that fearful march, who had so little reason to wish to prolong such a life as alone was left to him, was surely guiltless.

Numbers
of the
prisoners.

And now the feeble remnant of the two mighty armaments which Athens had sent forth to subdue Syracuse was brought together by the hands of citizens and allies of Syracuse as the most precious and speaking spoil of Syracusan victory. But the number of captives from the division of Nikias that fell into the hands of the Syracusan commonwealth formed a small part indeed of the whole. On the lands of Polyzêlos six thousand men had formally surrendered themselves as prisoners of war. They were no doubt all of them duly guarded and led to Syracuse. In the bed of the Assinaros there had been no such formal surrender; Nikias had simply prayed Gylippos to stop the slaughter, and Gylippos had given orders no longer to slay, but to make captives. But not a few of the victors understood the command laxly; they made captives, not for the profit of the state, but for their own. The greater part of the prisoners seem to have been embezzled, as one may say, in this sort¹. Add to this

Many
made pri-
vate slaves.

This harsh judgement sounds yet more strange, coming as it does just after a sentence of absolution on Nikias for his real faults; τοῦ λαβεῖν Συρακούσας ὀλίγον ἐδέξατο, καὶ πάντα δι' αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔταυσε, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόσον ἄν τις αἰτιάσαστο καὶ φθόνον τῶν οἰκιστῶν. Of all men that ever had to do with public affairs, Nikias is surely the one who had least reason to complain of φθόνος—unless at the hands of the gods.

¹ Thucydides (vii. 85. 3) marks the distinction very clearly; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀθροισθὲν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολλὸν ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ διαλαπὲν πολλόν, . . . ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ συμβάσεως, ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους, ληφθέντων. That is, the division of Demosthenês, surrendering on terms, became the undoubted prisoners of the commonwealth, while at the Assinaros it was held

that the number who could be made prisoners in any way was much smaller. Since the surrender of Dêmostenês many of the division of Nikias had died or strayed on the way, and they had been further cut short by the slaughter at the Assinaros, the greatest slaughter which had happened anywhere during the whole war in Sicily ¹. Moreover even at this last moment many escaped, more than escaped from the slaughter in the river. The three hundred who had made their way through the besiegers at the hill of Erineos were indeed pursued and taken, which seems to imply that they had kept together as an united body ². But others made their way from the Assinaros and found a roundabout road to the place of shelter at Katanê. The horsemen above all, of whom we have as yet heard so little, were able to wind up their service with a gallant exploit. Perhaps they had not gone down into the bed of the river; in any case, at some stage of the slaughter and captivity of their comrades, the more part of them, under their captain Kallistratos son of Eupedos, cut their way through the enemy, and, by what road we cannot guess, made their way to the city of refuge ³. There most of them stayed, and made themselves useful in the war which Katanê had still to carry on against victorious Syracuse ⁴.

CHAP. VIII.
Few
prisoners
in the
division of
Nikias.

The three
hundred
pursued
and taken.

Horsemen
escape to
Katanê;

exploit
and death
of Kalli-
stratos.

that every man might catch any enemy that he could. So Plut. Nik. 27. Cf. vol. ii. p. 223, 224.

¹ Thuc. vii. 85. 4; πλείστος γὰρ διὰ φόβου οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσαν τῶν ἐν τῷ Σικελικῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο. Plutarch (Nik. 27, see p. 396, note 4) notices that πολλὰ τῶν φονευθέντων ἐλάττονες οἱ διασωθέντες ἐγένοντο.

² Thuc. vii. 85. 2.

³ This story is told by Pausanias (vii. 16. 4, 5), being brought in in a curious way, when telling of the end of Diaios in B.C. 146, and contrasting his conduct with the valour of Kallistratos. His words are; τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδρὶ [Καλλιστράτῳ] ἱσπαρχήσαντι ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὅτε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τοῦ στόλου μετεσχέσεσαν ἀπώλυντο πρὸς τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Ἀσινάρῳ, τούτῳ τῷ Καλλιστράτῳ παρήστη τόλμα διεκπαῖσαι διὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἄγοντι τοὺς ἱππεῖας ὥς δὲ τὸ πολὺ ἀπέσωσεν αὐτῶν ἐς Κατάνην, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ We shall come to some of them again. See Lysias, xx. 26. Thucydides himself (vii. 85. 4) confirms the story; πολλοὶ ὁμῶς διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παρωγία.

CHAP. VIII. But Kallistratos himself deemed that, for him their captain, a life preserved by flight was a life not worth living. He rode back, we are told, to Syracuse; he found plunderers still at work—it must have been some days later—in the forsaken camp of the Athenians. He dashed in among them; he slew five with his own hand, and he and his horse fell pierced with many wounds¹.

Of all the Athenians and allies whom Nikias had led from Syracuse to the fatal bank of the Assinaros, Kallistratos was perhaps the only one who saw Syracuse again in any other character than that of a captive. Of the rest of his division, so many had been slain, so many escaped, so many become the spoil of particular men, that a thousand made up the full tale of the prisoners of the state². They were brought together; so was the other spoil of the day of the great slaughter. The banks of the Assinaros became one long line of Syracusan trophies. The tallest and goodliest of the trees that stood there were laden with Athenian panoplies³. One special trophy bore the armour and weapons of the captive Nikias. Another, bearing those of Dêmosthenês, had either been already set up in the field of Polyzêlos or else was set up now on the march homewards⁴. The victors crowned their own heads with wreaths; they decked their own horses gaily; they cut short the

Trophies
by the
Assinaros.

¹ Paus. u. s.; ἀνέστρεψεν ὀπίσω τὴν αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁδὸν εἰς Συρακούσας, διαρπάζοντας δὲ ἐτι εἰρῶν τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον καταβάλλει τε ὅσον πέντε ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ τραύματα ἐπικαίρα αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ ἵππος λαβόντες ἀφίᾳσι τὴν ψυχὴν. Pausanias goes on with his panegyric. The words τὴν αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁδὸν seem to point to a road round the end of Belvedere. He could hardly get to and from Katané by any other way.

² One gets the number from Thuc. vii. 87. 3, where the whole number of prisoners is given as 7000. Six thousand had surrendered under Dêmosthenês.

³ Plut. Nik. 27; τὰ μὲν κάλλιστα καὶ μέγιστα δένδρα τῶν περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἀνέθῃσαν αἰχμαλώτοις πανοπλίαις.

⁴ Diodôros (xiii. 19) wakes up just in time to tell how οἱ Συρακούσαιοι στήσαντες δύο τρόπαια, καὶ τὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅπλα πρὸς ἑκάτερον προσήλκυσαν, ἀνέστρεψαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

manes of such horses of the enemy as had fallen into their hands¹. In this guise of triumph and thankfulness, Gylippos and the Syracusans, with their fresh company of a thousand Athenian captives, marched back to the city which they had not only delivered but avenged. CHAP. VIII.

Is there any visible memorial on Syracusan soil, on soil near to the scene of the last slaughter, of the victorious issue of the greatest strife of Greek against Greek that Syracuse or any city of Hellas had ever witnessed? Local belief has found one; but, as usual, local belief most likely springs only from the guess of some scholar of the days of the revival of learning. At some distance beyond the Assinaros, far nearer to the stream of Helôros and to the ruins of the town that bears its name, a singular monument, known as the *Colonna*—sometimes as the *Torre—Pizzuta* forms a striking object from many points of view. A huge column—we are rather inclined to call it a small tower—rises to the height of thirty feet, and has clearly lost its finish. It bears no inscription, no sign of any kind, to mark its date or purpose; and it has not unnaturally been assumed to be the memorial by which victorious Syracuse commemorated its deliverance. But there is neither authority nor likelihood to make us think that such is the real date or purpose of the monument. Could we believe its taste and workmanship to be so early, a memorial of this kind would surely have been set up either in Syracuse itself, or else on the very scene of the event commemorated, hard by the banks of the Assinaros. That the *Torre Pizzuta* commemorates something or somebody we need not doubt; but it surely commemorates something or somebody more closely belonging to the local history of Helôron. Much

¹ Plut. Nik. 27; ἐστεφανωμένοι αὐτοὶ καὶ κοσμήσαντες τοὺς ἵππους διαπρεθεῖς, κείραντες δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων. In all this again we have the little touches of the eye-witness.

CHAP. VIII. nearer the spot, on the right bank of the Assinaros, a little Building higher up the stream, is another monument at whose object near the also we can only guess, but which we are far more strongly Assinaros. tempted to connect with the event which has made the neighbouring river illustrious. Not far from an ancient line of way down to the river, well nigh hidden by olive-trees, are the ruins of a building of Greek workmanship, built of large uncemented blocks, not very finely hewn. It is square outside, but it was covered within by a cupola, that is by an apparent cupola, of the same construction as the Mykenian treasure-houses, as the shepherds' huts above the Heraian Hybla, as the tombs into which Athenian corpses had been thrust after the fight in the Great Harbour¹. It is most likely a tomb, by no means the only tomb of which traces remain in its near neighbourhood. If it were recorded that any leading man on the Syracusan side had died in the bed of the Assinaros, it would be no ill guess that it covered his ashes. But our narrative supplies us with no such name; if the last day of the campaign saw the death of any man, great or small, on the Syracusan side, it must have been among those through whom Kallistratos and his horsemen cut their way. But, be its object what it may, as a work of the old days of Syracuse, hard by one of the most famous spots in the whole tale of Syracuse, the historian of Sicily can hardly, at this stage of his story, pass it by without a word².

The war between Athens and Syracuse on Sicilian soil was over. The victors had come back to the city with their spoil. A thousand captives from the division of Nikias were added to the six thousand of the division of

¹ See above, p. 364, and vol. i. p. 164.

² The Torre Pizzuta has often been described. The tomb, I believe, was noticed by no traveller before myself and Mr. Arthur Evans on March 15, 1889, when it was pointed out to us by the kindness of its owner, the Baron Granieri of Noto.

Démosthenês. The first duty of the returning army and of the rescued commonwealth was to come together as one man to offer sacrifices of thanksgiving to the gods who had wrought for them both deliverance and vengeance¹. In their joy in deliverance we can share; their joy in vengeance we can at least forgive, so far as it was vengeance wrought in the battle or the pursuit against men with arms in their hands. But the doings of the next day were a stain on the honour of the citizens and allies of Syracuse. It was a deeper stain than the worst that rests on the honour of the democracy of Athens. Athens had kept men in hard prison²; she had slain and sold into slavery by thousands. But she had not kept her captive enemies to make a cruel show out of their wretchedness. And assuredly in her assembly neither oligarch nor demagogue had ever ventured to breathe a word of death by torture as the fate of any enemy whom the fortune of war had put into her hands.

CHAP. VIII.
Syracusan
thanks-
giving.

The mili-
tary as-
sembly
after the
victory.
Compari-
son with
Athens.

On the return of the Syracusan army with the seven thousand prisoners of the commonwealth, an assembly was held to determine their fate. It is plain that it was not the ordinary assembly of the Syracusan democracy. Allies spoke and voted as well as citizens. We must therefore look upon it as the military assembly of all who had taken part in the war³. It came together in a frame of mind in which neither of the men to whom Syracuse owed most, the foremost of her citizens and the foremost of her allies, could gain the hearing which they deserved. A Syracusan

The mili-
tary
assembly.

¹ Diod. xiii. 19; τότε μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔθυσαν πανδημί.

² See the references to the look of the men from the Island, Arist. Clouds, 187; Knights, 393.

³ Thuc. vii. 86. 1; ἐνταυροῦθ' ὅτε οἱ Συρακούσιοι καὶ οἱ ἐγγεγραμμένοι . . . κατεβίβασαν . . . καὶ . . . ἀπέσφαζαν. This can only mean such an assembly as I suppose, one in which Gylippos and the Corinthians take part. Diodóros implies the same by making Gylippos speak; but he does not directly say so. See Appendix XXII.

CHAP. VIII. speaker, a demagogue, perhaps an otherwise unknown
 Motions of Euryklês or Dioklês. Euryklês, perhaps Dioklês presently to be famous, brought forward a string of resolutions¹. The first was harmless and reasonable enough. The day on which Nikias and his company had been made prisoners should be kept for ever with yearly honours as the Assinarian festival². The other proposals fitted but too well with the fierce spirit of vengeance with which the Syracusan people and some at least of their allies were just then filled. It was proposed that the two captive generals of Athens, Nikias and Dêmosthenês, should be put to death, perhaps with torture³. Hermokratês and Gylippos both spoke against the motion. Hermokratês was not now in office; he could speak to the Syracusans only as a citizen to whom they had often hearkened, to the allies as a comrade who had done good service in the common cause. He pleaded for mercy; victory was noble; but to use victory well was nobler⁴. Nor would he be blind to the advantage that it would be to Syracuse to have, as the Athenians had the men from Sphaktêria, two such Athenian hostages in their power. Gylippos had objects of his own. He wished to take the defeated generals of Athens, the rivals against whom he had striven, as captives to his own Sparta. He would fain have the glory of leading thither the two men of all the men of Athens who had done most for Sparta and most against her⁵. We are

The Assinarian festival. September 18.
 The generals to be put to death.
 Opposition of Hermokratês;
 of Gylippos.

¹ The speaker is, in Diodôros, Διοκλῆς τις, τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἐνδοξότατος ὢν. In Plut. Nik. 28 he is Εὐρυκλῆς ὁ δημαγωγός.

² Plut. Nik. 28; πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ τὸν Νικίαν ἔλαβον ἱερὰν ἔχειν θύοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἔργων, Ἀσιναρίαν τὴν ἱορτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καλοῦντας. See Appendix XXV.

³ Diod. xiii. 19; μετ' αἰτίας ἀνελεῖν. See Appendix XXIII.

⁴ Diod. u. s.; λέγων ὡς κάλλιον ἐστὶ τοῦ νικῆν τὸ τὴν νίκην ἐνεργεῖν ἀνθρώπων. Plut. Nik. 28; εἰπὼν ὅτι τοῦ νικῆν κρείττον ἐστὶ τὸ καλῶς χρῆσθαι τῇ νικῇ. These are from one source, from one who listened. Plutarch adds, οὐ μετρίως ἐθρομβήθη.

⁵ See above, p. 296. So Plut. Nik. 28.

not told whether, if Nikias and Dêmosthenês had been led to Sparta, each was to fare according to his deeds. Be this as it may, the voice of Gylippos as well as the voice of Hermokratês was given for mercy, present mercy at least, to the renowned captives who were now helpless in their power.

The people of Syracuse had once spared Ducetius the suppliant; but Nikias and Dêmosthenês had no such claim on their religious feelings as Ducetius had. Their temper at the moment, still more the temper of their allies, went against the pleadings both of the great citizen of Syracuse and of the great deliverer from Peloponnêsos. It is said that the Syracusans had by this time had enough of Gylippos and his Spartan ways; it is even hinted that they had found out his weak point¹. And the fierce instinct of the Syracusan people was not the only power that went against the captive generals. Two classes of men called for the death of Nikias on grounds of their own. Those men in Syracuse who had held communications with him were now the first to give their voices against him. They feared that their doings might be suspected; they feared that Nikias himself might be examined under torture, and might reveal their misdeeds². And the allies from Corinth pleaded against him—one asks whether Gongylos and Aristôn might not have shown a worthier spirit. The Corinthian argument was that Nikias might be able, by means of his wealth³, to bribe some one or other, that he might thus be able to escape, and might stir up some movement against Syracuse or Corinth⁴. Such a

Syracusan
feeling
towards
Gylippos.

The cor-
respond-
ents of
Nikias
urge his
death

and the
Corin-
thians.

¹ Plut. Nik. 28; Γύλιππον . . . Λακεδαιμονίους ὑβρίζοντες ἤδη τοῖς εὐτυχήμασιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι κακῶς ἔλεγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ παρὰ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῦ τὴν τραχύτητα καὶ τὸ Λακωνικὸν τῆς ἐπιστασίας οὐ βρόδιος ἐγνηροχότες, ὥς δὲ Τίμαιος φησι, καὶ μικρολογίαν τινα καὶ πλεονεξίαν κατεγνωνότες, ἀρρώστημα πατρῴον.

² Thuc. vii. 86. 4. See Appendix XXIII.

³ He was believed to be worth a hundred talents. See Lysias de Bonis Arist. 47.

⁴ Ib. See Appendix XXIII.

CHAP. VIII. fear might seem groundless on the part of the sick and worn-out general who, in his brighter days, had never been one to clamour for needless warfare. But to the plea of the Corinthians the other allies consented, and called for the death of the generals¹. The vote was passed, at all events the vote of death. But it is plain that the Corinthians had no object in adding the aggravation of torture, and the former correspondents of Nicias had an object the other way. It may then be that, with their help, Hermokratēs and Gylippos so far prevailed that it was by the sword or the axe, and not by any more grievous stroke, that the captive generals of Athens died at the hands of the executioner in the Syracusan prison².

The vote passed.

Death of Nicias and Dēmōsthenēs.

The shield of Nicias.

And so the man of devout and blameless life, who—so his great contemporary tells us—least of all men deserved such a fate, was shorn of the little remnant of life that disease and toil had left to him³. And with him died his colleague, for whom Thucydides, who has told his exploits, finds not a word to say at his last end. Dēmōsthenēs, known only as a soldier, but, as a soldier, in all things blameless and honourable, now found the fate which he had not been allowed to find at his own hand. The bodies of both generals were laid before the gate of Syracuse for all who chose to come and gaze on⁴. The shield of Nicias, rich with gold and purple, was believed in Plutarch's day still to hang in one of the Syracusan temples⁵. Its likeness has been recognized on the coins with which

¹ Thuc. vii. 86. 4; *πείσαντες τοὺς συμμάχους*. ² See Appendix XXIII.

³ Thuc. vii. 86. 5; *ὁ μὲν τοιαύτη ἢ ἐπὶ ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτία ἐτεθνήκει, ἥμιστα δὲ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, δαδὴν πῶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν [αἰ. ἐς τὸ θεῖον] νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν*. See Grote, vii. 480.

⁴ Plut. Nik. 28; *τὰ μέντοι σώματα πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις ἐκβληθέντα φανερά τοῖς θεομένοις τοῦ θεάματος*.

⁵ Ib.; *πυνθάνομαι δὲ μέχρι νῦν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἀσπίδα κειμένην πρὸς ἱερῷ δεικνυσθαι, Νικίου μὲν λεγομένην, χρυσοῦ δὲ καὶ πορφύρας εὖ πως πρὸς ἀλλήλα μεμιγμένων δι' ὅφης συγκεκροτημένην*.

Syracuse presently commemorated her victory¹. One asks CHAP. VIII. whether this was the general's holiday attire, left behind him in the camp, while some less costly spoil adorned the trophy by the Assinaros. And we ask again, how did so goodly a prey escape the greed of Marcellus and of Verres?

The decree that was carried in the military assembly, Treatment of the other prisoners. after it had ordained death for the Athenian generals, went on to fix the fate of the other seven thousand prisoners. In the case of the six thousand who surrendered under Dêmostenês death was expressly shut out by the terms of surrender; so it was implicitly in the act of Gylippos when he stopped the slaughter by the Assinaros². Yet some of them might have deemed that any reasonable form of death was a less grievous fate than that to which they were sentenced. It was only by a very strict interpretation on the side of harshness that that fate could be brought within those terms of the surrender of Dêmostenês which forbade the lingering death of hunger or of intolerable bonds³. The decree of the assembly was that the whole body of prisoners should for the present be thrust into the stone-quarries, the famous *Latomiai*. It was a safe place Terms of the decree. to keep them in⁴. Their allowance of food and drink, a scanty one indeed, seems to have been prescribed⁵. After a time, seemingly fixed in the ordinance, those of the allies of Athens who had not come from either Sicily or Italy were to be taken out and sold into slavery. The Athenian citizens and their Italiot and Sikeliot helpers were still to abide for a season; in the end they were to be taken out and set to hard labour in the public prison with an increased allowance of food⁶. So proposed Euryklês or

¹ See Appendix XXV.

² See above, p. 396.

³ Thuc. vii. 81; ἀσφαλεστέτην ἢ δὴ νομίσαντες τὴν τήρησιν.

⁴ Ib. 82. 2. See above, p. 388.

⁵ See Appendix XXIV.

⁶ Diod. xiii. 19. See Appendix XXIV.

CHAP. VIII. Dioklès ; so voted the assembly of the Syracusans and their allies ; of the words and thoughts of Hermokratès and Gylippos we hear nothing.

Imprison-
ment in
the stone-
quarries.

The decree was carried out in its fulness. Seven thousand men were shut up together in the stone-quarries. Among all the artificial hollows of various dates to which the name of *latomie* still cleaves at Syracuse, it is vain to try to fix with certainty that one which became their prison-house. If one might hazard a guess, it is perhaps more likely to have been some of those on Achradina, the great one possibly by the Capuchin monastery, rather than any of those outlying quarries which bear the picturesque names, the one of Paradise, the other of a power which seems to flit uncertainly between the Venus of pagan Rome and the Christian saint Venera. Be it which it may, as we tread those quarries, so vast and ancient as to put on the air of wooded dells among cliffs untouched by the hand of man, amid the trees, the flowery paths, the rocks, here clothed with verdure, there cut thick with monumental tablets, it seems a strange thought that spots now so full of wild loveliness should ever have been turned into the foulest of prisons. There the defeated warriors were heaped together without shelter, in a dungeon all the more cruel that it was open to the light of heaven, left by day to the sun and by night to the frost¹. There, in the dark words of our English psalmist, they lay in the hell like sheep, death gnawed upon them, while the triumphant folk of Syracuse might stand on the height to look down in mockery on their sufferings². With them the gnawing death took many forms. Some were wounded, some were already

¹ Thuc. vii. 87. 1 ; ἐν γὰρ κοίλῃ χωρὶς οὐκας καὶ ὀλίγῃ πολλοὺς ὅς τε ἤλαιο τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πνίγιος ἐτι ἐλύπει διὰ τὸ δαστέγαστον, καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπεγυγνόμεναι τοῖσιν ἀντίον μεταπαρῶν καὶ ψυχραὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐς δασθέειαν ἐνεσπέρειζον.

² Grote, vii. 475, 476. This is not directly stated by any ancient writer ; but the thought cannot fail to come into the head of any one who looks down into a Syracusan *latomia*. Cf. Psalm xlix. 14.

sick; the bodies of those that died were left to corrupt the air and spread sickness among their comrades. Hunger too and thirst played their part. The prisoners had food; they had drink; but their allowance of both was barely half the allowance of a slave; half a pint of water was all that was given each man, and a pint of corn¹. All this hardship the whole seven thousand, so many as were not relieved by death, endured together for seventy days, a measure of time which takes us to the end of November². This, we may suppose, was the time fixed in the original decree for the sojourn of the whole body in the quarries.

The imprisonment in the quarries seems to have been a piece of mere spite, and nothing more. From the point of view of a thrifty guardian of the Syracusan public purse, it was waste. Such waste was not to last for ever. And the ordinance had drawn a distinction between those who deserved a greater and a less measure of Syracusan vengeance. At the end of the seventy days, those of the victims who were less guilty in Syracusan eyes, the allies of Athens from Old Greece and the islanders who had refused the offered mercy of Gylippos, exchanged their frightful imprisonment for the less grievous doom of ordinary slavery³. With them, according to one account, were classed those who were slaves already, who were distinguished by branding the mark of a horse—the victorious cavalry of Syracuse?—on their foreheads. And with them, it is said, some Athenians contrived to pass themselves off, preferring the doom of bondage and branding to a prolonged imprisonment⁴. Otherwise the authors of evil and

¹ Thuc. vii. 87. 1; οἱ ἐκ τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν μεταβολὴν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπίθνησκον, καὶ ὁσμαι ἦσαν οὐκ ἀνεκτοί, καὶ λιμῇ ἅμα καὶ δίψει ἐπίζοργο. On the allowance see Appendix XXIV.

² Thuc. vii. 87. 2. See Appendix XXIV.

³ Ib.

⁴ Plut. Nik. 29; οὐκ ὀλίγοι δ' ἐπράθησαν διακλαπέντες ἢ καὶ διαλαθόντες ὡς

CHAP. VIII. their nearer accomplices, the Athenians themselves and The Athenian and the Sikeliot might look on as traitors, had to wait awhile before they had fully glutted the Syracusan thirst for vengeance. They had to thole for their sins, if not nineteen winters, yet one such winter as few can have gone through before or since.

413-May, 412. Six months more they abode in their prison. Then they were taken out, according to the ordinance, to work at hard labour in the public prison¹. It must have been a

Favour
shown to
some.

white day for them when they at least found a roof over their heads, and began to receive the increased food which was needed if their labour was to be of any profit to their masters². But it was only a small proportion for whom this fate was reserved. The more part, we are told, were already dead, and the destiny of another class was more lucky. Some escaped; some fell into private hands; we are even told that the young men of Syracuse rescued by force many whose manners and accomplishments were such as to win their favour³. What with those who escaped in any of these ways from the quarry and the work-house, what with those too who had escaped or fallen into private hands at the Assinaros, Sicily was full of slaves and fugitives, who had been warriors of Athens, citizens or allies. Those who could got to Katanê, either to join in the war which still lingered there, or to make their way thence to Athens⁴. But the doom of those who remained

οικέται. καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐπάλουν στίζοντες ἵππον εἰς τὸ μέτωπον. οὐ πολλοὶ δ' ἦσαν οἱ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τῇ δουλεύειν ὑπομένοντες. He had before (28) mentioned the *οἰκέται* along with the *σύμμαχοι*. I suppose therefore that the meaning is what I have said, but the words are far from clear, and Plutarch is not at all careful as to the time.

¹ Diod. xiii. 33. See Appendix XXIV.

² See Appendix XXIV.

³ Diod. u. s. See Appendix XXIV.

⁴ Thuc. vii. 85. 3, 4; *διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν . . . πολλοὶ . . . διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραντίκα [at the Assinaros] οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαστες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ἕστερον. τοῦτοις ἦν ἀναχώρησις εἰς Κατάνην.*

in slavery was in many cases lightened. The educated slave often won his master's favour, and was rewarded with freedom or an easier bondage. So many were employed in teaching the youth of Sicily that it became a proverb, He is either dead or is teaching letters¹. The tragedies of Euripidés were then as well known and as highly thought of in Sicily as in his own Athens. Slaves who could repeat with fitting voice and gesture this or that passage of the poet's plays won the special favour of their masters, and sometimes freedom as their reward². Others of those who had escaped from the march or from the last struggle, as they wandered here and there, found welcome and shelter by singing the pathetic verses of his choruses³. Some of them, when, in one way or another, they found their way back to Athens, went to thank Euripidés as their deliverer, and to tell him what their knowledge of his verse had done for them⁴.

CHAP. VIII.
Teachers
of youth.

Favour
shown to
those who
could re-
peat cho-
ruses of
Euripidés.

We have now told the tale of the great Athenian invasion of Sicily. It is needless to stop yet again to point its moral. We have seen its causes and occasions; we have traced the ups and downs of its varied story, a story which, when we come to its end, seems as if it had taken up a far longer time than two years and a few months. Its results stand out more clearly in Old Greece than in Sicily. We are not surprised to find that the news of the great overthrow led to wide-spread revolt among the allies of Athens. We are surprised to see her still bearing up through nearly nine more years of warfare, to see her again

The Athe-
nian inva-
sion ;

Revival of
Athenian
power.
413-404.

¹ Zenob. iv. 17; ἦτοι τέθνηκεν ἢ διδάσκει γράμματα. τῶν μετὰ Νικίου στρατευσαμένων εἰς Σικελίαν οἱ μὲν ἀπώλοντο οἱ δὲ ἐλήφθησαν αἰχμάλωτοι καὶ τοὺς τῶν Σικελιωτῶν παῖδας ἐδίδασκον γράμματα. So others of the Παροιμιογράφοι.

² Plat. Nik. 29; δουλεύοντες ἀφείθησαν ἐκδιδάξαντες ὅσα τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων ἐμύμηνητο.

³ Ib.; πλανώμενοι μετὰ τὴν μάχην τροφῆς καὶ ὕδατος μετέλαβον τῶν μελῶν ἔδοντες.

⁴ Ib.

CHAP. VIII. winning victories, to see her in the very year that followed
 412. that of the utter destruction of her two great fleets, again
 sending forth more than a hundred triremes to sea¹. We
 see with wonder how, even after the utter overthrow, not
 only of the forces of the city, but of the city itself, after
 404-403. the surrender to Lysandros and the rule of the Thirty, she
 could again arise as a free commonwealth, a great power,
 again a ruling city, to be the champion of Greece against
 Macedonia, to be the cherished ally of Rome and the uni-
 versity of the Roman world. Apseudês the archon had
 a successor in Hadrian; Nikias the general had a successor
 in Constantine. In Sicily itself the Athenian invasion was
 so soon followed by an invasion far more fearful that we
 are apt to forget that any events happened between the
 two. Yet from this time the connexion in various shapes
 between Sicily and Old Greece is far stronger and more
 frequent than before, and the first shape that it takes is
 that of most gallant and honourable service rendered by
 two Sikeliot cities to the allies in the motherland who had
 done so much for Sicily. But that faithful tribute of
 gratitude had one evil result. When the most awful need
 of all came, a large part of the strength of Sicily was
 warring on a distant coast, and the best captain and
 counsellor of Syracuse was a banished man.

Short
time be-
tween the
Athenian
and Car-
thaginian
invasions.
413-409.
Increased
connexion
between
Sicily and
Old
Greece.

Judgement
of Thucy-
dides on
the event. As for the event itself, it is best summed up in the
 judgement of the contemporary historian—it is but a feeble
 approach that any man can make to his words. “To my
 mind at least this work seems the greatest work that was
 wrought by Greeks in this war, the greatest of all works
 that I have ever heard of as wrought by Greeks against
 Greeks. It was the most glorious to them that had the
 better, the most unlucky to them that were overthrown.
 For they were vanquished in everything at every point.
 What they suffered of evil was in no point, in no sort.

¹ Thuc. viii. 30.

small. Land force, ships, whatever else there was, was destroyed, as men say, with utter destruction, and but few out of many came back to their homes. Such were the things that happened in Sicily¹.”

So it was that things did happen. We need hardly speculate what might have been if things had turned out otherwise, if all the dreams of Alkibiadês had been carried out to the letter. But a striking thought has suggested itself to a later writer, which could not have occurred to any man at the time. What if the Athenians, conquerors of Sicily, had gone on, according to the scheme of their leader, to warfare in Italy, and had there met the youthful power of Rome²? Could they have done what Archidamos and Alexander, what Pyrrhos himself, failed to do? Livy amused himself by thinking that Lucius Papirius would have been a match for the other and more famous Alexander³. We may ask for one moment how the Postumius whom his soldiers slew at Bola, how the Cornelius and the Furius in whose consulship Nikias died, would have fared against Dêmostenês and Lamachos. We must not forget that the Lucanian already threatened the land which Thucydides knew as Italy, that Kymê in the Opican land had already become Cumæ, city of Opicans. It was not by Athenian or Spartan or Epeirot conquest that the influence of Hellas was to spread over the lands of the West. The Greek was to lead captive his conqueror; but he was first of all to feel him as a conqueror; he was not to be the conqueror himself. Sicily, central land of Europe, was not to be the centre from which an Athenian

What if the Athenians had succeeded and had invaded Italy? Athens and Rome.

Greek influence in Italy.

¹ Thuc. vii. 87. 4. Cf. Plut. Nik. 27; ἀγῶνα λαμπρότατον ὃν Ἕλληνες πρὸς Ἑλλήνας ἡγωνίσαντο καὶ νίκην τελευτήσαν κρᾶται πλείστοι καὶ βόμῃ μεγίστῃ προθυμίας καὶ ἀρετῆς καταρθωκοίτες.

² Paus. i. 11. 7; Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐλπίσασιν καὶ Ἰταλίων πᾶσαν καταστρέφασθαι τὸ ἐν Συρακούσαις πταῖσμα ἐμποδὼν ἐγένετο μὴ καὶ Ῥωμαίων λαβεῖν πείραν. He goes on to speak of the Epeirot Alexander and Pyrrhos.

³ Liv. ix. 16, 17.

CHAP. VIII. dominion should spread over Africa, Spain, and Italy. It was to be the chosen wrestling-ground of Africa and Italy¹. But before that day it had to bear up against the might of Africa as it best might, and to bear up single-handed.

§ 8. *The Sikeliots in the Ægean.*

B. C. 412-408.

The wars of Syracuse and Athens did not come wholly to an end with the utter overthrow of the Athenian invaders on the soil and on the waters of Syracuse. The war was still carried on, in a somewhat feeble sort certainly, in Sicily itself. Syracuse was still at war with Katanê, and Katanê still had Athenian allies. We have heard how some, perhaps the more part, of the Athenian horsemen made their way from the Assinaros itself to the city of refuge, and how not a few escaped fugitives of other kinds found their way to the same shelter². Of the deeds of one of these we have the record spoken by his own mouth. An Athenian horseman, marked only by his father's name of Polystratos, escaped to Katanê. There he employed himself in making inroads on the Syracusan territory, where he contrived to rescue many of his countrymen from bondage, and gathered so great a spoil that the tithe which he dedicated to the goddess of Athens rose to more than thirty *minæ*³. Bidden by the Katanaian commonwealth to serve more regularly as a horseman, he obeyed, and won, so he himself witnesses, all honour, whether serving as horseman or as heavy-

The war goes on in Sicily.

Athenians at Katanê.

The son of Polystratos.

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 23.

² See above, pp. 399, 410.

³ *Lykias, ὡς ἐρ Πολ. 24; καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐξέπεμψεν, ὅμιν δ' ὅσα ἦν ὥστ' εἰδέναι [κατειλεγμένον εἰς] τοὺς ἱππέας, οἷος ἦν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥς τὸ στρατόπεδον οὖν ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διεφθάρη καὶ ἀνεσώθη εἰς Κατάνην, ἐληϊζόμεν δρμωμένος ἐντεύθεν καὶ τοὺς πολέμιους κακῶς ἐποίουν, ὥστε τῇ θεῇ τε τὰς δεκάτας ἐξαιρεθῆναι πλέον ἢ τριάκοντα μῶς καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις εἰς σωτηρίαν, ὅσοι ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ἦσαν.*

armed¹. And when a Syracusan envoy came on some not clearly described errand, but seemingly to beguile the Athenians at Katanê by oaths, the son of Polystratos successfully withstood him. And his story brings in another name besides that of Kallistratos, and one which is heard again. Tydeus, afterwards one of the unlucky, perhaps guilty, Tydeus generals at Aigospotamos, was then at Katanê, holding seemingly some command among the Athenians there².

At Syracuse the year passed on, and the first Assinarian games were held in the next autumn. They are commemorated by a special coinage, by which it appears that this time the prize was not a simple wreath, but a captive Athenian panoply³. And among the offerings of victorious Syracuse to the gods, the chief of all was the treasury reared at Delphi out of the spoils of Athens⁴. But there was also work to be done. Sikeliot fleets and Sikeliot men played a part, and a most honourable part, during several of the later years of the great war, when its scene had been moved to the shores of Asia. Syracuse was bound to make some return to Sparta and Corinth and Boiôtia for such help as had been given by Gylippos and Gongylos and Aristôn, and by the watchful Thespians at the moment of the night attack⁵. From the moment of the overthrow of Athens before Syracuse, the coming of a Sikeliot force to take its part in the struggle of Old Greece was looked

Assinarian
games.
Septem-
ber 18,
412.

Treasury
at Olym-
pia.

Sikeliot
help to
Sparta and
Corinth.
412-409.

¹ *Lysias*, ἐπὶ Πολ. 25; ἐπειδὴ Καταναῖοι ἡγάγκαζον ἰππεύειν [ἰππεύον, καὶ] αὐθιγὰς οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα κινδύνου ἀπελιπόμην, ὥστ' εἰδέναι ἅπαντας εἰς ἣν τὴν ψυχὴν ἰππεύω τε καὶ ὀπλιτεύω.

² *Ib.* 26; ἀφικομένου γὰρ ἐκεῖσε Συρακοσίου ὄρκιον ἔχοντος καὶ ἐτοιμοῦ ὄντος ὀρεοῦν καὶ προσέειπεν πρὸς ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκεῖ ὄντων, ἀντείπον εὐθὺς αὐτῷ, καὶ ἔλθων ὡς Τυδέα διηγούμενη ταῦτα, καὶ σύλλογον [αἰ. σύλλογην] ἐποίει, καὶ λόγιοι οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἦσαν. Tydeus was perhaps not the most trustworthy representative of Athens. See *Xen. Hell.* ii. 1. 16. 26; *Paus.* x. 9. 11.

³ See Appendix XXV.

⁴ *Paus.* x. 11. 5; Συρακουσίαν ἐστὶ θησαυρὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου πταίσματος.

⁵ See above, p. 313.

CHAP. VIII. for on both sides with all anxiety. When the news of the great blow dealt in Sicily reached Athens and the rest of Greece, hope, fear, and wonder were strong everywhere. At Athens the tale was not at first believed, any more than

Effect of the Athenian overthrow.
The news of defeat brought to Athens.

The allies of Athens.

They begin to revolt.

The neutral cities.

the tale of the Athenians' coming was at first believed at Syracuse. When the truth could no longer be withstood, men turned against the orators who had stirred them up to the expedition and against the prophets who had promised them success in it¹. Bowed down with their losses of every kind, with no immediate means of making good those losses, they looked for fresh attacks of their enemies and for a general revolt of their allies. The islanders who had stayed at home in their several cities were not likely to share the feelings under which so many of their soldiers had refused to forsake Athens in her distress². Men of Chios and Methymna had died worn out on the march or had borne seventy days of torment in the stone-quarries. Ships of Chios and Methymna had been sunk or burned in the harbour or towed off in triumph by the victorious Syracusans. It was not long before the allies of Athens began to fall away, and, as ever in such cases, the foremost were those who were most favoured, and who therefore had most strength and spirit to revolt³.

While the allies of Athens were forsaking her, the neutral states of Greece began also to turn against her. They had watched the course of things in Sicily, believing that, if Athens succeeded there, her next attack would be upon them. Now that she had failed in Sicily, it was time to strike the blow which should for ever disable her from

¹ There is the well-known story at the end of Plutarch's Life of Nikias. There is also the graver picture at the beginning of the eighth book of Thucydides, where he specially mentions how the Athenians ἀργίζοντο τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι, καὶ δόδοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπῆλπισαν ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν.

² See above, p. 387.

³ Lesbians in Thuc. viii. 5. 2; Chians 5. 4.

succeeding anywhere¹. Besides these dangers, all Athens was expecting to feel more pressing attacks from the enemies in Peloponnêsos and at Dekeleia; and she looked each moment to see her enemies from Sicily, the combined fleets of Syracuse and Corinth, showing themselves in hostile guise before Peiraiëus². The fears of Athens were keener than the hopes of Sparta. There it was expected that with the spring a great Sikeliot force would come, that the Sikeliot ships would make up for Lacedæmonian inferiority at sea. With Sikeliot help they would overcome Athens and become undisputed leaders of all Greece³. None of these hopes and fears were altogether fulfilled; but all were fulfilled in some measure. In the course of the next summer the Peloponnesian fleet came back from Sicily, and it was followed by a Sikeliot fleet. But neither appeared to threaten Peiraiëus, and the Sikeliot help that came, though admirable in quality, was hardly on such a scale as both friends and enemies seem to have looked for. It did not at once decide the fate of the war; its action did not even last till the end of the war. The Athenian ships kept watch over the Ionian and Corinthian seas⁴. When sixteen Peloponnesian ships came back from Sicily, a larger Athenian force was ready for them off Leukas. But one only became an Athenian prize; the rest escaped to Corinth⁵.

Fears of Athens.

The Sikeliot fleet expected.

Return of the Peloponnesian fleet. Summer, 412. The Sikeliot fleet follows.

The Athenian fleet off Leukas.

The actual Sikeliot fleet did not come till somewhat later, but still within the same summer. Much had happened

¹ Thuc. viii. 2. 1; ἰθελοντὶ ἰτέον ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίσαντες κἄν ἐπὶ σφῶς ἕκαστοι ἰλθεῖν αὐτοὺς, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ κατάρθωσαν. Who were these neutrals?

² Ib. 1. 2; τοὺς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεμίους εὐθὺς ἐνόμιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλευνεῖσθαι. This doubtless takes in both classes. Cf. c. 12 and 26. 1.

³ Ib. 2. 3; ἡ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις πᾶσι τε τούτοις ἐθάρσει, καὶ μέλιστα οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας αὐτοῖς ξύμμαχοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤδη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσγεγενημένου.

⁴ Ib. 10.

⁵ Ib. 13.

CHAP. VIII. before they came. The war had taken one special turn which goes far to change the direction of our sympathies. We are now made to look on it from a wider point of view than that of the local quarrels of Athens, Sparta, and even Syracuse. Hitherto we have felt, if not for Sparta, yet at least for the general sentiment which led the more part of the Greeks to the side of Sparta. In their eyes Sparta was the champion of the freedom of independent Greek cities against the restless ambition of Athens. Athens was to them the city that sought to bring all Greece and the world under her dominion. The day came when they found that Sparta could aim at lordship as well as Athens, and that she could exercise lordship far more harshly than Athens had done. But that day was not just yet. The professions of the Peloponnesian alliance were taking, and in the mouths of many of its members they were doubtless sincere. But things changed when Sparta made herself the ally of the barbarian, when, forestalling her own crime in the Peace of Antalkidas, forestalling the crime of our own day which gave back liberated Macedonia to the Turk, she acknowledged the Great King as master at least of the Hellenic cities of Asia, master perhaps of even a wider range of Hellenic ground than that¹. From the moment that Sparta *medized*, all changes. The war of the Greek powers becomes part of the Eternal Strife of East and West; Athens, with all her faults, becomes again the Athens of Marathôn, Salamis, and the Eurymedôn, fighting against Persia and Sparta as she once had fought against Persia and Thebes. It was Sparta, champion of Hellas, that had sent Gylippos to save Syracuse. It was Sparta, ally of the barbarian, that Hermokratês came to help against men whom Sparta had driven back into the old calling alike of Gelôn and of Kimôn. It is grievous to see men of Corinth and Syracuse

Position of
Athens and
Sparta.

Medium of
Sparta.

1878.

Change in
the charac-
ter of the
war.

Syracuse in
alliance
with the
barbarians.

¹ Thuc. viii. 18. 1. The words of the treaty ran; *ὁπόσον χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλεὺς εἶχον, βασιλεὺς ἔστω.*

taking the pay of a satrap; but Syracuse had at least sent out one citizen who could look a satrap in the face. CHAP. VIII.

The Sikeliot fleet of twenty ships from Syracuse and two from Selinous had been sent out mainly by the urgent counsel of Hermokratês, and it was he who most fittingly took the command¹. He and his following must have learned on their voyage that it was on the coast of Asia that their services would be needed. Much had happened before they got there. The prudent Chians, feeling sure that, after her Sicilian overthrow, Athens could do nothing against them, had revolted against her. But they had found that Athens had some strength in her yet². Other cities followed her example. Milêtos on the mainland, Milêtos once so true a friend of Sybaris, Milêtos that had suffered so bitterly at the hands of the Mede, had been persuaded by the traitor Alkibiadês to accept the alliance of Sparta against Athens that had once wept for her griefs³. But the alliance of Sparta and Alkibiadês was also the alliance of Tissaphernês, and the reward of Milêtos for her adhesion to the Peloponnesian cause, her first taste of independence under a Spartan guaranty, was to be chosen as the place of congress for Sparta and Tissaphernês. At Milêtos the Spartan and his barbarian paymaster made their first agreement by which all Greek Asia, Milêtos herself not excepted, was acknowledged to be a possession of the King⁴. Worse

Hermokratês commands the Sikeliot fleet.

Chios revolts against Athens. 412.

Revolt of Milêtos.

Treaty between Sparta and Tissaphernês.

¹ Thuc. viii. 26. 1; τῶν τε γὰρ Σικελιωτῶν, Ἑρμοκράτους τοῦ Συρακοσίου μάλιστα ἐνέγοντος συνεπιλαβεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς ὑπολοίπου Ἀθηναίων καταλύσεως, ἀποσι νῆες Συρακοσίαν ἦλθον καὶ Χελωνούντιαι δύο. These were the two cities at which the Athenian expedition was directly aimed. One would hardly ask for ships from Gela, Kamarina, or Himera.

² Ib. 24. 5. After recording the energetic action of the Athenians against Chios in the year 412, and after speaking of the general prudence of the Chians, he adds; οὐδ' αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν Σικελικὴν συμφορὰν ὅς οὐ πάνυ πύσθηρα σφῶν βεβαίως τὰ πράγματα εἶη· εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγους ἐσφάλεσαν, μετὰ πολλῶν, οἷς ταῦτα ἔδοξε, τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ συναναίρεθῆσθαι, τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ἐνέτηνυσαν.

³ Ib. 17. See Herod. vi. 21.

⁴ Thuc. viii. 17. Cf. c. 36, 37.

CHAP. VIII. things than an acknowledgement on stone were in store for her; but as yet Milêtos was a zealous ally of Sparta¹, and she looked to Sparta and the allies of Sparta for defence against her old mistress. Athens laid waste her lands; she defeated Athens and her allies in battle, that battle in which Ionian heavy-armed defeated Dorian on both sides². Siege was just about to be laid to the city. It was the evening of the day of battle; the trophy of Athens had been set up, when the combined fleets of Peloponnêsos and Sicily came to the help of Milêtos³. The Athenian fleet withdrew before them. But it was not wholly as an enemy of Athens that Hermokratês had come to the coasts of Asia. He had come to be also, whenever occasion called him, the champion of Hellas and of freedom against Spartan commanders and Persian satraps.

The Greek cities of Asia betrayed.

Hermokratês at Milêtos.

His career in Asia.

Distinction won by the Syracusans.

Taking of Iasos. 412.

In the first enterprise which the Sikeliot fleet undertook in common with the rest of the allies of Sparta, we hear that the men of Syracuse distinguished themselves above all others⁴. But the new fame of Hermokratês was won, as the fame of some later European commanders has been won, in no better cause than that of supporting one barbarian against another. Iasos was held by Amorgêes against King Darius and his satrap. Iasos could hardly count as a Greek city⁵, and when there are only despots and barbarians to choose among, the so-called rebel often promises better than the so-called lawful king. But Peloponnêsos and Sicily joined to storm and sack the wealthy stronghold,

¹ Thuc. viii. 36. 1; *οἱ Μιλήσιοι προθύμως τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἔφερον.*

² Ib. 25. 4.

³ Ib. 26. 1; *ἐν τούτῳ δὲ περὶ δέλιγν ἤδη ὀφίαν ἀγγέλλεται αὐτοῖς τὰς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ Σικελίας πέντε καὶ πενήκοντα ναῦς ὅσον οὐ παρῆναι.*

⁴ Ib. 28. 2; *καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπηνέθθησαν.* This must mean some formal vote of thanks, as in ii. 25. 3, and in the case of a whole people, Herod. viii. 93.

⁵ Polybios (xvi. 12) says only; *εὐχονται τὸ μὲν ἀνέκαθεν Ἀργείων ἀποκοι γεγονέναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Μιλησίαν.*

and to sell Amorgès and the people of the city for a good price to the satrap Tissaphernès¹. In the following winter Hermokratès had the chance of acting in a way one degree more worthy of his former fame. The wily satrap sought to defraud the sailors of their promised pay; the Spartan Thérámenès winked at the tricks of the barbarian, but the Syracusan withstood him, and gained some small instalment of what was due².

CHAP. VIII.
412-411.
Hermo-
kratès
withstands
Tissapher-
nès and
Théra-
menès.

About this time Thourioi, a city zealous for Athens in the last stage of the war in Sicily³, had, after the Athenian overthrow, been placed by the result of a new revolution in the hands of the party hostile to Athens. Three hundred Athenian partisans were driven out, among them the orator Lysias, who went back to Athens to do good service to the city of his first and his last adoption⁴. And, if older settlers were driven out, newer ones were welcomed. The Rhodian Dôrieus, of the great house of the Diagorids, himself famous for his majestic form and his athletic exploits, had been sentenced to death with all his house, as conspirators against Athenian dominion in their island⁵. He escaped and made his way to Thourioi. There he was received with honour and citizenship, and was given the command of ten Thourian ships to join in the war with the Athenian enemy. He led them to the Asiatic coast; and with them came one Laconian ship, and also, from whatever quarter, one ship of Syracuse⁶. We may be sure

Revolu-
tions of
Thourioi;
the Athe-
nian party
driven out.
412.

Dôrieus at
Thourioi.

He brings
the Thour-
ian fleet
to Asia.
412-411.

¹ Thuc. viii. 28.

² Ib. 29. 2; Ἑρμοκράτους ἀντειπόντος τοῦ Συρακοσίου στρατηγού.

³ See above, p. 305.

⁴ Plutarch (Vit. X. Orat.) helps us to the date; τῷ δὲ ἐξῆς Καλλίῳ, Ὀλυμπιάδι ἐννεηκοστῇ δευτέρᾳ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν συμβάντων Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ κινήσεως γενομένης τῶν τ' ἄλλων συμμάχων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκουμένων, αἰτιαθεὶς ἀπαιτεῖσθαι, ἐξέπεσε μετ' ἄλλων τριακοσίων.

⁵ Xen. Hell. i. 5. 19; Δωριέα, ὅντα μὲν Ῥόδιον, πάλοι δὲ φυγάδα ἐξ Ἀθηρῶν καὶ Ῥόδου ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, κατεψηφισμένων αὐτοῦ θάνατον καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου συγγενῶν.

⁶ Thuc. viii. 35. 1.

CHAP. VIII. that Dôrieus had some hand in the revolution in his own
 Rhodes island which changed Rhodes from a dependency of Athens
 revolt from into an ally of Sparta¹. But the immediate direction of
 Athens. his force was to Knidos, Knidos metropolis of the Isles of
 Fire, another city which had thrown off the yoke of Athens
 only to be brought under the yoke of a Persian satrap².
 Intrigues Presently we again hear how Tissaphernês, under the in-
 of Alki- fluence of Alkibiadês—now hardly to be called either
 biadês and Spartan or Athenian, but playing his own game for his
 Tissapher- own ends—bribes the Lacedæmonian commander Astyochos
 nês. and the chief officers of the fleet to consent to another
 lessening of the seamen's pay³. It is again Hermokratês,
 Hermo- whose hands were as clean as those of Nikias from all un-
 kratês lawful gain, who speaks the only word that was spoken on
 withstands Tissapher- behalf of the whole body of allies against their treacherous
 nês and leaders⁴.
 Astyochos.

The year We are now in a memorable year, the year of the Four
 411. Hundred, the year when Athens for a moment bowed to the
 The Four yoke of oligarchy and then set herself free again. But for
 Hundred us the military interest of the summer gathers less round
 at Athens. Athens and Samos than round the ships of Athens and
 Thourioi which were still watching off Milêtos⁵. Tissa-
 phernês was by this time believed to be playing fast and
 loose between Athens and Sparta. For Alkibiadês had
 Alkibiadês now come back to his Athenian allegiance, and had turned
 on the the mind of the satrap towards his own city⁶. Pay from
 side. the satrap's hoard came but sparingly to the Peloponnesian
 fleet⁷; and the fleet of Old Phœnicia, the often promised

¹ Thuc. viii. 44. 2.² Ib.³ Ib. 45. 1, 2.⁴ Ib. 3. The other officers are bribed by Tissaphernês, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοῦτων δὲ Ἑρμοκράτης ἡγαντιούτο μόνος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμμαχου.⁵ Ib. 46. 5; 47. 1; 49. 2; 61. 2. ⁶ Ib. 45. 1; 50. 2; 52. 1; 81. 1.⁷ Ib. 80. 1; Τισσαφέρους κακῶς διδόντος.

ships of Tyre and Sidon and Arados, never took their place ORAP. VIII. alongside of the ships of Syracuse and Selinous¹. The whole Peloponnesian armament suspected the admiral Astyochos of betraying them to the satrap. In the Peloponnesian ships the seamen were largely slaves; not so in the contingents from Sicily and Italy. The triremes of Syracuse and Thourioi were manned by freemen, who, with Dôrieus and Astyochos. Dôrieus at their head, went boldly to Astyochos to demand their pay². The Spartan was a mere Spartan, not one of the winning school of Brasidas and Gylippos. He spoke fiercely and threatened them. When the Rhodian captain, the Nemean, Isthmian, and Olympic victor, spoke on behalf of his men, Astyochos raised his stick to strike him³. The endurance of his men gave way at this insult to their leader. With the free spirit of seamen, they rushed with a fierce shout on the Spartan commander, pelting him with stones; he escaped only by taking refuge at an altar⁴.

In this story, though the presence of Hermokratês is implied, yet Dôrieus of Rhodes and Thourioi holds the first place. Almost at the same moment Hermokratês again comes to the front in person. The Milesians had by this time learned what came of Spartan deliverance from Athenian dominion. Two treaties had now been concluded Lichas objects to the two treaties. 411. between Sparta and the King⁵. To both of these the new Spartan commissioner Lichas objected that the clauses in them which acknowledged the dominion of the King might

¹ Thuc. viii. 78. 1; τὰς παρὰ Τισσαφέρμους Φοινίσσας ναῦς μένοντες, ἄλλων ὄνομα καὶ οὐκ ἔργον.

² Ib. 84. 2; τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων καὶ Θουρίων ὅσῃ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλευθέροι ἦσαν τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ναῦται, τοσοῦτῃ καὶ θρασύτατα προσπεύοντες τὸν μισθὸν ἀπῆτουν.

³ Ib.; τῷ γὰρ Δωριεῷ ξυμφορεῦντο τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ναύταις καὶ ἐπαῆρατο τὴν βακτηρίαν.

⁴ Ib. 3; τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ὡς εἶδον, οἷα δὲ ναῦται, ἔρμησαν ἐγχεραγόντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀστυόχον ὥστε βάλλων ὃ δὲ προῖδὼν καταφεύγει ἐπὶ βωμὸν τινα.

⁵ Thuc. viii. 18 and 37.

CHAP. VIII. be construed as asserting his rights over a large part of European Greece. It would seem, he said, that the Lacedæmonians, instead of working the freedom of Hellas, as they professed, had simply put her under the dominion of the Mede¹. In a third treaty this danger was avoided; no words were admitted which could be taken as asserting the King's dominion in any part of Europe. But in Asia the integrity of his empire was fully guaranteed, and not only the integrity but the independence. Asia was acknowledged as his own, and with his own he might do as he thought good².

Treaty of
Lichas;
Europe se-
cured, but
Asia sur-
rendered.

We hear nothing of the feelings of Hermokratês or of Dôrieus as to the general principle thus laid down, the subjection of the Greeks of Asia to the barbarian. But they, and the freemen of Syracuse and Thourioi generally had presently an opportunity of speaking their minds as to one particular exercise of the authority thus acknowledged. The King might do what he thought good with his own; Milêtos was part of his own, and at Milêtos what his satrap thought good on his behalf was that a castle, a *Zwingburg*, should arise in the great Ionian city, to keep its citizens in due obedience to Darius and Tissaphernês. The fortress of the barbarian planted within their walls put an end to the zeal which revolted Milêtos had once shown on the Peloponnesian side³. Stirred up by the boldness of the Thourians and Syracusans, the Milesians rose and suddenly stormed the castle and drove out the garrison⁴. Free action on the part of victims of the barbarian was natur-

Tissapher-
nês' castle
at Milêtos.

The Mile-
sians take
the castle.

¹ Thuc. viii. 43. 3; ἐνεῖναι καὶ νῆσους ἀπάσας πάλιν δουλεῖν καὶ Θεσσαλίαν καὶ Λοκροὺς καὶ τὰ μέγχι Βοιωτῶν, καὶ ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας ἂν Μηδικῇ ἀρχῇ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους περιθεῖναι.

² Ib. 58. 2; χώραν τὴν βασιλεὺς ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστὶ, βασιλεὺς εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς αὐτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.

³ See above, p. 420.

⁴ Thuc. viii. 84. 4; ἔλαβον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῃ ἐνφοδομημένον τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους φρούριον οἱ Μιλήσιοι, λάβρα ἐπιπεσόντες καὶ τοὺς ἐνόντας φύλακας αὐτοῦ ἐκβάλλουσι.

ally offensive, then as now, to those who had betrayed them CHAP. VIII. to the barbarian. Lichas, though he had protested against the clauses of the treaty which had seemed to recognize the King as lord of Thessaly and Boiôtia, was a prudent diplomatist who sought to avoid those difficulties and complications which are apt to arise when a people takes the solution of its own questions into its own hands. He bade the Milesians and all other bondmen of the King to preserve a prudent attitude, and to sit down quietly in their bondage, at least till the war was over¹. The mass of the allies were of another mind. The Syracusans above all, rejoicing in their own deliverance, sent forth to work the deliverance of others, felt no call to help in keeping any fellow-Greek under the barbarian yoke. They openly applauded the action of the Milesians²; the wrath of the Milesians grew fiercer against Astyochos and Lichas, till they were presently delivered from both of them. Lichas died of disease, and the Milesians refused him the place of honourable burial which the Lacedæmonians demanded for him³. Astyochos was recalled from his command to make way for Mindaros. He went back to Sparta, taking with him an envoy of Tissaphernês to speak against the Milesians and to speak for the satrap⁴. The Milesians sent envoys of their own, and with them went Hermokratês to tell of the double-dealing of the satrap and his intrigues with Alkibiadês⁵. From the day when he had

Lichas and the Milesians.

The Syracusans help the Milesians.

Hermokratês goes to Sparta to support them.

¹ Thuc. viii. 84. 5; ὁ μὲντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἤρρεκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνην καὶ δουλεῦειν τοὺς Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τὰ μέτρια καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν, ὥς ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. From which Blue Book of our own day is this translated?

² Ib. 4; ξυνεδόκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμαχοῖς καὶ οὐχ ἥμισυ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις.

³ Ib. 5.

⁴ Ib. 85. 2. The envoy of the satrap was a man τῶν παρ' ἐαυτοῦ, Γαυλίτης ὄνομα, Ἑὸρ ὀγλωσσος. A hellenized barbarian, not a barbarized Greek.

⁵ Ib. 3; εἰδὼς τοὺς τε Μιλησίους πορευομένους ἐπὶ καταβολῇ τῇ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα, καὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτην μετ' αὐτῶν, ὃς ἐμελλε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην

CHAP. VIII.
Hatred of
Tissapher-
nēs to-
wards Her-
mokratēs.

Sikeliot
and Italiot
ships off
Euboia.
411.

Comment
of Thucy-
dides ;
Lacedæ-
monians
and Syra-
cusans.

first pleaded for the sailors' pay, the heart of the Persian satrap had been filled with a bitter and abiding hatred towards the great citizen of Syracuse¹.

All this while the revolution and counter-revolution was going on at Athens. At one of its stages, at the moment of that revolt of Euboia which struck yet greater fear into the heart of Athens than even the overthrow in Sicily², we read of new reinforcements coming from the West, of ships from Taras and Lokroi, and some from Sicily also³. They formed part of the Peloponnesian fleet which came to the support of the revolted island. They helped to overcome the ships of Athens off the haven of Eretria, when the Dorian enemy and the Ionian ally agreed in slaughtering the men of the ruling city⁴. And had Syracusan Hermokratēs held the chief command instead of Lacedæmonian Agēsandridas, the ruling city might hardly have outlived that day. It is here that the Athenian historian stops to make the bitter comment that, both now and at many other times, the Lacedæmonian enemy seemed to carry on the war in the interest of Athens⁵. The slowness and lack of enterprise in the Spartan character did the work of their enemies⁶. It was otherwise with the Syracusans. They were a people like the Athenians themselves, and knew best how to wage war against them⁷.

The luck of the older comers among the Sikeliots in the

ἀποφαίνειν φθείροντα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγματα μετ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα.

¹ Thuc. viii. 85. 3 ; ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦν αὐτῷ αἰεὶ ποτε περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως.

² Ib. 96. 1 ; οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἐνυφορὰ, καίπερ μεγάλη τότε δόξασα εἶναι, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν πῶς οὕτως ἐφόβησεν.

³ Ib. 91. 2.

⁴ Ib. 95. 5.

⁵ Ib. 96. 5 ; οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίους πάντων δὴ ἐνυφοράτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς.

⁶ Ib. ; διάφοροι πλείστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀρεῖς, οἱ δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ ἀτολμοὶ ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ναυτικῇ πλείστα ἀφέλουν.

⁷ Ib. ; εἰδείξαν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν.

Ægean was less in the greater fight of Kynossema in the Hellespont. There Hermokratēs and the Syracusans held the right wing of the Peloponnesian fleet against the Athenian Thrasyllus. And if in the end they fled, they might boast that they were the last to flee¹. But the victory cheered Athenian hearts, still bowed down by Sicilian overthrow². It must have been with special glee that they set up their trophy on the height by the tomb of Hekabē³ for a fight in which they could show ships won from every member of the Corinthian household. The metropolis herself, Ambrakia, Leukas, and Syracuse, all paid their share⁴. And the Italiots and Sikeliots who stayed by Eubœia had their day of ill luck also. They formed part of the Peloponnesian or Boiotian fleet which was destroyed by a storm off Athōs. An inscription at Korōneia, read and recorded by Ephoros, was understood by Diodōros to mean that twelve men only escaped⁵.

CHAP. VIII.
Hermokratēs at Kynossema.
411.

Athenian victory over the Corinthian alliance.

Storm off Athōs.

Of the battles that followed in the Hellespont, in the first, fought late in the same memorable year, we hear of Dōrieus and his Italiots; indeed their escape and resistance form the main story⁶. In the fight which immediately followed, the Syracusans formed the left wing of the fleet

Battles in the Hellespont.
411-410.

¹ See the 104th and 105th chapters throughout. We read at the end αἱ τε Συρακοῖαι . . . μάλλον ἐς φυγὴν ὁρμήσαντες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔδραν.

² Thuc. viii. 106. 2. Till then they were φοβούμενοι τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διὰ τε τὰ κατὰ βραχὺ σφάλματα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ συμφορὰν.

³ Τὸ τῆς Ἑκάβης μνημεῖον (τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα in Thucydides) comes from Diodōros (xiii. 40). We know not whether Philistos recorded these eastern wars or whether we are only listening to Ephoros.

⁴ Thuc. viii. 106. 3. Five Corinthian, two Ambrakiot, one Leukadian, and one Syracusan.

⁵ Diodōros (xiii. 41) copies the inscription from Ephoros. Grote (viii. 150) suggests that the fleet was in great part Boiotian. This is likely enough; but this is the fleet spoken of in Thuc. viii. 91. 2, which had some Sikeliot and Italiot ships.

⁶ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 1-3; Diod. xiii. 45. He had just come from Rhodes.

CHAP. VIII. of Mindaros¹, which bore up on equal terms against the Athenians, till Alkibiadês came to turn the scale. And now, after so many changes, the man who had argued against Syracuse at Athens and at Katanê², who had argued for her at Sparta, who had argued against her and worked for her at Messana³, but whose warfare on the soil and on the waters of Sicily had not gone beyond surveys and skirmishes⁴, at last met Sikeliot enemies face to face, and met them to defeat them⁵. He met them with the same result in the greater battle of Kyzikos early in the next year⁶. Here the Peloponnesians, with their Greek and barbarian allies—this time the trustworthy Pharnabazos and not the deceitful Tissaphernês—were utterly defeated. The whole fleet fell into the hands of the victors, save only the ships of one division. When the Syracusans could not keep their ships for themselves, they burned them rather than let them go to strengthen the enemy⁷. New ships soon were made; Pharnabazos gave every help in money and timber. Nor was he the enemy to Greek freedom that Tissaphernês was. The people of Antandros had risen with Peloponnesian help against Tissaphernês' bloody lieutenant Arsakês⁸. The glimpse that we next get of the town seems to set it before us as a commonwealth tributary or dependent, but no more. Pharnabazos assigns it as the place for the building of the new ships. In that work doubtless the Syracusans joined. But they joined also in building the wall of Antandros, and by their conduct in every way they made themselves so acceptable to the people

Battle of
Kyzikos.
410.

The Syra-
cusans
burn their
ships.
New ships
built.

The Sike-
liots at
Antandros.

¹ Diod. xiii. 45; ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ λαὸν κέρας ἔταξε Συρακουσίους.

² See above, pp. 96, 151.

³ See above, pp. 179, 199.

⁴ See above, p. 148.

⁵ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 4-7; Diod. xiii. 45, 46.

⁶ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 14-20; Diod. xiii. 49-51.

⁷ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 18; τὰς δὲ ναῦς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντο ἄγοντες ἀπάσας ἐς Προκόννησον, πλὴν τῶν Συρακουσίων· ἐκεῖνας δὲ αὐτοὶ κατέκαιον οἱ Συρακούσιοι.

⁸ Thuc. viii. 108. 4.

of that town, that they gave them their citizenship and the honourable title of benefactors¹. CHAP. VIII.

This was the end of the career of Hermokratês as a Syracusan commander in the waters of Old Greece and Asia. We have now entered on a memorable and terrible year in the history of Sicily; but its great events must be told elsewhere. It is enough to say here that the party at Syracuse opposed to Hermokratês, the party doubtless of Dioklês, had gained the upper hand, and that they had carried a vote for the deposition and banishment of Hermokratês and his colleagues in the generalship². It may be that the Syracusans at home were dissatisfied with the ill-success of the late battles. They may have sent Hermokratês forth in the common belief, the fear of Athens, the hope of Sparta, that Athens would be crushed out of hand by the combined force of Peloponnêsos and Sicily. To that end it might perhaps have been needful to send a Sikeliot fleet of greater strength than twenty-two ships. Anyhow that end had not been gained; but the failure had been the common failure of the whole Peloponnesian alliance; it had been in no sort the special failure of the Sikeliot contingent. On the other hand Hermokratês and the force under his command had stood forth as the foremost men of the whole fleet and army, the bravest in battle, the first to stand up against wrong and to give help to allies in need. To the virtue of Hermokratês there is no better tribute than the lies of Tissaphernês and Astyochos.

The year 409: its importance in Sicily.

Banishment of Hermokratês.

Dissatisfaction at Syracuse.

Services of Hermokratês;

slanders against him.

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 26; *ναυπηγουμένων δὲ οἱ Συρακούσιοι ἅμα τοῖς Ἀντανδρίοις τοῦ τείχους τι ἐπετέλεσαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ φρουρᾷ ἤρεσαν πάντων μάλιστα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ εὐεργασία τε καὶ πολιτεία Συρακουσίοις ἐν Ἀντάνδρῳ ἐστὶ.*

² Ib. 27; *ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἡγγέλθη τοῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων στρατηγοῖς, ὅτι φεύγειεν ὁλοθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου.* This is only casually referred to by Diodôros (xiii. 63), and also by Thucydides (viii. 85. 3), when speaking of the spite of Tissaphernês against Hermokratês. See above, p. 425, and below, p. 432. See Grote, x. 574.

CHAP. VIII. The wrath of Hermokratês against Tissaphernês was kindled, so they said, because he had asked money of the satrap and had been refused¹. As far as the conduct of Hermokratês in the war had gone, no sentence could be more unjust than that which deprived him without a hearing of command and of citizenship. But we must not forget that in the internal politics of Syracuse Hermokratês, best of generals and foreign ministers, was ever suspected. And his own conduct will presently show that the suspicion was not wholly without grounds.

Hermokratês accepts the sentence.

When the sentence of deposition reached the fleet, Hermokratês called his men together. He enlarged on the injustice and the illegal nature of the sentence; he spoke of the toils of warfare which they had shared with him; but he bade them submit to the will of the commonwealth; he bade them show themselves as brave and faithful towards their new commanders as they had shown themselves towards him. He then bade them choose officers to take the command till the new generals came². A cry arose that Hermokratês and his colleagues should keep the command in defiance of the vote at home. This was specially the cry of trierarchs, steermen, and the heavy-armed who served on board the ships. It seems implied that the actual seamen, doubtless at Syracuse, as at Athens, the specially democratic class, were at least less eager in

He is called on to keep the command.

¹ Thuc. viii. 85. 4; καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα φηγόντος ἐκ Συρακουσῶν τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους, καὶ ἑτέρων ἡκόντων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Συρακουσίων ἐς τὴν Μίλητον στρατηγῶν . . . ἐνέκειτο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης φηγίδι ὄντι ἤδη τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει πολλὰ ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ κατηγορεῖ ἄλλα τε καὶ ὡς χρήματά ποτε αἰτήσας αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ τυχὸν τὴν ἔχθραν οἱ προσθείτο. It is not likely that Tissaphernês can have misrepresented any transaction between Hermokratês and himself, such as did presently take place between Hermokratês and Pharnabazos.

² Xen. Hell. i. 1. 27; ἐνυκαλίσαντες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν στρατιώτας, Ἑρμοκράτους προηγουμένου, ἀπολοφύρονται τὴν ἑαυτῶν ξυμφορὰν, ὡς ἀδίκως φεύγειν ἔπαυται παρὰ τὸν νόμον· παρήνυσάν τε προθύμους εἶναι τὰ λοιπὰ, ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πρὸς τὰ δεῖ παραγγελλόμενα, ἔλθουσι δὲ ἐκείνων ἀρχοντας, μέχρις ἂν ἀφίκωνται οἱ ἡρημένοι αὐτ' ἐκείνων.

the demand¹. To that demand the generals refused to consent; they would not withstand the authority of the commonwealth². As men going out of office, they submitted themselves to a voluntary *enkhyrē*. They recounted their own exploits; they called on any man who had aught to say against them to come forth and say it; but none answered³. They then yielded to a second demand, that they would at least keep the command till their successors came out⁴. Before long, at Milētos, they gave up their command to the new comers, Dēmarchos, Myskōn, and Potamis⁵, and withdrew amid the general applause of the army. The more part of the trierarchs bound themselves by oath that, when they got back to Syracuse, they would do all that they could to bring about their recall⁶.

CHAP. VIII.

They keep it only till the coming of the new generals.

The trierarchs pledge themselves to their restoration.

Secret plans of Hermokratēs.

All this public action was worthy of the best side of the great Syracusan. But we see that there was another side to him, when we hear of evening meetings in the general's tent, where, among chosen officers and soldiers, Hermokratēs set forth certain plans of his own which are not more fully described⁷. But we better understand their

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 28; οἱ ἀναβήσαντες ἐκέλευον ἐκείνους ἀρχειν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ τριήραρχοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιβάται καὶ οἱ κυβερνήται. The next words show that ἀρχειν means to keep the command altogether, not merely till the new generals come.

² Ib.; οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάσειν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν.

³ Ib.; εἰ δέ τις ἐπικαλοῖται τι αὐτοῖς λόγον ἔφασαν χρήναι διδόναι, μεμνημένους κ.τ.λ. . . . οὐδένος δ' οὐδὲν ἐπαιτιωμένον, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Ib. 29; θεομένων ἱμεῖναι, ἵνα ἀφίκοντο οἱ ἀντ' ἐκείνων στρατηγοί.

⁵ The names are given by Xenophōn, also in advance by Thucydides, viii. 85. 3.

⁶ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 30; τῶν δὲ τριηράρχων ὁμώσαντες οἱ πλείστοι πατάξαι αὐτοὺς, ἐπὶν ἐς Συρακούσας ἀφίκωνται, ἀπεπέμφαντο ὅσοι ἠβούλοντο πάντες ἐπαινοῦντες.

⁷ Ib. 30; ὃν ἐγίγνωσκε τοὺς ἐπικειστάτους καὶ τριηράρχων καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἐπιβατῶν, ἐκείνης ἡμέρας, πρὶ καὶ πρὸς ἑσπέραν, συναλίσιν πρὸς τὴν σπηρὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεξουούνητο, ὅτι ἐμελλε λέγειν ἢ πράττειν, ἐκείνους ἐδίδασκε, κελεύων λέγειν τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ παραχρήμα, τὰ δὲ βουλευσαμένους. This may very well have been Hermokratēs' usual practice; but we may be sure that its importance grew in the time that he was waiting for his

CHAP. VIII.

He builds
triremes
and hires
mercena-
ries.

408.

Hermo-
kratés at
Sousa.The Car-
thaginians
in Sicily.
409.

nature, when we read that Hermokratés went to Pharnabazos, and that, without his asking for anything, the satrap gave him a sum of money, which he spent in building triremes and hiring mercenaries to secure his own return to Syracuse¹. We hear further that, when Pharnabazos designed to take envoys from Athens, Sparta, and Argos, to the Great King at Sousa, Hermokratés and his brother Proxenos were in their company². To Hermokratés King and satrap would seem beings far away from Syracuse, who were not likely to threaten the independence or the power of Syracuse. From them he might fairly get any help that offered itself, any help that he might turn to his own Syracusan purposes. There was already an enemy in Sicily with whom he could stand on no such terms. The record of the year ends with the entry that it was then that the Carthaginians, under Hannibal their general, made war in Sicily with an army of ten myriads, and in three months took two Greek cities, Selinous and Himera³. There was no fear now that the alliance between Persia and Carthage seventy years before should be again renewed. Against

successor. The ἐπιεικέστατοι are a rather dangerous class in the mouth either of Hermokratés or of Xenophôn, and we may mark the significant absence of the democratic *ναῦται* from these gatherings.

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 31; ἀφικόμενος παρὰ Φαρνάβαζον, πρὶν αἰτῆσαι χρήματα λαβὼν, παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν ἐς Συρακούσας κάθοδον ξένους τε καὶ τρεῖρεις. These words follow a description of the great reputation of Hermokratés (τὰ πολλὰ ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ εὐδόξει, λέγειν τε δοκῶν καὶ βουλευεῖν τὰ κράτιστα), which may well refer to times both before and after the announcement of his banishment, and a reference to his visit to Sparta; κατηγορήσας δὲ Τισσαφέρνης ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ Ἑρμοκράτης, μαρτυροῦντος τοῦ Ἀστυόχου, καὶ δόξας τὰ ὅντα λέγειν. But Xenophôn did not mean that this visit took place after the announcement of his banishment. It is simply part of a general picture of Hermokratés. It is plain from Thucydides (viii. 85. 3) that the visit to Sparta was earlier.

With this last casual reference we part, in sorrow and reverence, from a guide who has none like him before or after.

² Xen. Hell. i. 3. 13.

³ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 37; καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ Καρχηδόνιοι, Ἀντίβα ἡγουμένου, στρατεύσαντες ἐπὶ Σικελίαν δέκα μυριάσι στρατιᾶς, αἰρούσιν ἐν τρισὶ μῆσι δύο πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας, Σελινοῦντα καὶ Ἱμέραν.

the barbarians who threatened the Greek life of Sicily CHAP. VIII.
Hermokratēs held that he might fairly use the wealth of
barbarians from whom Sicily had no harm to fear.

Thus the Syracusan and the Peloponnesian fleet lost the
services of a great man, on many sides of him a noble man,
but not a perfect citizen, like Aristeidēs or Timoleôn. But
the Sikeliots whom Hermokratēs had trained could now
fight even without Hermokratēs. The whole Sikeliot force
in the eastern waters now reached the tale of twenty-seven
ships. In the docks of Antandros, the Syracusans had
rebuilt their twenty ships and the Selinuntines their two.
Five more had come from Syracuse under the command of
Euklēs and Hērakleidēs, both names that we have heard
already; the latter we have seen borne by two generals
of Syracuse¹. The men on board of these ships played a
chief part amid the force, Greek and barbarian, by which
the Athenian Thrasylos was driven back from Ephesos².
The men of Syracuse and Selinous received the first prize
of valour and every honour which the city of Ephesos and
its citizens could bestow on them. The Syracusan who
chose to settle at Ephesos was to be free from the special
tax that was paid by strangers. To the Selinuntines
more was granted. The news had already come of the
awful deeds which were in-doing in their own island.
Hannibal was in Sicily, and Selinous was no more a
city. The Selinuntine warriors were, like Themistoklēs,
Kanáres, and Garibaldi, ἀπόλιες ἄνδρες; to such men, so
far from their lost home, the citizenship of Ephesos was
freely voted³. Ephesos was under the overlordship of the

Continued
action of
the Sike-
liots.

The Sike-
liot fleet
rebuilt at
Antandros.
Reinforce-
ments from
Syracuse.
Sikeliot
exploits
and
honour.

News of
the taking
of Selinous.
409.

Ephesian
citizenship
voted to
the Seli-
nuntines.

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 2. 8. On Euklēs see above, p. 228; on Hērakleidēs, pp. 208, 228.

² Ib. 9.

³ Ib. 10; τοῖς δὲ Συρακουσίοις καὶ Σελινουσίοις, κρατίστοις γενομένοις, ἀριστείαν ἔδωκαν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ πολλοῖς [see above, p. 420], καὶ οἰκεῖν ἀνέλειψαν ἔδωκαν τῷ βουλομένῳ δέ. Σελινουσίοις δὲ, ἐπεὶ ἡ πόλις ἀπωλώλει, καὶ πολιτείαν ἔδωκαν.

CHAP. VIII. Great King; it lay largely open to the caprice of his satrap; still it was a commonwealth, an Hellenic commonwealth, and Selinous was such no longer.

A few more notices there still are of this distant warfare of the Greeks of Sicily, each of which stands in a striking relation to something which has gone before in the story. Presently Thrasyllus is at Methymna. He sees the twenty-five Syracusan ships whose crews had just smitten his heavy-armed sailing away from Ephesos. He puts to sea at once; he attacks the Syracusan ships; he takes four with their crews and chases the rest back to Ephesos¹. In the winter the captives were taken to Athens. There were *latomia*i in Peiraieus as well as at Syracuse; they too could be used as prisons, and there the Syracusans were doomed to feel somewhat of the same form of suffering which, four winters before, they had inflicted on the soldiers of Nikias and Dêmôsthenês. But the luck of the new captives was greater than that of the men for whose griefs they were made to atone. The Syracusan prisoners contrived to cut their way through the rock, and to escape, some to Dekeleia, some to Megara². Lastly, Sparta, seeing that the whole Athenian naval force was engaged at the Hellespont, deemed it a fitting moment to try to win back long-lost Pylos, her own Koryphasion, so long the stronghold of wasting Helots. Of the eleven ships that she sent on that errand, five were Sicilian vessels with citizen crews³. They were perhaps on their way home. Pylos had been first taken by Dêmôsthenês when an Athenian fleet on its way to Sicily was kept back

Victory of Thrasyllus over the Syracusan fleet.

Syracusan prisoners in Attic *Latomia*i. Winter, 409-408.

They escape.

The Sikeliots help in the recovery of Pylos. 409.

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 2. 12.

² Ib. 14; *χειμὼν ἐπὶ, ἐν ᾧ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι Συρακούσιοι, εἰργμέναι τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἐν λιθοτομίαις, θεωροῦντες τὴν πέτρην, ἀποδράντες νυκτὸς ἔφυγον εἰς Δεκέλειαν, οἱ δ' εἰς Μέγαρα*. This looks as if they were set to work in the quarries.

³ Diod. xiii. 64; *Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Πύλῳ, ἣν Μεσσήνιοι φρουρᾷ κατέχον, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν ἑνδεκα ναυσὶν, ἃν ἦσαν αἱ ἀπὸ Σικελίας πέντε*. Cf. above, p. 423. See also Xen. Hell. i. 2. 18, and Grote, viii. 177.

by its taking¹. Another such point of the Peloponnesian coast was occupied by the same Athenian leader on the Sicilian voyage from which he never came back to Athens². And now it was by the help of Sikeliot hands that Sparta was set free from the thorn in her side which had so long made her feel that conquered Messéné could still deal a blow against her.

The Sikeliots were needed in their own island; no such need lay on the Italiots. Their Rhodian leader Dôrieus had his own island to watch over, and he had to avenge on Athens the sentence of death pronounced against him and his house. Presently a moment came when it seemed as if the sentence would be carried out. He and two Thourian triremes were taken by the Athenian Phanoethenês, and Dôrieus himself stood, like Ducetius at Syracuse, before the Athenian assembly to hear his doom. But the stately form of the Olympic victor, the dazzling glory of his exploits, made the assembled people forget their wrath. They saw in him, not the rebel whom they had condemned to death, the captain who had fought against them in many battles, but rather the man of such renown in the sacred games as no other Greek had ever reached. They let him go free without terms or ransom³. Our thoughts are carried back to the days of another Dôrieus, to his companion Philippos, and the honours granted to him in death by the men of Segesta who slew him⁴. A time came among the revolutions of Greek affairs when Dôrieus, still a Rhodian patriot, was the friend of Athens and the enemy of Sparta. Again a prisoner, this time in Spartan hands, he fared not at the hands of the oligarchs in secret council as he had fared at the hands of Dêmos on his Pnyx. To them

Dôrieus at
Athens.
407.

His release.

¹ See above, p. 38.

² See above, p. 303.

³ Xen. Hell. i. 5. 19; Paus. vi. 7. 4; Grote, viii. 217.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 95.

CHAP. VIII. he was a dangerous enemy and nothing more, and, as a
 He is put dangerous enemy, he paid the forfeit of his life¹.
 to death at
 Sparta.
 396.

The Car-
 thaginians
 at Akragas.
 407.

The Wars of Syracuse and Athens end with the Spartan recovery of Pylos. With the later acts of the war, with the fights of Arginousai and Aigos-potamos, with the surrender of Athens and the destruction of her Long Walls, the historian of Sicily has no concern. Kallikratidas touches us not; Lysandros we shall meet in our own island. We have now to turn to the far more fearful strife which was waging in Sicily itself. The doom of Selinous was known already; the Sikeliot fleet went back from Asia to show itself too late to save Himera from a heavier fate than Selinous. And the historian who records the capture and the release of Dôrieus again stops to mark the year by the misfortunes of Sicily. "The year ended in which the Carthaginians made war in Sicily with a hundred and twenty triremes and a land army of twelve myriads. And they took Akragas through hunger, having been overcome in battle, but having beleaguered the city for seven months²." Our small dealings with barbarians at Milêtos and Ephesos might be enough to remind us that the Eternal Question was then, as ever in the world's history, awaiting its solution. We have only to turn to our own ground to see it reopened in all its fulness.

¹ Paus. vi. 7. 6. He refers to the Attic history of Androtion. See C. Muller, i. 276.

² Xen. Hell. i. 5. 21; καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν ἐν ᾧ Καρχηδόνιοι ἐς Σικελίαν στρατεύσαντες εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τριήρεσι καὶ πεζῆς στρατιᾶς δώδεκα μυριάσιν, εἰλον Ἀκράγαντα λιμῇ, μάχῃ μὲν ἡττηθέντες, προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μῆρας.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SECOND CARTHAGINIAN INVASION¹.

B.C. 410-404.

THE brightest days of Greek Sicily had passed away. Effects of the Athenian invasion. The Athenian invasion had wrought but little material damage, and its result had been to raise the position of Syracuse and of all Sicily in the eyes of the world. But it was hardly to be hoped that the Sikeliot cities should again see that union of freedom, prosperity,

¹ It is a fall from a chapter through which our chief guide has been Thucydides to turn to a chapter in which we may say that our only guide is Diodóros. The fall is greater, because we have now no one to compare with Diodóros, as we had Diodóros himself and Plutarch to compare with Thucydides. In short it is through Diodóros alone that we have to get at Philistos or any other trustworthy source. But, as I have already noticed (see above, p. 1), Diodóros, freed from the overwhelming company of Thucydides, returns on the whole to his better level, though he does not supply us with many things so good as some of his best points in the later stages of the Athenian war. Plutarch has no Life illustrating this time. We have lost the company of Nikias and Alkibiadés; we do not yet come in for that of Diôn. The subsidiary writers give us the least possible amount of help, except in matters which personally concern Dionysios, the full examination of which I keep for the next chapter. The Carthaginian invasion of Sicily seems to have drawn to itself but little notice in Old Greece. Besides the two references quoted from Xenophôn, which have been suspected, we get one or two political references from Aristotle, and an anecdote or two from Polyainos; that is about all. We have not a single inscription to teach us anything during a time so important for Syracusan constitutional history. On the other hand, we get some valuable notices from coins. We shall get more light again in the tenth chapter, though nothing like what we had in the eighth.

CHAP. IX. and at least comparative peace, which had marked the years that followed the fall of the tyrants. The struggle with Athens had stirred men's minds; it had brought to the front every element of discord; those who had dreaded Syracusan ambition in former days were likely to have much more reason to dread it now. Hermokratês, preacher of peace and Sikeliot unity, no longer guided the counsels of his city. Soon after the deliverance of Syracuse, he had gone on active foreign service in the Ægæan waters; since then he had been condemned in his absence, and was now a dangerous exile, planning an armed return. The most influential leader at Syracuse was the enemy of Hermokratês, Dioklês, demagogue and lawgiver. We must presently glance at his political career; but at this moment the domestic politics of Syracuse count for less than her external relations. Besides her efforts in the eastern waters, warfare in Sicily still lingered. Katanê and Naxos had been her enemies in the Athenian war; the overthrow of Athens left them without their powerful ally, and warfare, though seemingly on no great scale, had been going on with them as the natural survival of the great struggle¹. Leontinoi was now an undisputed Syracusan possession. The exiles, if any still clung to their two strongholds, must have been driven out a second time²; Leontinoi is no longer a separate city; it has sunk into an outlying Syracusan fortress, with which the ruling commonwealth deals as it thinks good. Of the other cities, Himera, Selinous, Gela, and Kamarina were all her allies. All had sent help to Syracuse in her hour of danger; but it was only Himera, in whose mingled population there was an ancient Syracusan element³, which had shown any great zeal in the cause⁴. Kamarina at all events had been very half-hearted⁵, and Akragas had all along stood

¹ See above, p. 399.² See above, p. 71.³ See vol. i. p. 411.⁴ See above, p. 414.⁵ See above, pp. 152, 164, 185.

aside in strict neutrality¹. In truth the invasion had been driven back, not by any great general effort even of the Dorians of Sicily, but much more by Syracuse herself and her allies from Old Greece. The Sikeliot action in the Ægean had been all but wholly a Syracusan action. No city but Selinous had given help—in naval warfare none but Selinous was likely to give help—and the Selinuntine contingent to the fleet had not been large. As things then stood, Syracuse, full of pride and hope after her great deliverance, might well be expected to claim a place in Sicily like that to which in Old Greece Sparta had risen by land and Athens by sea, a place like that which Carthage had won for herself among the Phœnician cities of the West, like that to which Rome—if Rome came within the range of Syracusan thought—was already taking the first steps on the nearest mainland. It would have been only natural if Syracuse had now begun to strive, as a ruling commonwealth, after the same kind of dominion in Sicily which had once been held by her tyrants, and which was before long to be held by her tyrants again. But all schemes of this kind were cut short, the general well-being of Greek Sicily, the very existence of some of her cities, was cut short, by a blow unexpected and fearful beyond experience or thought. In the days of peace and prosperity, in the days of strife with Athens, the Greeks of Sicily might almost have forgotten that the Canaanite was still in the land. Suddenly they were to learn that he was among them of a truth, to learn how fearful his power could be in his days of wrath and vengeance.

CHAP. IX.

Chances of
Syracusan
advance.

Sudden-
ness of the
Cartha-
ginian
attack.

§ 1. *The Legislation of Dioklés.*

B.C. 412.

We have as yet had only one glimpse of the internal affairs of Syracuse—of no other Sikeliot city have we so

¹ See above, pp. 290, 318, 338.

CHAP. IX. much as a glimpse—in the days which immediately followed the defeat of the Athenian invaders. We have seen Hermokratês deposed from his office of general and declared a banished man by the vote of an assembly in which he was not present to defend himself¹. This of itself implies, if not an actual revolution, yet at least a change in the politics of the commonwealth which had brought the party opposed to his into more distinct prominence. During the war he had once been deprived of office², and his pleading on behalf of the Athenian generals had not carried the assembly with him³. But he had remained an important and even a leading citizen, and, when Syracusan help was sent to the Dorians of Old Greece, Hermokratês was the chief among those to whom the command was entrusted⁴. His appointment, we may believe, was the last act of the time immediately following the Athenian overthrow, a time during which Syracuse was on the whole of one mind. It was a time of thankfulness to both divine and human benefactors. The temples of the gods were adorned with costly offerings, and rewards were bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves in the war⁵. The man who stood foremost in that class, the Spartan deliverer, may have become wearisome to those whom he had delivered, and may have become an object of the mockery to which Sikeliot lips were prone⁶. But none the less, he with the rest of the allies from Old Greece, was sent back with every public honour that Syracuse could bestow⁷. And at such a moment it would fall in with the general temper of the city

Decrees
against
Hermokratês.

His position
through
the Athenian war.

Feeling
immediately
after
the deliverance.

Offerings
and
rewards.

Gylippos.

¹ See above, p. 429.

² See above, p. 229.

³ See above, p. 404.

⁴ See above, p. 419.

⁵ Diod. xiii. 34; αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου γενομένας ὠφελείας ἀποδίδοντες, τοὺς μὲν ναυὺς ἀναθήμασι καὶ σκύλοις ἐκδύσαντες, τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν τοὺς ἀριστεύσαντας ταῖς προσηκούσαις δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν.

⁶ See above, p. 245.

⁷ Diod. u. 8.; Συρακούσιοι καταλευκύντες τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμον, τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους συμμαχῆσαντας, ὃν ἤρχε Γύλιππος, ἐτίμησαν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου λαφύροις.

to bestow the command of the force which was to go forth CHAP. IX.
to distant warfare on its own greatest citizen. Hermo-
kratès might be dangerous in the home politics of Syra-
cuse; as the leader of the forces of the commonwealth in
distant warfare every man in Syracuse knew that he might
be trusted.

It would not follow that such a temper would last. The
democracy of Syracuse, delivered from Athenian invasion,
was in the same case as the democracy of Athens sixty-
seven years before, delivered from Persian invasion. In
both cases there had been an effort of the whole people;
such an effort was sure to be followed by a movement for
making the sovereignty of the whole people yet more com-
plete, if any point of democratic perfection was still lacking.

We have the witness of Aristotle that, at this time, owing
to the democratic sentiment which had been heightened by
common efforts and common victory, changes took place
which made the constitution of Syracuse more strictly demo-
cratic than it was before. The philosopher indeed somewhat
darkens his statement by the use of his own peculiar tech-
nical language, a language different from that of practical
men like Thucydides and Athénagoras. In their eyes Syra-
cuse was a democracy before; in the nomenclature of Aris-
totle it became a democracy now¹. As far as we can see,
Syracuse for the second time borrowed something from the
institutions of her chief enemy. She had once borrowed,
in her own form, the Athenian institution of the tile²;
she now borrowed the Athenian institution of the bean.

We have already noticed the great powers which the pre-
siding magistrates exercised in the Syracusan assembly,
and the further fact that those magistrates were the elected
generals³. It would seem that the presidency was now
transferred to other magistrates, taken, according to the

Turn
against
Hermo-
kratès.

Tendency
towards
democratic
change.

Witness of
Aristotle;

his peculiar
language.

Syracusan
imitation
of Athens.

Adoption
of the lot.

Change in
the presi-
dency of

¹ See Appendix IX and XXVI.

² See vol. ii. p. 332.

³ See above, p. 129.

CHAP. IX. custom of Athens, by lot. Thus much seems clear from the assembly. what we know of the former state of things compared with the next story which gives us any kind of picture of a Syracusan assembly. There we no longer see generals clothed with the power of putting an end to a debate which seems likely to become dangerous. We have instead magistrates of some other kind, who have drawn their office by lot, who can impose a fine for a breach of order, but who can neither put a stop to the debate nor do more to the offender than repeat the fine at each repetition of the offence¹. Such a change is what Aristotle calls a change from a "commonwealth"—in his sense of that word—to a democracy. What Thucydides would have called the new state of things we cannot say; he would certainly not have spoken of democracy as being first brought in by such a change.

Legislation of Dioklès. The change in the presidency of the assembly is likely to have been only one change among others. And here comes the main difficulty of the story. As far as our faint glimpses of Syracusan affairs can guide us, the leading democratic politician of Syracuse at this time is a certain Dioklès. In one account we have heard of him already as the man who proposed the harshest way of dealing with the captive Athenian generals². We shall hear of him largely again both in the camp and in the city, and always as a strong opponent of Hermokratès. We are thus strongly tempted to suppose that it was on his proposal that the deposition and banishment of Hermokratès and his colleagues was carried. Thus far the course is fairly plain. But are we to suppose that this Dioklès is the same as a Syracusan lawgiver of the same name, whose alleged career hardly agrees with that of our present demagogue, but whom we cannot assign to any later date, and for whom there is no obvious place at any earlier? Dioklès

Other notices of him.

His opposition to Hermokratès.

¹ See Appendix XXVI.

² See above, p. 404.

the lawgiver is made to die by his own hand after the fashion of Charôndas; that is, the legend of Charôndas has been transferred to him. The confusion is in any case not greater than that which transferred Charôndas to the days of the foundation of Thourioi¹. We are further told that after death he received the honours of a hero, and that a temple was built for his worship, which was swept away by Dionysios, because it stood in the way of his works of defence. All this does not sound like the end of a political leader who was sentenced to banishment only a very short time before Dionysios rose to power. Yet we have no means either of correcting the story or of finding any other place for Dioklês and his laws. And the only notice that we have of his legislation closely couples it with the change in the appointment of magistrates, which is further spoken of as his work². The action of Dioklês the demagogue and the existence of laws at Syracuse known as the Laws of Dioklês both seem ascertained facts. As to their relation to one another, we must face the difficulty as we can. We may add that Dioklês is a name which has taken possession of popular Syracusan imagination. Among the rocks of Achradina the cave is shown to which the wise philosopher and lawgiver withdrew from the world for solitary meditation.

CHAP. IX.
 Legendary
 version of
 his death.
 Confusion
 with
 Charôndas.

Modern
 legends.

Of the legislation of Dioklês, whether the demagogue or any man of earlier times, we hear that his laws were of extreme severity, that they were most minute in the definition of offences and in the apportionment of penalties to them, but that the language was brief, and such as to leave many points open to dispute. All this reads like the description of some code far earlier than the days of Hermokratês and Dionysios; it seems to put the laws of Dioklês along with those of Drakôn, Zaleukos, and Charôndas. But we are told that they were adopted by other cities

Character
 of the law
 of Dioklês.

¹ See vol. II. pp. 61, 451.

² See Appendix XXVI.

CHAP. IX.
Later
respect
for his
legislation.

besides Syracuse, while in Syracuse they were held in such reverence that later Syracusan legislators, Kephalos in the days of Timoleôn and Polydôros in the days of King Hierôn, were allowed no higher title than that of expounders of the Laws of Dioklês¹. Statements of this kind can hardly be mistaken; but the alleged reason for the name given to Kephalos and Polydôros, namely that the Laws of Dioklês needed an interpreter on account of the archaic language in which they were written, must either be an unlucky guess of the reporter, or else it points to a primitive legislator rather than to a demagogue of the last years of the fifth century.

Historic
notices of
Dioklês.

But be the laws of Dioklês of any date that we may think good, the action of the demagogue Dioklês, the adversary of Hermokratês, is clear enough in the records of the fearful time to which we have now come. At Himera at least he would never have won the honours of a hero, if Himera had lived on to bestow either honour or disgrace on any man. But before we come to the more fearful tale of Himera, we have to tell the tale, fearful enough, of the first time when the Phœnician was able fully to glut his will at the cost of a Greek commonwealth in Sicily. While Dioklês was playing the demagogue at Syracuse, while Hermokratês was plotting his return to Syracuse, Hannibal was playing the destroyer at Selinous. We have heard the echo of the tale on the coast of Asia²; we must now come back and look on the deed in its fulness.

§ 2. *The Carthaginian Siege of Selinous.*

B.C. 410-409.

Like occasions
of the two
Carthaginian
invasions.

The great Carthaginian invasion which marks the later years of the fifth century before Christ, as the invasion which was beaten back by Gelôn marks its earlier years, was brought about by occasions which, as we read them, seem

¹ See Appendix XXVI.

² See above, pp. 432, 436.

almost word for word the same as those which had brought about the Athenian invasion. The invitation to the invader came from the same quarter. It was again Elymian Segesta and her endless disputes with her Greek neighbours at Selinous that called in these new and more terrible invaders. The Athenian force had come, as one of its main objects, to defend Segesta from Selinuntine aggression. Overthrown in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, that force could do nothing more for the Elymian allies of Athens, who now lay open without defence to the renewed attacks of their border enemies. The men of Segesta feared that the day of vengeance at the hands of Selinous and the allies of Selinous was coming upon them¹. They feared that, if they kept back anything to which Selinous could make the shadow of a claim, the forces of Syracuse would be joined with the forces of Selinous to sweep away Segesta from the earth. When therefore the Selinuntines began the war again in order to win back the disputed lands, the Segestans deemed it wise to give them up without a struggle². This would imply that at this moment Segesta was in possession of the lands in dispute. But the ambition of Selinous—our narrative clearly comes from the Segestan side—was not satisfied with this cession. The Selinuntine force went on to harry the lands beyond the river, the lands which were the scene of warfare six years before, and which in Segestan eyes were undoubtedly Segestan territory³. Help must be sought for somewhere. The isolated Elymian city had no kinsfolk to appeal to, no

CHAP. IX.
Renewed
disputes of
Segesta and
Selinous.

Segesta
reigns the
disputed
lands.
410.

Selinuntine
invasion of
undisputed
Segestan
lands.

¹ Diod. xiii. 43; Ἐγισταῖοι . . . καταλυθέντος τοῦ πολέμου περιδεεῖς παθεισῆσθαι ἤλπιζον γὰρ, ὅπερ ἦν εἰκελὲς, τιμωρίαν δώσειν τοῖς Σικελιώταις ἐπὲρ ὧν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐξήμαρτον.

² Ib.; τῶν δὲ Σελινουντίων περὶ τῆς ἀμφισβητησίμου χώρας πολεμοῦντων αὐτοὺς, ἰουσίως ἐξεχώρουν, εὐλαβοῦμενοι μὴ διὰ ταύτην τὴν πρόφασιν οἱ Συρακοῦσιοι συνεπλάθωνται τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς Σελινουντίοις, καὶ κινδυνεύωσιν ἄρδην ἀπολίσσαι τὴν πατρίδα.

³ Ib.; οἱ Σελινούντιοι, χωρὶς τῆς ἀμφισβητησίμου, πολλὰν τὴν παρακειμένην ἀπετέμνοντο.

CHAP. IX. Greek city in Sicily, and, since the great Athenian failure, no Greek city out of Sicily, could be looked to to take up her cause; her only chance lay in help from her Phœnician friends, in Sicily or out of it. A Segestan embassy accordingly went to Carthage, craving help against Selinous and offering Segesta to Carthage¹. The only meaning that we can put on this last phrase is that hitherto the relation between Segesta and Carthage had been, in form at least, one of simple friendship, Segesta remaining an independent ally. She now offered, in exchange for help given at this moment of danger, to enter the ranks of the Carthaginian dependencies.

Segesta
asks help
of Carthage
and offers
submission.

416.

Six years before this time Segestan envoys had appeared at Carthage with the same prayer for help, but seemingly not with the same offers of submission². How far that offer had any effect on the difference of the reception which the Segestans met with now and then we have no means of judging. But it is far more likely that the different treatment which the appeal met with on the two occasions was owing to wider views of Carthaginian policy than this. We may be sure that never since the day of Himera had the thought of renewed action on Sicilian ground passed for a moment out of the public mind of Carthage. But for a long time the thought had been of necessity secondary to other thoughts, and now that Sicilian warfare could again become the first of Carthaginian objects, it was not an object to be dealt with lightly or without full preparation. When, at the beginning of the war between Syracuse and Athens, Hermokratēs counselled his countrymen to send an embassy to Carthage³, when somewhat later on an embassy from the Athenian camp actually went thither⁴, no more came of

The two
appeals
from Se-
gesta to
Carthage.

¹ Diod. xiii. 43; *οἱ τὴν Ἑγεσταν οἰκούντες* [a curious formula] *πρέσβας ἀπέστειλαν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, δεόμενοι βοηθήσαι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἐγχειρίζοντες.*

² See above, p. 84.

³ See above, p. 119.

⁴ See above, p. 196.

either errand than when Segesta first asked for help CHAP. IX.
 against Selinous. It may well be that, at the time of the Policy of
 first appeal, Carthage was still only making ready for work Carthage.
 in Sicily, while at the second time she felt herself strong
 enough for action. We should know more about the
 matter if we were not so utterly in the dark as to those wars
 in western Sicily forty years or more before our present
 time which have already caused us so many searchings of
 heart ¹. If Carthage really did allow one of her Phœnician
 dependencies in Sicily to undergo defeat at Greek hands
 without striking a blow both for her own power and for the
 general interests of the Phœnician name, it is the surest
 of all proofs that, then at least, she was kept back from
 Sicilian action by full occupation at home ². It proves far
 more than any refusal to help her Elymian ally against
 Greek enemies. It is most certain of all that, when the
 war of Athens and Syracuse was actually going on, it best Her neu-
 suited the policy of Carthage to look on, to leave the two trality in
 Greek powers to wear each other out, rather than to strike the Athe-
 a blow for or against either. For Syracuse Carthage could nian war.
 have no good will, while Athens, as we have seen, she
 directly feared ³. When the chief forces of all Hellas were
 gathered together in Sicily, it was the wisdom of Car-
 thage to hold back. She did nothing for or against either
 side, unless when she allowed the Peloponnesian and
 Boiotian helpers of Syracuse to pass as friends along her
 coast ⁴. But when the forces of Old Greece, victorious and Her policy
 vanquished, had vanished from Sicily, when part of the after the
 forces of Greek Sicily were engaged in warfare on the coast war.
 of Asia, then it distinctly suited the interests of Carthage
 to see in the second appeal from Segesta an honourable call
 to armed action in Sicilian affairs.

¹ See vol. II. pp. 338, 549.

² See vol. II. p. 556, and above, p. 17.

³ See above, p. 119.

⁴ See above, p. 319.

CHAP. IX.
Vengeance
for Ha-
milkar.

Greatness
of the
house of
Magôn.

Carthage
becomes a
land-power.

Periplus
of Hannôn.

Seventy years before a Shophet of Carthage had given his life for Carthage on the shore of Sicily¹. The death of Hamilkar was still unavenged, and one of his house was now high in office and in influence in the Carthaginian commonwealth. From the father of Hannôn the father of Hamilkar that house was known as the House of Magôn, of Magôn whose name has so strangely lived on in other lands and tongues, to be to this day the name of a Balearic haven, and to be borne, as a title in the British peerage, by one who felt a call to write one memorable chapter in the history, if not of Phœnician, at least of Teutonic Carthage². Three sons of Hamilkar of Himera, three sons of his brother Asdrubal, kept up the fame of their lineage. Under them, like Venice under Francesco Foscari, Carthage became a land power on her own continent; she founded her African province, and freed herself from the rent for her own soil which she had hitherto paid to an African landlord³. A rhetorician of later times could speak of his day as the time when the Phœnician settlers in Africa might be reckoned to have themselves become Africans⁴. That is, they were no longer strangers in Africa but masters, and one memorable act of their mastership was done by a son of Hamilkar. That was Hannôn, the man of the famous *Periplus*, he who went forth to plant settlements of the Libyphœnician subjects of Carthage on the less dangerous coasts of Ocean⁵.

¹ See vol. ii. pp. 195, 518.

² From Magôn comes Portus Magonis, Port Mahon, and thence the title borne by Lord Mahon (afterwards Earl Stanhope), who wrote the *Life of Belisarius*.

On the house of Magôn, see Meltzer, *Karthager*, i. 225; Holm, G. S. ii. 421.

³ See vol. i. p. 287.

⁴ Dion Chrysostom, Or. 35, vol. i. p. 313; Καρχηδονίους δὲ ἄνθρωπον μὲν ἀπὸ Τυρίων ἐκείνησε Λιβύας, καὶ Λιβύης κατοικεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν. Truly a rhetorician's way of putting it.

⁵ On Hannôn and the *Periplus* see C. Müller, *Geog. Min.* i. xxi, xxii; Meltzer, i. 231.

So powerful became the statesmen and generals of the CHAP. IX. house of Magôn that constitutional changes were needed to keep their influence within bounds. It was to curb The them that the famous council of a Hundred Judges was Hundred Judges. called into being, to which the generals, the Shophetim themselves, had to give an account on their return from warfare¹. It is said that Hannôn himself, the explorer of Banish- new worlds for Carthage, was sent into banishment by ment of Hannôn and Giskôn. their judgement². It concerns us more that his brother, Giskôn son of Hamilkar, on whatever ground, underwent the same punishment. He found a shelter at Selinous; an Giskôn at Selinous. exile from Carthage, presumably an enemy of Carthage, might be welcome there³. His son Hannibal had either not shared his sentence, or had been restored. Shophet of Hannibal Shophet. the commonwealth, he was now the leading man in its councils, and it fell to his lot to receive the envoys of Segesta when they came to ask help at Carthage against the renewed encroachments of Selinous, and to offer the submission of Segesta as a willing dependency of Carthage⁴.

The envoys from Segesta now appeared before the Carthaginian senate and declared to those wise elders the commission which they had brought from the popular assembly of their own city. A distinction between the diplomacy of Segestan and Carthaginian diplomacy. Carthage and that of Segesta seems here to be marked. Segesta had adopted the practice of the Greek democracies, while at Carthage all is done in a solemn conclave. The Debates in the Senate. senators balanced the arguments for and against the grant of help to Segesta. The offer of what was practically

¹ Justin, xix. 2. 4; Grote, x. 353.

² Meltzer (l. 228) seems to refer to this Hannôn the story in Justin (xvi. 4. 1) of a Hannôn who aimed at the tyranny; but he comes later and is crucified.

³ Diod. xiii. 43; 'Αντίβας ἦν υἱὸς Γίσκανος ὃς διὰ τὴν πατρὸς ἡττῶν ἐφυγαδευθὴ καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινούντι. The ground for the banishment seems inconsistent with Herodotus' version of the death of Hamilkar.

⁴ Ib.; τῇ γερονσίᾳ τὰς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δεδομένας ἐντολὰς εἰπόντων.

CHAP. IX. an enlargement of Carthaginian dominion was tempting; it would be a distinct gain to make Segesta, at least in all times of warfare, as much a Carthaginian outpost as Motya and Panormos on each side of it. But at this stage some still shrank from making an enemy of Syracuse, just then in all the power and pride of her late overthrow of the Athenian invader¹. The Senate, swaying to and fro between war and peace, was at last determined in favour of war by the influence of the Shophet Hannibal. He felt no gratitude towards the city where his banished father had found a home. The ruling passion of his soul was a general hatred of the Greek name, and a special yearning to exact a memorable vengeance for the overthrow and death of his grandfather². By his persuasion the Senate was led to accept the offered submission of Segesta, and to promise help to the new dependency³.

Submission
of Segesta
accepted,
and help
promised.

Policy of
Hannibal;

embassies
to Selinous
and Car-
thage.

Cartha-
ginian
party in

The chief object of Hannibal was ancestral vengeance; yet he was not so wholly carried away by his personal feelings as to neglect anything that a skilful diplomacy could do to promote the public interests of Carthage. It would seem that he first of all sent an embassy to Selinous, calling on that commonwealth peacefully to accept the cession of the disputed lands on the part of Segesta⁴. It is certain that there was a party in Selinous, headed by a citizen named Empediôn, which entertained friendly feelings

¹ Diod. xiii. 43; οὐ μετρίως διεπόρησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἐπεθύμουν παραλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν εὐκαιρον, ἅμα δ' ἐφοβοῦντο τοὺς Συρακοουσίους, ἰωρακότες προσφάτως καταπεπολεμηκότας τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεις.

² Ib.; Ἀννίβας ὃν μὲν καὶ φύσει μισέλλην, ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθῶσασθαι βουλόμενος. This reads strangely alongside of his father's sojourn at Selinous. But the matter becomes plainer in c. 53, when we get to Himera.

³ Ib.; τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς πρωτεύοντος παρακαλοῦντος παραλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν, τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς ἀπεκρίθησαν βοηθῆσαι. This πρωτεύων is directly after described as Ἀννίβας, κατὰ νόμους τότε βασιλεύων.

⁴ This would seem to be the meaning of the words; θεωρῶν ὅτι τοὺς Σελινουντίους οὐκ ἄρκουμένους τῇ παραχωρήσει τῆς ἀμφισβητήσιμου χώρας.

towards Carthage. At this or at some other stage of CHAP. IX. these negotiations, Empediôn strongly exhorted his fellow-Selinous ; Empediôn. citizens to avoid war with so dangerous a power¹. But his counsels of peace did not prevail; the Selinuntines, as a body, were stiff-necked and eager in their ambition. His next step was to send a joint Carthaginian and Segestan embassy to Syracuse, offering to submit the quarrel between Segesta and Selinous to the judgement of the Syracusan commonwealth². This, we are told, was the subtlety of Hannibal. He would fain make a fair show of moderation by inviting a peaceful decision of the points at issue before finally taking up arms. But he felt sure that the men of Selinous would refuse all arbitration; and he further hoped that, if they did so, his proposal would secure the neutrality of the Syracusans, who were not likely in such a case to send help to Selinous³. Things turned out as he had reckoned; a Selinuntine embassy came to Syracuse, declining all arbitration⁴. On this the Syracusans, puzzled Doubtful answer at Syracuse. and annoyed, passed a somewhat inconsistent vote. They would not break off their alliance with Selinous, but they would keep the peace towards Carthage⁵.

When the envoys came back to Carthage to tell the result of their negotiations, Hannibal and his commonwealth were free to act. It was determined to send A small force sent first. help to Segesta; but the force sent, considerable in a war

¹ Diod. xiii. 59; Ἐμπεδιῶν . . . δειξὶν τὰ Καρχηδονίαν πεφρονηκὸς καὶ πρὸς τῆς πολιτείας τοῖς πολίταις συμφεραντικὸς μὴ πολεμεῖν Καρχηδονίους.

² Ib. 43; πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλε μετὰ τῶν Ἑγεσταιῶν πρὸς Συρακουσίους ἐπιτρέψαν αὐτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν τούτων.

³ Ib.; τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενος δικαιοπραγεῖν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ νομίζων, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ βοῦλεσθαι τοὺς Χελιουντίους διακριθῆναι, μὴ συμμαχεῖν αὐτοῖς τοὺς Συρακουσίους.

⁴ Ib.; ἀποσπειλάντων δὲ τῶν Χελιουντίων πρέσβεις, διακριθῆναι μὲν μὴ βουλομένων, πολλὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς παρὰ Καρχηδονίαν καὶ τῶν Ἑγεσταιῶν πρέσβεις ἀντειπόντων.

⁵ Ib.; τέλος ἐδοξε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις ψηφίσασθαι τηρεῖν πρὸς μὲν Χελιουντίους τὴν συμμαχίαν, πρὸς δὲ Καρχηδονίους τὴν εἰρήνην.

CHAP. IX. between two Sicilian cities, was but a small instalment of the power of Carthage. Either there was still an opposition to the Sicilian war which Hannibal hoped to overcome by degrees, or his policy was to send a small force in advance, while he gathered together a host capable of striking such a blow as he was yearning to strike against the hated Greeks. Five thousand Africans were sent—they were easily to be had—and with them eight hundred men of European stock whose description awakens a greater interest. These were Campanian mercenaries, who had been hired by the Chalkidians of Sicily to enter the service of Athens during the late war, but who had come into the island only to find the great Athenian force altogether overthrown¹. We are told that they had no longer any paymaster²; they therefore did not serve in the lingering war carried on against Syracuse by Chalkidians and Athenians at Katanê³. Are we then to infer that, during the three years which had passed since the overthrow of the Athenians, they had been wandering about Sicily without employment, or employing themselves in the way in which such men in such a case were sure to do? It marks the difference between Sicily under free commonwealths, and Sicily a few years later under tyrants, that no paymaster had been found for them. One is almost tempted to wonder that they had not, like not a few such wandering companies of their race in days to come, seized upon some town and taken it to themselves as their abode. They now, doubtless gladly, entered the service of Carthage at a high rate of pay; they could exact another kind of treatment from her from that which she dealt out to her own African subjects. We notice further that these Campanians were to act as cavalry; Carthage

The Campanians.

They are hired by Carthage.

¹ Diocl. xiii. 44; οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν ὑπὸ τῶν Χαλκιδέων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰς τὸν πρὸς Συρακοσίους πόλεμον μεμισθωμένοι.

² Ib.; μετὰ τὴν ἡτταν καταπεπλευκότες, οὐκ εἶχον τοὺς μισθοδοτοῦντας.

³ See above; p. 414.

bought horses for all of them¹. One is almost tempted to ask whether the Campanian knights, famous somewhat later in Roman story, made a practice of letting themselves out for foreign service. CHAP. IX.

The force thus formed, European and African, reached Segesta, and presently gave altogether a new character to the strife between that city and Selinous. Up to this time Selinous had had greatly the better in the war with undefended Segesta. Success had led to carelessness. The Selinuntines began by systematic ravages carried on in an orderly way; presently they began to despise the enemy, and were scattered hither and thither without discipline². The Segestan commanders, strengthened by their new allies, Victory of the Segestans and their allies. watched their opportunity, and Elymians, Africans, and Campanians, set upon the Selinuntines when an attack was in nowise looked for³. A thousand were slain; the booty which they had got together from the lands of Segesta was won back from them⁴. The pride of the Selinuntines was humbled; they now craved for help at Syracuse. The Segestans, most likely fearing that they would have to strive against Syracuse as well as Selinous, Selinuntine embassy to Syracuse; help voted. sent to Carthage to crave for further help. Both embassies were successful; it may have been thought at Syracuse that to give help to an old ally when he was directly attacked was no breach of the resolution to keep the peace towards Carthage. But far less zeal was shown at Syracuse on behalf of Selinous than was shown at Carthage on behalf of Segesta. Or more truly the Shophet of Carthage, the leading spirit of his commonwealth, had ends of his own, to which the relief of Segesta, and even Objects of Hannibal.

¹ Diod. xiii. 44; πᾶσι ἵππους ἀγοράσαντες καὶ μεθοδὸς ἀξιολόγου δότες.

² Ib.; μετὰ ταῦτα καταφρονήσαντες, κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν ἐσκεδάσθησαν.

³ The Segestans are distinctly marked as the principals (Diod. u. a.); οἱ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων στρατηγοὶ . . . ἐπείθεντο μετὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τῶν Καμπαίων. There were then some Carthaginians.

⁴ I suppose this is implied by τῆς λείας πόλεως ἐνυπνίσαν in Diod. xiii. 44.

CHAP. IX. the dealing out of vengeance upon Selinous, were merely the means.

The second Carthaginian invasion. Spring, 409. The greatest and most terrible of the Carthaginian invasions of Sicily now begins. Carthaginian feeling had now wholly come over to the side of Hannibal; men saw that a great war was before them, and they held that in such a case the general who was put in command should be frankly trusted. Hannibal received from his countrymen as full powers to fix the number of the army and all points touching the war as Athens had granted to Nikias and his colleagues. But never was the difference between a general who has his heart in his enterprise and one whose heart is far away from it more clearly shown than in the contrast between Hannibal and Nikias. It is a contrast between the man who had won over his countrymen to an undertaking into which he had thrown his whole soul and the man whom his countrymen forced into an undertaking from which he had done all that he could to dissuade them ¹. His energy. The winter was spent by the energetic Shophet in gathering troops from all quarters. He sought for picked men everywhere. The wealth of Carthage hired the best mercenaries from Spain; a conscription called in the best soldiers from all the African towns—Phœnician we may suppose as well as Libyan ². His levies of troops. The wealth of Carthage hired the best mercenaries from Spain; a conscription called in the best soldiers from all the African towns—Phœnician we may suppose as well as Libyan ². Service of Carthaginian citizens. It marks the greatness of the enterprise that a large body of Carthaginian citizens were called on to serve, evidently not only as officers, but as a substantial division of the army ³. Greeks in the service of Carthage. More wonderful is it to find, by a perfectly casual reference in the story, that among the many nations from which Hannibal gathered his mer-

¹ See this put by an advocate of Nikias in *Lysias*, Or. xviii. 1.

² *Diod.* xiii. 44; *ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν Λιβύην, ἐπιλεγόμενος ἐξ ἀπάσης πόλεως τοὺς κρατίστους*. So in c. 54; *τοὺς ἐξ Ἰβηρίας ξενολογηθέντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Λιβύης καταγραφέντας στρατιώτας συνήγαγε*.

³ *Ib.* 44; *οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν κατέγραψεν*. Not however the Sacred Band, as we shall find in a later invasion.

cenaries, there were Greeks who were not ashamed to take the pay of the barbarian to fight against their fellow-Greeks¹. CHAP. IX.

Who they were, what Greek cities they came from, we are not told. Mercenary service was indeed fast becoming rife in parts of Greece far beyond the Arkadian land where it had long been traditional. It shows itself on a great scale a few years later in the host which was brought together by the younger Cyrus. But the comrades of Xenophôn were at the worst hired to fight for one barbarian against another; they did not sell themselves to the barbarian to destroy cities of their own folk. Spread of mercenary service.

By the spring all was ready. Sixty ships of war were in full order for sailing, and with them no less than fifteen hundred transports and other ships of burthen. There was good store of all engines of war, and of every need for a great campaign. But we mark the absence of one arm known both in earlier and in later Punic warfare; this time the war-chariot is not spoken of. The number of the horse is given as four thousand; that of the foot was variously reckoned at one and two hundred thousand². The fleet sailed straight for the point of Lilybaion, and the army disembarked by the sacred spring³. Thither all the allies and subjects of Carthage sent their contingents. The men of one city alone are mentioned; the troops of Segesta came, naturally eager to fight in their own quarrel along with such allies. With them would naturally come the Voyage and force of Hannibal;
no war-chariots.
They land at Lilybaion;
the Segestans join them;

¹ This comes out casually long after in c. 58.

² The smallest figure, as usual, comes from Timaios and the larger from Ephoros. See c. 54.

³ Diodóros here (xiii. 54) carefully marks the state of things when there was as yet no town of Lilybaion; *κατέπλευσε τῆς Σικελίας ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν ἀπέναντι τῆς Λιβύης* [see vol. i. pp. 61, 271], *καλουμένην Λιλύβαιον*. And directly after the march begins, *ἀρτήμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος, ὃ κατ' ἐκείνους μὲν τοὺς καιροὺς ἐνομάζετο Λιλύβαιον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν αὐτῷ πισθείσης πόλεως, αἴτιον ἐγενήθη τῇ πόλει τῆς ἐπωνυμίας*. But the foundation was not so many years after, and all this care does not prove that he may not have jumbled Lilybaion and Motya long before. See vol. ii. p. 551.

CHAP. IX. Libyans and Campanians who had been sent to the help of Segesta the year before. The name of allies of course takes in the people of the Phœnician cities, already dependencies of Carthage, and which the result of this war was to bring into a more complete subjection to the ruling city¹. Motya, Solous, Panormos, must have sent whatever they had of land-forces. The campaign was to be waged wholly by land. Hannibal, doubtless more fearful of Syracusan enmity now that Syracusan help had been actually promised to Selinous, left his ships in the docks of Motya, that the Syracusans might distinctly see that his enterprise was in no sort directed against them². The land-force of Carthage and her Sicilian dependencies thus stood at the western extremity of Sicily ready to begin its march. The direction which that march took showed in what fearful earnest Hannibal was about to begin his work. A force which had come merely to defend Segesta against Selinous might have been expected to march first to clear the territory of Segesta of any lingering Selinuntine invaders, and to secure the city of Segesta against any attacks from the Syracusan allies of Selinous. But Hannibal, the hater of Greeks, the *Mishellén*³, had not come into Sicily merely to protect Segesta against Greek enemies. Or rather his way of protecting an ally was thoroughly to root out the enemy by whom the ally was threatened. And beyond all thoughts of alliances, he had his own work, the work of his house, the work of the hater of Greeks, to do in its fulness. His march was straight upon Selinous, and his object was to do all in human power to enslave or destroy the city which had given shelter to his banished father.

relations
towards
Syracuse.

The ships
left at
Motya.

March on
Selinous.

¹ Diod. xiii. 54; παραλαβὸν τοὺς παρ' Ἐγεσταίων στρατιώτας καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων. See Holm, ii. 81.

² Ib.; βουλόμενος ἔννοιαν δίδουσι τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, ὥς οὐ πάρεστιν ἐκείνοις πολεμήσαν, οὐδὲ ναυτικῇ δυνάμει παραπλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ Συρακούσας.

³ See above, p. 450.

The Sicilian historian points out the great prosperity of Selinous and its large citizen population at the time of its renewed war with Segesta¹. When Hannibal came against them the Selinuntines were engaged on mighty works indeed, the completion of which was hindered by his coming². Selinous had been but little touched by the Athenian invasion, and the war with Segesta would hardly stand in the way of works at Selinous itself. The city had long spread from the akropolis over the northern hill and down into the two valleys; it was fast growing, at least in the form of sacred suburbs, over the eastern and western hills. These were now specially chosen as spots where the homes of the gods would stand alone in their holiness, undisturbed by the meaner dwellings of men. The great temple on the eastern hill, which some call that of Apollôn, while others deem that its vast scale marks it as the house of none but Olympian Zeus himself, surpassed, in size at least, not only its neighbours, but every other holy place in Sicily, except its fellow Olympieion at Akragas. Each of those great temples was now fast growing up to its full perfection, a perfection which both were destined never to reach. Vast as the Pillars of the Giants seem where they are standing, they strike us with even more of awe when we trace them back to the rock whence they were hewn and to the hole of the pit whence they were digged³. There we still see the vast drums which were to be piled into columns, the yet vaster stones that were to be set on them as capitals, some already hewn, some still in the hewing. Here is a block not yet fully cut away from the native rock; here is another which seems to have set forth on its journey for its place of duty, and to have fainted by the way. How these huge blocks were brought over the space of several miles between the quarry

CHAP. IX.

Prosperity
of Selinous.Spread of
the city.Building of
the great
temple.The
quarries.

¹ *Diod. xiii. 44; παρ' ἡσέλιον τοῦ χρόνου εὐδαιμονοῦντες καὶ τῆς πόλεως αἰνῶς πολυάνθρωπον ὄντων.*

² See vol. ii. p. 409.

³ See vol. i. p. 423; vol. ii. p. 409.

CHAP. IX. and the temple it is hard to understand. But, as we muse and wonder, we better take in the wealth, the zeal, the mechanical skill, of the Greeks of Sicily at the moment when the barbarian came against them in his full might. At that moment the last touches were still wanting to the great temple of Selinous. Most of the huge drums were still untouched by fluting, standing, as their lowlier fellows at Segesta stand to this day, to proclaim that the graver's task was not yet over. The limner's task was not yet begun. The adornment of various colours, which, hard as we find to believe it, was an essential finish to the outside of a Greek temple, traces of which may still be seen in more than one of the smaller temples of Selinous, could as yet have had no being save in the thoughts of the painter. The vast unfinished temple and the smaller ones beside it now stood, as far as we can see, open to the unlooked-for invader, unguarded by walls and bulwarks¹. So yet more surely did the buildings which lay more directly in the line of the Punic march. On the western hill beyond the river and on the lower hill in front of it stood the *propylaia* of the goddesses of Sicily², whose ruin, unlike that of the buildings on the eastern hill, we may with all likelihood assign to the presence of Hannibal that day.

The temple
still un-
finished.

The
temples de-
fenceless.

It is most unlucky that our one account of the coming siege throws no light on topography. We hear of a fierce attack and a stout defence of the walls of Selinous, without a word to mark their extent. But we may be sure that the walls spoken of were the walls fencing in the central hill, and specially the akropolis. We hear of fierce fighting in the *agora*, without a word to tell us where the *agora* was³. It had doubtless been within the akropolis as long as the akropolis was the whole city; but it may well have changed its place, as at Syracuse, when the city was

¹ See vol. i. p. 427.

² See vol. i. p. 427; vol. ii. p. 410.

³ Diod. xiii. 57. We shall come to this presently.

enlarged. It has therefore been placed on various sites on the central hill and in the valley between the central and the eastern hill. If we look, as the discovery of the buildings on the western hill leads us to look, on the central hill as strictly the city, and on the eastern and western hills as its sacred suburbs, we may be more inclined to place it on the central hill, not within the original akropolis, but in the later town to the north¹. Anyhow it is provoking, on a spot where the ground is so marked as it is at Selinous, to have no account of the great siege which enables us to call up a single local feature with certainty.

CHAP. IX.
Site of the
agora.

The march of Hannibal was as speedy as the march of so vast and motley a host could be when it had work to do on the road. But it was not so speedy as to enable him to come upon the city unawares. The Selinuntines evidently knew of the blow that was aimed at them; they were watching the coast, even beyond the bounds of their own territory. There were Selinuntine horsemen posted in the neighbourhood of Lilybaion, ready at a moment to carry any news, good or bad, to their own city². They saw the fleet draw near; they marked its vastness, and they rode off with all speed to Selinous to tell their countrymen how dangerous an enemy was coming against them. They thus had time to make ready for the immediate needs of war, a war which was most likely to take the form of a siege. But they had no time fully to strengthen their fortifications, which, we are told, through the long peace, had been neglected and had fallen out of repair³. This statement has

News of
the landing
brought to
Selinous.

The de-
fences
neglected.

¹ I have collected some of the opinions on this matter, vol. i. p. 426. See also Holm, ii. 422, who places it between the central and eastern hills, but at a different point from Benndorf. All views of the topography of Selinous must be modified by the discovery of buildings on the hill west of the river Selinous.

² Diod. xiii. 54; τῶν Σελινουντίων τινὲς ἰστίαν περὶ τοῦ τόπου διατρίβοντες.

³ Ib. 55; ἐν πολυχρονίᾳ εἰρήνῃ καὶ τῶν τευχῶν οὐδ' ἥντιναοῦν ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένοι.

CHAP. IX. a strange sound. We can believe that the Selinuntines, in their scorn of their enemies at Segesta, had never thought of strengthening their city against them. But such neglect seems wonderful in the days when an Athenian assault on Selinous was a likely event¹. One thing at least they could do, and they did it at once. The war with Segesta had indeed changed its nature; they were now alone; their allies had promised them help, but none had come, while help had indeed come to the side of Segesta. In their hard strait they at once sent messengers to Syracuse with a written message², praying that help might be sent to Selinous, and that speedily.

Help asked
for at
Syracuse.

Meanwhile Hannibal and his host were on their march. The line that they took was along the coast, as far as the frontier stream of Mazaros, the boundary between Greek and Phœnician on its lower course, as higher up it was the boundary between Greek and Elymian. At its mouth stood the commercial and military outpost of Selinous to the west, the forerunner of the later town of Mazzara. That point, destined to be in after ages the firstfruits of another Semitic occupation, was now the first spoil of Hannibal. The fortress was taken at a blow³, and the host marched on to the attack on Selinous. The approach was from the west; the Punic army would first occupy the western hill on the right bank of the river Selinous and the lower hill in front of it, the hills crowned by whatever buildings were approached by the *propylaia* at its foot. From that point Hannibal looked out on the fortified central hill, the akropolis and the outer city, perhaps on the roofs of the

Taking of
Mazara.

The west-
ern hill.

¹ See above, pp. 142, 143, 155.

² Diod. xiii. 54; τοὺς βιβλιαφόρους παραχρῆμα πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἀπέστειλαν.

³ Ib.; ὡς δ' ἐπὶ τὸν Μασάραν ποταμὸν παρεγενήθη, τὸ μὲν παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμπόριον κείμενον εἶλεν ἐξ ἐφόδου. See vol. i. pp. 80, 419, 422; Schubring, Selinous, 436; Holm, G. S. ii. 421. Elsewhere it is φρούριον. See vol. i. pp. 562, 563.

new and unfinished temples on the eastern hill beyond¹. CHAP. IX.
 The army was then divided into two parts, and the city—
 so says our narrative—was beleaguered all round². That is The central
hill sur-
rounded.
 to say, the central hill was surrounded. One division
 attacked the western wall from the valley of the Selinous;
 the other marched round by the northern end of the hill
 into the valley of the Hysias, to attack the eastern side.
 In this attack the vastness of Hannibal's battering-engines
 is specially insisted on. Six wooden towers of unusual The
engines.
 height were brought across the two valleys to play on the
 besieged town on both sides. Planted on the low ground
 by the two rivers, they had need to be lofty indeed to com-
 mand the battlements of the Selinuntine akropolis³. But
 no difficulties stood in the way of Hannibal and his de-
 stroying energy. The great siege of Selinous, the first of
 the fearful sieges of this memorable war, was now to begin.

It is a singular remark of our Sicilian guide that the First day's
fighting.
 Selinuntines were in special distress and amazement, not
 only from their ignorance of what a siege was—no enemy
 had come against the city within living memory or tra-
 dition—but because they did not look for such treat-
 ment at the hands of Carthage. They looked for some Relations
between
Selinous
and Car-
thage.
 other return for the services which they, alone among
 the Greeks of Sicily, had done for the Punic cause in
 the war of Himera⁴. This is not the thought of a con-

¹ The broken columns can now be clearly seen from the lower hill above the propylæa. Would the buildings on the central hill altogether hide the eastern temples when they kept their entablatures and roofs? Some glimpses would surely be had over the sinking below the akropolis and the outer town to the north.

² Diod. xiii. 54; πρὸς τὴν πόλιν παραγενθὲς εἰς δύο μέρη διείλε τὴν δύναμιν περιστρατοπεδεύσας δ' αὐτὴν, κ.τ.λ.

³ Ib.; ἔξ μὲν γὰρ πύργους ὑπερβάλλοντας τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἐπέστησε.

⁴ Ib. 55; ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντες ἀπειροὶ πολιορκίας, καὶ Καρχηδονίους ἐν τῇ πρὸς Γέλασιν πολέμῳ συνηγαγμένοι μόνον τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ὅπουτ' ἤλπιζον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀεργηθέντων εἰς τοιοῦτους φόβους συγκλεισθήσεσθαι.

CHAP. IX. temporary. No great thankfulness was really due from Carthage to dependent Selinous in the days of Gelôn and Hamilkar, and independent Selinous had certainly done nothing to add to the score¹. The shelter given to Giskôn might have been more reasonably expected to have some weight in the private conscience of Hannibal. But assuredly neither thought weighed in the least with the Punic commander. He came to destroy, and he set his engines of destruction to work with all their power. Rams clad with iron—they seem to be spoken of as some special device of his own²—were brought to bear upon the walls, and a multitude of bowmen and slingers kept up a ceaseless shower of missiles against the defenders of the battlements. As the men of Selinous looked forth on the multitude of their enemies and on the greatness of their artillery, they felt the full depth of the danger that had come upon them, and their hearts began to fail them for fear. Yet they did not give up all hope. They still trusted speedily to see the Syracusans and their other allies hastening to their help³. With this hope to cheer them, the whole population of Selinous fought on manfully. The men of military age stood to their arms and stoutly withstood the besiegers. The old men looked to the needful preparations, and made the circuit of the walls, calling on the actual fighting men to stand their ground, and not to let their fathers fall into the hands of the enemy. The women and children brought food and fresh supplies of weapons to those who were fighting. A comment, copied doubtless from some earlier writer, strikingly sets forth the usual seclusion of Greek women. To do this needful service was a casting aside of

Preparations for attack and defence.

Action of the women.

¹ See vol. ii. pp. 187, 196, 211, 553.

² Diod. xiii. 54; *ἰδίου κριοῦς κατασεσθηραμένους προσήρεισε τοῖς τείχεσι*.

³ Ib. 55; *προσδοκῶντες συντόμας ἔξεν τοὺς Συρακουσίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους*.

all the shamefacedness to which they had been used in days of peace¹. CHAP. IX.

Meanwhile Hannibal promised the plunder of the town to his soldiers, and brought up his best warriors in turn to the attack of the wall². At his bidding the trumpets sounded a war-note; the whole host of Carthage joined in one mighty shout of battle³. From the wooden towers, which rose far above the walls of the town⁴, the assailants made a great slaughter of the Selinuntine defenders. The fall of part of the wall opened a breach, and the Campanians, eager to do some famous exploit⁵, were the first men in the host of Hannibal to make their way into the Selinuntine city. At first the few defenders of the point where they entered fell back before them in panic. Presently greater numbers of Selinuntine warriors flocked to the spot; their courage rose, and, by a vigorous effort, they drove the Campanians out with great loss. The rest of the Punic army did not as yet attempt to follow their daring example. The wall had fallen; but, till the ruins had been cleared away, the breach was not easy to enter by⁶. When night came on, Selinous was still unconquered. Hannibal called off his men, and put off the fresh beginning of the assault till the next morning.

That night must indeed have been a night of fear in Selinous; but it was also a night of counsel. The best horsemen in the city were mounted on the fleetest horses, and were bidden to ride with all speed to crave help with-

¹ Diod. xiii. 55; *τὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς εἰρήνης αἰσχύνῃ παρ' οὐδὲν ἡγούμεναι.*

² Ib.; *τοῖς κρατίστοις στρατιώταις ἐκ διαδοχῆς προσέβαλε τοῖς τείχεσιν.*

³ Ib.; *ὁμοῦ δὲ αἱ τε σάλπιγγες τὸ πολεμικὸν ἐσήμαινον καὶ πρὸς ἐν παράγ- γελμα πᾶν ἐπηλάλαξε τὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στράτευμα.*

⁴ Ib.; *τῇ δ' ὕψει τῶν πύργων οἱ μαχόμενοι πολλοὺς τῶν Σελινουντίων ἀσφύρουσαν . . . τῶν ξυλίνων πύργων πολλὰ τοῖς ὕψεσιν ὑπερεχόνταν.*

⁵ Ib.; *οἱ μὲν Καμπανοὶ, σπεύδοντες ἐπιφανέες τι πράξαι.*

⁶ Ib.; *ὅπως γὰρ τελείως ἀνακαθαρμένοι τοῦ τείχους βιασάμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἴσφον εἰς δυσχωρίας ἐμπίπτοντες.*

The Cam-
panians
enter by
the breach;

they are
driven out.

Messages
to the Sike-
liot cities.

CHAP. IX. out delay from the allies of Selinous. To Akragas, the nearest of Sikeliot cities, to more distant Gela, to yet more distant Syracuse, they carried their message, praying for instant relief¹. Selinous, they said, could no longer of her own strength bear up against the barbarian attack. The contrast is indeed wonderful between the fearful energy of Hannibal in the work of destruction and the slow and feeble action of the Greek commonwealths in the work of deliverance. When it was an affair of hours, of minutes, when at any moment the barbarian might be doing his good pleasure within the Greek city, the allies of Selinous dallied and loitered as if the work to which they were called had been some petty border strife. A swift march from Akragas might bring timely help to Selinous; but both at Akragas and at Gela it was deemed safer to wait till help should come from Syracuse. The forces of all three cities would be better able to cope with the Punic host than those of one or two only. While the nearer cities lingered, the more distant had other matters on hand. Syracuse had already promised help to Selinous²; but instead of making ready for the relief of the threatened ally, she was still engaged in her petty warfare with her Chalkidian neighbours. Before her troops could march to Selinous, the formalities of a peace had to be gone through with Katané and Naxos³. Athens could hardly have been included, as Syracusan ships, though no longer commanded by Hermokratés, were still fighting on the Lacedæmonian side in the Ægean⁴. When peace had been made, the forces of the whole Syracusan territory

Energy of
Hannibal
and slow-
ness of the
Greeks.

Warfare of
Syracuse
with Ka-
tané and
Naxos.

Peace
concluded.

¹ On the time and distance see Holm, G. S. ii. 421, 422. The messengers could reach Syracuse in two days, and the Syracusans could reach Selinous in five.

² See above, p. 453.

³ *Diod. xiii. 56; οὐ Συρακούσιοι . . . πρὸς Χαλκιδεὺς πόλεμον ἔχοντες διελύσαντο.*

⁴ See above, p. 433.

had to be got together—warring with Carthage was CHAP. IX. another matter from warring with Katanê—and much preparation had to be made for the campaign. Time thus passed away; the Syracusans believed that, loiter as they would, they would come in time to find Selinous still a besieged city, not a city hopelessly stormed and sacked by the barbarians ¹.

Meanwhile Hannibal did not loiter. With the morning Second light he again began the assault. But such was the day's stubbornness of the defence that he had to do the like, fighting. day after day, for seven other successive mornings. For Alleged nine days in the whole, all day and every day, did Selinous, nine days' so we are told, bear up against the ever-renewed attacks of resistance. her besiegers. On the part of those besiegers, the first act of the second day was to open a path for storming parties by clearing away the ruins from the breach. We would gladly give something to know at what point of the wall of central Selinous that breach was made. Then Hannibal brought up his forces by relays, fresh men relieving the wearied, while the Selinuntines, with their smaller numbers, had no such means of dividing the work. It seems hardly within the bounds of belief that such a struggle as this could go on for so many days, stopping, we must suppose, every night, and beginning again the next morning. The number of days must surely be exaggerated; or a shorter time than the story seems to imply must be given to the fighting at the breach, and a longer to the fighting that followed within the town. The example of Carthage herself, when the Roman had made his way within her gates, shows how long fighting of this last kind can be kept up ². We are told that at the beginning of the struggle the Selinuntines were to some extent beaten back. But they were not dis-

Diod. xiii. 56; *μεγάλην ποιούμενοι παρασκευὴν ἐχρόνισον, νομίζοντες πολιορκηθήσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναρπασθήσεσθαι.*

² Appian, *Punica*, 130.

CHAP. IX. lodged; the struggle went on, and the besiegers came in for their share of loss and suffering as well as the besieged. So the strife went on, day after day; the Carthaginians could ever bring up new troops, while the Selinuntines had no helpers to fall back on¹; the last stage and the hardest fighting of all were yet to come.

The last day.

The Iberians enter the town.

Fighting in the streets.

That sternest work of all came at the moment, on whatever day of the siege it was, when the Iberian mercenaries, who stand out foremost at this stage, as the Campanians stood out at the beginning, made their way into the town through the breach. Now the enemy was in the city, the defence of the walls ceased². Those who had been stationed on them left their posts, and gathered themselves wherever the narrow, and most likely crooked, streets of Selinous gave an opportunity for street-fighting. These streets were surely in some other quarter than those comparatively wide roads, with the native rock for pavement, which have been lately brought to light on the Selinuntine akropolis. Barricades were thrown across the streets at fitting points, and the defence went on behind them³. The women and children climbed the houses, and hurled down stones and tiles from the roofs. For a long time the Punic army struggled on at a great disadvantage. No military array could be kept in the narrow streets, and no fighting on equal terms could be kept up amid the showers of missiles which were ever falling from above. The advancing army of Carthage in the streets of Selinous was in nearly the same case as the retreating army of Athens had been on its march towards the Akraian cliff. At last, towards evening—a phrase which may perhaps make us doubt as to the

¹ Diod. xiii. 56; τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις νεαλεῖς διεδέχοντο τὴν μάχην, τοῖς δὲ Σελινουντίοις οὐδὲν ἦν τὸ βοηθῆσον.

² Ib.; κατὰ τὸ πεπωκὸς μέρος τοῦ τείχους ἀναβάντων τῶν Ἰβήρων . . . οἱ Σελινούντιοι . . . τὰ τεῖχη ἀπολιπόντες.

³ Ib.; κατὰ τὰς ἐσβολὰς τῶν στενῶν τόπων ἄνθρωποι συνίσταντο, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς διοικοδομεῖν ἐνεχείρουν.

nine days' resistance—the supply of missiles from the roofs failed. A new and fresh Punic force, brought up to relieve those who were worn out in the terrible struggle, at last succeeded in driving the Selinuntines from the narrow streets. One last stand was made in the *agora*, somewhere doubtless within the wall of the outer town on the northern part of the central hill. There the remaining fighting men of Selinous gathered only to be slaughtered to a man; for the orders of Hannibal were to give no quarter¹. Resistance was now over; the wrongs of Segesta were avenged. Selinous, or so much as was left of her, was in the hands of the Punic allies of the Elymian.

CHAP. IX.

Last stand
in the
agora.Taking of
Selinous.

All the horrors of barbarian conquest were now let loose upon the unhappy people of Selinous. Their fate is described in full. The story is the same in all such cases; that the details of suffering are dwelled on in this case with special minuteness marks the fact that this was the first time that any Greek city of Sicily had fallen into the hands of barbarians. To be stormed and sacked by Africans and Spaniards was a new experience. The Greek, in his worst moments, had never shown that delight in mere slaughter, and not only in slaughter but in mutilation, which was characteristic of many of the races which had been brought together by Carthaginian pay. We here see the worst side of the Phœnician character. While reading the story of the sack of Selinous, it seems strange and repulsive to think that the doer of all this was not an Asiatic despot, but the chief magistrate of a commonwealth whose political system stood on a level with the best devised constitutions of Greece and Italy. In war, at this stage, the Carthaginians were still barbarians in every sense. We can hardly judge of the elder Hannibal as a general. The

First Sikeliot city
taken by
barbarians.Warfare of
Hannibal;

¹ Diod. xiii. 57; οἱ δὲ ταῖς εὐημερίαις ἐκπληρόμενοι, σφάττειν παρεκελεύοντο· οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀγορὰν συνδραμόντων τῶν Σελινουντίων, οὗτοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα μαχόμενοι πάντες ἀντρείθησαν.

CHAP. IX. kind of warfare which he practised allowed of no great displays of skill in the field ; but the efficiency of his war-like engines is a striking contrast to the warfare of his greater namesake, so mighty in battle, so weak in the leaguer. Yet in our present Hannibal we seem to see something of the barbarian's trust in mere numbers. Here indeed it was not wholly out of place ; in such a warfare as the siege of Selinous numbers must prevail in the end. Even where the question of numbers did not come in, a Carthaginian general had no call to be chary of the blood of subjects and hirelings in the way in which political reasons alone made a Greek general chary of the blood of citizens and allies. But in the attack and defence of Selinous it was simply a question of numbers. The commander who can always bring up fresh fighting men to fill the places of those who are killed or wearied out must at last gain his point over those who have no such reserve to draw on. Hannibal won the day at Selinous as Xerxes had won the day at Thermopylai ; how he might have fared against the forces of Selinous and her allies in such a fight as that in which Gelôn overcame his grandfather we can only guess. But there is at least nothing to show that, as the commander of an army made up of various nations and various arms, he had reached to any measure of that wonderful power by which the later Hannibal knew how to use every element in such a mingled force to its special end.

Slaughter
of the Seli-
nuntines.

To the might of numbers then Selinous at last yielded. Once within the city, the barbarians of Africa and Spain had full licence to glut their savage instincts at the cost of the conquered. An indiscriminate slaughter of men, women, and children was no more than could have taken place if Selinous had been stormed by a Roman army. But as no Greek, so no Roman, and, we may suspect, no Campanian, soldiers would have gone about adorned with

wreaths of the hands of the slaughtered, or even with heads carried in triumph on the points of their spears¹. The slaughter of one class of victims only was forbidden.

Hannibal granted their lives to the women who fled with their children to the temples. They would most easily flee to the temples on the akropolis; yet some may have made their way to those on the eastern hill. But we are expressly told that the motive for this exception was neither mercy nor reverence for the gods. The Punic commander thought perhaps of the desperate resolution which was sometimes shown by both men and women of his own people and which was presently to find an Hellenic counterpart in the temples of captured Akragas. He feared lest the suppliants should set fire to the temples over their own heads, and so lessen the amount of booty which he looked for from the plunder of the holy places². And after all, the safety for their lives guaranteed to these women did not exempt them from outrage and slavery. A harrowing picture is drawn, which can hardly be more harrowing than the truth, of the wretchedness which came on women used, as many in Selinous must have been, to every comfort and luxury that Greek life supplied, when they were suddenly brought down to slavery in a strange land, and doomed, while yet in their own city, to endure the extreme of insult in their own persons and to see the like wrongs endured by their maiden daughters. It is not clear whether these women and children made up the whole of those who were taken alive, or whether, after a while, the lust of blood was quenched, and a

CHAP. IX.

Mutilation.

The women in the temples enslaved, not slain.

Hannibal's motive.

¹ Diod. xiii. 57; ἡρωτηρίασαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς κατὰ τὸ πατρῶν ἔθος, καὶ τινὲς μὲν χεῖρας ἀθρόας περιέφερον τοῖς σώμασι, τινὲς δὲ κεφαλὰς ἐπὶ τῶν γαισῶν καὶ τῶν σαννίων ἀναπείραντες ἔφερον. See Grote, x. 563.

² Diod. xiii. 57; τοῦτο δ' ἐπραξαν οὐ τοὺς ἀληροῦντας ἐλεοῦντες, ἀλλ' εὐλαβούμενοι μήποτε τὴν σωτηρίαν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀπογνοῦσαι, κατακαύσωσι τοὺς ναοὺς καὶ μὴ δυνήσῃσι συλῆσαι τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς καθιερωμένην πολυτέλειαν. See vol. ii. p. 408.

CHAP. IX. remnant was spared to be led into captivity. The figures, however got at, give six thousand as the number of the slaughtered, while the number of captives exceeded five thousand. Two thousand six hundred had the good luck to make their way out of captured Selinous, and to find a city of refuge at Akragas¹. We have no means of correcting the arithmetic of our one narrative; but the aggregate of the numbers seems strangely small for the whole population of Selinous, bond and free. The desertion of slaves was common enough, as it was natural enough; but we have heard nothing of it in this case. And in the hour of massacre, Iberians and Africans, thirsting for blood, were not likely to stop to draw distinctions between the slave and his master.

Sympathy
of the
Greeks in
the Punic
service.

In the midst of the description of all these horrors, we are struck with the remark of our guide that the wrongs of the people of Selinous awoke a feeling of pity in the hearts of the Greeks who were serving on the side of Carthage². It is only from this casual notice that we learn that any of the Hellenic name had sold themselves to such treason against all Hellenic fellowship. The notice stands quite by itself, and we are not told whether any practical results came of their sympathy. We do not hear, for instance, whether the Selinuntines who escaped were at all helped

Reception
of the fugi-
tives at
Akragas.

by the connivance of their repentant brethren. At any rate those of them who escaped to Akragas found the most friendly reception there. The Akragantines, by their strange delay in sending help at such a moment, had been in some measure the cause of the overthrow of Selinous. They now did what little they could to make up for their fault. The Selinuntine refugees received an allowance of corn from the public treasury of Akragas, and the men them-

¹ Diod. xiii. 58.

² Ib.; θεωρούντες τὴν τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες συμμαχοῦντες ἠέλειον τὴν τῶν ἀκληρούντων τύχην. That is all.

selves were parted out among the houses of the citizens. CHAP. IX.
And every man was zealous to do all that he could for the
guests that were quartered upon him ¹.

While Hannibal and his destroying army were revelling March of
the Syra-
cusans
under
Dioklés.
in the overthrow of Selinous and the slaughter and bondage
of its people, while the remnant of that people was enjoying
the hospitality of Akragantine hosts instead of returning
thanks for the help of Akragantine comrades, the promised
succours from Syracuse were at last on their march. Three
thousand picked men were sent to the help of Selinous
under the command of Dioklés, demagogue and lawgiver ².
And when they once set out, they did not linger ³. When They hear
the news at
Akragas.
they reached Akragas, they heard that Selinous was already
in the hands of the barbarians. The blow then had fallen;
nothing could be done to ward it off; the only hope was
that something might be done to lighten its bitterness. It
does not appear that there was any thought of military
action against the victorious Carthaginians; but something,
it was hoped, might be gained by diplomacy. Syracuse Negotia-
tions with
Hannibal;
was still nominally at peace with Carthage, and a Syracusan
embassy was sent from Akragas to Hannibal, praying him
to put his captives to ransom, and to spare the temples of
the gods ⁴. The answer put into the mouth of the Punic
commander is in any case characteristic, and it may be
genuine. The people of Selinous had not been able to
keep their freedom; they must therefore have a taste of
slavery. As for the gods, they had gone away from Selinous
in displeasure against its inhabitants ⁵. The diplomacy of

¹ Diod. xiii. 58; *προθύμους οὖσι χορηγεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἅπαντα.*

² Ib. 59. His name comes in quite casually at the end. We must not forget his death in c. 33 and 35.

³ Ib.; *προπεσταλμένοι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπὶ τὴν βοήθειαν.*

⁴ Ib.; *παρακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀννίβαν τοὺς τε αἰχμαλώτους ἀπολυτῶσαι καὶ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς ναοὺς ἑῶσαι.*

⁵ Ib.; *τοὺς μὲν Σελινοῦντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν πείραν*

CHAP. IX. Syracuse thus did but little for the captives and refugees of Selinous. But Hannibal, in whom the family feeling was so strong, was also capable of being moved by private friendship. Empediôn, the friend of Carthage, most likely his treatment of Empediôn. the personal friend of Giskôn when he lived at Selinous, was among the refugees at Akragas. He was sent to Hannibal in the name of the whole body who had escaped, and he was favourably received. His own property was given back to him; such of his kinsfolk as were among the captives were set free¹. And some measure of scornful mercy was meted out to the whole body of the refugees. The refugees return as subjects of Carthage. They were allowed to come back to their town, and to till its lands. But Selinous was wiped out of the roll of Hellenic cities. It ceased to be even a dependent commonwealth. The remnant of its citizens who were allowed to dwell in it were to hold its soil simply as subjects and tributaries of Carthage². No Sikeliot city had ever before been brought to submit to such a fate. But the doom of Selinous was only the beginning of sorrows. The historian now, for the first time but not for the last, makes use of a mournful formula. "Thus was a city destroyed which had stood two hundred and forty-two years from its foundation³." The exact date may be doubted; but in any case we are startled at the shortness of the time during which Selinous had been in being. We feel that in Sicily we are in a colonial world, where things are newer and less abiding than they are in lands of older birth. Two hundred and forty-two years seems but a short life when

628-409.

Newness of Selinous.

τῆς δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινούντος ἀίχεσθαι, προσκίμαστας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.

¹ On Empediôn, see above, p. 450.

² Diod. xiii. 59; τοῖς ἐκπεφευγόσι Σελινουιντοῖσι ἔδωκεν ἐξουσίαν τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖν καὶ τὴν χώραν γεωργεῖν, τελούντας φόρον τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

³ Ib.; αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως οὐκ ἐθεῖσα χρόνον ἐτῶν διακοσίων τεσσαράκοντα δύο, ἐάλω. See c. 62. The number, according to the reckoning of Thucydides, vi. 4. 2, would rather be about two hundred and twenty.

set against the long ages of Ogygian Athens or Ogygian Thebes. CHAP. IX.

Hannibal had now done the work which Carthage had laid upon him. He had been sent to defend Segesta against the aggressions of Selinous, and of aggressions on the part of Selinous there was no longer any fear. He might take his host back to Carthage without any danger of crucifixion or banishment. But, if he had done the work which Carthage had laid upon him, he had not done the work which he had laid upon himself. It is not clear that he had any commission from the Senate and People of Carthage to wage war against any city except Selinous. But he would have said that he had a commission from the ghost of his grandfather and from the gods of Carthage to wage war upon Himera. The difference in his position towards the two cities must be well grasped in order to understand what he really did at Selinous. "Having," says our narrative, "pulled down the walls of Selinous, he set forth with his whole force for Himera, being eager above all things to raze that city to the ground¹." He had work to do at Himera which he had not to do at Selinous. At Selinous he was simply the general of Carthage, sent to do the work of Carthage, a work which undoubtedly was largely a work of destruction. At Himera he was beyond all this the grandson of the slain Hamilkar, coming with the stern and sacred mission of the avenger. Towards Selinous then and its buildings he stood in a wholly different position from that in which he stood towards Himera. At Selinous he had no temptation to destroy anything more than was needed for his military purposes. Those were fully satisfied by doing what he certainly did. He destroyed, at least in

Public
work of
Hannibal
done;

his personal
errand
against
Himera.

¹ Diod. xiii. 59; ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας, περιελὼν τὰ τείχη τῆς Σελινοῦντος, ἀνίειψε μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἱμέραν, ἐπιθυμῶν μάλιστα ταύτην κατασκάψαι τὴν πόλιν.

CHAP. IX.
The walls
slighted.

the military language of the seventeenth century he *slighted*, the walls of the Selinuntine akropolis and of the Selinuntine city. He slighted them, but he assuredly did not grub up their foundations. Nor did he, beyond this necessary operation of war, work any further destruction on the city of Selinous or its holy places. We shall presently see that he did work such destruction at Himera.

No motive
for destruc-
tion at
Selinous.

There so to do was part of his special mission. To burn and to root up walls, temples, houses, was at Himera a great act of symbolic vengeance; no such ceremonial destruction was called for at Selinous. Where the remnant of the Selinuntines were to be allowed to dwell as subjects of Carthage, there was every reason for breaking down walls; there was none for destroying temples or houses. We have seen that, in a kind of bravado, he asserted a right to destroy the temples of Selinous; but there is not the slightest ground to think that he carried out that right¹. The destruction of temples is nowhere asserted in the narrative; it is implicitly denied when his slighting of the walls is so emphatically recorded. And the destruction of the Selinuntine temples would have delayed him on his path towards the vengeance which he longed for at Himera.

In truth it only needs a sight of the ruins of Selinous fully to understand that it was not by the Punic crow-bar that the Pillars of the Giants were overthrown. It would indeed have needed giants to overthrow them; for every-day mortals such a task would have been too long and wearing to undertake, unless at the bidding of some special call of duty. Such a call Hannibal did feel at Himera; there was no reason why he should feel it at Selinous. Nor is there any evidence to show that he made any distinctions, that, while sparing the rest, he overthrew the great unfinished temple on the eastern hill, most likely that of

¹ See above, p. 471.

Olympian Zeus¹. And there is distinct evidence that some at least of the temples were standing ages after the times with which we are dealing. In short we may fairly acquit Hannibal of destroying anything at Selinous for the mere sake of destruction. But a question presents itself whether in one part of the city his approach did not cause a good deal of destruction, though not of the solemn and symbolic kind. While the temples on the eastern hill and the akropolis have always been visible, their fallen columns lying plainly above ground, it is otherwise with the buildings lately brought to light on the sandy hill of the *propylæa*. The covering power of the sand must be taken into account; still there is the fact that, while on the eastern hill little has been actually destroyed, though everything has been overthrown, on the western hill what little is left is standing. Instead of whole columns lying in fragments, we here see the lower courses of columns and walls, but only the lower courses, standing in their places. This certainly may suggest that in this quarter, where the invading army was most likely actually encamped, a good deal of direct destruction was wrought, while it was otherwise on the akropolis and the eastern hill. The temples that stood there assuredly did not fall beneath the hands of the Punic army, but beneath the mightier powers of nature. The way in which most of the columns lie, above all in the oldest temple on the akropolis, drum by drum in order, each pillar keeping its place, like the Sacred Band of Thebes lying in their ranks on the field of slaughter, shows how they fell. They were not pulled down by chains, or undermined by the crow-bar, or beaten down by battering engines. They could have fallen only by some sudden crash which brought down the whole mass of each temple, the whole company of all the temples, in one common overthrow. An earthquake alone could have wrought the

CHAP. IX.

Did Hannibal destroy on the western hill?

The temples destroyed by an earthquake.

¹ Schubring, Nachrichten, 432. Cf. Holm, G. S. ii. 83.

CHAP. IX. destruction ; of this havoc at least we may hold Hannibal the son of Giskôn harmless. But we may be sure that, after his visit, the helpless tributaries of Carthage who dwelled at Selinous had no wealth or strength left in them to finish or to repair the works of happier days. If neither Greek Akragas nor Roman Agrigentum, though it again became a considerable city, ever found means to finish its Olympieion after the Punic visitation¹, still less could unwalled and tributary Selinous. The columns which were unfluted never received their last finish ; the limner's hand never added the bright lines which the Greek loved ; no sculptured forms of gods and heroes filled the metopes of the latest of Selinuntine temples to point a contrast to the rude art of its earliest neighbour. So little is known of the later fates of Selinous that it is vain to guess at the date of the great overthrow. We can only say that at Himera Hannibal was the destroyer ; at Selinous a devout Greek would have said that the destruction was the work of Poseidôn.

The great temple remained unfinished.

§ 3. *The Destruction of Himera.*

B.C. 409.

March of Hannibal to Himera. The Syracusan version of Hamilkar's death seems assumed.

THE work of Hannibal was done as regarded Selinous. He at once set forth with all his host on the special errand to which he believed himself to be specially called. It is to be noticed that our single narrative assumes, as it was likely to assume, the story which we read long ago as the Syracusan version of the earlier fight of Himera². It knows nothing of the tale of the self-sacrifice of Hamilkar which Herodotus handed down from Carthaginian sources. The defeat, the slaughter, the captivity, of the Punic host are set forth as motives for vengeance, and Hamilkar is spoken of as slain, not by his own act, but by the act, not

¹ Diod. xiii. 82.

² See vol. ii. pp. 194, 518.

necessarily by the hand, of Gelôn¹. Yet it would not seem CHAP. IX.
 that the more striking version of the tale is thereby shut Yet the
 out. The defeat, the slaughter, the captivity, of the host Cartha-
 in general is the same in either case, and, if Hamilkar ginian ver-
 threw himself into the fire, it was so far Gelôn's act that it sion may
 was the result of Gelôn's victory. And the special way, the not be
 solemn sacrificial act, by which Hannibal sought to appease shut out.
 the shade of his grandfather seems to fit in better with the
 belief that the death of Hamilkar was no mere chance of
 the battle, but itself a solemn sacrificial act. The work Hannibal's
 that his grandson had to do at Selinous was a stern one. mission of
 It was to carry out a ruthless law of war by the hands of vengeance
 men who knew not what mercy was. But it was no more. against
 The work that he had to do at Himera was more stern, Himera.
 more fearful, but at the same time from his own point
 of view, more solemn, more lofty. He came on the sacred
 errand of the avenger; he came to exact a mighty *wergeld*
 of blood for the defeat and death of his forefather, and to
 appease his ghost by an offering such as the gods and
 ghosts of Canaan loved.

Of the march from Selinous to Himera we have no Line of
 details. The road, it will be remembered, by which the Hannibal's
 Punic army had to make its way was the same by which, march.
 in the earlier war, Selinous had sent her horsemen to give
 help to the Punic cause². It would seem to lie through a
 territory mainly Sikan; the most direct course would be
 between the towns of Entella and Skartheia³. The feeling
 of the Sikan inhabitants may really have been on the
 side of Carthage. They had felt the presence of Greek
 enemies; they had not as yet felt the yoke of Carthaginian

¹ Diod. xiii. 62; τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῆρθεῖ. This is not literally true according to either version. In c. 59 he says only, καταστρατηγῆθεις ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῆρθεῖ, which might seem to imply the story of the Selinuntines.

² See vol. ii. pp. 187, 196.

³ See vol. i. p. 121.

CHAP. IX. masters. Or it may be that Hamilkar found it expedient to press the native races of the island into his service. We hear of both Sikel and Sikan reinforcements. If the former are authentic, they must have come of their own free will; Sikans may have found it either necessary or expedient to join the banners of the conqueror who was passing through the special Sikania. By one means or the other, twenty thousand men of the ancient races of Sicily were added to the Punic host¹. At the head, it would seem, of his whole force²—Selinous in its defenceless state may have been held to need no garrison—Hannibal reached the Himeraian territory and the immediate neighbourhood of the city. The second Punic siege of Himera began. As a siege, as a matter of local interest generally, the warfare of Hannibal against the Greek city stands higher than the warfare of his grandfather. But it has not the same place in the history of Greece and the world.

As in the narrative of the earlier siege, the topography is less clear than we could wish. But several things lead us to think that the disposal of the besieging forces must have been different under Hannibal from what it had been under Hamilkar. We must remember that Hannibal brought no sea-force against Himera. We shall see that the besiegers and those who came to their relief did what they pleased in the way of ships without let or hindrance.

On the other hand, we heard nothing of military engines in the former siege, while they play the chief part in the present one. The language too of our one informant is singularly different. In the former siege we heard of the sea-camp of Hamilkar, as well as of the land-camp with which he occupied the ground to the west of the city³.

Now we are told that the city was surrounded. Hannibal

Himera
"surround-
ed."

¹ Diod. xiii. 59; προσγενομένων ἄλλων παρὰ τε Σικελῶν καὶ Σικανῶν δισμυρίων στρατιωτῶν.

² Ib.; μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως.

³ See vol. ii. p. 188.

placed forty thousand men on some heights away from the city, and with the rest he surrounded it¹. Strictly surrounded Himera cannot have been; for this time there clearly was no sea-camp, as there had been in the days of Hamilkar. But we must suppose that the surrounding now spoken of means something more than merely a camp on the western hills. One is inclined to think that the heights here spoken of are the peaked hill to the south and the rocks which at no great distance rise above the Himeras. These form part of the same mass of high ground as the hills of the city, but they must have been a good way outside its walls. And we are tempted to believe that it was on this side that the besieging engines were brought up. Their attack cannot possibly have been made on the sea-side. Even if that side had not been left open, as it clearly was, the height of the ground on which the walls stood, so much higher than at Selinous, would, to say the least, have made an assault of that kind very hard. From the south the engines might at many points be brought up to attack the walls on level ground. Still the story is not without its topographical difficulties. Had we the text of Philistos, we should doubtless understand many of these things far more clearly.

CHAP. IX.
Camp
on the
southern
hills.

The
engines
brought
from the
south.

The overthrow of Selinous and the purpose of Hannibal to march against Himera and to do more than he had done at Selinous must have been well known everywhere. And the Greeks of Sicily had been stirred up by the fate of Selinous to act with greater vigour on behalf of the second city which he threatened with destruction. An army charged with the relief of Himera, if not yet at her gates, was at least on the march to save her. While Hannibal was marching from Selinous to Himera, the Syracusan host

March
of the
allies of
Himera :
force under
Dioklès.

¹ Diod. xiii. 59; τέτρασι μυριάσιν ἀποθεν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τινων λόφων περὶ στρατοπέδευσε, τῇ δ' ἄλλῃ δυνάμει πᾶσιν περὶ στρατοπέδευσε τὴν πόλιν. The mention of the Sikels and Sikans follows.

CHAP. IX. which Dioklēs had led forth too late, was making its way from Akragas to the same point. The three thousand picked men who had set forth from Syracuse were now raised to a force of five thousand by the accession of other Greek allies, the more part doubtless being sent by Akragas¹. For once, the first and the second of Sikeliot cities pulled heartily together. As the story is told us, it would seem that Hannibal was beforehand with them, and that they found the siege actually begun. But they came in time to take their share in at least one stage of the work. And their presence is one of several things which give the resistance of Himera another character from that of Selinous. At Himera there is something more than the hopeless defence, first of the wall and then of the streets of the town. We hear something of the ups and downs of battle outside the walls. And we come across a strange by-play of rumours and accidents which leads in the end to a result wholly unlike that of the siege of Selinous. Himera, as a city, fell far more utterly than Selinous. But, while the inhabitants of neither city were wholly rooted out, the work of slaughter came nearer to such an ending at Selinous than it did at Himera.

Comparison of the sieges of Selinous and Himera.

First day; Carthaginian attack. The siege now began. Hannibal's general method of attack was essentially the same at Himera as it had been at Selinous. But we now hear of some engineering devices of which nothing was said in the earlier siege. The assault began most likely, as we have said, on the southern or landward side of the city. As at Selinous, Hannibal again brought up his engines to play upon the wall; he again brought up his multitudes of men in turn to wear out the smaller numbers of the defenders². But at Himera he used

Use of mines.

¹ Diod. xiii. 59; *παρεγενήθησαν αὐτοῖς εἰς τὴν βοήθειαν οἱ τ' ἐξ Ἀκράγαντος Συρακούσιοι καὶ τινες τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων, οἱ πάντες εἰς τετρακισχίλους, ὃν Διοκλῆς ὁ Συρακούσιος εἶχεν ἡγεμονίαν.*

² The *μηχαναί* come in c. 59; but no details are given.

mines, of which we heard nothing at Selinous. Most likely the already tottering walls of Selinous, which there had been no time to repair, could be easily breached by simpler means. But at Himera his coming had been expected; the defences were therefore doubtless in better order, and their overthrow needed all the engineering skill at the command of the Punic general. But more than this, at Selinous the attack, carried on from the valley against the walls of the akropolis, was made by means of moving towers of unusual height. In such a case the mine could hardly be available. But at Himera, if the assault was made on the landward side, it would be far easier to find places where this kind of attack could be used. The mine was dug; the wall was meanwhile kept up by props of timber; the timbers were fired, and a large piece of the wall fell¹. Now came the fiercest fighting of all, the fighting in the breach. The barbarians pressed on eagerly to make their way into the town. The Greeks, remembering all that Selinous had suffered², bore up against them with all the courage of despair. By a mighty effort the besiegers were driven back, and, as at Selinous, night put an end to the first day's struggle. Hannibal called off his men, and left Himera for that night an unconquered city of Hellas. The defenders were even able to repair a large part of the breach which had been made in their walls³.

CHAP. IX.

Fight in the breach.

The barbarians driven out and the breach repaired.

The passive success of this day's resistance was not all. It would seem that it was at the end of this first day's fighting that the Syracusans and other allies of Himera appeared before the city which they were charged to rescue⁴. They were able to make their way into the

Arrival of the allies.

¹ Diod. xiii. 59; *ἐπώρυγτε δὲ καὶ τὰ τεῖχη, καὶ ξύλοις ὑπῆρξεν, ὃν ἐμπρησθέντων, ταχὺ πολὺ μέρος τοῦ τεύχους ἔπεσεν*. Like William at Exeter.

² Ib.; *φοβούμενων μὴ ταῦτα πάθωσι τοῖς Σελινουσίαις*.

³ Ib.; *ταχὺ τὸ μέρος τοῦ τεύχους ἀνικοδόμησαν*.

⁴ In Diodóros' account (c. 59) they seem to come just after the first day's fighting is over. The next chapter (60) begins; *τότε μὲν οὖν, νυκτὸς*

CHAP. IX. town ; on the side of the sea and of the river there could
 Second have been little to hinder them. The presence of these new
 day ; helpers stirred up the men of Himera to a more daring blow
 on the second day, the like of which does not seem to have
 been thought of in the defence of Selinous¹. Himeraians
 and allies numbered in all ten thousand Greek fighting-
 men, and they deemed that, with such a force, they might
 well go forth to renew the exploit of Gelôn and Thêrôn²,
 and attack the besiegers in their own quarters. The at-
 tack, like that of Gelôn and Thêrôn, must have been made
 on the Punic camp to the west across the western valley.
 The fight is set before us after the manner of a battle
 before Ilios. Parents and children and kinsfolk looked out
 from the wall, and the feeling of their presence stirred up
 those who were fighting for their deliverance to greater
 efforts. For a while the daring sally succeeded. The bar-
 sally from barians were taken by surprise ; they had never dreamed
 Himera. that the men whom they had shut up fast in the city would
 come forth to fight against them. Attacked all of a
 sudden, they fancied that yet another force had come to the
 relief of Himera³. Eighty thousand men came crowding
 together to one spot in no certain order. Suddenly they
 found themselves face to face with a better disciplined
 force of ten thousand, men knowing their own purpose, and
 kindled by all the strongest motives of human nature to
 do all that man can do in such a case⁴. The fight soon

First Greek
 success.

ἀφελομένης τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ πλείονι φιλονεικίαν, ἔλυσαν τὴν πολιορκίαν—that is, for the night only.

¹ Diod. xiii. 60 ; *ἔδοξε μὴ περιορᾶν αὐτοὺς συγκεκλεισμένους ἀγεντῶς, καθάπερ τοὺς Σελινουντίους*.

² See vol. ii. p. 197.

³ Diod. xiii. 60 ; *ἀπροσδοκῆτως δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπαντήσαντες, εἰς ἐκπληξιν ἤγαγον τοὺς βαρβάρους, νομίζοντας ἦκειν τοὺς συμμάχους τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις*. He had already mentioned that the newly come allies joined in the sally, and, if he merely means them, *νομίζοντας* is an odd word.

⁴ *Ib.* ; *πολὺ ταῖς τόλμαις ὑπερέχοντες καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, μᾶς ἐλπίδος εἰς σωτηρίαν ὑποκειμένης, εἰ τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσειαν*.

became a disorderly flight on the part of the barbarians. CHAP. IX.
 They strove as they could to make their way to the camp of their comrades who were posted on the height to the south¹; the Greeks followed them, slaying them with a great slaughter and crying each man to his comrade to make no prisoners². But in the pursuit they themselves became disordered; Hannibal then gave the word for the reserved force encamped to the south, fresh and no doubt stirred up by the slaughter of their comrades before their eyes, to go down and fall upon the pursuers. This they did with fearful effect. A second fight with the new The Greeks driven back by fresh forces. enemies followed, in which the more part of the Greeks were put to flight. A body of three thousand, who kept their ground to the last, were cut to pieces to a man³.

The second day of action in concert with the newly-come allies had thus done less for the deliverance of Himera than the first day of unassisted self-defence on the part of the men of Himera alone. But the city was not taken, and, even after the loss in the sally, it was still capable of vigorous resistance. But all was spoiled by a series of rumours and misunderstandings. At the very moment, it Evening of the second day; coming of the Sikeliot fleet. would seem, when the event of the fighting had turned against Himera, a powerful force came to her help. We must remember that, while Greek Sicily was invaded by barbarians, Sikeliot ships and Sikeliot soldiers were still serving in Greek warfare on the coast of Asia. The news

¹ *Diod. xiii. 60; οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ φευγόντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν λόφων στρατοπεδεύοντας.*

² *Ib.; ἀλλήλοις παρακαλουνομενοι μηδὲνα ζῶγειν.* As usual, Timaios gave the moderate figure for the slain, six thousand, while Ephoros raised it to twenty thousand.

³ *Ib.; τρισχίλιοι αὐτῶν, ὑπεστάντες τῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων δυνάμει καὶ πολλὰ δρῶσantes, ἅπαντες ἀνιρέθησαν.* Frontinus, who confounds Hannibal son of Giakōn with the great Hannibal, has a story (iii. 10. 3) how he took Himera by leaving his camp for the besieged to take ("castra sua capite industria passus est"), and meanwhile assaulting the city. This must be some confused report of this day's work.

CHAP. IX. of the overthrow of Selinous had reached her sons so far away, and hospitable welcome had been given in distant cities to the men who were now without a home¹. By this time the small remnant of Selinous and the greater contingent of Syracuse had been called back to the more pressing need of all Hellenic Sicily. In the face of the common danger Syracuse had made up her differences with her own Chalkidian neighbours², and she no longer felt called upon to spend her strength even in the cause of Corinth against Athens. Orders must have been sent on the voyage, telling of the danger of Himera, and bidding the ships to make their way at once thither instead of going home to Syracuse. On the evening therefore of the second day of the fighting, just as the Greeks who had sallied were discomfited by the second attack, the hopes of the defenders of Himera were cheered by the sight of twenty-five friendly ships of war showing themselves before the city³.

The new comers had full command of the sea. Hannibal had no naval force before Himera. His ships, left in the docks at Motya, could do nothing against this new enemy. His Phœnician craft did not fail him. He spread abroad a tale that the whole force of Syracuse was on its march to Himera. He himself, the story said, was about to seize the opportunity, to put the ships at Motya to sea, to man them with picked crews, and to sail suddenly against Syracuse while her military force was engaged elsewhere⁴. All

The Greeks command the sea.

False rumours of Hannibal's plans; alleged design on Syracuse.

¹ See above, pp. 429, 433.

² See above, p. 464.

³ Diod. xiii. 61; *τῆς μάχης αὐτῆς ἤδη τέλος ἐχούσης, κατέπλευσαν πρὸς τὴν Ἱμέραν πέντε πρὸς ταῖς εἴκοσι τριῆρεις παρὰ τῶν Σικελιωτῶν*. He goes on to explain that they had been in the *Ægean*.

⁴ Diodōros (xiii. 61) does not directly say that Hannibal spread abroad this report. His words are *διεδόθη δὲ καὶ φήμη τις κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι Συρακοῦσιοι, κ.τ.λ.* But what follows shows that he had no purpose of the kind, while the belief that he had such a purpose completely served his ends. So Holm (G. S. ii. 82) calls it "ein Gerücht, das Anhänger Karthagos ausgestreut hatten."

was pure fiction; but the tale perfectly well suited the purposes of Hannibal, and his device was unhappily successful in dividing the forces which were now come together for the defence of Himera. CHAP. IX.

When the news of Hannibal's supposed design was spread abroad, Dioklès and the captains of the Syracusan triremes became uneasy for the safety of their own city. Syracuse had already undergone a serious loss in the slaughter of so many of her picked men in the battle before Himera¹. If Hannibal were to sail against Syracuse while she was thus left defenceless, their own homes might fall into the hands of the barbarians². This naturally seemed in their eyes a nearer call than even the relief of Himera. They determined therefore that the Syracusan forces by land and sea should be withdrawn from Himera, and should go back at once to the defence of Syracuse. And in truth, not only from a Syracusan, but from a general Sikeliot point of view, to preserve Syracuse was a greater object than to rescue Himera. To the Himeraians Dioklès and the naval officers gave this counsel. Let them make up their minds to forsake Himera; let half the population go on board the Syracusan ships, which would engage to carry them safe beyond the bounds of the Himeraian territory³; that is doubtless out of danger of Carthaginian attacks. The rest were to keep watch till the ships came back to take them away also. Though they were anxious to sail to Syracuse, yet it is plain that they could, in any case, allow their allies so much time as this. For it would naturally take longer for Hannibal to go by land to Motya, and, when there, to put his ships to sea and sail for Syra-

Dioklès
and the
captains
determine
to leave
Himera.

The people
of Himera
to be
carried
away by
sea.

¹ Diod. xiii. 61; Διοκλῆς ὁ τῶν ἐν Ἰμέρα στρατηγὸς συνεβούλευσε τοῖς ναυάρχοις, κ.τ.λ.

² Ib.; ἵνα μὴ συμβῇ κατὰ κράτος ἀλῶναι τὴν πόλιν, ἀπολωλεκότων ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῶν κρατίστων ἀνδρῶν.

³ Ib.; ταύτας [τὰς τριήρεις] κατακομῶν αὐτοὺς, μέχρις ἂν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἰμεραίας γένωνται χώρας. We shall see directly that they went further.

CHAP. IX. cuse, than it would take for themselves to reach Syracuse from Himera even after this delay. Such a proposal as this was naturally not pleasing to the people of Himera. But they had, as they thought, no choice, and they bowed to destiny¹. A confused crowd, mainly of women and children², got on board the ships, and were carried to a place of safety at Messana. Messana, it must be remembered, distant as it was, was the nearest purely Greek city to Himera. Sikel Cephalœdium, mingled Kalê Aktê, might not be looked on as safe against either force or treachery.

The first
party
carried to
Messana.

But this lengthened voyage, longer than the words of the original agreement would imply, brought destruction on the remnant that still stayed to guard Himera. Some of them, along with some of the women and children whom the triremes could not hold, made their escape by land under the protection of the force which Dioklêas led back to Syracuse. One almost wonders that they had time to join themselves to him. For he started in haste, in such haste as to forget one of the most binding duties of Greek religion. With less excuse than Nikias after the last sea-fight, he left the bodies of those who were slain in the battle beneath the walls without funeral rites³. Their bones were left to bleach, and the neglect of Dioklêas was in the end of no small political importance. Whether Hannibal would have granted the burial-truce, which between Greek and Greek was never denied, we cannot say; if he had refused it, the refusal would have become a new count in the charges of cruelty and impiety against the barbarian invader. As it was, Dioklêas failed to discharge

Hasty
march of
Dioklêas;
he leaves
the dead
unburied.

¹ Diod. xiii. 61; τῶν Ἱμεραίων σχετλιαζόντων μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις, οὐκ ἔχοντων δὲ ὁ πράξειαν ἕτερον.

² Ib.; ἐπληροῦντο κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναμῖξ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων. The other bodies are not very clearly named.

³ Ib.; τοὺς πεσόντας ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καταλιπών. Cf. above, p. 356.

this paramount duty; and the sin was his and not Hannibal's. CHAP. IX.

The perfect freedom with which both the land and the sea force sailed and marched away shows, along with other things, how far the Carthaginian siege of Himera was from being a strict blockade. The defenders of the town hold communication with the ships, part of the inhabitants go on board the ships, another part set out with the Syracusan land-force, without any attempt to hinder them on the part of the Punic army. That is to say, while the Carthaginians made their attack on the western and southern sides, the sea and the valley of the Himeras were open to the allies of the besieged. The next day's fighting, after the ships had sailed and Dioklês had marched away with his army and the accompanying refugees, is spoken of as if it were the beginning of a new siege¹. Such in truth each day's fighting might well be called. More than one such was still in store for doomed Himera. The departure of the ships and of the land-force took place on one day, seemingly towards the evening. The men who were left in Himera did one more whole day's fighting; on the third day—the fifth day from the beginning—the ships came within sight of Himera on their voyage back from Messana; but they came too late to help; they came only to see the end.

With the morning of the day after the departure of Dioklês, Hannibal again brought up his forces, and the day was spent in attacks which the defenders of Himera, looking out all the while for the coming of the ships, succeeded by manful efforts in beating back. The last morning came; the ships had passed the headland of Cephalædium and were actually to be seen in the distance, when the final blow fell. Then the stoutest warriors in the camp of

¹ Diod. xiii. 62; ἡμέρῃ τῶν Καρχηδονίων περιστρατοπεδευσάντων τὴν πόλιν.

CHAP. IX.
Himera
stormed
by the
Spaniards.

Slaughter
and
plunder.

Hannibal, the Spanish swordsmen, made their way in a body through the breach. The men of Himera still fought; they still bore up against other assailing parties; but the Spaniards were within the city. They occupied the walls, and made the entrance more easy for their comrades¹. The whole host poured in, and Himera was a captured town. A merciless slaughter of course began; but Hannibal, not indeed in mercy, gave the word to take no more lives but to make captives². The pillage of the houses was granted to the soldiers as their reward. When they were glutted with booty, the time came for the symbolic act of vengeance which their commander had come thither to do.

Plunder
and de-
struction of
temples.

Hannibal, master of Himera, did the work to which he was called in a grave and solemn order. The soil, the buildings, the men, the gods, of Himera were all in his eyes guilty of the death of Hamilkar, and all had to pay their forfeit. For the gods of Hellas he recked not. The servant of Baal had come by the grace of Baal to show how far mightier were the gods of Canaan than any feeble powers that might have fought for Himera. At the altars of those vanquished deities some still confiding worshippers had sought shelter as suppliants. They were dragged forth to the fate which Hannibal had decreed for them. The hoards of the gods were plundered; fire was set to their temples³. If their columns and sculptures were left to stand in blackened ruin, it would be a yet more memorable trophy of the victory of Carthage and her gods than if they had been rooted up from the earth. One question suggests

¹ Diod. xiii. 62; ἤδη συνέβαινε τὸ μὲν τεῖχος πεσεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν μηχανῶν, τοὺς δ' Ἰβήρας ἀθρόους παραιοπεσεῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν. τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν ἡμύνοντο τοὺς παραβοηθοῦντας τῶν Ἱμεραίων, οἱ δὲ καταλαβόμενοι τὰ τεῖχη παρεδέχοντο τοὺς ἰδίους.

² Ib.; τοῦ Ἀννίβα ζῶγειν παραγγέλλαντος.

³ Ib.; τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλίσσας καὶ τοὺς καταφυγόντας ἱέτας ἀποσπάσας ἐνέπρησε.

itself. Was one holy place spared amid the common havoc? CHAP. IX.

If we hold that the sacrifice of Hamilkar was done, according to the Syracusan version, to Poseidôn, and if we hold that the one surviving remnant of Himera by the mouth of the river is a fragment of Poseidôn's temple, it may be that we have here the one building in all Himera which Hannibal did not destroy¹. Be this as it may, all else perished.

The houses and public buildings were swept away; the walls doubtless were thoroughly slighted; Himera, after a life of two hundred and forty years, ceased to be a city².

The fate of the surviving citizens was now to be decreed.

The women and children were sent to the camp as slaves.

The remnant of the men of the guilty city, three thousand in number, were doomed to be the materials of a mighty sacrifice to appease the ghost of Hamilkar. They were led to the very spot where Hamilkar had made his memorable sacrifice; and there the whole three thousand, after many tortures or mutilations, were slaughtered³. For victims slain in honour of a dead forefather the fires of Moloch were not kindled. The gods of Carthage asked for nobler offerings than captive Greeks. In Hamilkar they had had the noblest offering of all; and it would have been a profanation of their service to give the men who carried with them the hereditary guilt of his death the honour of dying as the Shophet of Carthage had died when his life could no longer serve his country.

Question as to the temple of Poseidôn.
End of Himera.
B. C. 409.

Hannibal had now done his work; he had fulfilled the mission of Carthage and the mission of her gods. Carthage had sent him to give help to Segesta; he had given her such help that Segesta herself was forgotten in the blow that had fallen on her enemy. The gods of Carthage had

¹ See vol. i. pp. 415, 416; vol. ii. p. 195.

² Diod. xiii. 62; τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἰδαφος κατέσκαψεν, οὐκ ἐσθθεῖσαν ἐτὶ διακόσια τεσσαράκοντα. See above, p. 472, and vol. i. p. 410.

³ Ib.; πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.

CHAP. IX. sent him to avenge Hamilkar; and in the overthrow of Himera, in the solemn slaughter of her citizens, Hamilkar was avenged indeed. Yet it is grievous to think that the doom which the Phœnician, in the full consciousness of a high religious mission, meted out to the people of Himera was but little harder than that which Greek had learned to mete out to Greek. But a few years before, Athens, under the guidance of Alkibiadês, without any call of vengeance, without any call of policy, out of little more than the mere caprice of the stronger, had done to the people of Mélos, in all save the barbarian refinement of torture, as Hannibal did to the people of Himera.

Carthage
and
Athens.

Hannibal
dismisses
his army.

Discontent
of the
Campan-
ians.

Trium-
phant re-
ception of
Hannibal
at Car-
thage.

Now that Himera was overthrown the Punic leader had no call to remain longer in Sicily. In the space of three months¹ he had fulfilled his country's mission and his own. His designs on Syracuse were merely pretended, in order to deprive Himera of Syracusan help. He now broke up his camp; he sent his Sicilian allies back to their own homes, and with them the Campanian mercenaries. These last bitterly complained that their services, which they held to have outstripped those of any other division of the army, had not been valued at Carthage as they should have been². Of the soldiers whom Hannibal had brought with him from Africa, a part were left in Sicily as garrisons in the allied towns. The rest were put on board the ships, both ships of war and of burthen. He then sailed back to Carthage loaded with spoil, and was received with joyful greetings. He had, men said, in a short time done greater things for Carthage than any general whom she had ever before sent forth to war³.

¹ Xen. Hell. i. 1. 37; Καρχηδόνιοι . . . αἰρούσιν ἐν τρισὶ μηνσὶ δύο πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας Σελινούντα καὶ Ἱμέραν.

² Diod. xiii. 62; ἐγκαλοῦντες τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς αἰτιώτατοι μὲν τῶν εὐμερημάτων γεγενημένοι, οὐκ ἀξίας δὲ χάριτας εὐληφότες τῶν πεπραγμένων.

³ Ib.; ἀπήντων αὐτῷ πάντες δεξιούμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μείζονα πράξαντα τῶν πρότερον στρατηγῶν.

The first expedition of Hannibal was indeed rich in fruits for Carthage of other kinds than the destruction of two Greek cities. There is no doubt that from this time the position of Carthage in Sicily was greatly strengthened as concerned her relations to her non-Hellenic allies and dependencies in Sicily, and specially towards them of her own household. On this subject much light has been thrown by recent research in the matter of coins. We have already seen how Segesta had hitherto, however much she might be under Punic influence, kept all the formal rights of an independent commonwealth, and how she had now sunk into a community formally dependent on Carthage¹. The numismatic expression of this change is seen in the speaking fact that the coinage of Segesta, of late wrought with such special cunning², now comes to an end. So too among the Phœnician cities of Sicily, it seems plain that the dependence of Panormos and Motya, whatever we take its measure to have been before, became much stricter from this time. The numismatic evidence leads us to see something of a conscious effort to check the spread of Hellenic influences in the Phœnician towns. Up to this time at least, no coins had been struck in Carthage itself³. We are left to wonder how the great trading city, bearing rule over so many coasts, continued so long to carry on her dealings with no better means of exchange than such as had passed as

CHAP. IX.

Increased position of Carthaginian Sicily.

Numismatic evidence.

End of the Segestan coinage.

Coins struck by Carthage in Sicily.

¹ See above, p. 450.

² See vol. ii. p. 422. It seems however that the coins there spoken of come a little later than the actual time of peace. They are now held (see A. J. Evans, *Syracusan Medallions*, p. 90) to have been struck just at the time of the negotiations between Segesta and Athens. This splendid issue of money, examples of which are very rare, was in truth part of the display of fictitious wealth made by Segesta. See above, pp. 92, 140. They are the latest coins of independent Segesta.

³ See this point discussed in the *Numismatique de l'Ancienne Afrique* (Copenhagen, 1861), p. 70. But how can coins (p. 91) with π mark "Agrigentum ou Agyrum," or those with $\pi\eta$ "Hybla ou Abacenum?" Even if π could stand for *Aspétyas*, what had the Carthaginians to do with the Sikel towns?

CHAP. IX. current money with the merchant in the earliest days of the Hebrew and the Hittite¹. In this matter the smallest Sikel and Sikan towns had outstripped the mistress of Africa. Still more was she outstripped by her sister and dependency at Panormos of whose coins of the fifth century we have already had to speak, coins not only struck after Hellenic models but bearing the name of the Phœnician city only in the Hellenic tongue². It is at this point, according to the last numismatic inquiries, that the Greek coinage of Panormos gave way to a coinage struck by Carthaginian orders on Sicilian soil. It is a coinage locally Panormitan, of which the art is Greek, but whose short legend consists of three Phœnician letters, that mysterious *Ziz* which has passed for the Phœnician name of Panormos³. One's first impression would be that these coins were struck by Hannibal after his victories for the payment of his mercenaries, perhaps of the refractory Campanians first of all. But it is said, a sad and speaking fact to have to record, that there are coins of Himera, of her very latest day, which show the influence of these very coins with the name of *Ziz*. She forsook the cock which had crowed so gallantly in the days of early Punic inroads for the sea-horse which appeared on the new Punic coinage, and that in a copy which, one is grieved to hear, was of inferior workmanship to the model⁴. For these two coinages, Himeraian and Panormitan, time must be found. The inference is that the coins bearing the name of *Ziz* were not struck by Hannibal after he had overthrown Selinous and Himera, but that their coinage was part of the preparations for his coming. They were a sign that a new state of things was to begin in the north-western lands of Sicily. The Greek was to be smitten

Greek legends on the coins of Phœnician towns in Sicily.

New coinage with Phœnician legends. 410.

Ziz.

The new coins imitated at Himera just before the siege. 409.

¹ Genesis xxiii. 16.

² See vol. ii. p. 423.

³ See vol. i. p. 251; Syracusan Medallions, p. 64 et seqq.

⁴ Syracusan Medallions, p. 65.

within his own walls, and was to be hindered from spreading his influence within the walls of any Phœnician town. The tongue of Canaan alone was to be graven on the moneys of Canaan. And the mightiest city of Canaan was henceforth to hold in the barbarian corner of Sicily something more than the supremacy of a powerful ally. She was to be direct lady and mistress over the Phœnician and the Elymian, and yet more so over any feeble remnant of Hellas which she might allow still to lead the life of helpless tributaries within the borders which she had now made her own.

CHAP. IX.

Carthi-
ginian
dominion
in Sicily.

§ 4. *The Last Days of Hermokratés.*

B.C. 408-407.

If the mission of Carthage was to wipe out, as far as might be, the life of Europe, the praise bestowed on Hannibal the son of Giskôn was not undeserved. He had left his mark on the spot where Himera had once been, on the spot where Selinous could hardly be said still to be. And yet, after all that he had done to both those cities, the story of Selinous, and even the story of Himera, is still not quite over. Hannibal had hardly turned away from his work of destruction before what was left of Selinous became a centre of warfare against the Phœnician. Soon after the Sikeliot fleet had come back from the Ægean, the banished Hermokratés followed them. Rich with the gifts of Pharnabazos¹, he sailed for Messana. There he caused five triremes to be built; he took into his pay a thousand mercenaries, and he was further joined by a thousand of those men of Himera who had escaped from the fall of their city². Some at least of them had been taken to Messana in Syracusan

Return of
Hermo-
kratés.
408.His force;
he is joined
by the
Himeraian
fugitives.

¹ Diod. xiii. 63; ἐκ τῆς στρατείας φιλίαν ἔχων πρὸς Φαρνάβαζον τὸν τῶν Περσῶν σατράπην, ἔλαβε παρ' αὐτοῦ πολλὰ χρήματα. See above, p. 432, and Appendix XXVII.

² Diod. xiii. 63; παραλαβὼν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκπεπονημένων Ἱμεραίων ὡς χίλους.

CHAP. IX. ships ; how they had fared since that time we are not told. At the head of this force, and with the zealous support of many in Syracuse, Hermokratês planned his return to his own city. We have no details ; from the analogy of other such cases, and from the later conduct of Hermokratês himself, we should infer that he was anxious, if so it might be, to be restored with the good will of his countrymen, but that he was ready to use force if force were needed. And we certainly cannot wonder that the leaders of the Syracusan democracy were not eager to recall a man who came back to his native city with so much of the air of an invader. Hermokratês brought with him a following which might easily be used as the means for building up a tyranny. But the time for force was not yet come. The company that Hermokratês had brought with him could be useful only as the kernel of a native force. With five ships and two thousand followers, he could not make his way into Syracuse, unless a great majority of the people of Syracuse were ready to receive him. Men were in days to come to make their way into Syracuse in the teeth of greater physical obstacles than Hermokratês would have had to strive against. A very few years later, he might himself have been gladly welcomed even as a master. But as yet Syracuse was in full possession of her freedom, and to no man who came in a guise threatening to her freedom was she likely to lend an ear.

Objects of Hermokratês.

He is dreaded at Syracuse.

Not yet strong enough for force.

His crusade against the barbarians.

Baffled in his hopes of an immediate welcome, the next object of Hermokratês was to do some exploit which would raise his fame in Syracuse and in all Sicily, some exploit which might at once make the Syracusan people better disposed to vote his peaceful return, and which might also enable him to surround himself with a body of followers better able to win for him an entrance by force. Nothing was more likely to awaken general enthusiasm, to make Hermokratês the common hero of all Greek Sicily, than for

the man whom Syracuse would not receive to go forth as the voluntary champion of Hellas against the barbarian. What the Sikeliot commonwealths, as commonwealths, had failed to do should be done for them by a single man with the help of those who would join him of their own free will. There may have been some in Syracuse who not only looked on Hermokratês as personally dangerous to the democratic constitution, but who may have been inclined to look with suspicion even on his Hellenic enterprise. And on formal grounds something might be said against warfare undertaken without any public authority. It might be deemed yet more dangerous when it was aimed at a power with which Syracuse was still nominally at peace, and which might be stirred up by any attack to further efforts against Syracuse and all Sicily. For the object of Hermokratês was to strike a sudden blow at the Carthaginian power, and, as far as might be, to win back for Hellas the lands and cities which had become the spoil of Hannibal in his late wasting inroad. The heart of every Greek would go forth with him on such an enterprise, and the moment was suited for his purpose. The great Carthaginian host had left Sicily, and it was not likely to be soon gathered together again in the same force. The survivors of Selinous and Himera, many of them wandering about the island, would be ready to take up arms in such a cause; volunteers were likely to flock in from all quarters. The enterprise of Hermokratês had the character of a private crusade; the charm of personal adventure was added to the loftier impulse of going forth to fight in a cause which every Greek deemed to be a holy one.

CHAP. IX.

Its possible aspect at Syracuse.

Relation of Syracuse and Carthage.

Hermokratês' private enterprise.

When therefore Hermokratês was refused admission at Syracuse, he at once set forth with his two thousand, suggesting a later hero with half that number, and marched right across the inland parts of the island to what was left of Selinous. There a feeble folk, tributary to the

CHAP. IX. barbarian, dwelled without defence in what had so lately
 He occu- been their strong and flourishing city. Hermokrates oc-
 pies Seli- cupied the place, and began at once to restore the dis-
 nous. mantled fortifications. "He walled in a part of the
 His walls city¹;" those are the words of our narrative. There is
 in the hardly room for doubt as to what part he walled in. It
 akropolis. was the akropolis, as distinguished both from the eastern
 and western hills, and from the northern part of that central
 hill of which the akropolis itself forms another part. As
 in so many other cases, the oldest and the youngest Seli-
 nous had the same extent. Hermokratês did again what
 Pamillos had once done; only from his recovered post he
 looked forth, not on lands waiting to be won, but on lands
 which had been lost, but which might be won again. He
 looked on the shadow of what had been, on empty houses
 and slighted walls, on a forsaken haven, on temples left with-
 out worshippers, on the greatest temple of all never to be
 brought to perfection. The broken walls of the akropolis he
 His wall. set up again, and his work is there to speak for itself. Both
 on the western and the northern side of the hill of the
 akropolis are large remains of walls which can hardly fail to
 belong to this repair of Hermokratês. The wall is a very
 fine piece of engineering skill; the construction is most
 cunning, a construction which may perhaps be best de-
 scribed as a horizontal long-and-short work. But the work,
 like the wall of Themistoklês on the akropolis of Athens,
 shows that it was done to meet some sudden need²; the
 capitals of fallen columns were freely used as materials.
 Ditch and At the north-west and north-east, where the hill has less of
 gates. natural defence, a ditch had been cut, most likely by the
 first settlers. Additional strength was now sought by
 throwing out round bastions, one of which has been

¹ Diod. xiii. 63; *καταλαβόμενος τὸν Σελινόυντα καὶ τῆς πόλεως μέρος ἐτείχισε*. See Schubring, 431.

² See Schubring, 26, 431, 432.

strangely mistaken for a theatre¹, in advance of the more ancient work. A gate is clearly to be seen on the north side, marking doubtless the original approach to the akropolis from this end; and on the same side, in the ditch, is a postern with the same apparent arch which we have already seen on the western hill². One can hardly doubt that all these are parts of the restored wall of Hermokratês. We see them now only in a ruined state, broken down through the whole extent of their length. But quite enough is left to show what manner of wall it was within which the enterprising Syracusan set up for a while a restored outpost of Hellas against the Phœnician.

In that character the Selinous of Hermokratês played a short but brilliant part. Not a few men of daring and enterprise flocked to the champion of Hellas in his new stronghold. He presently found himself at the head of a force of six thousand men. With these he began to make war on the Carthaginian dependencies in Sicily. From Motya Hannibal had set forth for the destruction of Selinous; and from restored Selinous Hermokratês now set forth for a plundering expedition against Motya. The short record of his warfare is strangely confused. We are told that he harried the Motylene territory, that he defeated the men of Motya who came forth against him, and drove them back into their city³. These few words are all, and we should certainly never have found out from them that Motya was an island, though an island yoked, like that of Syracuse, to the mainland by a mole⁴. When we come to a more famous warfare before Motya, we shall find that ships play no small part in the story. Hermokratês had five triremes, by this time perhaps more; but

¹ See vol. i. p. 410.

² Ib.

³ Diod. xiii. 63; *πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τῶν Μοτυνηῶν ἐπόρθησε χώραν, καὶ τοὺς ἐπεελθόντας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως μάχῃ κρατήσας, πολλοὺς μὲν ἀνείλε, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους συνεδίωξεν ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους*. This is all.

⁴ See vol. i. p. 271.

CHAP. IX. we hear nothing of them in this expedition. From Motya he set forth to attack the head of Phœnician Sicily. He entered the land of Panormos; we have no account of his course; but if he came straight from Motya, he would most likely enter by the valley of the Orêthos, and approach the city from the south. He began to harry the Golden Shell, and to carry off from that rich land a spoil that could not be reckoned¹. The men of Panormos, strengthened no doubt by some of the troops that Hannibal had left behind, came forth in battle array for the protection of their fields. Hermokratês and his followers beat them back into the city, with the loss of five hundred men².

His
victory.

Historic
position of
his war
with Pan-
ormos.

This is not the first time that the name of Panormos has been mentioned in our narrative³; but it is the first time that Panormos distinctly plays a part of its own in Sicilian history. The enterprise of Hermokratês is the first of a long series. It was the first of many attempts, successful and unsuccessful, made by European armies upon the Semitic stronghold. The fight won by Hermokratês before Panormos was the forerunner of the more successful warfare of Pyrrhos, of Atilius, of the Hauteville brothers. Indeed the whole expedition of Hermokratês, his warfare with Motya as well as his warfare with Panormos, is something even more. To have made his way in arms within the chosen preserve of Canaan on Sicilian soil was the first step to the appearance of European armies on the shore of Africa itself. Never till now since the days of Dôrieus can we be sure that a Greek army set foot on Phœnician territory in Sicily⁴;

¹ Diod. xiii. 63; τὴν τῶν Πανορμυτῶν χώραν λεηλατήσας, ἀναριθμήτου λείας ἐκυρίευσεν. Cf. vol. i. pp. 59, 252.

² Ib.; τῶν δὲ Πανορμυτῶν πανθημεῖ παραταγμένων πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, εἰς πεντακοσίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀνείλε, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους συνέκλεισεν ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως.

³ As in vol. ii. p. 186. But we have much oftener wondered that we have not heard of it.

⁴ This of course turns on the view which we may take of the Selinuntine victory discussed in vol. ii. p. 553.

least of all had the fruits of the Golden Shell ever been made a spoil by Hellenic plunderers. The haven of Panormos was doubtless well known to Greek merchants; but when Greek warriors first broke by land into its *campagna*, it was breaking into an unknown world, which had hitherto been kept carefully sealed up against all enemies, almost against all visitors. We are told that as Hermokratês did to Motya and Panormos, so he did to the whole of that part of Sicily which was under the Punic dominion¹. This would take in the new Carthaginian dependency of Segesta, whose lands would naturally come in for their share of havoc on the march from Motya to Panormos. It would also take in the Old-Phœnician settlement of Solous, which lies straight on the road to the next place where we hear of any exploit of Hermokratês. From Solous he must have felt a call to go on and do for fallen Himera what he had done for fallen Selinous. Hellas had been cut short by two of her cities; it had fallen to his lot to restore one; it would be glory indeed if he could do the like by the other. But the present expedition was one wholly of defiance and plunder. The Phœnician in his pride of conquest must be taught that the Greek of Sicily could still strike a blow at him on the spot which was his proudest badge of conquest. But that enterprise was to be put off till the next year. For the present it was enough that Hermokratês had won back Selinous from the barbarian, and that he had turned it into a centre of warfare from which he had dealt a heavy blow at the chief points which the barbarian held on Sicilian soil.

After all, the object nearest to the heart of Hermokratês was his restoration to his own city. To look no further, he could carry on his Phœnician warfare with far greater

Extent
of his
warfare.

Segesta
and
Solous.

New posi-
tion of
Hermo-
kratês.

¹ Diod. xiii. 63; παραλησίας δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν ἔκτισαν τὴν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίου οὖσαν πορθῶν.

CHAP. IX. effect as general of the Syracusans than he could as a private adventurer with no commission from any acknowledged power. Of the recall which he longed for his exploits against the Phoenicians began to give him a fair hope. His fame went forth through all Greek Sicily as the victorious avenger of Hellas¹. At Syracuse admiration for his deeds was mingled with regret that such a citizen should be a banished man. His case was discussed in several assemblies, and it was plain that the more part of the people had repented of the vote which had driven Hermokratês into exile². But a powerful party still opposed his recall, and the leader of that party was that same Dioklês, demagogue and general, who in all likelihood had been the author of his banishment³. Hermokratês now began again to take measures for his return⁴, ready, as before, to use persuasion or force, whichever might serve him best at the decisive moment. He set forth, but he did not set forth by the nearest road from Selinous to Syracuse. He had formed a plan by which he hoped to raise his own glory to the highest pitch, and at the same time to discredit his political enemy⁵. He marched to Himera, or rather to the spot where Himera once had been, and encamped just outside the ruins of the fallen city, in what once had been its busy

Feeling towards him at Syracuse.

He plans his return.

He marches to Himera.
407.

¹ Diod. xiii. 63; *ἐπαίνου παρὰ τοῖς Σικελιώταις ἐτύγχανε*. If it were one city only, one would be tempted to understand this of a formal vote of thanks, as in Thuc. ii. 25. 3, but could there be any general Sikeliot congress just now to pass such a vote?

² Ib.; *εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν Συρακουσίων οἱ πλείστοι μετεμελήθησαν, ἀναΐσαν τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς ὁρῶντες πεφυγαδευμένον τὸν Ἑρμοκράτην. διὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὁ μὲν δῆμος φανερός ἦν βουλόμενος καταδύχεσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα*.

³ The opposition of Dioklês comes out in c. 75; *ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἀντιπράττων αὐτῷ [Ἑρμοκράτῃ] περὶ τῆς καθόδου*.

⁴ Diod. xiii. 63; *ὁ δ' Ἑρμοκράτης, ἀκούων τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις, παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ καθόδον ἐπιμελῶς, εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους ἀντιπράζοντας*.

⁵ Ib. 75; *ὁ δ' Ἑρμοκράτης ταῦτα ἔπραττεν, ὥπως ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς . . . προσκῆσαι τοῖς πλῆθεσιν, αὐτὸς δὲ . . . ἐπαγάγῃ τὸ πλῆθος εἰς τὴν προτέραν εὐνοίαν*.

*proasteion*¹. If he really had any thought of yet further undoing the work of Hannibal, if he at all hoped to do at Himera as he had done at Selinous, the design was at least put off. It may be that he hoped to restore Himera, not as a private adventurer, but as once more the general of the Syracusan commonwealth. What he actually did was an act well suited to bring him nearer to that post by an appeal to the religious and patriotic feelings of every Syracusan.

Hard by the camp that Hermokratês had pitched near Himera still lay scattered the unburned and unburied bones of the soldiers of Dioklês, the men who had died in the fight before Himera, and whom their commander had left without those funeral honours which the common law of Greece never refused, even to an enemy. Hermokratês gathered up the relics; he piled them on wains decked in costly guise, and sent them forward on their way to Syracuse². He himself tarried behind on the borders of the Syracusan territory. At this stage he still professed all deference to the law; he was a banished man, and, as such, was forbidden to cross the borders of the commonwealth which had cast him out³. He sent on some of his friends with the funeral procession, and himself waited to see what effect his present action would have on the popular mind of Syracuse. He had hoped that men would contrast his conduct with that of his enemy Dioklês. Dioklês, general of the Syracusan people, had, in neglect of one of the holiest obligations of Greek religion, allowed the bodies of his fellow-citizens, slain in a fight in which he

CHAP. IX.

He takes up the unburied dead;

he sends them to Syracuse.

Neglect of Dioklês.

¹ Diod. xiii. 75; κατεστρατοπέδευσεν ἐν τοῖς προαστείοις τῆς ἀναγετραμμένης πόλεως.

² Ib.; τὰ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ὀστᾶ συλήθροιζε, παρασκευάσας δ' ἀμάξας πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένας, ἐπὶ τούτων παρεκόμισεν αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν Συράκουσαν. The singular form is doubtless due to some late copyist. See vol. i. p. 357. It is akin to the ἀλογα in a fragment of book xxiii.

³ Ib.; αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρων κατέμεινε, διὰ τὸ κωλύεσθαι τοὺς φυγάδας ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων συνιέναι. Cf. Plut. Marius, 43.

CHAP. IX. commanded and which he survived, to lie on the battlefield unburied and unhonoured¹. Hermokratês the exile had, of his own pious and patriotic zeal, fulfilled the duty which the general had left unheeded. By his act the bones of the slain men were now at last at the city gates, ready to receive the long-delayed honours at the hands of their countrymen. Hermokratês might fairly hope that such an act might win for him the repeal of the sentence against him. He might even go on to a further hope, that the recall of Hermokratês might be coupled with the banishment of Dioklês. The assembly met. Dioklês, unwisely, one would think, for his own interests, opposed the reception of the relics². But the general feeling was against him. The remains of the dead of Himera were received, and the long-delayed funeral rites were at last paid to them by the whole Syracusan people³. The political results were unlike anything that either Hermokratês or Dioklês could have looked for. Sentence of banishment was passed on Dioklês for his neglect of duty towards the dead. But the sentence against Hermokratês was not repealed⁴.

Dioklês
opposes the
reception of
the bones.

He is
banished,
but Her-
mokratês
is not
restored.

Whatever was the wisdom or justice of this decision, it at least could not be called a party vote. It is more like the suggestion of Aristeidês that himself and Themistoklês should both be thrown into the *barathron*⁵. We are told that the reason why the recall of Hermokratês—no doubt proposed in the assembly—was not carried, was because the people feared his daring spirit. They deemed that, if he were again intrusted with power in the state, he would

¹ Diod. xiii. 75 ; δοκῶν αἴτιος εἶναι τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τῶν τετελευτηκότων ἀτάφους.

² Ib. ; τοῦ μὲν Διοκλέους καλόντος θάπτειν.

³ Ib. ; οἱ Συρακούσιοι θάψαντες τὰ λείψανα τῶν τετελευτηκότων καὶ πανδημεὶ τὴν ἐκφορὰν ἐτίμησαν.

⁴ Ib. ; ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδύθη, τὸν δ' Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ' ὡς προσέδεξαν.

⁵ Plut. Arist. 3.

use it to make himself tyrant¹. Did this belief wrong him? It is hard to say. It was at least not an unnatural thought after Hermokratês had once shown himself with his own fleet and his own mercenaries in the waters of Syracuse. That Hermokratês, like Godwine, meant, if so it were needful, to return by force, no man can doubt. But that does not of itself prove that Hermokratês had any more thought of overthrowing the commonwealth than Godwine had of overthrowing the king. Hermokratês, restored to Syracuse, would undoubtedly have looked to be the first man in Syracuse. He had been so in times past when his fame was less than it was now. But a man of his stamp would surely have been better pleased to be the chief of a commonwealth, whether aristocratic or democratic, than to sink to the selfish and hateful position of a tyrant. But the existence of such a feeling in Syracuse is instructive. That it did exist, that it amounted to a firm belief, seems clear from the refusal to restore Hermokratês. That refusal was a strong measure indeed, when the services of Hermokratês were so great and when popular feeling was so strong against his rival. Coming events surely cast their shadows before them. Men in Syracuse felt truly that tyranny was threatening; but we may believe that they judged wrongly as to the man.

Hermokratês, thus disappointed in his hope of restoration to his own city, withdrew to the post which he had won for himself at Selinous. He saw that the time for an appeal to force was not yet come². But force was ever in his mind as a possible course; and before long circumstance seemed to have so far changed that he made up his mind to risk the attempt. The many invitations which he received from his friends in Syracuse took away all scruples

CHAP. IX.

Did Hermokratês aim at the tyranny?

He returns to Selinous.

He determines on an armed return to Syracuse.

¹ Diod. xiii. 75; ὑπέσπευον γὰρ τὴν τάνδρως τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχόν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.

² Ib.; τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ ὁρῶν εὐθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι.

CHAP. IX. from his mind. Most banished Greeks who had the same chance would have done the same. Not a few would have gone further; they would have had little scruple in such a case in allying themselves with the enemies of their own city. Alkibiadês had even ventured to plead conduct of this kind as a sign of his love for the city to which he was so eager to be brought back at any price¹. So it was in our own early days; if Godwine did not shrink from an armed return, Ælfgar did not shrink from a return by the help of the Dane and the Briton². But Hermokratês did not stoop to the baseness of Alkibiadês. He was the ally of no enemy of Syracuse. He had become an independent power, at the head of a force only partly Syracusan. At the head of that force he demanded his restoration to Syracuse; but he demanded it as a Syracusan citizen who had suffered wrong from his political enemies. Whether he cherished any further thought of becoming a Syracusan tyrant we have no evidence to prove, and the judgement of charity is the safer.

His march
by Gela.
407.

Hermokratês now set forth from Selinous with a body of three thousand men. Of the earlier stages of his march we hear nothing; but, as he drew near to the Syracusan side of the island, he passed through the territory of Gela. He came by night to an unmarked trysting-place which must have been arranged with his friends in Syracuse, and which could not have been far from the city³. His march from Gela naturally led to the gate of Achradina, hard by the *agora* and the docks in the Great Harbour⁴. The gate was, by what means we are not told, in the hands of the friends of Hermokratês⁵. But the whole of his party

¹ Thuc. vi. 92. 3.

² Norman Conquest, ii. pp. 318, 394.

³ Diod. xiii. 75; πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἤκε νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον. The line of march after Gela would seem to be inland.

⁴ Ib.; προσελθὼν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Ἀχραδινὴν πυλῶνι. See vol. ii. p. 142.

⁵ Ib.; τῶν φίλων τινὰς εὐρὼν προκατελημμένους τοὺς τόπους.

had failed to follow him, and it was with a few comrades only that he was received within the gate. Hermokratês son of Hermôn was again within the walls of Syracuse; but he came as a banished man who had made his way into the city, as yet indeed without bloodshed, but in the teeth of the declared will of the Syracusan people. With so small a company as had entered with him, he did not venture at once to risk any decisive action of any kind. He waited in the *agora* for the remainder of his force that lagged behind. We are not told what became of them; if they came up at all, they came up too late¹.

CHAP. IX.
He enters the gate of Achradina with a small party.

He waits in the *agora*.

Meanwhile the news had spread through Syracuse that Hermokratês was in arms within the city. The people were roused; a multitude soon gathered in the *agora*, seemingly by the order of the magistrates and in some military array. A battle followed in the *agora* itself². The assembled citizens were strong enough to overpower the small party of Hermokratês; he and the more part of his followers were slain. Others were taken prisoners and were reserved for a formal trial; their doom of banishment was perhaps lighter than one might have looked for. This sentence, it is plain, could apply only to Syracusan citizens; it may be that the small party which accompanied Hermokratês within the gate belonged wholly to that class. But others who should have come before the court escaped its judgement in a strange fashion, but a fashion which has its parallels both in English history and in English legend³. Some who were grievously wounded were given over to their friends as dead. In course of time some of them recovered, and one recovered to play a memorable part indeed. For in the immediate

Battle in the *agora*. Hermokratês is slain.

Punishment of his followers.

Strange escape of DIONYSIOS;

¹ Diod. xiii. 75; ἀνελάμβανε τοὺς ἀφυστεροῦντας.

² Ib.; οὐδὲν τοῖς δπλοῖς ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγοράν. This, it will be remembered, is the battle after which Arnold supposes Dioklês to have killed himself. See Appendix XXVI.

³ Norman Conquest, iii. pp. 500, 505, 514.

CHAP. IX. following of the great Hermokratês was one man, the son of a less renowned bearer of his own name, who was presently to make Syracuse, at the cost of its freedom, the greatest power in the European world. Dionysios son of Hermokratês is a name that has often come into our thoughts as we have traced the long warfare of the Athenian siege along so many spots which were presently to draw their chief
 his first appearance in history. renown from works of his making. We have called him up in fancy by the site of his own castle and along the line of his own wall. That he had played his part, and played it well, as one soldier in the ranks of the defenders of Syracuse we cannot reasonably doubt. But this is the first time that his name is heard in our story. And we hear of him as one of the men who were thus strangely brought to life again from the very jaws of death¹.

Comparison of Hermokratês and Dionysios.

Strangeness of their partnership.

Hermokratês died and Dionysios lived. The coupling of the names is strange in itself, and it is made more strange by the chance that the follower of one Hermokratês was the son of another, and by the further fact that at a later stage the son of the obscure Hermokratês married the daughter of the renowned one. Setting apart these incidental points, it is in itself strange to find Dionysios in the following of Hermokratês. Dionysios presently rises to power by the usual path of a candidate for tyranny. He appears as a leader of the commons and an accuser of men in authority. Yet here we find him sharing the fortunes of a man who had been banished as dangerous to the democracy, so dangerous that his restoration had been refused even after an act that might pass as a great public service. We are not told how Dionysios, who, as a follower of Hermokratês, must have been either

¹ Diod. xiii. 75; *τινὲς αὐτῶν πολλοὺς περιπεσόντες τραύμασιν, ὥς τετελευτηκότες ὑπὸ τῶν συγγενῶν παρεδόθησαν, ὅπως μὴ τῇ τοῦ πλῆθους ὀργῇ παραδοῶσιν· ὃν καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα τῶν Συρακουσίων τυραννήσας.*

actually a banished man or liable to a sentence of banishment, was able on his recovery again to take his place as a citizen. The difficulty would be less in the case of one who could hardly as yet be looked on as dangerous or eminent. The really striking thing is the union of Hermokratês and Dionysios in one fellowship. The Syracusan people may well have been justified in their dread of Hermokratês. His tendency was to oligarchy; he might conceivably have been driven into tyranny. But he was essentially a citizen, though an oligarchic citizen. His object was the greatness of Syracuse, the independence and union of Greek Sicily. He would rejoice to see Syracuse the head of Sicily, and to find himself the first man in Syracuse. But for Syracuse to reign over unwilling allies, for himself to reign over unwilling citizens, was at least no part of his original design. In the beginning at least, his own personal aggrandisement could have held no further place in his schemes than it must hold in the schemes of any man who seeks to be the leader in any community of men. And, even if circumstances at last drove him to seek for more than the law of his own commonwealth allowed him, we may believe that his own advancement was still sought largely as a means to his great ends. We may further mark how in the change of times those ends had changed. Seventeen years before, at the congress of Gela, what Hermokratês had set before the assembled Greeks of Sicily was the union of their common island against Greek enemies from the old Greek lands. Of danger from barbarians there was not a word¹. Now danger from barbarians is everything; it is in warfare with the barbarian destroyers of Sikeliot cities that Hermokratês won his last victories. Of one thing we may be sure; as leader of a Syracusan commonwealth, nay even as lord of Syracuse, Hermokratês would never have

CHAP. IX.

Hermokratês ever true to Syracuse and to all Greek Sicily.

¹ See above, p. 81.

CHAP. IX. purchased a barbarian guaranty of his own power over his own people at the cost of the betrayal of Greek cities to barbarian invaders.

Herein lies the difference between Hermokratês and the one man in his following whose name we know. Dionysios does, at certain moments of his life, stand forth as the champion of Hellas against barbarians. We may believe that at any time of his life he was best pleased to show himself in that character. He had, on a smaller scale, as one man in the following of Hermokratês, shown himself in that character already. But objects like these, foremost in the platform of Hermokratês, were secondary in the platform of Dionysios. It may be that Hermokratês was ready to become a tyrant, if it was only as a tyrant that he could carry out his objects. With Dionysios the first object was to grasp and to secure the tyranny. To that end he did not scruple even to betray Greek cities to the barbarians; once in possession of power, he was ready to do something for their recovery. The objects of Dionysios through life are essentially selfish; the establishment and maintenance of his own power comes first; he sticks at no means that seem to him needful for the winning of power or for the keeping of it. We shall before long have to trace the steps by which this single, perhaps unnoticed, soldier in the little army of Hermokratês grew to be master of the greatest power in Hellas and in Europe. It is only because of his later fame that he is casually shown to us at the stage which we have now reached. By a chronicler whose annals ended with the death of Hermokratês the name of Dionysios would hardly have been preserved, or would have been preserved only on account of the strange form of his escape. It may be that the death of his leader first suggested to him the thought of his own rise to power. But he was no follower of Hermokratês, no walker in his steps, no carrier-out of his schemes. Bent upon being

Dionysios
how far
champion
of Hellas.

He seeks
the ty-
ranny.

His objects
selfish.

master of his own city, his path to lordship was necessarily the opposite to that of his chief. His time was not yet come; but he had not long to wait for it; we shall very soon see him enter on the steps of the "despot's progress¹," that progress which we nowhere see so fully or so clearly set forth as in his own case. CHAP. IX.

§ 5. *The Siege of Akragas.*

B. C. 406.

The series of events which led as their incidental result to the establishment of the power of Dionysios, but whose immediate object and immediate result was a further overthrow of Greek cities by Phœnician hands, now begins. The action of Hermokratès against the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily naturally stirred up wrath at Carthage. He had done something more than had been done by those cities which had armed for the defence of Selinous and had taken an actual share in the defence of Himera. He had won back from Carthage one of her newly-gained possessions, and he had carried his arms into ancient Phœnician lands where no Greek warrior had ever before been seen. Our story seems to imply that formal complaints were made at Syracuse on the part of Carthage. For we read of a Syracusan embassy to Carthage, which complained of the war waged by Carthage in Sicily, and tried to bring about a settlement of the differences between the two commonwealths². Such a complaint would have great force as a retort; it would come rather late as an original complaint against the doings of Hannibal. The Carthaginian Senate made a doubtful answer, and presently gave its mind to making ready for a new Sicilian expedition. This time, it is said, it was the

Displeasure at Carthage at the acts of Hermokratès.

Embassies between Carthage and Syracuse.

Carthage designs the conquest of all Greek Sicily.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 66.

² Diod. xiii. 79; Συρακούσιοι πέμψαντες εἰς Καρχηδὸνα πρέσβεις, περὶ τοῦ πολέμου κατεμήφοροντο, καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν ἤξιον παύσασθαι τῆς διαφοράς.

CHAP. IX. distinct purpose of the elders of Carthage to enslave all the Greek cities of the island¹.

Founda-
tion of
Therma.
407.
The first
Cartha-
ginian
colony.

At the same time they took another step to strengthen themselves in Sicily by the foundation of a new city. This was the first distinctly Carthaginian colony in the island. But it was not destined to remain for any great time either as a distinctly Phœnician settlement or as an immediate possession of Carthage. Of the two cities overthrown by Hannibal, Selinus had been restored to a certain measure of life, and it kept it for a while, without ever rising again to its old greatness. But the death of Hermokratês cut short any schemes that he may have formed for the restoration of Himera. The site remained desolate in the days of Diodôros; it remains desolate in our own day. Still Himera was in a manner represented by a new city

Position of
Termini.

which now arose at the bidding of Carthage. The site of the hot baths for which the neighbourhood of Himera was famous, the baths of which we have heard in the legend of Hêraklês and in the song of Pindar², was now chosen to become a stronghold of Carthage. The position was an important one; it must, while still a possession of Himera, have been more than a bathing-place; it must always have been a military outpost³. The hot springs themselves, which still bubble up as they did when they refreshed the conqueror of Eryx, lie at the foot of a hill which rises boldly above the sea, and which holds a marked central position in the coast which stretches from Palermo to Cefalù. The Sikel headland stands out

¹ Diod. xiii. 79; οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ἀμφιβάλλοντες δόντες, ἐν μὲν τῇ Λιβύῃ μεγάλας παρεσκευάζοντο δυνάμεις, ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἀπάσας τὰς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πόλεις καταδουλώσασθαι.

² See vol. i. pp. 59, 76, 210, 417.

³ Stephen of Byzantium quotes it from the third book of Philistos as χωρίον Σικελίας. This was the book which contained the acts of Hippokratês and Gelôn. Therma may have been mentioned in connexion with Terillos or Thêrôn at Himera.

as a boundary on the one side; on the other side lie the hills and havens of the Phœnician. Nowhere do we so thoroughly take in the position of Solous as a Phœnician outpost, the advanced guard of greater Panormos¹. The range of the Panormitan mountains, the isolated mass of Herktê and its neighbour, are seen rising above the gap which parts the hill of Solous from the inland mountains. We see how wide after all was the opening into the Phœnician garden by the way of the coast, and we are at once struck by the wisdom of Carthage in planting one of her strongholds on the hill above the Baths of Himera. There is every reason to think that in so doing she was winning back a site which had been held by her own people in days when Carthage was not yet a power in Sicily, and when independent Solous had to withdraw before the advance of Himera².

The fitness of the post for the plantation of a city has been already spoken of. A height, not isolated, like Herktê and Solous, but a spur of the inland mountains, stands forth as if set there to guard the coast, to block the passage between the lands to the east and west of it. Joined by a kind of isthmus to the high mountains behind it, the hill above the hot springs, its steep ascent crowned by a wide platform, and again surmounted by a higher point, was thoroughly well suited to become the site of a town and its dominating citadel. The new city arose, a Phœnician settlement, an actual colony of Carthage. A body of Carthaginian citizens were chosen, doubtless to form the patrician order in the new dependency. With them went another body of natives of Africa, voluntary settlers and not conscripts, to form the general mass of the new population³.

¹ See vol. i. p. 265.

² See vol. i. p. 417.

³ Diod. xiii. 79; *πρὶν ἢ δὲ τὰ στρατόπεδα διαβιβάξεν, καταλίψαντες τῶν πολιτῶν τινας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λιβύων τοὺς βουλομένους, ἔκτισαν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς θερμοῖς ὕδασι πόλιν, ὀνομάσαντες Θέρμα.*

CHAP. IX. We can understand that to form even the *plebs* of a separate, though dependent community, was felt to be a higher position than that of mere subjects of Carthage in their own land. No Phœnician coins of the new settlement have come down to us, and we know not its Phœnician name, a name most likely equivalent to that which it bears in Greek, *Therma* or *Thermai*, the Hot Baths, the Hot Baths of Himera. This last seems to have been its formal description, but it admitted of an easy contraction.

It becomes
Greek.

Himera itself certainly never rose again; yet we presently hear of Himeraians as a people, and a Greek people. That is to say, Men of *Therma* and Men of *Himera* became alternative names for the people whose full description was Men of the *Therma* of *Himera*¹. And before long those men were Greeks. The citizens of Carthage and their African subjects occupied the strong place and made it into a city, but into a city for strangers to dwell in. Its political position, its relation to Carthage, alters with the general revolutions of the island; but, in freedom or in bondage, *Therma* remained Greek and kept up the memories of *Himera*². The town survives, and its name is hardly changed in the modern *Termini*. It stands out conspicuously, if not as one of the great cities of Sicily, yet as a considerable dwelling-place of men, a town and haven which, if not specially attractive or rich in antiquities,

It preserves
the tradi-
tions of
Himera.

¹ We shall presently come to *Therma* or *Himera* as a Greek town, though under Carthaginian dominion. See Diod. xiii. 114, xix. 2, where it appears as the birth-place of Agathoklēs. But we can hardly take the words of Cicero (*Verr.* ii. 35) quite literally; "Oppidum Himeram Karthaginienses quondam ceperant . . . Himera deleta, quos cives belli calamitas reliqua fecerat, ei sese Thermis collocarant, in ejusdem agri finibus, neque longe ab oppido antiquo." The coins (*Coins of Sicily*, 83, 84) have commonly ΘΕΡΜΙΤΑΝ, sometimes ΘΕΡΜΙΤΑΝ ΙΜΕΡΑΙΩΝ with the figure of the Himeraian *Stésichoros*.

² Cic. u. s.; "Hi se patrum fortunam et dignitatem recuperare arbitrabantur, cum illa majorum ornamenta in eorum oppido collocabantur." We shall hear more of them in Cicero's own day.

still keeps its historic site and shelters some memories of the past. The Phœnician has left only a memory; the Greek has left only a name; but the Roman and the Arab may be traced in their works. The walls of the mediæval city are there, making their way down from the height to the sea. The valleys are spanned by an aqueduct of no single date; and the name of the mountain rising above the city, above the Greek memories and the Roman buildings, belongs to the days when Greek and Roman were words of the same meaning. Elias himself keeps his post at the foot of the hill of Solunto¹; but Termini looks up to the northern mountain of Saint Calogero. The ideal monk, the finder and patron of healing waters, has displaced Hēraklēs by the Baths of Himera, as he has displaced Daidalos by the Baths of Selinous².

CHAP. IX.

The
present
town.Mount
Calogero.

The foundation of the new Punic colony on the north coast of Sicily, coming on the voluntary submission of Segesta and the fuller establishment of Carthaginian power over Panormos, Motya, and Solous, marked a stage in the spread of Carthaginian dominion in the island. Carthage had destroyed one Greek city; she had enslaved another; she had supplied the place of the city which she had destroyed by a colony of her own citizens and subjects. Such a stage was sure to be only a step to further advance; and the next advance of Carthage takes the shape of an overwhelming blow dealt at one of the noblest cities of Hellas. The successes of Hannibal in Sicily stirred up the Senate and People of Carthage to a longing for further exploits of the same kind. A vast force was to be got ready, with the distinct purpose of making the conquest of all Sicily³. Hannibal was again named to the command. He was now an aged man; he had done the work of his

Extension
of Cartha-
ginian do-
minion.Gathering
of the army
for the
conquest of
Sicily.¹ See vol. i. p. 267.² See vol. i. p. 69.³ Diod. xiii. 80; *σπεύδοντες ἀνάσσει τῆς νήσου κυριεύσαι*.

CHAP. IX.
Hannibal
in com-
mand with
his col-
league
Himilkôn.

Gathering
of mercen-
aries.

New Cam-
panian
levy.

country at Selinous and the work of his own house at Himera; he had no further special call to tempt him; he prayed to be allowed to decline the toilsome commission. His prayer was not granted in full; he was again to be the general of Carthage in Sicily. But he was allowed to share his labours with a colleague, a member of his own house, Himilkôn son of Hannôn, of that Hannôn who had enlarged man's knowledge of earth and Ocean¹. The two commanders took counsel together, and began to make the usual preparations for a great expedition on the part of Carthage. They sent some of the chief men of the commonwealth, plentifully supplied with money, to hire the best mercenaries that were to be had in Spain and the Balearic isles. They themselves went through the African possessions of the city, enrolling both African and Phœnician troops, as well as the best warriors of Carthage herself. Messengers were sent to the kings and nations in alliance, dependent or independent, with the commonwealth; troops were to be levied from Mauretania and Numidia and from the parts between Carthage and Kyrênê². Others went to Italy to hire fresh mercenaries from Campania. Carthage knew well the value of Campanian soldiers; but those who had already served under Hannibal and had been left behind in Sicily were known to have such evil will to Carthage that they were likely to join the Greeks of Sicily against her³. The host thus got together from all parts was gathered at Carthage; the statements of its numbers, horse and foot, range from 120,000 to 300,000⁴. All the triremes of the common-

¹ Diod. xiii. 80; παραιτούμενον δὲ διὰ τὸ γῆρας, προσκατέστησαν καὶ ἄλλων στρατηγῶν, Ἰμίλκωνα τὸν Ἀνναῖος, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐτα συγγενείας. See above, p. 448. So with Nikias; see above, p. 275.

² Ib.; καὶ τινες τῶν οἰκούντων τὰ πρὸς τὴν Κυρήνην κεκλιμένα μέρη.

³ Ib.; ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας μισθωσάμενοι Καμπανούς, διεβίβασαν εἰς Λιβύην ᾗδεισαν γὰρ τὴν μὲν χρεῖαν αὐτῶν μεγάλη συμβαλλομένην, τοὺς δ' ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταλειμμένους Καμπανούς, διὰ τὸ προσκεκοφέναι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, μετὰ τῶν Σικελιωτῶν ταχθησόμενους. ⁴ Ib.; Τιμαῖος and Ephoros, as usual.

wealth were put under sailing orders; with the multitude of transports and ships of burthen they had made up a tale of more than a thousand vessels. The news of such preparations reached the Greek cities of Sicily, and they began to make ready to meet the danger. The destroyer of Selinous and Himera was coming against them. Nothing but the most strenuous efforts, the closest union, could save all or any of them from the fate of Selinous and Himera.

Syracuse took the lead. She had done good service to Sparta in her war with Athens, which, it is well to remember, was not yet ended. Her own troops had been withdrawn for duties nearer home; but she had some claim on the head of Dorian Greece. An embassy was sent to ask for Lacedæmonian help; Gylippos or one like Gylippos might do as good work against the Carthaginian as he had done against the Athenian. Other appeals were made nearer home, to the Greeks of Italy, and, above all, to those who were most nearly concerned, to the Greeks of Sicily themselves. They were called on to stand ready for common defence on behalf of their common freedom¹. The Syracusan fleet was made ready, and was sent to cruise off the western coast of Sicily, to meet the barbarian, if need be, in his own waters. But if Syracuse was the first to take heed to the common defence, it was at Akragas that the immediate alarm was greatest and the preparations for immediate defence were most active. It was deemed, and, as the event showed, rightly deemed, that that city would be the first object of Punic attack². And, under the stress of the great coming danger, all jealousy between Syracuse and Akragas had passed away.

¹ Diod. xiii. 81; *πρὸς τοὺς παρορμήσοντας τὰ πλήθη πρὸς τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας κίνδυνον*.

² Ib.; *Ἀκραγαντινοὶ . . . διελάμβανον, ὅπερ ἦν, ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πρώτους ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ πολέμου βάρος*.

CHAP. IX.
Exposed
position of
Akragas.

The position of the great city of the southern coast made her in everything the first in the coming danger. She was now the nearest Greek neighbour of Carthage; since the overthrow of Selinous, the territories of Carthage and of Akragas had marched on each other. Hermokratēs had indeed made Selinous once more a Greek military post; but it is not likely that he had occupied the whole Selinuntine coast from the Mazaros to the Halykos, and his settlement can hardly have lasted after his death. By sea, now Selinous was gone, Akragas was the nearest Sikeliot city to Africa, as it had always been the one which most directly fronted Africa. To an African power which had already destroyed Selinous, and which longed either to win more dominion or to do more destruction among the Sikeliot cities, Akragas might seem almost to challenge attack. Moreover the commercial dealings between Akragas and Africa had doubtless taught the prudent traders of Carthage that it would be more profitable to have the vines and olive-trees of Akragas to their own than to go on buying their fruits from their present owners¹. The Akragantines therefore began to gather all their crops and substance that lay without the walls, and to bring all within the defences of their vast enclosure². So the Athenians had done during the earlier Peloponnesian inroads; but then there was no fear of a Peloponnesian attack on the city of Athens. At Akragas every one knew that the city itself was the direct object of the invaders. The second city of Sicily, the wealthiest city of Hellas, was threatened with the same utter overthrow at barbarian hands which had already fallen on two of her sisters.

Trade
between
Akragas
and
Africa.

Prepara-
tions of
Akragas.
All things
brought in
from the
country.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 390.

² Diod. xiii. 81; ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν τε σῖτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καρποὺς, ἐνὶ δὲ ταῖς κτήσεσι ἀπάσας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας κατακομίζειν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν. Cf. Thuc. ii. 14, 17, 52. It is just after this that Diodōros makes that picture of the prosperity of Akragas on which I have drawn largely in vol. ii. p. 390, et seqq.

Yet Akragas was not the first point to which Carthaginian CHAP. IX.
vessels sailed in the present war. Forty triremes were sent
in advance, but their course was towards the Carthaginian
possessions in Sicily. These last had doubtless to be looked
to at such a moment, and they would be called on for their
contingents in the present warfare. In the waters near
Eryx¹, that is on a voyage between Motya and Panormos,
the Punic ships fell in with the watchful fleet of Syracuse.
Sea-fight
off Eryx:
Syracusan
victory.
A sea-fight followed, a fight stoutly contested for some
while. In the end the Greeks had the victory; fifteen of
the ships of Carthage perished; the rest escaped by sailing
hither and thither on the open sea². We wish to hear
whether any further action followed on the part of Syra-
cuse; but all that we are told is that, when Hannibal
heard of the Carthaginian defeat, he set forth with fifty
ships, at once to hinder the Syracusans from following up
their success, and also to secure a safe passage for his own
army³. The next time we hear of Syracuse in this war,
her forces are equally zealous and equally successful; but
it is not by sea in the parts of Eryx, but by land on the
road between Syracuse and Akragas. We feel how frag-
mentary our story has become in the loss of the great
contemporary guide. But one thing is plain. At such a
moment as this all differences among the Greeks of Sicily
were forgotten. Akragas no longer envies Syracuse, and
Syracuse does not vex Akragas.

Akragas was now at the height of her splendour. The Prosperity
of Akragas.
magnificent Gellias⁴ still lived. The mighty temple of

¹ Diod. xiii. 80; ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐρυκα τόποις.

² Ib.; διέφυγον εἰς τὸ πέλαγος.

³ Ib.; ἔσπευδε γὰρ τοὺς μὲν Συρακουσίους κωλύσαι χρήσασθαι τῇ προτερή-
ματι, ταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις δυνάμεσιν ἀσφαλῆ παρασκευάσαι τὸν κατάπλουν.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 392. According to Holm (G. S. ii. 425), Gellias is to be
seen in the Pollis—one goes back to our Syracusan king and his wine
—of a very odd story in John of Stoboi (lxii. 48), in which we not only

CHAP. IX. Zeus had been brought to perfection as far as walls and capitals and cornices were concerned. It merely awaited its roof¹. Just before the war broke out, the city had seen one of those gorgeous spectacles in which Akragas and all its citizens delighted. A man of Akragas, Exainetos by name, had won an Olympic victory in the chariot-race. He was brought into the city on the victorious car, in a procession in which, besides horsemen and footmen, three hundred pair of white horses drew the chariots of the other rich men of Akragas who came to do honour to the victor². These men, we must remember, must all have belonged to the class of the horsemen, the military strength of the city. Was their warlike vigour at all impaired by this wonderful splendour of life? We have one hint which is instructive. About this time, as part of the preparations for the defence, a military ordinance was passed in Akragas, to forbid any undue amount of luxury among those citizens whose duty it was to pass the night in the watch-towers. They doubtless took their turns of sleep and of watching, and the new law provided for the furniture of their beds. No man was to have more than a mattress, a quilt, and two pillows³. At Akragas, it is added with a touch of scorn, this was looked on as the hardest bed that could be endured⁴. Among the foreign defenders of the city were some to whom this standard of campaign life must have seemed strange. A Spartan, Dexippos by name, was tarrying at

Olympic
victory of
Exainetos.
412.

Regula-
tions for
the guard.

see him in a kindly light towards his slaves, but as having views on the art of slave-growing.

¹ See vol. ii. p. 402.

² Diod. xiii. 34, 83. He gives the date; *συνεπόμενον δ' αὐτῷ, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, συνωρίδες τρακόσαι λευκῶν ἵππων, πᾶσαι παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων.*

³ Ib. 84; *τῆς πολιορκίας γενομένης ποιῆσαι ψήφισμα περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φυλακείοις διανυκτερεύοντων, ὥπως μὴ τις ἔχῃ πλείον τύλης καὶ περιστρώματος καὶ κωδίου καὶ δυοῖν προσκεφαλαίων.*

⁴ Ib.; *τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς σκληροτάτης στρωμνῆς ὑπαρχούσης, ἔξεστι λογίζεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν λαιπὸν βίον τρυφήν.*

Gela. It was the year of Arginousai, and the name of Spartan, carried to a higher pitch of glory by Kallikratidas in his defeat than by other leaders in their victories, was everywhere feared and honoured. Dexippos was hardly a Spartan of the school of Kallikratidas; but to be a Spartan was enough. Akragas may have thought that she was calling another Gylippos to her help, when she invited Dexippos to come to her defence with as many mercenaries as he could get together¹. He presently came with fifteen hundred. The Campanians too who had quarrelled with Hannibal, and who still remained in Sicily, were taken into the Akragantine service to the number of eight hundred². Not that the city trusted wholly to help of this kind; the citizens of Akragas were fully ready to take their share in the defence. And presently all, citizens and strangers, were called on to do their uttermost.

CHAP. IX.
The Spartan Dexippos called in.
406.

The Campanians hired.

We are not told where Hannibal landed his army; doubtless at one of the havens west of Akragas. His voyage, according to a later account, was shrouded in mystery. The same story is told which we hear in other cases, how written and sealed orders were given to the captains, which were to be opened only at sea, lest, it is said, the course of the fleet should be betrayed by deserters³. And, as a further precaution, the lights which the ships carried at their masts⁴—a night voyage is taken for granted—

Voyage of Hannibal.

The lights.

¹ Diod. xiii. 85; he comes *προσφάτως ἐκ Γέλας παρόν, μετὰ ξένων χιλίων πεντακοσίων*. Then, as an explanation, we read, *οὗτος γὰρ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, ὡς Τίμαιος φησιν, ἐν Γέλᾳ διέτριβεν, ἔχων ἄλιωμα διὰ τὴν πατρίδα· διόπερ ἤξίωσαν οἱ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι, μισθωσάμενον στρατιώτας ὡς πλείους ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἀκραγάντα*. But how came this Spartan with his *ἀλιωμα*, to be staying idly, as it would seem, at Gela? And had his coming anything to do with the Akragantine mission to Sparta?

² Ib.; *ἐμισθώθησαν καὶ οἱ πρότερον Ἀννίβᾳ συμμαχήσαντες Καμπανοί, περὶ δακαοσίους ὄντες*. See above, p. 490.

³ *ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτομόλων ἐξαγγελθῇ*. The story is told by Polyainos, v. 10. 2.

⁴ See Norman Conquest, iii. 400.


CHAP. IX. had their fore parts covered, lest the enemy should see them ¹.
 He lands and makes two camps before Akragas. The south-western camp. The Iberians on the eastern hills. Hannibal's message to Akragas; alliance or neutrality.


Wherever it was that Hannibal landed, his course, as soon as he was once in the neighbourhood of Akragas, is clear enough. He divided his force into two parts, to threaten the city on both sides. His main camp, strongly guarded by a trench and other defences, was pitched to the south-west of the town, on the right of the Hypsas, on the flat ground formed by a bend in the river, and with its stream between the camp and the nekropolis to the north. But a body of forty thousand, consisting of the Spaniards and part of the Africans, was stationed on the other side of the town, on the hills beyond the Akragas, with the evident purpose of watching any help that might come from Gela and Syracuse². Somewhat to our surprise, the Punic general did not at once begin with warlike action. Having shown the men of Akragas how great a host it was against which they would have to strive, he next sent a message of peace to the city. Let the commonwealth of Akragas become an ally of Carthage in the present war; that is, let her forces join with those of Carthage against the other Sikeliot cities. He even added an easier alternative. Let Akragas, remaining on friendly terms with Carthage, preserve a strict neutrality³. In asking this, he was in truth asking only that Akragas should act now, in the day of Punic invasion, as she had acted a few years earlier in the day of Athenian invasion. But the two cases were not parallel. Athens after all was not Carthage; and Akragas had already overcome her sullen dislike to Syracuse when she had joined with her, if too tardily, in sending help to Selinous. The men of Akragas were not so lost to all Sikeliot,

¹ Polyainos, v. 10. 2; λαμπτήρας ἦρε τὸ πρόσθεν μέρος πεφραγμένους, ὅπως μὴ γινωρίζοιεν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς οἱ πολέμοι τὸν ἐπίπλουον.

² See Appendix XXVIII.

³ Diod. xiii. 85; ἀπέστειλαν πρέσβεις πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκραγαντίνους, ἀξιοῦντες μάλιστα μὲν συμμαχεῖν αὐτοῖς, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, καὶ φίλους εἶναι Καρχηδονίαν, ἐν εἰρήνῃ μένοντας.





to all Hellenic feeling, as to accept either of the proposals between which Hannibal gave them their choice¹. As the first attacked, the honours and burthens of the championship were laid upon them, and they did not shrink from the work. The Punic offers were declined, and the city made all things ready for defence. The whole military force of Akragas was called out. The citizens were told off, some to take the first turn in the defence of the walls, others to hold themselves in readiness to relieve them. A special duty was laid on the Campanian mercenaries. They were posted on the rock of Athênê, the highest point within the walls, looking down on the whole city². There they were doubtless to act as a check on the Spaniards and Africans posted on the hills beyond the Akragas. The city stood ready to withstand the barbarian attack, and its defenders looked to be presently strengthened by helpers from the other Sikeliot cities.

CHAP. IX.
Refusal of
Akragas.

Prepara-
tions for
defence.

The Cam-
panians on
the rock of
Athênê.

The siege now began. The point of attack chosen by Hannibal and Himilkôn was the line of wall on the western side of the city³. One almost wonders that they did not make their attack on the southern wall, the wall towards the sea. The task would not have been an easy one. The besiegers would have had to work against the strong line of rock which had been hewn into the seaward defences of Akragas. In some parts, towards the south-eastern corner, these are hardly less strong than those on the western side⁴. But at the south-west end of the wall, the end nearest to their own camp, the southern defences were much less

Attack on
the western
side.

Why not
on the
south?

¹ Diod. xiii. 85; *οὐ προσδεξαμένοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῦδε λόγου.*

² Ib.; *οἱ . . . Καμπανοὶ . . . κατέσχον τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως λόφον, κ.τ.λ.* See vol. i. p. 433.

³ Diodóros (xiii. 85) says only, *διασκεψάμενοι τὰ τεῖχη, καὶ καθ' ἓνα τόπον θεωροῦντες εὐέφοδον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.* But the whole story makes it clear on which side it was. See vol. ii. p. 227.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 402.

CHAP. IX. formidable than on the side chosen for attack. There was also more room for military operations and for the working of military engines. On the other hand, the south wall had the whole city behind it in a way in which no other part of the defences had. Anyhow, with whatever motive, the Punic generals chose to attack the wall on the west side, the wall overhanging the valley of the Hypsas. This was another and loftier wall of natural rock, strengthened and supplied by artificial building at whatever points it was needed. It was hard work to bring any of the usual arts of the besieger against these steep crags defended by men whose all was staked on the defence. The Punic commanders carefully examined the walls, looking out for a weak point to make their attack. Such an one they thought they had found near the point of junction of the small stream of Saint Leonard with the Drago or Hypsas. Here the valley widens; here the line of cliffs is broken by a deep inlet, whose mouth, defended by a lofty wall of masonry brought down to the lower ground, formed the great outlet of Akragas to the west, the gate of Hérakleia¹. Beyond the gate, towards the akropolis, the natural wall becomes for a while considerably lower. Here then Hannibal and Himilkôn chose the point for their main attack. Two huge moving towers were accordingly brought up the ravine, and set to play on the walls at this point. They worked during the whole of one day, and many of the defenders were slain. At nightfall the trumpet called off the besiegers, and in the night the Akragantines contrived to burn the towers².

Attack
near the
gate of
Hérakleia.

The nature of the ground had fought against Hannibal

¹ See vol. ii. p. 227.

² Diod. xiii. 85. Polyainos (v. 10. 4) has a wonderful story how Himilkôn employed the trick of the feigned flight, as at Ai and Senlac, how he lighted fires close to the town, how the pursuers, thinking that the town was on fire, turned to help, and how they were cut to pieces by those whom they had chased, helped further by some who were set in ambush.

no less than the arms of the Akragantines. With that barbaric grandeur of conception which a Carthaginian Shophet might share with a Persian king, his next plan was to change the nature of the ground. Even where the valley was widest, where the rocks were lowest, the assault was not easy. He would make new ground for his troops and engines; he would fill up the rough and narrow valley and the troublesome streams which ran down it. Materials for this purpose were found by occupying the nekropolis, and destroying the tombs. These were to be used to pile up a causeway wider than the Bridge of the Dead¹, for the better attack of the wall on the opposite height. On the hill of tombs we now see only those that were wrought in the solid rock; in the great days of Akragas the whole hill was covered with tombs of masonry. It was a fancy of the Akragantines to commemorate in this way, not only their human forefathers and friends, but the horses which had won them fame in the games, even the pet birds of the boys and maidens². Above all rose the stately tomb of the hero Thêrôn, whose name has been so hopelessly transferred to a work of later days in another place³. All these works, many of them, no doubt, no mean fruits of Akragantine skill, Hannibal began to sweep away, and to use the fragments for his mole at the bottom of the valley. The tomb of Thêrôn, victor at Himera, would be in Hannibal's eyes the memorial of an enemy which called for an exemplary and symbolical act of destruction. The work of havoc was begun; but before the monument of the hero was altogether levelled, a sign from heaven spoke

CHAP. IX.

The tombs
destroyed
to make a
causeway.

Tomb of
Thêrôn;

¹ Diod. xiii. 85; *παρήγγειλαν τοῖς στρατιώταις καθαιρεῖν τὰ μνημεῖα καὶ χώματα κατασκευάζειν μέχρι τῶν τειχῶν*. See vol. ii. p. 229.

² Ib. 82; *ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν τρυφήν αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ πολυτέλεια τῶν μνημείων, ἃ τινα μὲν τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἵπποις κατασκευάσαν, τινα δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παρθένων καὶ παῖδων ἐν οἴκῳ τρεφομένοις ὀρνιθαρίοις*. Timaios said he had seen such. But did such *τρυφή* go on again in restored Akragas?

³ See vol. ii. p. 295.

CHAP. IX. the divine displeasure at the sacrilegious deed. A thunderbolt fell and shook the tomb; and the prophets of Baal who followed the camp of Carthage bade the general cease from this attempt on a spot thus specially hallowed¹.

Plague in the Carthaginian camp; death of Hannibal. At this stage at least of the siege the gods of Hellas fought for Akragas. A plague fell on the Punic camp; many died; others were smitten with divers sicknesses and grievous pains². Hannibal himself, chief sinner against Hellenic gods and Hellenic men, died of the pestilence. The camp of Carthage was filled with vague fears. The watchers of the night saw oftentimes the shadows of the dead, the dead doubtless whose graves had been profaned, flitting around them³. Himilkôn, now left alone in command, thought that the time was now come for the last and most fearful rite of his own creed, to move the gods of Canaan to come to the help of their downcast worshippers. On Hellenic soil, before the walls of Akragas, with the temples of a milder worship standing in ordered line upon the wall, the fires of Moloch were kindled. A precious victim was needed, and Himilkôn caused a boy, perhaps his own son, to pass through the fire. Nor was this all. The Punic general would not only do his duty to his own gods; he would win the deities of Hellas to his own side. The powers of the sea were ever friendly to the Greeks⁴. Himilkôn therefore caused a crowd of victims, this time doubtless not human, to be led down to the shore, and thrown into the sea as an offering to Poseidôn⁵. The

Human sacrifice of Himilkôn;

his offering to Poseidôn.

¹ Diod. xiii. 86; τὸν γὰρ τοῦ Θήρωνος τάφον, ὄντα καθ' ὑπερβολὴν μέγαν, συνέβαινεν ὑπὸ κεραυνοῦ διασεσείσθαι. Διόπερ αὐτοῦ καθαυρομένου, τῶν τότε μάντεων τινες προνοήσαντες διεκώλυσαν.

² Ib.; εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ λοιμοὶ ἐπέπεσον εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν ἐτελεύτησαν, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ στρέβλαις καὶ δειναῖς ταλαιπωρίαις περιέπιπτον.

³ Ib.; ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Ἀννίβας ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς φυλακὰς προπεμπομένων ἡγήγελλόν τινες διὰ νυκτὸς εἶδαι φαίνεσθαι τῶν τετελευτηκότων.

⁴ See vol. ii. p. 186.

⁵ Diod. xiii. 86; Ἰμίλκων δὲ θεωρῶν τὰ πλῆθος δεισιδαιμονοῦντα, πρῶτον

consciences of the general and his army being thus relieved, CHAP. IX. they went on with their work with a better heart. The destruction of the tombs was stopped; but the causeway The causeway finished. across the valley of Hypsas was still piled up with meaner materials. The new ground was made¹; all the engines in the Punic camp were brought up and set to work on it. Daily attacks were made on the western wall.

While the city was thus fiercely assaulted on the side Coming of help to Akragas. of Hêrakleia, a powerful relieving force was on its march from the side of Gela. The cause of Akragas was the cause of all Greek Sicily. Let her undergo the fate of Selinous and Himera, and all men felt that their own hour might come next². Even in Italy the Greek cities felt that the long arm of Carthage might reach them. They were therefore ready to send help to the Greek city which stood foremost in the general defence of Hellas against the barbarians. Syracuse took the lead. It was the last effort and the worthiest of that Syracusan democracy which had now flourished for sixty years since the fall of Thrasyboulos. A Syracusan force was made ready to act Succour sent from Syracuse; in the common cause; helpers came to Syracuse from Messana and from Italy, and the army set forth for Akragas. On the road they were joined by the forces of from other cities. Kamarina and Gela, which swelled the whole host to a tale of thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse. The fleet. Thirty triremes meanwhile sailed along the coast in concert with

μὲν ἐπαύσατο καθαιρῶν τὰ μνημεῖα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἰκέτευσεν τοὺς θεοὺς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος, τῷ μὲν Κρόνῳ παῖδα σφαγιάσας, τῷ δὲ Ποσειδῶνι πλῆθος ἱερείων καταποντίας. It is not clear whether the boy was his own son; but we are fully justified in saying that it ought to have been. On the offerings to Poseidôn cf. above, p. 489, and vol. ii. p. 195.

¹ Diod. xiii. 86; *χώσας τὸν παρὰ τὴν πόλιν ποταμὸν μέχρι τῶν τειχῶν.* This is a thoroughly good bit of local description, which savours much more of Philistos than of Timaios.

Ib. *φοβούμενοι μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς Σελινοῦντίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἱμεραίοις τύχωσιν οἱ πολιορκούμενοι τύχη.*

CHAP. IX.
The Cam-
panians
sent to
meet them.

the land army. When the news of their approach reached Himilkôn, he sent orders to the Iberians and Africans to come down from the camp on the heights to meet the new enemy. They awaited the coming of the relieving army, seemingly in the lower part of the vale of the Akragas or among the hills immediately to the east of it, through which the road from Akragas to Gela passed.

Battle and
defeat of
the Cam-
panians.

By this time the Syracusans and their allies had crossed the southern Himeras and were on Akragantine ground. At some point not far from the city they met the Punic detachment which was sent against them¹. A sharp contest followed; we may fancy the battle-field near the point where the vale of the Akragas opens into the flat ground towards the sea, with the so-called temple of Lakinian Hêra looking down on the fight. If that name were a true one, it would be a good omen for the Italiot allies. They held the left wing, the wing nearest to the sea; the Syracusans kept the right. The Italiots were before long hard pressed in the battle. Daphnaïos, so the story ran, leading on the right wing, heard the shouts that rose from the left. He hastened to the spot, and saw the Italiots giving way. With ready wit he came back to the right wing, and told his countrymen that their Italiot comrades were driving the enemy before them, and that they, Syracusans, should not fall behind them in prowess. Stirred up by this appeal, the right wing pressed on the enemy with redoubled zeal, and presently put them to flight². Whatever truth there may be in this story, the victory of the Greeks is undoubted. It is added that they began to pursue in some disorder. Daphnaïos remembered the mischief that had come of such an indiscreet chase during

Device of
Daphnaïos.

¹ Diod. xiii. 87; ἤδη δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τὸν Ἰμέραν ποταμὸν διαβεβήκοσαν ἀπήγγησαν οἱ βάρβαροι. See Appendix XXVIII.

² This story is told by Polyainos, v. 7. Daphnaïos has a section to himself.

the siege of Himera¹, and he feared that Himilkôn might take advantage of the confusion to march out with his whole force. He contrived therefore to call off his men from further pursuit. He then led them, not into the city, but to the camp on the hills above the Akragas which their defeated enemies had just quitted².

He occupies the eastern camp.

And now all Akragas could see the routed barbarians fleeing in confusion. They pressed along the road beneath the southern wall and its range of temples, to seek shelter in the camp beyond the Hypsas³. Every heart among the defenders of the city was stirred by the sight. One common voice was raised, calling on the Akragantine generals not to lose the precious moment, but to lead forth the whole force of the city, and utterly to cut off the enemies whom their allies had already put to flight. The generals refused. We may give them the chance of the alternative motive suggested by the historian, that is, a fear lest, while the Akragantines were smiting the men whom the Syracusans had defeated, Himilkôn might make a successful attack on the city thus shorn of its defenders⁴. But when the relieving force was seen occupying the hill-camp which had been lately held by Africans and Iberians, the popular impulse took another shape. Men streamed out of the city—through the gate of Gela and down the steep road that leads to the river—to welcome the new-comers and to take counsel with them. Dexippos himself was carried away with the multitude; and, while the defeated barbarians made their way

The Akragantine generals refuse to sally.

The people go forth and meet the allies.

¹ Diod. xiii. 87; καὶ γὰρ τοὺς Ἱμεραίους ἐγίνωσκε παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν τοῖς ὅλοις ἐπτακίτας.

² Ib.; παραγενηθεὶς εἰς τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐκλελειμμένην στρατοπεδείαν, ἐν ταύτῃ παρενέβαλεν. This is clearly the camp on the hills beyond the Akragas, opposed to the camp by the city of which we hear directly.

³ Ib.; τῶν βαρβάρων φευγόντων εἰς τὴν πρὸς Ἀκράγατι παρεμβολήν . . . διεσώθησαν εἰς τὴν παρὰ τῇ πόλει παρεμβολήν.

⁴ Ib.; φοβηθέντες μὴ τῆς πόλεως ἐρημωθείσης Ἱμίλκων αὐτὴν καταλάβηται,

CHAP. IX. in safety to the camp beyond the Hypsas, the Akragantines and their allies came together in full military assembly at some point on the eastern side of the city, not far from the camp newly occupied by the allies¹.

The military assembly.

Indignation against the Akragantine generals.

Estimate of their conduct.

The habits of a democratic commonwealth allowed even such a sudden and stormy gathering as this to put on something of the outward shape of a more regular assembly in the *agora* or the theatre². There was even some show of debate. The universal feeling charged the Akragantine generals with treason. We seem to hear in our narrative something like the echo of a formal indictment. The accused had let slip the opportunity; they had failed to take fitting vengeance on the routed barbarians; when they should have gone forth to break the power of the enemy, they had allowed so many myriads of them to escape³. The wrath of the people was wholly turned on the generals of Akragas; not a word seems to have been breathed against Daphnaïos and the relieving force. It might indeed have been awkward to bring charges against allies who had but that moment come to their help, and who had already won a battle on their behalf. Otherwise the conduct of Daphnaïos and his colleagues in not pursuing the enemy whom they had defeated seems at least as much open to comment as that of the Akragantine generals in not going forth on the same errand. What makes the matter yet more strange is that an officer in the army of Daphnaïos, who could hardly have known anything of what went on inside Akragas, was foremost in the accusation of the

¹ Diod. xiii. 87; τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως στρατιωτῶν ἐπιμυθέντων—that is with the Syracusans and other allies who had occupied the eastern camp.

² Ib.; ἀπὸ συνδρομῆς εἰς ἐκκλησίαν τὰ πλῆθη συνήλθε. So at the beginning of the next chapter.

³ Ib.; πάντων ἀγανακτοῦντων ἐπὶ τῷ παρῆσθαι τὸν καιρὸν καὶ κεκρατηκότας τῶν βαρβάρων τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν παρ' αὐτῶν μὴ λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ δυναμένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγούς ἐνελεσθῆναι καὶ διαφθεῖραι τὴν τῶν πολεμίων δύναμιν, ἀφεκέναι τοσαύτας μυριάδας.

Akragantine generals. The assembly, already noisy and tumultuous, was further stirred up against them by the fierce speech of Menês the commander of the contingent from Kamarina. Rage now burst all bounds. No formal resolution was passed; the defence was not even heard.

CHAP. IX.
Menês of
Kamarina
accuses the
generals.

When the generals strove to speak, they were howled down; stones began to fly, and four of the accused officers perished beneath the shower of missiles¹. Such a form of death was a legal sentence in the Macedonian military assembly²; it was a common form of illegal violence among the motley hosts of Carthage³; but one is amazed to hear of a Greek assembly, even in the wildest moments of wrath, thus lowering itself to the level of barbarians⁴. Only a few months later, six Athenian generals died by a sentence

Four
generals
are
stoned.

more unjust, it may be, in itself than the Lynch law of Akragas, and which trampled under foot every principle and rule of Athenian law. Still the victims of Arginousai died according to the ordinary process of law, by virtue of a decree which, however illegal, took the form of a regular vote after a regular debate. Yet the Akragantine assembly, even in this whirlwind of bloody wrath, stopped to make the distinctions which the Athenian assembly failed to make. A fifth general, the youngest of the college, Argeios by name—was he excepted in the accusation of Menês?—was allowed to pass unhurt. And the awe of the Spartan name sheltered Dexippos from the fate of his Akragantine colleagues. But suspicions were

Suspicious
against
Dexippos.

¹ Diod. xiii. 87; Μένης δὲ Καμαριναῖος, ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένος, κατηγορεῖ τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων στρατηγῶν, καὶ πάντας οὕτω παράξυνεν, κ.τ.λ. One would like to know what kind of evidence he brought.

² Arrian, iii. 26. 3.

³ Polyb. i. 6. 10.

⁴ One finds something like it a few years later among the returning Ten Thousand. See Xen. Anab. v. 7. 26-27.

CHAP. IX. in warfare, had shrunk from his duty through wilful treason¹.

The murder—we can call it nothing else—of the Akragantine generals was a strange greeting to give to the relieving host on the day of their coming and their victory. It must have been followed, either in the tumultuous assembly that slew them or in a more regular one gathered very soon after, by an election of successors to their dangerous office. For generals of Akragas are again spoken of a little later². But for the moment the practical leadership seems to pass to Daphnaios of Syracuse. For a while things prosper under his command. Then follows a time of confusion, a time of divided authority, a time certainly of evil counsel, and universally believed to have been a time of treason. Whether Daphnaios had done wisely or not in allowing the defeated Spaniards and Africans to escape so easily to the Carthaginian camp, his designs presently reached as far as an attack on the camp itself. But when he saw how strongly it was fortified, he gave up the thought of a direct attack³. Still he was able to bring the besiegers to great straits by sending horsemen everywhere to cut off their supplies. The story reads as if Himilkôn had no naval force immediately at command; the haven of Akragas was certainly not suited to shelter a Carthaginian fleet. On land the Syracusan horsemen were thoroughly in their element, cutting off the Punic foraging parties and allowing no kind of provision to enter the camp. Meanwhile the Syracusans had the command of the sea; and it must be remembered that the hill-camp on the left bank of the Akragas was no longer an outpost of the enemy. Corn and whatever else was needed was freely brought into

Command
of Daph-
naios.

He declines
to attack
the Punic
camp.

Distress
of the
besiegers.

¹ Diod. xiii. 87; *βλασφηήμιας δὲ τυγχάνειν καὶ τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον Δέξιππον, ὅτι τεταγμένος ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων οὐκ ἀπειροῦ τοῦτ' ἔπραξε προδοσίας ἔνεκα.*

² They appear towards the end of c. 88.

³ Ib. 88; *πολυτελῶς αὐτὴν ὁρῶντες ὠχυρωμένην.*

the city; the Akragantines felt no need to husband their CHAP. IX. resources, but freely enjoyed whatever came to hand. They fully believed that the barbarians would soon be driven to raise the siege by sheer stress of hunger¹.

Such a belief was by no means without grounds. Hunger Hunger in the camp. had made its way into the Punic camp, and men were already dying in its grasp. Those who were allowed to die were, we may be sure, neither Carthaginian citizens nor Spanish mercenaries, but the despised subjects from Africa. But even the best soldiers in the army were on short allowance. A general mutiny, led by the Cam- Mutiny of the Campanians. panians, broke out; the soldiers crowded round the tent of Himilkôn, and threatened, if they did not receive the full measure of their promised rations, to desert at once to the enemy². The general persuaded them to wait a few days, The plate of the Carthaginian citizens pledged. giving them in pledge the cups belonging to those citizens of Carthage who were in the camp³. We thus get a glimpse of the wide distinction that was made in all Punic warfare between the men of the ruling city and the multitudes whom they pressed and hired into their service. The native Carthaginians had brought the luxuries of the city into the camp; the plate of their tables was accepted as a valuable pledge even by half-starved men with arms in their hands. Himilkôn did not waste the time which he had thus gained. He learned that a large stock of provisions was coming from Syracuse to Akragas by sea, under the convoy of Syracusan triremes. To intercept this was his Himilkôn intercepts the Greek stores by sea. only hope⁴. He sent messengers to Motya and Panormos for the ships that were lying in those havens. They came with all speed; before the Syracusan fleet had reached

¹ Diod. xiii. 88; ἀεὶ προσδοκῶντες ταχέως λυθῆσθαι τὴν πολιορκίαν.

² Ib.; ἀπειλοῦντο μεταβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους. We must remember the presence on the Akragantine side of the Campanians who had been soldiers of Hannibal, and of whom we shall hear again directly.

³ Ib.; ἐνέχυρα δοὺς τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ Καρχηδόνης στρατευομένων ποτήρια.

⁴ Ib.; ταύτην μὲν ἔχων ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας.

CHAP. IX. Akragas, Himilkôn was at sea with forty triremes. A naval attack was exactly what the Syracusans had no fear of. The Carthaginians had for some while left the sea completely open; winter was now beginning, and no man believed that the enemy would be able to put to sea at such a moment¹. The Syracusan ships therefore sailed carelessly; the crews of the triremes did not keep the watch that they ought to have kept over the provision ships which they were sent to protect. Before long Himilkôn with his forty triremes was upon them. Eight of the Syracusan warships went to the bottom; the rest were chased to the shore. The Punic commander took possession of all the ships of burthen. This precious freight was soon made use of to relieve the hunger of the mercenaries, and to set the cups of the Carthaginian citizens free from pawn.

Scarcity in
Akragas.

The tide now turned again in favour of the besiegers. It was now no longer in the Punic camp, but within the walls of Akragas, that lack of food was beginning to be felt². The former supplies had been too lavishly wasted; the later had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The Cam-
panians
join the
Cartha-
ginians.

The Campanians on the Akragantine side were the first to show the effects of the change, just as the Campanians on the Carthaginian side had been a little while before. The special service which had been assigned to them, the watching of the outlying Punic camp on the eastern side, was no longer needed. Some change in their duties must have followed, and some quarrel may have arisen. Moreover it was believed that their movements were quickened by a bribe of fifteen talents discreetly applied by Himilkôn³. This gift wrought so on their minds that they forgot their

¹ Diod. xiii. 88; κατεφρόνουν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ὥς οὐκ ἐτί τολμασόντες πληροῦν τὰς τρήρεις.

² Ib.; ἔλαθεν αὐτοὺς ὁ σίτος ἐξανασθεῖς.

³ Ib.; καταγρόντας τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑποθέσεως πεντεκαίδεκα ταλάνταις φθαρῆναι.

old grievances against Hannibal, and transferred their swords from the service of Akragas to the service of Carthage. But it was further believed that Punic gold had its weight in much higher quarters than these barbarian mercenaries. By a kind of reaction from the strict home discipline of Sparta, greediness of gain was becoming the common vice of her officers in foreign commands. Dexippos, so all men believed, was not superior to temptations to which even Gylippos had yielded. Gylippos indeed had never sunk so low as to sell the cause of Hellas to barbarians; from this infamy Dexippos, according to the general belief of the time, did not shrink. Like the Campanians, he took his fifteen talents from Himilkôn; for this sum he undertook to persuade the allies of Akragas to forsake her. He told the Italiot officers that, under the present lack of provisions, it was expedient to remove the war to some other place¹. It seems to be taken for granted that such advice as this could have been given only under the influence of a bribe; and truly it is hard to see how the defence of beleaguered Akragas could be carried on so well anywhere else as at Akragas itself. It may be that the Italiots also had their share of Punic gifts; at any rate they took the hint of the Spartan, and marched off towards the strait. They gave out, like some warriors of later times, that their term of service was up². The Italiots only are named; but it would seem from the course of the story that the Syracusans and other Sikeliots did the like. Akragas was left to defend herself against the besiegers by no strength but her own³.

CHAP. IX.

Alleged
bribery of
Dexippos.He per-
suades the
Italiots and
Sikeliots
to go
away.Akragas
left to
herself.

¹ Diod. xiii. 88. The charge, hinted at before (p. 530, n. 1), now comes out more clearly; λέγεται δὲ καὶ Δέξιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος πεντεκαίδεκα ταλάντοις διαφθαρῆναι· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀπεκρίνατο πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν στρατηγούς, ὅτι συμφέρει τὸν πόλεμον ἐν ἄλλῃ συστήσασθαι τόπῳ, τὴν γὰρ τροφὴν ἐκλείπειν.

² Ib.; πρόφασιν ἐνέγκαντες ὡς διεληλύθασιν οἱ ταχέιντες τῆς στρατείας χρόνοι.

³ In this whole narrative we miss something. There is no reason to

CHAP. IX. The distress and danger was great ; yet the defence had been kept up for eight months¹ with many turns of fortune, and the time for utter despair would hardly seem to have come. At any rate, in the worst case, if Akragas was to fall, it was open to her to fall nobly, to fall like Selinous. The determination to which the Akragantine generals and their officers came certainly fills us with amazement. They first made search throughout the city to see what amount of food there was ; then, finding it to be very small, they determined that Akragas must be forsaken². Those who could flee must seek shelter elsewhere ; those who could not flee must be left to the mercy of the barbarians. And so it was done. It was not like the men of Mesolongi, cutting their way through the barbarian host, with their women and children guarded in the midst of a square of warriors. In the Akragantine story there seem to be no enemies to cut their way through ; the fugitives go forth without any hindrance from the Punic camp. The flight. The Akragantines march out, and, when they are gone, the besiegers march in. The flitting, to be sure, was done by night ; but even by night one would have thought that such a migration could not have been made without some knowledge of it reaching the besiegers. But, taking the tale as it is told us, the forsaking of Akragas by its own citizens must have been a scene as fearful and heartrending as any that history records. On every side of human interest, it must have been a scene yet sadder

The city
to be
forsaken.

The flight.

doubt the recorded facts ; of the suspected bribes we can only say, as ever, that the charge becomes suspicious through its very likelihood. But we miss the relations of cause and connexion between the several events ; the bribes cannot account for everything.

¹ Diod. xiii. 91. See above, p. 436.

² Ib. 88 ; *συνελθόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένων, διέγνωσαν ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει σίτον ὃν εὐρόντες παντελῶς ἀλίγων, ἐθεώρουν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν*. This seems wonderfully quick work. The generals must be Akragantine generals, successors of those who were murdered. See above, p. 530.

than the setting-forth of the Athenians from the camp before Syracuse. It needed only to have been painted by the same hand to have been yet more famous¹. CHAP. IX.

In the one narrative that we have we are pointedly told ^{Philistos'} that it was with the fall of Akragas that ^{account} Philistos of ^{of the} Syracuse ended the first division of his great work². ^{march.} In the story as we have it there are some touches that seem clearly to come from the hand of a contemporary, and we may believe that it is on no less witness than his that we read the harrowing details of the flight and of the entry of the barbarians. Men, women, and children, set out on the night march, leaving behind them their homes, and all that made their homes pleasant, all the goodly things of prosperous and wealthy Akragas. They went forth, they knew not whither, into banishment and poverty³. To save their lives was the utmost that they could hope, and that while the coming of the barbarian enemy was every moment looked for. But, more than this, not only their goods were to be left behind, but their friends also. Only the strong and active could undertake the desperate journey; the sick and aged were left behind to the mercies of Punic invaders. Some who could have escaped looked on a removal from their native city as worse than death; they ^{Some stay} lifted up their hands to the gods, and prayed that they ^{behind.} might at least die in the homes of their fathers. Among these was Gellias, the rich and bountiful; with a small ^{Gellias and} party he betook himself to the temple of Athênê in the ^{others take} akropolis, in the hope that the hearts of the barbarians ^{refuge in} might be touched with some reverence for the holy place⁴. ^{the temple} ^{of Athênê.}

¹ See above, p. 369.

² Diod. xiii. 103. See Appendix I.

³ Ib. 89; *ἡγαγόντο καταλιπεῖν εἰς διαρπαγὴν τοῖς βαρβάροις ταῦτ' ἐφ' οἷς αὐτοὺς ἐμακάριζον· ἀφαιρουμένης γὰρ τῆς τύχης τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῶν οἴκων καλῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

⁴ Ib. 90. On Gellias, see vol. ii. p. 392. He is brought in now as *ὁ πρωτεύων τῶν πολιτῶν πλούτης καὶ καλοκαγαθία*.

CHAP. IX. Meanwhile all who were able set forth on the road to Gela under the protection of the still remaining armed force. The high-born matrons and maidens of Akragas, used to every luxury, had now to make their weary way, shorn of all that their lost wealth could supply, to the one shelter that was still open to them. The road and the whole country in the direction of Gela was covered with these trembling sufferers, bowed down with fear and unaccustomed toil. At last all safely reached Gela, where the citizens welcomed them with every good will ¹.

The fugitives reach Gela.

The barbarians enter Akragas.

Slaughter and plunder.

Death of Gellias.

Wealth of Akragas.

The pictures and statues.

With the morning light the host of Himilkôn entered the forsaken city. With such a plunder lying before them ready to be grasped, they did not care to pursue the fugitives. And within the undefended walls they found victims enough fully to glut their lust of slaughter. All whom they came across were slain; the temples gave no protection; those who had sought shelter in them were dragged forth and put to death like the rest. Gellias and his companions, from their lofty place of refuge, might see what was going on in the lower parts of the city, in the range of temples along the southern wall. Seeing their last hope had failed them, the hope that they might at least escape the hands of the barbarians in their own persons, they set fire to the temple and died in the flames ². The houses of Akragas were thoroughly ransacked; the sack of the richest city of Hellas, the great and wealthy city which had never seen an enemy within its walls, supplied such a booty as none had seen before ³. No small part of the spoil consisted of the works of art, the pictures and statues, which the taste of the rich citizens of Akragas

¹ Diod. xiii. 89.

² Ib. 90. Diodôros enlarges at some length on the act.

³ Ib.; *τοσαύτην ἀφέλειαν συνήθροισεν ὅσῃν εἰκός ἐστιν ἐσχηκέναι πόλιν οἰκουμένην ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν εἰκοσι μυριάδων, ἀπόρθητον δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπίσεως γεγενημένην, πλουσιωτάτην δὲ σχεδὸν τῶν τότε Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων γεγενημένην.* On the population, see vol. ii. p. 396.

had gathered together during the years of peace¹, both in the temples and in their own houses. The temples, thus despoiled, were set on fire. We know what that means, whether the fire is kindled by Gellias or by Himilkôn. Massive walls and columns cannot strictly speaking be burned; but the wooden roofs and all wooden furniture may be, and the flames, if they do not actually burn the stone-work, damage it in a way which makes it more exposed than before to the effects of decay and accident. The temples of Akragas, thus shorn of their ornaments and endangered in their fabric, were in after days restored; the signs of fire, the signs of work later than the original building, may still be traced on them. But the greatest temple of all, the mighty house of the Olympian Zeus, unfinished when the destroyer came, never felt the restorer's hand. Such a work was beyond the resources of restored Akragas and of Roman Agrigentum, and the hugest temple in European Hellas has gradually crumbled away from the days of Himilkôn to our own². For the gods of Greece and for their holy places the Punic general and his host had no reverence; but in the matter of mere art Carthage was already coming under Hellenic influences. The statues and pictures torn from the temples and houses of Akragas were sent to Carthage as precious trophies, just as in later days the like spoil was carried from Syracuse to Rome. Among the works of the craftsman which now became a prey, there was one piece of cunning workmanship which would seem more in place in Carthage than in Akragas. According to the received belief both of Carthage and of later Agrigentum, the brazen bull of Phalaris formed part of the booty of Himilkôn. But, as we have already seen, another version told that the genuine bull had long before gone to the bottom of the sea, and that the image which was

CHAP. IX.

Burning of temples.

The Olympieion left unfinished.

Question as to the bull of Phalaris.

¹ Diod. xiii. 90, 96. See vol. ii. p. 411.² See vol. ii. p. 404.

CHAP. IX. shown at Carthage and which in after days was brought back to Agrigentum was a mere impostor¹.

December, Himilkôn had thus, after eight months of siege, at the
406. time of the winter solstice, got possession of the city which ranked second in power, first in wealth and stateliness of buildings, among the Greek cities of Sicily. The prize was much too precious to be thrown away, and no such motives called Himilkôn to the destruction of Akragas as had called Hannibal to the destruction of Himera. The town was allowed to stand, to furnish winter-quarters for the Punic host, and to be used as a starting-point for further conquests when the next season of warfare should come².

Himilkôn
winters at
Akragas.
406-405.

General
fear in
Greek
Sicily.

Gela was naturally marked as the next prey; but not in Gela only, but everywhere throughout Greek Sicily, such a blow as the loss of Akragas, its sack and the flight and slaughter of its inhabitants, filled every heart with fear. Selinous, Himera, Akragas, all were gone. Himera was swept away from the earth; Selinous and Akragas were no longer cities of Hellas; Gela, Kamarina, Syracuse, Katanê, Naxos, Messana, still survived; but which of them could hope to escape from the advancing power of destruction? In the cities which still were left, some sent their wives, children, and property for safety into Italy³; others sought refuge in Syracuse as the Sikeliot city which had the best chance of bearing up against the enemy. But everywhere there was grief, fear, almost despair. And out of those natural feelings arose a state of mind which led to political results in Greek Sicily, and more immediately in its greatest city, which proved hardly less momentous in Sicilian history than the invasion of the barbarians themselves.

¹ Diod. xiii. 90. See vol. ii. pp. 75, 76, 462.

² Ib. 91; *οὐκ εὐθὺς κατέσκαψεν, ὥστε αἱ δυνάμεις ἐν ταῖς αἰκίαις παραχει-
μάσθωσι.*

³ Ib.

§ 6. *The Rise of Dionysios*¹.

CHAP. IX.

B. C. 406-405.

The general belief throughout Greek Sicily was that it was through the treason or cowardice of the Syracusan generals that Akragas had been lost, and that all the other Greek cities had been brought into this frightful danger². The surviving Akragantines fully shared the belief. They went to Syracuse and brought a formal accusation against the Syracusan generals. It was through their presence at Akragas that Akragas had been lost³. The charge, true or false, did not lack likelihood. Commanders have been charged with treason in far later times when the loss has not been so great nor the suspicion so strong. The Akragantines above all might be forgiven if they believed the worst. If the last stage of their misfortunes had been the immediate act of their own generals, it was through the desertion of the Syracusan generals that things had been brought to such a pitch that to forsake the city seemed the only chance. Fierce charges against the leaders of the Syracusan commonwealth went up from many quarters. And there was one man in Syracuse who saw that the time was come for the first step towards making himself, first a popular leader and then a master.

In this moment of fear and anxiety the Syracusan assembly came together to consider the state of affairs. A

¹ In this chapter, Dionysios, though a most important actor, is still an incidental one. Our present subject is the Punic war which began with the landing of Hannibal at Mazara, and ended with the treaty that Dionysios made with Himilkôn. I therefore cannot help recording the actual rise of Dionysios to the tyranny and his first acts as tyrant. But the full consideration of his position as tyrant, and the examination of the authorities for his reign, I put off to the next chapter, which will be specially his own.

² Diod. xiii. 91; συνέβαινε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων Συρακουσίων ἐπιτιμήσεως τυγχάνειν τοῦ Συρακουσίου, ὅτι τοιοῦτους προστάτας αἰροῦνται, δι' οὓς ἀπολείσθαι κινδυνεύει πᾶσα Συρακία.

³ Ib.; φάσκοντες διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων παρουσίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν πατρίδα.

CHAP. IX. memorable meeting it was that gathered that day in the wide agora between the harbour and the slopes of Achradina. It was a day that left its mark on the history of Sicily and the world. Two men then stepped forth into historic notice whom Syracuse already knew well. One was to make himself the most memorable actor in the events of his age. The other was to be the recorder of acts in which he filled a place second only to that of the chief whom he helped to raise to power. For a while every mouth in the crowd was shut. The general alarm was so great that no man dared to make any proposal with regard to the conduct of the war¹. At last a speaker arose, and that speaker was Dionysios. This is the second time that we have heard that memorable name. We know not whether this was his first appearance in the assembly or whether he had already won for himself any position in its debates. At some time, either before he had joined the armed following of Hermokratês or after his wonderful recovery from the very gates of death, he had acted as a clerk to some of the Syracusan magistrates². This was an office which at Athens was certainly looked down upon, and it was most likely so at Syracuse also. But war-time brings new men to the front; and, notwithstanding this civil employment, Dionysios had won for himself a full right to be heard on military matters. As a private soldier or a subordinate officer, he had borne his part in the war before Akragas, and he had borne it with distinguished honour. His displays of courage had won him the general admiration of all Syracuse³. He was therefore able to speak from his own knowledge of all that had gone on in the campaign. And

General silence.

Speech of DIONYSIOS.

Notices of him since the death of Hermokratês.

Military reputation of Dionysios.

¹ Diod. xiii. 91; *μεγάλαν φόβον επικρεμαμένον, οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα περὶ τοῦ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν.*

² Ib. 96; *ἐκ γραμματείας καὶ τοῦ τυχόντος ἰδιώτου.* I shall say more of the early life of Dionysios in the next chapter.

³ Ib. 92; *Διονύσιος, ὅς ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Καρχηδονίους μάχαις ἀνδρῖα δόξας διεννοχέειν, περίβλεπτος ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Συρακούσις.*

now, when all others kept silence, he stood forth as the CHAP. IX. accuser of the generals of Syracuse.

The first public appearance of Dionysios is an event so striking that we are likely to forget that the debate in which it took place gives us our only glimpse of the working of the laws of Dioklès¹. It would seem that Dionysios, in speaking when he did, broke through the order Dionysios' breach of order. which the rules of the Syracusan assembly laid down for its members; it is certain that he broke through the rules which reason and decency lay down for the guidance of all assemblies. The speech of Dionysios was loud and fierce. He arraigned the generals as traitors; they had betrayed Akragas to the Carthaginians. He stirred up the people to the wildest wrath against them. He called on them not He calls for the immediate slaughter of the generals. to wait for any legal trial or even for any regular vote—impeachment and bill of attainder were both too slow in such a case. Let the people arise at once, and take summary vengeance on the criminals². We seem to be falling even below the level of the sudden military assembly held in the valley of the Akragas. In the darkest day of Athens there was a vote, if an unjust and illegal vote; there was no act or word of sheer violence. In the assembly which condemned the Akragantine generals there was at least the form of a vote, though the vote was carried out by violence³. But here, if he be truly reported, Dionysios calls on the people to cast aside every shred of legal form, and, instead of voting, to slay at once. Such language as this was He is fined by the magistrates. doubtless illegal; but it would seem that the magistrates who presided under the new law—not the generals, but some other officials drawn by lot—could only lay on a fine; they could neither dissolve the assembly nor forcibly silence the

¹ See Appendix XXVI.

² Diod. xiii. 91; παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλήρον, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.

³ See above, p. 529.

CHAP. IX. speaker¹. They used what powers they had, and at once laid a fine on Dionysios for his breach of order². It seems implied that to Dionysios the fine imposed would have been a serious loss. But he had a friend whose resources were at this stage greater than his own. Philistos, one of the richest men in Syracuse, at once stepped forward and paid the fine. He even told Dionysios to go on speaking, all day if he chose; so often as the magistrates fined him, so often would he, Philistos, pay the fine for him³. Thus encouraged, Dionysios went on declaiming against the generals, charging them with having received bribes to betray the Akragantines. He then went on to attack the chief men of Syracuse generally; they were, he said, all of them in league to bring in the rule of oligarchy⁴. The remedy was plain; let them no longer choose rich and powerful men to the office of general. Such men despised their fellow-citizens and treated them as slaves; they sought their own advantage in the misfortunes of their country. Let them put at their head men of the commons, who loved the commons, men who had no personal position which they could abuse to the disadvantage of the commonwealth⁵.

PHILISTOS
pays the
fine.

He goes on
with his
speech.

Such words naturally stirred up the already excited people to the highest pitch⁶. The mass of the assembly

¹ See Appendix XXVI.

² Diod. xiii. 91; τῶν ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὡς θορυβοῦντα. See Appendix XXVI.

³ Ib.; Φίλιστος ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὑστερον συγγράψας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, ἐξέτισε τὰ πρόστιμα, καὶ τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρεκελεύετο λέγειν ὅσα προηρεῖτο· καὶ προσέτι εἰπόντος ὅτι καθ' ἑλὴν τὴν ἡμέραν, ἂν ζημοῦν ἰθίλωσιν, ἐπέτισεν τὸ ἀργύριον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. This, our first introduction of a memorable man, is most likely a piece of autobiography.

⁴ Ib.; συγκατηγόρησε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπισημοτάτων πολιτῶν, συνιστὰς αὐτοὺς οἰκείους ὄντας ὀλιγαρχίας.

⁵ Ib.; ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἀρχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὰς τῆς πατρίδος συμφορὰς ἰδίᾳ ἡγεῖσθαι προσέδους· τοὺς δὲ ταπεινοτέρους οὐδὲν πράξειν τῶν τοιούτων, δεδιότας τὴν περὶ αὐτοὺς ἀσθένειαν. This is not the democracy either of Periklēs or of Athēnagoras.

⁶ Ib.; θαρρήσας ἀνέσειε τὰ πλῆθη, καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν συνταράττων. So 92; οὐ μετρίως ἐξῆρε τὸν τῶν ἐκκλησιαζόντων θυμόν.

had come together with their minds predisposed against the generals. The belief that they had traitorously mis-conducted the war had made them universally hated¹. The speech of Dionysios therefore fell upon willing ears. When he saw that he had gained his point, he seems no longer to have suggested open violence; at least we hear only of a vote, though we should be glad indeed to know by what show of constitutional forms such a vote could have been carried. The generals were deposed from office, and other generals were chosen in their stead, one of whom, as might be looked for, was Dionysios himself². If military efficiency had been all that was needed, no choice could have been better; Dionysios could play the part of a good general as well as any man whenever he thought good. But his designs were darker and deeper than any that he laid to the charge of the officers whom he had supplanted. With him the generalship thus irregularly obtained was only the first step to the tyranny.

CHAP. IX.

The
generals
deposed;
new
generals
chosen,
Dionysios
among
them.

In all this Dionysios was only treading in the most ordinary path of tyrants; the part of the story where we most need some explanation is the conduct of Philistos. His position in the city was such that we should have expected him to be on the side of those who were denounced as oligarchs and traitors rather than on the side of their accuser. Or, if he sought for more than legal power for himself, we might have fancied him playing the not uncommon part of the man of lofty birth who affects the character of a demagogue in order to grow from demagogue into tyrant. But Philistos appears throughout as a man satisfied with the second place, and never aiming at the first. He helps to set up a tyranny; but he does not himself

Action of
Philistos.

His posi-
tion.

¹ Diod. xiii. 92; ὁ δῆμος καὶ πάλαι μισῶν τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν προαφίστασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.

² Ib.; ὁ δῆμος . . . τοὺς στρατηγοὺς . . . ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐτέρους δ' εἰλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Cf. above, p. 229.

CHAP. IX. seek to be tyrant; it is enough for him to be the tyrant's minister. He helps on a man clearly of much lower position in the city than his own, one to whom his patronage, as we may call it, gives increased strength. Had Dionysios been a lawful prince, Philistos would have appeared as a faithful servant of his prince, who was not always so well requited by his prince as his services deserved. But looking on Dionysios in his real character as a selfish conspirator against the laws and freedom of his city, the position of Philistos becomes more puzzling. It is strange to see a man who had a good start towards being leader of a commonwealth, aristocratic or democratic, willingly take part in a revolution the result of which must be to make him a subject. One suspects that there must after all have been a side to the famous tyrant which was not altogether hateful. He had friends; Philistos was not the only one. Some kingly qualities Dionysios undoubtedly had; there may have been some glamour about him which won men to his side, something which made one who was born his superior willing to accept a secondary place under one who was in some sort a man of his own making.

Dionysios had thus gained his first point; he had taken the first step in the despot's progress. He was now in a place of authority, though a place in which his authority was shared with others. As he had risen thus far by discrediting his predecessors, his next step was to rise higher by discrediting his colleagues. Dionysios never met the other generals in council; he altogether avoided them; at the same time he gave out that they were engaged in treasonable communications with the enemy¹. The best citizens,

Dionysios
accuses his
colleagues.

¹ Diod. xiii. 92; οὐτε συνήδρευεν ἅμα τοῖς στρατηγοῖς οὐθ' ὅλως συνέχευε ταῦτα δὲ πράτταν, διεδίδου λόγον ὡς διαπεμπομένους αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους. Whom then could the people have given him for colleagues?

we are told, that is the aristocratic party whom he had denounced, saw through his objects, and spoke against him in all their gatherings¹. But the multitude, not suspecting his designs, loaded him with praise, and said that the city had at last, after much pains, found a champion who could be trusted². Assemblies of the people were constantly held to consider the needful preparations for the war³, and in each debate he never failed strongly to insist on the restoration of the exiles. By these exiles we must understand the remnant of the party of Hermokratês, those who were condemned to banishment when Dionysios himself only escaped the like sentence by being looked on as a dead man. He pleaded in short for the restoration of his old comrades. The exiles are painted in very dark colours; but the description reads like a mere conventional picture of exiles in general, while Dionysios at least could paint them in colours altogether different. They are described by an unfriendly hand as men eager for change, well fitted for the purposes of one who was aiming at the tyranny, men who looked forward to the slaughter of their enemies, to the confiscation of their goods, and to the recovery of their own lost possessions. This last was a natural, it might be a lawful, wish; it might be taken for granted in banished men of any political party. The rest of the description gives us nothing specially characteristic of the followers of Hermokratês. To these men, we are told, Dionysios looked as certain to be supporters of his own

CHAP. IX.

He asks for the return of the exiles.

Aims of the exiles.

¹ Diod. xiii. 92; *οἱ χαρίεστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπάπτενον τὸ γενησόμενον, καὶ κατὰ πάσας τὰς συνόδους ἐβλασφήμεον αὐτόν*. The mention of the *σύνοδοι* has a contemporary sound; but, if Philistos is here our narrator, his report must surely have been a little coloured either by Diodoros himself or by some one between them.

² Ib.; *ὁ δὲ δημοτικὸς ὄχλος, ἀγνοῶν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, ἐπῆναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐφασκε τὴν πόλιν προστάτην εὐρηκέναι βέβαιον*. On *προστάτης* see above, p. 116. The name is also applied to generals in the last chapter. So used, it marks official men, but it cannot be an official title.

³ Ib.; *πολλάκις ἐκκλησίας συναγομένης περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον παρασκευῆς*.

CHAP. IX. designs¹. Pleading for their recall, he asked why Syracuse should send for helpers to Italy and Peloponnésos, while there were men of her own stock ready to fight in her cause, men who had refused the most tempting offers of the enemy to take service on his side, men who chose rather to wander as exiles in foreign lands than to do anything hostile to their own city². Their punishment was the result of former quarrels in the state; recalled, they would fight valiantly for Syracuse, if only to repay the favour of their restoration to those who had voted for it³. This sounds like a trace of arguments really used by Dionysios; it has a ring altogether different from the other conventional picture of banished men. And we seem to see in his words signs of dealings unrecorded in the narrative history, of attempts on the part of Carthage to win over Hermokratês and his followers to her side, at the time when he was acting as an independent power in Sicily. Dionysios in short was asking for the recall of his own comrades, men who might likely enough become his instruments, but whose first tie to him had been of a nobler kind. He pleaded their cause in many assemblies; his colleagues dared not oppose him; they saw how thoroughly the feeling of the people was on his side; if the recall of the exiles was voted against their opposition, the credit would go to Dionysios, and the odium would be their own⁴. The vote for the recall of the exiles, that is, of the men who had striven to make their way into

The exiles
restored.

¹ Diod. xiii. 92; ἐλπίζων ἰδίους ἔχειν τοὺς φυγάδας, ἀνθρώπους μεταβολῇς ἐπιθυμοῦντας. καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῆς τυραννίδος εὐθέτως διακειμένους· ἡμελλων γὰρ ἡδέως θύεσθαι τῶν ἐχθρῶν φόνους, δημεύσεις τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἑαυτοῖς ἀποκαθισταμένα τὰ χρήματα.

² Ib.; οἱ, τῶν πολέμων μεγάλας δαρεὰς ὑπὸ χνουμένον, ἀν συστρατεύσασαι, προαιρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ξένης ἀλωμένους ἀποθαρνεῖν, ἢ περ ἀλλότριον τι κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος βουλευσάσθαι.

³ Ib.; εἰ διὰ τὰς γεγεννημένας ἐν τῇ πόλει στάσεις φυγεῖν, νῦν γε τυχόντας ταύτης τῆς εὐεργεσίας, προθύμως ἀγωνιεῖσθαι, τοῖς εἰ ποθέσασιν ἀποδιδόντας χάριτας.

⁴ Ib.; διὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἑαυτῶ μὲν περιεσομένην τὴν ἀπέχθειαν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετηθέντων χάριν.

Syracuse by the side of Hermokratês, was accordingly passed, CHAP. IX. and they presently came back to the city¹.

We go back to the war with Carthage. That war had now to be waged on the side of Syracuse with Dionysios in formal office simply one member of a college of generals, but practically holding a position in which none of his colleagues shared. Himilkôn had been resting his army during the winter in his comfortable quarters in forsaken Akragas. Objects of Himilkôn. With the next season of warfare he would assuredly go forth to attempt new conquests, and the first object of his renewed attacks could not fail to be Gela. The men of Gela had Danger of Gela. sent their contingent to the army which had marched to the relief of Akragas, and they had hospitably received the fugitives from that hapless city². These last were, at some stage which could not have been very far from the present time, planted by Syracuse in the Syracusan outpost of Leontinoi, once an independent city of Hellas³. We now get a glimpse of the internal state of Gela. Its citizens Politics of Gela; were, like those of other cities, divided by political disputes. And the city seems to stand, for immediate military purposes, in a certain relation of dependence on Syracuse, which its military dependence on Syracuse. doubtlessly does not imply any acknowledged political dependence. We find the Lacedæmonian Dexippos at Gela, Dexippos commands a garrison at Gela. at the head of a garrison, seemingly of mercenaries, and his command is held by a commission from Syracuse⁴. There was clearly at least a party in Gela to which the presence of this force was not displeasing. We see also that

¹ Looking back to c. 75 of Diodôros (see p. 505) we see that there were two classes of them, those who had not reached the gate when Hermokratês went in, and the survivors of those who went in with him, who were formally banished.

² See above, p. 536.

³ Diod. xiii. 89; ὕστερον εἰς Λεοντίνους κατέβησαν, Συρακουσίων αὐτοῖς δόσαν τὴν πόλιν ταύτην οἰκητήρων.

⁴ Ib. 93; τὴν πόλιν τῶν Γελῶν, ἣν τότε παρέφύλαττε Δέξιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, κατασταθεὶς ἐπὶ Συρακουσίων.

CHAP. IX.
Disputes
of the rich
and the
commons.

there was at the same time a dispute between the Geloan commons and an oligarchic party, described as the rich¹. The commons, we are told, envied their ascendancy, and spoke of it by a name which expressed the power of masters over slaves². Such disputes were always coming to the front in the Greek commonwealths; but we may be pretty certain that in this case the quarrel was at least sharpened by the actual state of affairs. The immediate dispute had most likely, as at Syracuse, arisen out of the treatment of the war. If we could look a little more narrowly into Geloan politics, we should most likely find that the Geloan generals were charged with not having done their best for the defence of Akragas. Those who brought that charge would naturally look on the party of Dionysios and Philistos at Syracuse as the surest defence of Gela against foes within and without. It doubtless marks the increased influence of this popular party that letters were sent from Gela to Syracuse, asking for an increase of the Syracusan force in Gela³.

The
Geloans
ask for a
larger gar-
rison.

No application could have better suited the purposes of Dionysios. His influence was now such that he was himself sent in answer to it, with a body of two thousand foot and four hundred horse. Whether they were citizens, allies, or mercenaries, we are not told; but we may suspect that the restored exiles formed a strong element among them. Dionysios made his way to Gela with all speed, and at once threw himself zealously into the local disputes. At Gela he was able to carry out yet more violent measures than any that he had attempted at Syracuse. He accused, so it

Dionysios
leads
troops to
Gela.

¹ Diod. xiii. 93; καταλαβὼν τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους στασιάζοντας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον.

² Ib.; τοῖς γὰρ δυνατωτάτοις φθονοῦντες τὴν ἐκείνων ὑπεροχὴν δεσποτείαν αὐτῶν ἀπεκάλουν. Δεσποτεία is not an usual word in this sense. We should rather have looked for *δυναστεία*, the tyranny in the hands of several.

³ Ib.; ἐκ τῆς Γέλας ἐνεχθέντων γραμμάτων ὥπως ἀποσταλῶσι στρατιῶται πλείους.

is implied, the whole body of the rich and powerful in Gela before the Geloan assembly. He procured their condemnation to death and the confiscation of their property ¹. Yet it is hard to believe in slaughter on such a scale as this, not wrought like the massacre which Dionysios had hinted at in Syracuse, but decreed with the formalities, if not of a judicial sentence, at least of a bill of attainder. We are strongly tempted to think that the victims were the generals only, men against whom Dionysios might be able to find or invent some definite charge, and not the whole body of the rich and well-born in Gela. Whether the number of the condemned was many or few, their confiscated wealth was treated by Dionysios, or by the Geloan assembly under his influence, as a contribution to the common military chest. Of any action on the part of Dexippos or his garrison we have heard nothing at this stage. Dionysios was able to give them their arrears of pay ², and he promised to the soldiers whom he had himself brought double the pay which the Syracusan commonwealth had promised them ³. This reads as if both forces were at least largely mercenary, but we must not forget that citizens too received pay during the time that they were actually serving. By these means he won the attachment of both divisions of the army, as well as that of the commons of Gela. They looked on him as the author of their freedom; they passed votes in his honour, votes accompanied by large gifts, and they sent envoys to Syracuse formally to announce to the commonwealth the honours which a sister city had bestowed on an illustrious Syracusan ⁴.

CHAP. IX.

He procures the condemnation of the oligarchs.

He raises the soldiers' pay.

His popularity at Gela

His honours announced at Syracuse.

¹ Diod. xiii. 93; κατηγορήσας αὐτῶν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ κατακρίνας, αὐτοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τὰς δ' οὐσίας αὐτῶν ἐδήμευσεν.

² Ib.; ἐκ τῶν χρημάτων τούτων τοῖς μὲν φρουροῦσι τὴν πόλιν, ὧν ἡγήτο Δέξιππος, ἀπέδωκε τοὺς ὀφειλομένους μισθοὺς.

³ Ib.; ἐπηγγείλατο διπλοῦς ποιῆσειν τοὺς μισθοὺς ὧν ἡ πόλις ἔταξε.

⁴ Ib.; ἐξέπεμψαν πρέσβεις τοὺς ἐπαινέσοντας ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα φέροντας, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸν μεγάλας δαιρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν.

CHAP. IX. All this exactly served the purposes of Dionysios. His object now was to go back to Syracuse, and on the strength of his newly increased reputation, to help on his schemes of seizing the tyranny. He took Dexippos into his counsels; whether he let the Spartan into a full knowledge of his whole design may be doubted. But he at least proposed to him to join him in a march to Syracuse. When Dexippos refused, he made ready to start at once with the force which he had himself brought to Gela and which is spoken of as his own¹. But the Geloans had no mind to part with one whom they had already proclaimed as their deliverer. They felt assured that the next step of the Punic commander would be an attack on their own city with his full force. They prayed Dionysios to tarry at Gela, lest, without the help of their newly-found protector, they might have to go through all that their neighbours and colonists at Akragas had gone through².

The
Geloans
pray him
to stay.

The appeal of the Geloans to Dionysios was made in all singlemindedness. The candidate for tyranny did not look on things in the same light. To tarry at Gela would by no means have suited the purposes of Dionysios. He had to show himself at Syracuse, in all the new glory of the destroyer of the Geloan oligarchy. He told the men of Gela that he would come back as soon as might be with a larger army; for the present he set forth for Syracuse with his own soldiers³. At the moment of his coming, the Syracusan people were gathered together in the theatre, not for any political debate, but for the enjoyment of a dramatic spectacle⁴. Dionysios and his party, as they drew near to

He
marches to
Syracuse;

the people
in the
theatre;

¹ Diod. xlii. 93; ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος ἐπεβάλετο μὲν τὸν Δέξιππον πείθειν κοινωρῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ συγκατετίθετο, μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων στρατιωτῶν ἔτοιμος ᾗν ἀνακάμπτειν εἰς Συρακούσας.

² Ib.; ἑδέοντο τοῦ Διονυσίου μέναι, καὶ μὴ περιδεῖν αὐτοὺς τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς Ἀκραγαντίνοις παθόντας.

³ Ib.; μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων στρατιωτῶν, as just before.

⁴ Ib. 94; θέας οὖσης ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις, τὴν ὥραν τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου παρῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

the gate of Achradina, must have passed below the theatre ; CHAP. IX.
 if the last views on the Greek theatre are correct, no barrier
 would have hidden them from the spectators¹ ; in any case
 the occupants of the highest seats might, in the midst of the
 mimic actions and sufferings on which they were gazing,
 have been called back to the realities of life by the sight of
 their own countrymen marching back in arms from the
 neighbouring city. As Dionysios reached the gate, the
 entertainment came to an end ; the multitude, pouring out
 of the theatre, gathered round him and his followers, craving
 for news of the enemy². It was no regular assembly ; Irregular assembly.
 but the popular general seized the opportunity for a stirring
 harangue. The Syracusan people, Dionysios told them, knew Dionysios again accuses his colleagues.
 not that they had, in those whom they had placed at the
 head of affairs, enemies at home far more dangerous than the
 Carthaginians without. In those enemies they put their
 trust ; they amused themselves with festivals in the theatre,
 while their own chiefs left the soldiers unpaid and turned
 the revenues of the state to their own profit³. Mean-
 while the foreign enemy was making ready for carrying
 on the war on the vastest scale, and of that the generals of
 Syracuse took no heed. Why all this was he had long
 known, and he now knew better than ever. A herald Alleged attempt of Himilkôn to bribe him.
 had been sent from Himilkôn to himself, under pretence
 of treating for the ransom of prisoners⁴, but really with
 the object of tempting Dionysios into a treasonable under-
 standing. He it was, Dionysios who now spoke to them, on
 whom the Carthaginian commander set a higher price than
 on any of his colleagues ; he it was whom he had invited, if

¹ See vol. ii. p. 288.

² Diol. xiii. 94 ; *συνδραμόντων τῶν ὅχλων ἐπ' αὐτὸν καὶ πυνθανομένων περὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.*

³ Ib. ; *τοὺς ἔνδον τῶν κοινῶν προεστώτας, οἷς οἱ μὲν πολλοὶται πιστεύοντες ἑορτάζουσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ διαφοροῦντες τὰ δημόσια, τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀμίσθους πεποιήκασι.*

⁴ Ib. ; *Ἰμύλκων γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπεσταλκῆναι κήρυκα, πρόφασιν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν οἰχμαλίων.*

CHAP. IX. he could not do any active service on the side of Carthage, at least not to be active in any operations against her. To such a pitch, added Dionysios, with the air of a righteous man charged with wrong that he abhorred, had the treacherous dealings of his colleagues come, that he, the incorruptible, not only shared the common dangers of his fellow-citizens, but was further believed by the enemy to be capable of treason against them¹. In such a case he could no longer be general; he would give back to the people the command which they had bestowed upon him. By words like these, uttered with the full power of passionate eloquence, every hearer was stirred. No legal action could be taken at the moment; but of the crowd which had flocked joyously to the spectacle in the theatre every man now went back to his house heavy and distressed².

He resigns
the general-
ship.

Lawful
assembly
next day.

The next day a lawful assembly came together, summoned, we may believe, by Dionysios as his last act in the office which he was about to throw up³. He again renewed his charges against his colleagues, amidst the general applause of the multitude. But the proposal of any definite step was left to others. It was no doubt by a well-understood arrangement that a cry was raised in the assembly to make Dionysios general with full powers. Let them not wait till the enemy's battering engines were shaking the walls of Syracuse⁴; let the needful step be taken at once; let power be put into the right hands while there was yet time⁵. The cry was followed up by speakers prepared

Dionysios
is chosen
στρατηγὸς
αὐτοκρά-
τωρ.

¹ Diod. xiii. 94; οὐ γὰρ ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι, τῶν ἄλλων παλούντων τὴν πατρίδα, μὴ μόνον κινδυνεύειν μετὰ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξαν μετεσχηθέναι τῆς προδοσίας.

² Ib.; εἰς ἕκαστος ἀγωνιῶν εἰς ὄκνον ἐχωρίσθη. This is surely a contemporary touch.

³ Ib.; τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ συναχθείσης ἐκκλησίας.

⁴ Ib.; μὴ περιμένειν ἄχρις ἂν οἱ πολέμοι τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐπισείωσι.

⁵ Ib.; τῶν καθήμενων τινὲς ἀνεβόησαν στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν αὐτοκράτορα καθιστάναι . . . χρεῖαν γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πολέμου τοιοῦτου στρατηγοῦ.

with arguments and precedents. The fate of the offending generals might be discussed in another assembly with greater leisure; the business of the moment was to provide for the needs of the moment¹. With so great and terrible a war on their hands, a commander was needed under whom there might be a hope of success, a commander at once able and trustworthy. Such an one they had ready at hand in the man who had fought so well in the ranks, the man whom they had chosen to command as general, but who had been driven by unworthy colleagues to lay down an office which he could no longer hold with honour. Let that man, Dionysios son of Hermokratês, be at once placed at the head of affairs; let him be general with full powers, free and untrammelled by colleagues, to do all that might be needed for the welfare of the state. So had Syracuse done in earlier times when her existence had before been threatened by the same enemy. It was under the command of Gelôn as general with full powers that the great salvation of Himera had been won; let the same trust be placed in Dionysios, and a new deliverance would follow worthy of the old².

Precedent
of Gelôn.

The historic reference was a daring one. The name of Gelôn, general, tyrant, or king, as we may choose to call him, was still honoured at Syracuse, and not wholly without reason. His statues, his stately tomb, were still revered as those of a hero and a second founder. A few aged men could remember his great victory and his solemn funeral seventy-two years before. But a speaker on the other side might easily have reminded his hearers that the glorious rule of Gelôn had been followed, first by the oppressions of Hierôn and then by that tyranny of Thrasyboulos which not only Syracuse but all European Sicily had

Memory of
Gelôn.

¹ Diod. xiii. 94; τὰ περὶ τῶν προδοτῶν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ βουλευέσθαι· τῶν γὰρ ἐνεστῶτων καιρῶν ἀλλότρισον εἶναι. Some word like ἐτέρᾳ has clearly dropped out before ἐκκλησίᾳ.

² See vol. ii. p. 499.

CHAP. IX. united to put down. But in the present state of mind of the Syracusan assembly, the reference to the greatest day in the Syracusan annals did its work. Dionysios, brave and trustworthy as Gelôn, should go forth, with the full powers which Gelôn had wielded, once more to overthrow the enemy whom Gelôn had overthrown. A vote taken on the spot declared Dionysios general with full powers¹. His first act in that character was to propose and carry a decree that the pay of the soldiers should be doubled². If this were so, he said, all men would be more ready and zealous in the struggle; nor need they fear the cost; the hoard of Syracuse under his command would be fully able to bear it. The assembly was then dismissed³.

He raises
the sol-
diers' pay.

Nature of
his office.

The second step in the despot's progress was thus taken. Dionysios, untrammelled by colleagues, was placed at the head of the armies and of the commonwealth of Syracuse. The vote which gave him such powers was certainly hasty, perhaps irregular; but the office which it bestowed was in itself a perfectly legal one. It was no more than the application of the principle of the Roman dictatorship;

In seasons of great peril

'Tis good that one bear sway.

The commission given to Dionysios in no way set him above the laws; it simply empowered him, at a moment when united and vigorous action was called for, to take such military steps as he might think good, without either consulting colleagues or asking for decrees of the

¹ Diod. xiii. 94; *ταχὺ τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ εἰώθασιν, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον βεβόη-
των, ὁ Διονύσιος ἐπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*. Whose is the general
reflexion?

On Mitford's general view of Dionysios, I mean to say something elsewhere. I will say here only that I cannot admit that the words about Hipparinos in Plut. Dion 3, necessarily prove that Dionysios had a colleague in his extraordinary command.

² Diod. xiii. 95; *ψήφισμα ἐγράφε τοὺς μισθοὺς διπλασίονι εἶναι*.

³ Ib.; *διαλυθείσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας*.

assembly on every point. It was the same commission, CHAP. IX. only given to one man instead of three, which the Athenian assembly had given to Nikias, Alkibiadēs, and Lamachos at the beginning of the expedition against Syracuse¹. No doubt it made, especially in Greek ideas, a vast difference that the commission was given to one man instead of to three. But we have an analogy in very recent times in the vast powers which we have seen the greatest commonwealth of modern days intrust to its chief in time of danger. The dictatorship, as we may call it, of Dionysios came practically to the same thing as the dictatorship less formally conferred on Abraham Lincoln during the great American Civil War. The difference in all the cases lay wholly in the personal characters of the men concerned. Neither Nikias nor Lincoln, nor Alkibiadēs either, nor yet any Fabius or Marcius who carried the axe in his *fascēs*, was the least likely to make himself tyrant. With Dionysios every step that he gained was a step towards the tyranny and nothing else. And to have received this extraordinary, though not illegal, measure of authority was a very great step indeed. Master of the military resources of the city, he had the means, if so he chose, of using them, not against the common enemy, but for the advancement of his own power and the overthrow of the liberties of his fellow-citizens. Abraham Lincoln. A step towards the tyranny.

As the story is told us, men began to feel this as soon as the vote was passed. The assembly was hardly dissolved before some of the citizens began to blame their own act². They began to feel the shadow of the dominion which they were helping to place in the hands of a single man. They had sought to secure freedom by placing power in the hands Reaction at Syracuse.

¹ Thuc. vi. 26. 1; *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐψηφίσαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.* See above, p. 165.

² Diod. xiii. 95; *οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν Συρακουσίων καταγόρουσι τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥστερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ τὰτα κεκυρακότες.* This seems a touch from Thuc. viii. 1; *ὥστερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισμένοι.*

CHAP. IX. of a man whom they believed that they could trust; they began to fear that they had thereby given themselves a master¹. With such feelings abroad, the object of Dionysios was to take one step more, to secure one more vote in his favour, before the citizens generally had turned against him². One thing still was wanting; the general with full powers had the military forces of Syracuse placed at his discretion; but in the citizen armies of that day there were some bounds even to military obedience. Dionysios could hardly expect that citizens or allies of Syracuse would march at his bidding to disperse the senate or assembly of Syracuse in a lawful session, or to seize the chief men of the city in their beds without sentence or accusation. What he still needed was to have a force at his bidding which would obey him even on such errands as these. He wanted in short the personal body-guard which distinguished the tyrant from the lawful magistrate. This he sought to obtain by an elaborate stratagem which is said to have been suggested to his mind by the old story of Peisistratos of Athens. He, so the tale ran, had obtained his guard of clubmen by the pretence that the enemies of freedom had attacked and wounded him³. But Dionysios doubted whether, in the present temper of many at Syracuse, such a vote could be obtained from any Syracusan assembly. He chose another spot for the execution of the trick which he designed. He had thus early learned what in days long after was still deemed a secret of empire⁴. It was not only in Syracuse that a tyrant of Syracuse could be made.

Position of
Dionysios
towards
the army.

He needs
a body-
guard.

Precedent
of Peisist-
ratos.

¹ Diod. xiii. 95; τοῖς λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχομένοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οὖν βεβαιῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαβον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. On δεσπότης (not a technical term like τύραννος) see above, p. 548.

² Ib.; τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι βουλόμενος.

³ Ib. Cf. Herod. i. 59.

⁴ Tac. Hist. i. 4; "Evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romæ fieri."

Leontinoi, the commonwealth which Syracuse had swallowed up and which Athens had failed to restore to separate being, now begins to play an important part in our story. But as yet it is always the part, if not of a dependency of Syracuse, yet of something which stands in a special relation to Syracuse. Leontinoi is at this moment a town under the dominion of Syracuse, which Syracuse uses for her own purposes, but which may, if it so happens, become the scene of plans and actions contrary to those purposes. Just now we are told that Leontinoi was full of exiles and strangers; that is, it had been assigned as a place of shelter for the fugitives from Akragas¹. These men were likely to be favourable to Dionysios; they had witnessed his gallant exploits in the war waged around their own city. They were bitter enemies of the Syracusan generals whom Dionysios had overthrown²; they were naturally partisans of the man who had overthrown them. We are not told what was their political position at Leontinoi. Unless they had been formally admitted to Syracusan citizenship—a thing of which we have no hint—they could have no votes in a regular Syracusan assembly; but they might easily be made use of away from Syracuse for the purposes of Dionysios. The general accordingly ordered the whole military population of Syracuse up to the age of forty years to march to Leontinoi in arms with provisions for thirty days. A march to Leontinoi might have a strange sound, when the point directly threatened by the enemy was Gela; but that was a matter within the discretion of the general with full powers. The limit of age was most likely designed to keep out those whose years and experience would make them the most troublesome censors; and it is somewhat strangely added

CHAP. IX.
Position of
Leontinoi.

The exiles
there.

General
march to
Leontinoi.

¹ Diod. xiii. 95; αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις τότε φρούρεον ἦν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις πλῆρες ὑπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων. Cf. at the end of c. 89.

² Ib. 91. See above, p. 547.

CHAP. IX. that he expected that the mass of the Syracusans would not come to Leontinoi¹. It was clearly to his advantage that they should stay away; but it might seem somewhat dangerous to trust to the probable breach of his own orders.

He en- With some following or other he made his march, and camps. encamped for the night near Leontinoi², on one or other

Stir in the of the spots which look up to its double akropolis. In the night. the night a cry was heard, a disturbance and a rushing to and fro. The news was spread abroad by the slaves of Dionysios, that their master, the general of the Syracusans, attacked by traitors, had been driven to seek shelter in the akropolis of Leontinoi³. On one or other of the two heights which bore that name he abode for the night; he kindled fires; he sent for the best known men among the

He seizes the akropolis. soldiers to come to his help and to share his counsels. On

Military assembly. the morrow an assembly of some kind was got together⁴. In a military gathering like this, the distinctions of Syracusan citizenship could hardly be attended to; none who bore arms, allies or mercenaries, could be shut out. The exiles from Akragas would be there ready to support any demands of Dionysios. To this gathering the general told his story; he spoke much of the conspiracy against him on the part of the enemies of the commonwealth; he at last obtained a vote, authorizing him to pick out from the army six hundred men at pleasure to form his personal body-guard⁵. From that moment we may call him tyrant.

Tale of a conspiracy against him. The body-guard is voted.

¹ Diod. xiii. 95; ἤλπιζε γὰρ τοὺτους [the exiles] συναγαμιστὰς ἔχειν ἐπιθυμούντας μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείους οὐδ' ἦεν εἰς Λεοντίνους.

² Ib.; ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας στρατοπεδεύων, that is outside the city. See vol. i. p. 369.

³ Ib.; κραυγὴν ἐποίησεν καὶ θόρυβον διὰ τῶν ἰδίων οικετῶν· τοῦτο δὲ πράξας συνέφυγεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.

⁴ Ib.; αἶμα δ' ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ πλήθους ἀθροισθέντος εἰς Λεοντίνους.

⁵ Ib.; ἐπεισε τοὺς ὄχλους δοῦναι φύλακας αὐτῷ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἑξακοσίους, οὓς ἂν προαιρῇται.

The one dynasty of tyrants that Syracuse had yet seen was founded by a lord of Gela who was invited to Syracuse as a helper of one of her contending parties, and who made himself absolute master of both. Gelôn had come altogether from outside. Dionysios was a citizen of Syracuse, the chosen general of her armies; but he did not seize the tyranny from within any more than Gelôn; to make himself master of the commonwealth, he too had to put on somewhat of the character of a conqueror from without. It was in the outpost of Leontinoi, not in Ortygia or Achradina, not in the assembly of Syracuse but amidst a mixed multitude of citizens, mercenaries, and exiles, that Dionysios first found himself really master of his native city. With his six hundred ready to do his bidding, he went on to enlarge the numbers of those who were bound not to Syracuse but to Dionysios. He presently chose more than a thousand others, picked out from among the most needy and most daring men in the army¹; these he adorned with the most costly and splendid arms, and bound them to himself by the most lavish promises. He then gathered the mercenaries around him, and made them his own by winning words². To them one cause was the same as another, and the service of a bountiful master might be more attractive than that of a commonwealth. The general mass of the Syracusan army might be harder to deal with; but he did what he could to bring it under his control, by dismissing officers and appointing others as it suited him³. He further sent for the mercenaries who were in garrison at Gela, with their captain the Spartan Dexippos. He had tried Dexippos already⁴, and he had found that he did not suit his purposes; he now sent him back to Peloponnêsos, as

CHAP. IX.
Gelôn and
Dionysios.

He in-
creases his
body-
guard.

He wins
over the
mercen-
aries.

He changes
the Syra-
cusan offi-
cers.

He sends
away Dex-
ippos.

¹ Diod. xiii. 96; τοὺς χρημάτων μὲν ἐνδεεῖς τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ θρασεῖς ἐπιλέξας.

² Ib.; φιλανθρώποις λόγοις χρώμενος ἰδίου κατεσκεύαζε.

³ Ib.; μετετίθει δὲ καὶ τὰς τάξεις, τοῖς πιστοτάτοις τὰς ἡγεμονίας παραδίδους.

⁴ See above, p. 550.

CHAP. IX. a man who was not unlikely to help the people of Syracuse in any efforts to win back their freedom¹. He further gathered together from all quarters men who are described as exiles and godless²—the last epithet is surely not meant to apply to the luckless fugitives from Akragas—and at the head of this mixed force, he marched back to Syracuse. Men's eyes were by this time opened; it was with heavy hearts that the citizens saw the man whom they had trusted and promoted come back to the city in the unmistakeable character of its master. Dionysios now took up his dwelling by the docks in the Great Harbour, between Ortygia and the gate of Achradina. There was now no question as to the political condition of the city. The general with full powers, once supplied with a personal body-guard, had quickly grown into the tyrant; the long reign of the elder Dionysios had begun³.

Reaction against Dionysios.

He dwells by the docks.

His tyranny established.

§ 7. *Dionysios and the War of Gela.*

B. C. 405.

It is curious to see how soon a man possessed, by whatever means, of absolute power, instinctively begins to put on some of the feelings of a prince. Dionysios had sprung from small beginnings; he had no family honours to boast of; but, once lord of Syracuse, he saw that it was likely to serve his turn, and it would be gratifying to his pride, to connect himself as closely as might be with some of the illustrious houses of the city⁴. One of his first acts as

He tries to connect himself with the great families.

¹ Diod. xiii. 96; ὑφειρᾶτο γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, μὴ καιροῦ λαβόμενος ἀνακτήσεται τοῖς Συρακουσίοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. Two pictures of Dexippos seem to have been handed down.

² Ib. πανταχόθεν συνήγε τοὺς φυγάδας καὶ ἀσεβεῖς, ἐλπίζων διὰ τούτων βεβαιωτάτην τηρηθῆσθαι τὴν τυραννίδα.

³ Ib.; κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τῇ ναυστάθμῳ, φανερώς ἑαυτὸν ἀναδείξας τύραννον. See vol. ii. p. 141; Holm, *Topografia*, 243; Lupua, 163.

⁴ Ib.; τοῦτο δ' ἐπραξε βουλόμενος οἰκίαν ἐπίσημον εἰς οἰκειότητα προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ τὴν τυραννίδα ποιῆσαι βεβαίαν.

tyrant was to take to wife the daughter of the most illustrious Syracusan of his time, his old captain, Hermokratês son of Hermôn¹. His own sister he gave in marriage to Polyxenos, brother of the wife of Hermokratês, uncle therefore of his own wife, and no doubt belonging to another family of the old *Gamoroi*. He next called an assembly, and, as our informant puts it, put to death two of the most powerful of the men who had opposed him, Daphnaïos and Dêmarchos. Daphnaïos will be remembered as the Syracusan general before Akragas. He was one of the men against whom Dionysios had been so long bringing charges of treason, one of those who had been deposed to make room for his own first election as general². Daphnaïos, whether guilty or innocent towards Syracuse and Hellas, paid the penalty of opposition to the will of Dionysios. But the most notable thing in this short entry is the seemingly contradictory form of words. Dionysios called an assembly and put Daphnaïos and Dêmarchos to death³. The tyranny, something illegal and extra-legal, did not necessarily sweep away legal forms. Assemblies still met; but they met only to vote as the master of the state dictated. Most likely only the creatures of the tyranny attended; if there was any show of opposition, the body-guard and the mercenaries were ready. But legal forms were doubtless observed; it was in every way the interest of the tyrant to observe them whenever he could. Dionysios' own account of this transaction would doubtless have been that, as general of the Syracusan commonwealth, he summoned the Syracusan people to a lawful assembly; that, in that assembly, whether on his own proposal or on that of any other

CHAP. IX.

He marries the daughter of Hermokratês.

Daphnaïos and Dêmarchos condemned by the assembly.

Assemblies under the tyranny.

¹ On the daughters of Hermokratês, see Appendix XXIX.

² See above, p. 543.

³ Diod. xiii. 96; συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, τοὺς ἀντιπράξαντας αὐτῷ τῶν δυνατοτάτων ὄντας Δαφναίων καὶ Δῆμαρχον ἀνείλε.

CHAP. IX. citizen, Daphnaios and Dêmarchos were condemned to death. The Syracusan assembly under Dionysios was in truth much like an English Parliament under Henry the Eighth; each voted such bills of attainder as its master thought good.

Causes of
submission
to Diony-
sios;
fear of the
mercen-
aries;

of Car-
thage.

Himilkôn
sets forth
from Akra-
gas.
Spring,
405.

He plun-
ders the
Geloan
territory.

He en-
camps near
the temple
of Apollôn.


Two motives are assigned for the submission of the Syracusan people to the yoke which they had unwittingly bound on their own necks. One is the influence of sheer physical force. The city was full of foreign soldiers¹. The power of Dionysios rested mainly on the mercenaries, Greek and barbarian, whom he had taken into his service. Yet this was not all; they had another reason for submission; they feared the vast power of the Carthaginians². That is to say, heavy as was the tyrant's yoke, it was felt that the time of a most dangerous foreign war was not the moment to attempt to shake it off. If Dionysios could be trusted to do anything, it was, men might fairly think, to wage war against Carthage. And the moment was now come for vigorous action. With the beginning of the season of warfare, Himilkôn set forth from the winter-quarters of his army at Akragas to carry his arms against the remaining cities of the south coast. With his whole force he crossed the Himeras, and entered the territory of Gela. He there began a systematic harrying far and wide. He swept the Geloan fields of all their wealth; he then crossed the boundary stream, and carried the like havoc through the lands of Kamarina. Having thus enriched his army with good things of every kind³, he drew near to Gela, and pitched his camp by the river from which the city took its name. This is to be understood of a camp pitched

¹ Diod. xiii. 96; *οἱ Συρακούσιοι βαρέως φέροντες ἡναγκάζοντο τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι περαινὲν ἠδύναντο· ἥ τε γὰρ πόλις ἐγεμεν ὅπλων ξενικῶν.*

² Ib.; *τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐθεδοίκεισαν τηλικαύτας ἔχοντας δυνάμεις.*

³ Ib. 108; *πλήρες ἐποίησε τὸ στράτευμα παντοίας ὠφελείας.*





the right bank of the western branch of the river¹. CHAP. IX.

The site reminds one of the low ground on which Punic armies had encamped before Akragas and on which they were to encamp before Syracuse. But we do not, at this stage at least, hear of pestilence doing its work before Gela, as it did before Akragas and Syracuse. Yet surely no sacrilegious invaders ever better deserved such a visitation than they who directly sinned against the god whose arrows

G I sent forth the pestilence.

The tale of the dealings of Himilkôn and others of his creed with the patron god of Gela is an instructive lesson in The hill of Apollôn. ancient religion. Where the camp of Carthage was pitched, the hill and temple of Apollôn outside the city wall rose straight before the besiegers². The holy place was, it would seem, defended by no Gelœan garrison, but left to the protection of its own holiness. On that hill the The statue. people of Gela had, at the bidding of an oracle, set up a renowned image of the Dorian god, wrought of colossal size in the molten brass³. To the devout worshipper of Baal, the dutiful colonist of Tyre, it seemed a work praiseworthy on every ground to make a prey of this proud badge of the foreign worship, to make it more than a prey, to make it an offering to the mother-city and to the gods of the mother-city⁴. Under the eyes of his worshippers, before the city which he guarded was directly attacked, Apollôn himself was led into captivity. His brazen form was sent as a trophy to Tyre, the offering of a victorious child to comfort the parent from whom dominion and independence had passed

¹ Diod. xiii. 108; ἐν τῇ Γέλῳ πορευθεὶς, παρὰ τὸν ὀρέοντιον ποταμὸν τῇ πόλει κατεστρατοπέδευσε. See vol. i. p. 402. Schubring, Alt. Sicilien, 83; Holm, G. S. ii. 97. Grote (x. 620) could not have understood the ground—he had not many opportunities for so doing—when he placed the camp “between the city and the sea.”

² See vol. i. p. 405.

³ Diodôros here (xiii. 108) mentions the oracle.

⁴ Diod. xiii. 108; συλῆσαντες αὐτὸν ἀπέστειλαν εἰς τὴν Τύρον.

CHAP. IX. away. A day came when the captive god of Hellas was
 Apollôn deemed by his Phœnician gaolers to be acting as the friend
 imprison- of his own people, when the Macedonian chief of Hellas
 ed, and set of his own people, when the Macedonian chief of Hellas
 free by besieged the city of his bondage. Insults and fetters were
 Alexander, heaped on him by the men of Tyre; but great was the
 332. honour of Apollôn, great were the sacrifices and gifts of
 Greek and Alexander and his host, when the god of Gela opened the
 Phœnician gates of Tyre to the victorious Greeks, on the anniversary
 religion. of the day on which Himilkôn had sent him from his
 Sikeliot home into barbarian banishment¹. In this story,
 as in so many others, the inherent opposition between Greek
 and Phœnician religion stands forth in all its fulness. The
 war between Hellas and Canaan is already a foreshadowing
 of the war to be waged in after days on the same soil
 between the later faith of Rome and the later faith of
 Arabia.

Himilkôn's The divine protector of Gela having been thus sent
 camp. away into bondage, Himilkôn went on to strengthen him-
 self by temporal defences. In those days trees grew in the
 Geloan fields; they were cut down through the whole width
 of the plain, and used to make palisades for the Cartha-
 ginian camp². The story reads as if the Punic general
 had not thought such defences needful against possible
 Geloan sallies; but he heard that the lord of Syracuse was
 marching to the relief of Gela, and against him he thought
 it wise to make his camp strong³. Meanwhile within the
 walls everything was made ready for the defence. In the
 face of so great and threatening a danger, a vote was
 passed to send the women and children for safety to Syra-
 cuse. But the vote was repealed when the women of Gela

Prepara-
 tions with-
 in the city.

¹ Diod. xiii. 96; he comes back to the story in his account of the siege of Tyre, xvii. 41, 46. In one place he calls the statue *ξύανον*, a name which hardly applies. The delivered god was called *Ἀπόλλων φιλαλέξανδρος*.

² Diod. xiii. 108; *δενδροτομοῦντες τὴν χώραν*.

³ Ib.; *προσιδέχοντο γὰρ τὸν Διονύσιον ἤξειν μετὰ δυνάμεως πολλῆς βοηθήσοντα τοῖς κινδυνεύουσιν*.

crowded round the altars in the *agora*, and prayed that they might be allowed to share the fate of their husbands¹. The Geloan army was then marshalled; as many companies as might be were formed, and the men were sent forth to different quarters for service of different kinds in the warfare which now began². Some were sent forth in parties out of the city, and by their knowledge of the country they were able to cut off the stragglers of the besieging army, daily killing many and taking many alive. Others did their duty on the walls, as the many divisions of the Punic army, each in its turn, were brought up to attack the city, bringing the rams to bear upon its defences. Our guide has a word of praise for the stout hearts of those who so well defended a city of no great strength³. The long low hill of Gela, a hill largely of crumbling earth, would doubtless present more weak points for attack than Himilkôn had been able to find in the walls of Akragas grounded on the solid rock, and in many places skirting the edge of steep and lofty cliffs. The wall gave way at many points; but what was broken down in the day was built up again in the night. The men of military age kept up a gallant defence. The women, children, and other non-combatants took their share of the work by helping on the building, and doing whatever was needed for the comfort and relief of the actual soldiers.

CHAP. IX.
Zeal of the
women.

The
engines
against the
walls.

Military
weakness
of Gela.

Zealous
defence.

Thus far the Geloans, without the help of a single ally⁴, bore up bravely against the vast host that was brought against them. But now a force came to their help, which, one would have thought, was specially called on to renew

March of
Dionysios.

¹ Diod. xiii. 108; ἐπὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν βωμοὺς καταφυγουσῶν καὶ δεομένων τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς ἀνδράσι τύχῃς κοινωνήσαι.

² Ib.; τάξεις ποιησάμενοι πλείστας, κατὰ μέρος τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν.

³ Ib.; γενναῖος ἤμυνοντο . . . ἐδίξαντο τὴν ἰφοδὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐρώστας . . . πόλιν ἀνόχυρον ἔχοντες, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Ib.; συμμάχων ὄντες ἔρημοι.

CHAP. IX. the glories of the day of Himera. As on that day, a lord of Syracuse came to the help of a Greek city threatened with overthrow by Phœnician hands. And this time it was the native city of Gelôn himself that was threatened. It was the first warfare of Dionysios in his character of tyrant, his first warfare in his character of sole general of Syracuse. He had been placed in that office expressly as the successor of Gelôn, to do again the work that Gelôn had once done so well¹. A strange destiny had thus speedily raised the clerk, the private soldier, the persuasive demagogue, to the place of captain-general of Western Hellas. The Greeks of Italy—the particular cities are not named—had sent a force to fight in the common cause of Greece. They and the Sikeliot allies all put themselves under the command of the lord of Syracuse². Dionysios further called out his mercenaries and the more part of the citizens of Syracuse of the military age. The numbers are variously reckoned at thirty and fifty thousand foot, with a thousand horse—a somewhat small proportion for Syracuse—and fifty iron-clad ships³. We get our first picture of those great gatherings of fighting-men of various kinds, at the head of which the master of Syracuse was to give a new start to the art of war in every shape.

Dionysios' use of arms of various kinds. Reinforce-ments from Italy.

Dionysios encamps near the lake.

His delay.

Fleet and army went on in concert till they reached a point near the shore to the east of Gela, between the lake and the city, on the left bank of the eastern branch of the river⁴. The professed object of Dionysios was to continue the combined action of his land and sea force, and for both to attack the enemy at once. He delayed however in a somewhat strange way. As in a friendly country, he did

¹ See above, p. 553.

² The language of Diodôros, xiii. 109, is remarkable—*μεταπεμφόμενος παρὰ τῶν ἐξ Ἰταλίας Ἑλλήνων βοήθειαν*. But we have seen already (see above, p. 547) that Syracuse had a certain supremacy during the war.

³ Diod. xiii. 109; *ναῦς καταφράκτους πενήκοντα*.

⁴ *Ib.*; *κατεστρατοπέδευσε παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν*. See Appendix XXX.

not allow his light-armed troops to seek for provisions in the already wasted Geloan fields; his plan was by means of his ships and horsemen to cut off the supplies which were brought to the besieging camp from the Carthaginian territory¹. This would imply that the horsemen were sent round to cut off anything that might be brought from that territory by way of Akragas. It was not till after twenty days had been spent in this way with no great result that Dionysios at last determined on a general attack on the besiegers of Gela. The army was parted into three divisions, to march by three different roads. The Syracusans and other Sikeliots were to take the inland road, leaving the city to their left, and to attack the Punic camp from the eastern side. He himself, with his mercenaries, would enter Gela by the eastern gate; they would pass through the city to join its defenders at the point where the enemy's engines were being brought to bear on the walls². This would imply that the stress of the Carthaginian attack was made on the western part of the city, the part nearest to the Carthaginian camp. The Italiots meanwhile were to march between the sea and the walls of the city—one wonders whether the path was as sandy then as it is now. The fleet, acting in concert with them, was to attack the least strongly defended end of the Punic camp, the western end namely, the one turned away from the city. The horsemen meanwhile were to wait till the other divisions had set out; they were then to cross the stream of Gelas and ride across the plain to watch the state of things. If they saw their comrades on foot getting the better, they were to join in the fight; if they saw them giving way, they were to come to their help³.

CHAP. IX.

His plan of attack on the Punic camp.

The three divisions. The Sikeliots.

Himself with the mercenaries.

The Italiots;

the fleet;

the horsemen.

¹ Diod. xiii. 109; τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἡγωνίζετο καὶ τὴν χώραν οὐκ εἰς προνομέεσθαι, τοῖς δ' ἰππεῦσι καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπειράτο τὰς ἀγορὰς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰς κομζομένας τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπικρατείας.

² Ib. See Appendix XXX.

³ Ib. On all these arrangements see Appendix XXX.

CHAP. IX.

Attack of
the fleet
and the
Italians.

The scheme, as a scheme, seems to have been well devised; the question is whether its author was so zealous in carrying it out as some parts of his army certainly were. The foremost were those who had the longest way to go, the Italians and the sea-force. They made their attack in concert at two different points on the two sides of the hill of Apollôn. The crews of the ships were the first to land, seemingly at a point to the west of the hill, by the mouth of a small stream which most likely marks the most western of the lost mouths of the river Gelas¹. The more part of the Punic force hastened to the shore to hinder their landing. They thus left another point of their camp open to the attack of the Italians, whose march along the coast led them to that mouth of the Gelas which forms the modern *Torrente* just at the time when the ships had reached the further point. They thus found the camp left with but few defenders, and were able to force their way into it.

The Ital-
ians driven
back.

When the Carthaginians by the shore knew of this, the more part of their force turned to the rescue of the camp, and, after a hard struggle, they succeeded in driving the Italians out of it. Many were driven into the ditch by the multitude of the barbarians who pressed upon them². The Iberians and Campanians were foremost in the work; the barbarians of Italy doubtless felt a special call to be the chastisers of the Greeks of Italy³. With a loss of a thousand men, the Italians were driven towards the city; but a shower of arrows from the ships—sailing doubtless eastward to their help—hindered their enemies from pursuing them, and the remnant made their way safely to Gela⁴.

The men of Greek Italy had thus had to bear the brunt

¹ Diod. xiii. 110. See vol. i. p. 401, and Appendix XXX.

² Ib.; τῶ πλῆθει τῶν βαρβάρων καταπονούμενοι.

³ Ib.; οἱ δὲ Ἰβηρες καὶ Καμπανοὶ . . . βαρεῖς ἐπικείμενοι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας Ἑλλήσι.

⁴ Ib.; τῶν δ' ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνειργόντων τοξέεσσι τοὺς διώκοντας. See Appendix XXX.

of the struggle against the overwhelming numbers of the Punic host. The Geloans themselves gave them some help, but not much; they were afraid to leave the ramparts of the city undefended¹. There is something more suspicious in the failure of the Syracusans and other Sikeliots, and above all of the mercenaries under the tyrant's immediate command, to reach their side of the Carthaginian camp in time to give any help to the gallant assault of the Italiots. They had a shorter and, one would think, an easier course before them; yet the Italiots were at their appointed place before them. Perhaps indeed they had been already driven out of the camp on the western side before the Syracusans came to assault it on the eastern side. If however it was through any trick of Dionysios that the Syracusans failed to reach the camp in time for a joint attack, no blame could attach to the mass of the Syracusan and Sikeliot force. They fought well against the Africans who came forth to oppose them; they slew many of them, and drove the rest back to their camp. By this time the Italiots had reached the city, and the Spaniards and Campanians, no longer within reach of the archers on shipboard or on the shore, were free to act. They now set on the victorious Sikeliots, and at this stage the native Carthaginians are specially mentioned². Perhaps under the immediate leadership of Himilkôn, they joined in the attack on the Sikeliots. These too, like the Italiots, were driven back to the city with the loss of six hundred men. The horsemen meanwhile, seeing the defeat of their comrades, but seeing also their escape to the city, followed them into Gela, with the enemy pressing hard after them.

The Italiots had done their work manfully. So had the

¹ Diod. xiii. 110; οἱ Γελῶται μέχρι τινὸς ἐπεβήσαντες ἐπεβοήθουν κατὰ βραχὺν τόπον τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις, ἐλαβοῦμενοι λιπεῖν τὴν τῶν τευχῶν φυλακὴν διόπερ ὑστέρουν τῆς βοήθειας.

² Ib.; τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ Καμπανῶν ἔτι δὲ Καρχηδονίων παραβοηθούσαντων τοῖς Λίβυσι.

CHAP. IX.
Failure of
the Sikel-
iots and
mercen-
aries to co-
operate
with the
Italiots.

Suspicious
against
Dionysios.

The Sikel-
iots fight
well, but
are driven
back.

The native
Cartha-
ginians.

CHAP. IX.
Action of
Dionysios
and the
mercen-
aries.

Dionysios
in Gela.

Probable
treason of
Dionysios.

Sikeliota no less, as far as they had been able to do any work at all. Both had fought well as separate divisions. Was it chance, was it one man's fault, that those divisions, failing to act in concert, had each yielded to overwhelming numbers? The tyrant's own course meanwhile is by no means equally clear. With his mercenaries he entered the town of Gela, the town which had lately hailed him as its deliverer. His business now was to deliver Gela again. While the other divisions attacked the Carthaginian camp, he was to drive away the assailants of Gela from her walls. He at least, most likely his mercenaries also, must have known the topography of the town. And Gela must at all times have mainly consisted of one long street along the ridge of the hill, with little room for any perplexing labyrinth of ways on either side. Yet the story reads as if it were alleged that the immediate soldiers of Dionysios were hindered from taking any part in the work though the difficulties of the way through the town of Gela. They could not, from some cause not clearly explained, hasten, as they longed to do, to the place of battle¹. A few days later Dionysios was charged by his enemies with having betrayed Gela. And things certainly look as if the hindrance to the advance of the mercenaries, the failure of the Syracusans to act in concert with the Italiots, were both due to no other cause than the will of the master of Syracuse. Certain it is that Dionysios and the mercenaries had no share in the battle, and that, while both Italiots and Sikeliota suffered heavy loss, no man of the mercenaries was slain². All that we read is the strange tale that Dionysios passed through the city with difficulty, and finding his army defeated, came back within the walls³.

¹ Diod. xiii. 110; οἱ μετὰ Διονυσίου μισθοφόροι μόλις διεπορεύοντο τὰς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὁδοὺς, οὐ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν ἐπισπεύσαι. So, at the end of the chapter, Διονύσιος μόγις διελθὼν τὴν πόλιν.

² Ib. 112; τὸ μηδένα πεπτωκέναι τῶν μισθοφόρων.

³ Ib. 110; ὡς κατέλαβε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἡλαττωμένον, τότε μὲν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν ἀνεχώρησε.

His conduct after the battle was such as to strengthen any suspicion against him. He at once called a council of his friends¹—a body where Philistos must have been among the foremost—and we are told that every voice declared that Gela was an unfit place for risking a decisive action with the enemy². Towards evening he sent a herald to the Carthaginian camp, asking, in the usual Greek fashion, for the burial of the dead³. We are not told what was the answer of Himilkôn, and Dionysios clearly did not wait any more than Dioklês had done for the performance of any funeral rites. The request seems to have been simply a blind, a blind rather for Sikeliot than for Punic eyes. The decision of the private council was carried out at once. Gela was to be forsaken, not only of her armed defenders, but like Akragas, of her own people. We are told, in few and pithy words, that Dionysios sent the multitude out of the city at the first watch of the night⁴. At midnight he himself followed, leaving only two thousand light-armed in Gela. These had orders to kindle many fires and to make all possible noise⁵, so that the besiegers might believe that the city was still occupied by the whole army. With the dawn of day they too set forth to follow their master; Gela was left without a man of the force which had come to relieve her. When the Carthaginians knew what had happened, they removed their camp to the city, and plundered whatever they found in the houses⁶.

CHAP. IX.

His council;

Gela to be forsaken.

Dionysios sends the Geloans away.

He follows with his army.

The Carthaginians enter Gela.

¹ Diod. xiii. 111; τῶν φίλων συναγαγὼν συνέδριον, Cf. above, p. 431, for the *conciliabula* of Hermokratês.

² Ib.; πάντων λεγόντων ἀνεπιτήδειον εἶναι τὸν τόπον περὶ τῶν ὅλων κρίνεσθαι.

³ Ib. ἀπέστειλε κήρυκα πρὸς τὴν ἐσπέραν περὶ τῆς εἰς αὐρίον ἀναιρέσεως τῶν νεκρῶν. This is all.

⁴ Ib. τὸν μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὄχλον περὶ τὴν πρώτην φυλακὴν τῆς νυκτὸς ἐξαπέστειλεν.

⁵ Ib.; πυρὰ καίειν δι' ὅλης τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ θορυβοποιεῖν. For the fires compare the action of Nikias in p. 381. The retreating Athenians hardly had spirits for the process of *θορυβοποιεῖν*.

⁶ Ib.; τὰ περιλειφθέντα κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας διήρπασαν.

CHAP. IX.

Flight
from Gela
and Kama-
rina.

Kamarina
forsaken at
Dionysios'
order.

Sympathy
of the
soldiers.

The details of the flight from Gela are mixed up with the like details of the flight to which the people of another city were driven at the same moment. For the march of Dionysios led him by Kamarina, and there he compelled the whole people to set forth for Syracuse, with their women and children. Their fear of the barbarians made them willing to obey, and eager not to put off their flight for a moment. For everywhere men remembered the fate of Selinous, Himera, and Akragas, and they saw the merciless cruelty of the Carthaginians to all who now fell into their hands. Of their sufferings new and full details are given. At Selinous and Himera our accounts are vague; the captives of Gela and Kamarina had to undergo intolerable insults and torments, reaching to the height of impalement or crucifixion¹. The road to Syracuse was covered with the hapless crowds fleeing from Gela and Kamarina. Some took with them their gold and silver and whatever else of their goods they could carry; others thought not of their goods, but only of finding a place of shelter for their parents or their little children². And not a few of the sick and aged who had no friends or kinsfolk to care for them were, as at Akragas, left behind, fearing every moment that the barbarians would be upon them³. Gela and Kamarina had doubtless shared in their measure in the wealth and luxury of Akragas, and the sudden change from such a life to the state of homeless fugitives was strange and shocking to those who looked on as well as to those who had to endure it. The soldiers grieved as they saw the crowds of women and children, the boys and maidens of good birth, toiling along the road, shorn of all attendance and with all reserve

¹ Diod. xiii. 111; οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς φειδῶ τῶν ἀλικομένων, ἀλλ' ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἡττηθέντων οὐδὲ μὲν ἀνεσταύρουσι, οὐδ' ἀφορήτους ἐπέγγον ὕβρεις.

² Ib.; τινὲς δὲ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνα τὰ νήπια λαβόντες ἔφευγον, οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὴν χρημάτων ποιοῦμενοι.

³ Ib. Cf. the Athenian retreat, above, p. 368.

cast aside¹. They grieved as they saw aged men striving with efforts beyond their feeble strength to keep up with the pace of vigorous youth. Sorrow like unto their sorrow they had never seen. CHAP. IX.

But there were those who saw the sight and did more than grieve². There was the sorrow; on whom lay the guilt of it? The cry rose high against Dionysios as the author of all this grief. He had betrayed Gela and Kamarina to the barbarians. He had done it all by agreement with the barbarians, in order that, supported by the fear of Carthage, he might reign over Syracuse and the other Sikeliot cities which were still left. The evidence against him was clear. Every act of the last few weeks and days proved his guilt³. Why had he so delayed in bringing help to Gela? How was it that, while other divisions of the army had suffered severe loss, not a man of his own mercenaries had fallen? Why had he constrained the people of Gela and Kamarina to flee in such haste? No hopeless blow had fallen even upon Gela, and Kamarina had not even been attacked. Above all, how came it that the Carthaginians had not pursued the army, that they had not pursued the fugitives? The guilt of the tyrant was clear. He who had been foremost to denounce the neglect of the Syracusan generals in the relief of Akragas had now done far worse than those whom he denounced. Gela, the city which he had professed to defend, Kamarina which had not as yet stood in need of defenders, were the price which he had treacherously paid to win barbarian help for the support of his own unlawful power. By the favour of the gods his crimes had been revealed; the hour

Wrath
against
Dionysios.

Evidence
of his
treason.

¹ Diod. xiii. 111; *ἑώραν γὰρ παῖδας ἐλευθέρους καὶ παρθένους ἐπιγάμους, ἀναξίως τῆς ἡλικίας, ὥς ἔτυχε, κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὠρμημένους, ἐπειδὴ τὴν σεμνότητα καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἐντροπὴν ὁ καιρὸς ἀφῆρείτο.*

² Ib.; *ἃ θεωροῦντες οἱ στρατιῶται δι' ὀργῆς μὲν εἶχον τὸν Διονύσιον, ἡλείουν δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀκληρούντων τύχας.*

³ Ib. 112. The points are given in order.

CHAP. IX. had come when all who had been looking out for a means of deliverance should work together to bring about the overthrow of the tyrant's dominion¹.

The Italiots
go home.

Revolt of
the Syra-
cusan
horsemen.

They ride
to Syra-
cuse.

They are
admitted
at the gate.

The first sign of the feeling against Dionysios was the act of the Italiots, the division of the army which had fought the best and suffered the most heavily in the battle before Gela. They forsook him on the march, and went off through the inland country towards the strait. The enemies of Dionysios in his own city were not satisfied with such a negative sign of discontent. The Syracusan horsemen, who had been constrained to play a somewhat ignoble part before Gela, now deemed that the time was come when a bold stroke might get rid at once of the tyrant and of the tyranny. They hoped at first to find an opportunity of slaying Dionysios on the march; but he was too well guarded by his mercenaries for any chance of that kind². With one consent therefore they rode with all speed to Syracuse. They hoped to upset the tyranny in the absence of the tyrant, and to defy him on his return in the name of a restored, perhaps an aristocratic, commonwealth. Their course naturally led them to that quarter of the city where revolutions now commonly happened. For them, men fresh from the army, high in rank in the army, coming, it might be supposed, at Dionysios' own bidding, the gate of Achradina stood open; they were admitted without suspicion. Within the gate, they were hard by the docks, the immediate seat of the tyrant's power, where he had fixed his own dwelling-place³. Those who were left

¹ Diod. xiii. 112; ὥστε τοῖς πρότερον ἐπιθυμοῦσι καιρὸν λαβεῖν τῆς ἀποστάσεως, καθάπερ θεῶν προνοία πάντας ὑπουργεῖν πρὸς τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς δυναστείας.

² Ib.; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπετήρουν, εἰ δύναντο κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἀνελεῖν τὸν τύραννον· ὅς δὲ ἑώραν οὐκ ἀπολιπόντας αὐτὸν τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἀφίππευσαν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας.

³ Ib.; καταλαβόντες τοὺς ἐν τοῖς νεαρίοις ἀγροῦντας τὰ περὶ τὴν Γέλαν.

in charge there knew nothing of what had happened at Gela, and offered no opposition to the horsemen. But the first act of newly recovered freedom did not augur well. The deliverers burst into the tyrant's house; they plundered it of all the silver and gold and other wealth which he had already heaped together. But they went on to deal cruelly and shamefully by his newly-married wife, whom one would have thought that Syracusans of equestrian rank would have respected as the daughter of Hermokratēs¹. She died, perhaps by her own hand; and from this time the maltreatment of the women of the house of a fallen enemy became almost as common a feature in the revolutions of Syracuse as it was in the revolutions of any Eastern court². Its one effect was of course to make party strife yet more bitter. By Dionysios, a temperate and domestic tyrant, the wrong done to his wife was keenly felt, and it stirred him up to fiercer revenge. We are not told what other steps were taken by the liberators. They deemed that they had succeeded in their enterprise; they deemed that by the loss of Syracuse following at once upon the failure at Gela, the power of the tyrant was altogether broken. They trusted that he would not venture either to come back to Syracuse or to abide with the army. They gave out that Dionysios had pretended that the Carthaginians had been defeated and had fled. However this might be, they added, with

CHAP. IX.

They plunder the house of Dionysios.

Maltreatment of his wife.

General treatment of women.

Hopes and rumours.

εἰσῆλθον οὐδενὸς καλῶσαντος. This almost reads as if some words had dropped out. At any rate we see the nearness of the tyrant's quarters to the gate.

¹ Diod. xiii. 112; *τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα συλλαβόντες, οὕτω διέθεσαν κακῶς ὥστε καὶ τὸν τύραννον βαρίως ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν ὀργήν, νομίζοντες τὴν ταύτης τιμωρίαν μεγίστην εἶναι πῖστιν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας κατὰ τὴν ἐπίθεσιν.* In xiv. 44 she is spoken of as *κατὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῶν ἱππέων ἀνερρημένη.* Plut. Dion 3: *δεινὰς καὶ παρανόμους ὑβρεῖς εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθύβρισαν, ἐφ' οἷς προήκατο τὸν βίον ἱκονσίαις.* On another, imaginary, daughter of Hermokratēs, who became the subject of one of the later Greek novels, see Appendix XXIX.

² See Grote, xi. 257.

CHAP. IX. perfect truth, that the Syracusans, under his leadership, were the defeated side¹.

Dionysios
hastens to
Syracuse.

But for the energy of Dionysios the revolted horsemen of Syracuse were no match. As soon as the tyrant heard what had happened in the city, he saw that the only way to maintain his power was to strike a blow as sudden as that which his enemies had struck. He must show himself where he was even less looked for than they had been. He chose a body of men in whom he could trust, a hundred horse and six hundred foot, none of them, we may be sure, citizens of Syracuse.

He reaches
the gate.

At the head of the most active of these, he made a march of four hundred stadia as quickly as might be. It was in the dead of the night when he came before the gate of Achradina. It was of course shut. Whether he demanded admittance and was refused, or whether he chose the course which he took as that which would cause the greatest surprise, his next step was to burn the gate. To that end he got together a vast heap of the tall reeds which grow so plentifully in the marshy ground about Syracuse, and which are used for many purposes². The fire burned merrily before the gate; while it was blazing, Dionysios waited for the coming of the rest of his following. At last the gate gave way before the flames, and Dionysios was again in Syracuse.

Burning
of the gate.

The horse-
men meet
Dionysios
in the
agora.

The force at the head of which he came was not large, but the ill-luck or the folly of his enemies made it irresistible. As soon as the news reached them, the leaders of the horsemen, that is, the richest and best-born men in Syracuse, went forth at once to meet the tyrant, perhaps without waiting for the whole of their own body, certainly without

¹ Diod. xiii. 112; *ἔφασαν αὐτὸν ἐκ μὲν Γέλας προσποιηθῆναι τοὺς Φοίνικας ἀποδιδράσκειν, νυνὶ δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀποδεδρακέναι τοὺς Συρακουσίους.*

² Ib. 113; *ἦν [τὴν πύλην] καταλαβὼν κεκλεισμένην, προσέθηκεν αὐτῇ τὸν κατακεκομμένον ἐκ τῶν ἐλῶν κάλαμον, ᾧ χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν οἱ Συρακοῖσιοι πρὸς τὴν τῆς κονίας σύνδεσιν.* This is surely a touch from an eyewitness and actor.

any attempt to call the mass of the people to their help. CHAP. IX.
 Was this mere haste or foolhardiness, or was it aristocratic scorn of the commons? Or did the leaders of the revolt know that the mass of the people was not on their side? The commons of Syracuse were perhaps not greatly drawn to such deliverers as they had just now got, and they may have thought that a change from tyranny to oligarchy would be no gain. In any case it was only a very small body of the leading horsemen who came as far as the *agora* to meet Dionysios in arms. There they met him marching through Achradina¹. It was a massacre rather than a battle which followed on a spot so rich in revolutionary scenes. The horsemen were so few that no real fighting was needed to get rid of them. They were easily surrounded and shot down by the tyrant's mercenaries². Their motives.
 Dionysios then marched through the city; a few who came out to withstand him without discipline or union were easily slain. He then went round to the houses of those whom he knew to be the most opposed to him. They are surrounded and shot down.
 Many were taken; but even now Dionysios made distinctions; some were killed at once; others were only driven out. A body of the horsemen contrived to escape out of the city³. Vengeance of Dionysios.

Such was the night's work. By the morning light, the whole body of the mercenaries and the mass of the Sikeliot allies had reached Syracuse. The men of Gela and Kamarina, whose wrongs had been the immediate occasion of the whole movement against Dionysios, did not dare to put Flight of the surviving horsemen.
Approach of the rest of the army.

¹ Diod. xiii. 113; εἰσήλθαι δὲ τῆς Ἀχραδίνης. This is clearly (see vol. ii. p. 444) the Lower Achradina. The gate, the docks, and the *agora* are all near together.

² Ib.; ἦσαν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν, καὶ περικλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἀπαντες κατηκοντίσθησαν. They were ὀλίγοι παντελῶς.

³ Ib.; τοῖς τε σποράδην ἐκβοηθοῦντας ἀνείλε καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τῇ τυραννίᾳ διακειμένων ἐπήγει τὰς οἰκίας, ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξέβαλε.

CHAP. IX. themselves in his power by entering Syracuse. At the head of the rest of his following, Syracusan, Sikeliot, and mercenary, Dionysios was again undisputed lord of the city. Over the whole extent of its subject and dependent lands his dominion was less certain. The fugitives from Gela and Kamarina betook themselves to Leontinoi, there to join the Akragantine remnant who could hardly be reckoned any longer as partisans of Dionysios¹. The horsemen who escaped from the city found another place of shelter, which they made the centre of all opposition to the tyrant. They fled to Inessa, a place which we saw a few years back in the condition of a Sikel town controlled by a Syracusan garrison. In that character it had done good service for Syracuse in the Athenian war². From henceforth it appears as *Ætna*, the name which it had borne from the time when it became the refuge of the last Deinomenid ruler to the time when it became the firstfruits of the restored Sikel dominion of Ducetius³. In Syracusan mouths, in Greek mouths generally, it may have been *Ætna* all along, as an alternative name with the Sikel Inessa. Henceforth we hear only of *Ætna*; that is the name on its coins of later date⁴. Of its Sikel inhabitants at this moment we hear nothing; the light in which *Ætna* just now shows itself is that of a place where Syracusans dissatisfied with the rule of Dionysios could set up a separate Syracusan community of their own. It is, in a better cause, what Eleusis was to Athens after the overthrow of the Thirty⁵. Leontinoi, grown again into something more than a Syracusan outpost, *Ætna* held by

Restoration of the power of Dionysios.

The Ge-loans and Kamari-naians go to Leontinoi.

The horsemen flee to Inessa or *Ætna*.

Name of *Ætna*.

Ætna centre of opposition to Dionysios.

Position of Dionysios towards

¹ Diod. xiii. 113; Γελῶται δὲ καὶ Καμαρινῶται τῷ Διονυσίῳ διαφορῶς ἔχοντες, ἐς Λεοντίνους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

² See above, pp. 35, 205.

³ See vol. ii. pp. 322, 368.

⁴ Coins of Sicily, 4; Head, 104. The coins of this *Ætna* begin in Timoleon's day, and must be distinguished from coins (see Coins of Sicily, 43; Head, 114) which belong to the Hieronian *Ætna* at Katané. There seem to be no coins with the name of Inessa.

⁵ See Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 39, 43; Grote, viii. 380-383. Cf. the secession from Gela to Maktōrion in vol. ii. p. 101.

a garrison no longer at the command of the existing powers of Syracuse, were difficulties with which the new master of Syracuse had to grapple from the first moment of his dominion.

CHAP. IX.
Leontinoi
and Ætna.

The suspicion of treacherous dealing with the enemy which had led to the late outbreak against the tyrant was presently confirmed by the negotiations which followed the restoration of his power. Himilkôn at once sent a herald to Syracuse, calling, with barbarian pride, on the vanquished to accept terms of peace¹. Dionysios gladly accepted the offer. That is to say, the negotiation now was a sheer pretence. The whole thing, we may be sure, had been arranged before the tyrant's march to Gela. A treaty was now agreed on between Dionysios and Carthage, every word of which, even in the shape in which we have it, is worthy of careful study, but of which we specially wish to see the exact words which were graven on the stone. We should like to know in what form of words Dionysios contracted on behalf of the people whom he held in bondage, and yet more should we like to know whether such terms as he agreed to received the formal consent of even the most submissive of assemblies. And we might ask further by whom, besides Dionysios himself, the treaty was, according to custom, sworn to on the Syracusan side. On all these points our grievous lack of Syracusan documents forbids us to do more than guess. Of the terms of the treaty we have a report, not very satisfactory certainly, but which is likely to be accurate in the main points². The usual engagement for the restoration of ships and prisoners on both sides does not fail to be found in it; it is the graver and more special clauses of the

Negotiations with
Carthage.

Message
from Himilkôn.

The
Treaty.

Its constitutional
aspect.

Report of
Diodōros.

¹ Diod. xiii. 114; *ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι.*

² *Ib.*; See Appendix XXXI.

CHAP. IX.
Comparison
with the Peace
of Antalkidas.

*Uti
possidetis.*

Acknowledgement
of Dionysios by
Carthage.
Carthage acknow-
ledged
mistress of
Greek
cities.

Various
relations
of the
dependent
cities.

Case of
Therma.

Gela and
Kamarina.
Distinction
of subjects

treaty which give it its character. The peace between Dionysios and Carthage more than forestalled on Sicilian ground the disgraceful surrender of Greek cities to the barbarian which several years later was the main article of the Peace of Antalkidas on Asiatic ground. The peace which the King sent down¹, the peace of which Sparta under Agêsilaos was not ashamed to be the executor, was the fellow to the peace which Himilkôn sent to Dionysios. The principle of the treaty was simple. Each of the high contracting parties was guaranteed in all that he had already grasped. Dionysios was acknowledged by Carthage as lord of Syracuse—one would like to see the style and title in Greek and Phœnician—and Carthage was acknowledged by Dionysios as mistress of all the Greek cities on the northern and southern coasts of Sicily. Never yet had Hellas received such a blow since Greeks first ceased to be free², since the Greek cities of Asia passed under the power, first of the Lydian and then of the Persian.

But, if the general principle of the treaty is simple, there is much that is both instructive and puzzling in the details. While so many cities are brought under some measure or other of Carthaginian authority, the exact relation to the ruling city was not to be the same in each case. By the terms of the treaty, in our report of them, Carthage was to keep, not only her ancient Phœnician dependencies, but her conquests, Greek and barbarian. "Sikans, Selinuntines, and Akragantines"—such is the strange grouping of the treaty—"and moreover the Himeraians³." These last of course are the men of the Himeraian Therma; but one would like to know what was the actual word used in the document. Besides these, the Geloans and Kamarinaians are to dwell in unvalled towns, and to pay tribute to Carthage. A distinction is here clearly drawn between direct subjects of

¹ Xen. Hell. v. i. 30, 35; ἡ εἰρήνη ἣν κατένευθε βασιλεῖς.

² Herod. i. 6.

³ See Appendix XXXI.

Carthage and mere tributaries. Selinous and Akragas, or what was left of them, enter into the relation of subjects, Gela and Kamarina only into that of tributaries. The tributary relation was one degree less degrading. The cities that entered into it would remain distinct, though dependent, communities; they would keep their own laws and magistrates, only paying a stipulated sum to the ruling city. The price of such half-freedom was that, in order to hinder revolts against the ruling city, they were to remain unwallled towns incapable of defence. But Selinous, Akragas, and Himera or Therma, became, not merely tributary to Carthage, but actual Carthaginian possessions. Carthage could, if she pleased, hold and garrison them as parts of her own territory, more strictly her own than Panormos or Motya. Hence there is nothing said about the towns remaining unwallled. It may well be that Selinous kept the wall of Hermokratès, that Akragas kept the elder wall of Thêrôn. But those walls now became bulwarks of Phœnician power, no longer defences against it.

CHAP. IX.
and tribu-
taries.

Tributaries
unwallled.

Selinous,
Akragas,
and Ther-
ma abso-
lutely
subject.

Another point to be noticed in the language of the treaty is that the Old-Phœnician towns of Sicily are spoken of, not only as dependencies of Carthage, but as her ancient colonies¹. One would again like to see both the Greek and the Phœnician text; one wishes to know whether the phrase is due to the craft of the diplomatist or to the carelessness of the historian. Either cause is quite possible. Diodôros was always capable of a confusion; and the art, not always unsuccessful, of trying to change facts by giving them more convenient names was doubtless already known at Carthage. In either case the employment of such a style is remarkable. It marks the effect of the late successes of Carthage on Phœnician as well as on Greek cities. It marks the last stage in the gradual fall of Panormos, Motya, and Solous, from independent commonwealths to mere

Position of
the Old-
Phœnician
cities;
called
colonies
of Car-
thage.

Effects
of Cartha-
ginian ad-
vance on
the Phœni-
cian cities.

¹ See Appendix XXXI.

CHAP. IX. possessions of a sister colony. They are now put on a level with the newly won Greek territory of Carthage. If they kept any shadow of freedom after this, it must have been simply municipal. It is further to be noticed that, at least as the treaty has come down to us, these Phœnician dependencies of Carthage in Sicily are not mentioned by name. This again may be the confusion of the historian; yet diplomatists in all ages have found that a certain vagueness of language often serves their purposes very happily. So again, in a document which is evidently meant as a settlement of all Sicily, we are struck by the absence of any mention of the Elymian towns. But any mention of them was needless. Segesta had become, by its own act, a dependency of Carthage¹. Eryx could have kept no independence after the submission of Segesta. It must have been now that it became a part of the Carthaginian dominion, where Carthaginian *Shophetim* held the highest magistracy, and where another Himilkôn from him of our story paid his vows to Ashtoreth on her own mountain². Subjects of Carthage both Segesta and Eryx had now become; but it would be yet more strange to speak of them as her colonies than to apply that name to the Phœnician cities.

No mention of the Elymian towns.

Guaranties of the independence of the Sikels, and of Leontinoi and Messana.

Thus far Carthage negotiated directly in her own interest. Some lands and cities were to be her immediate subjects; others were to be her tributaries. But the whole of Sicily has not yet been provided for. Clauses follow to secure the independence of some parts and the bondage of others. "The Leontines, the Messanians, and all the Sikels, shall be independent³." These provisions must have been most bitter restrictions on the ambition of the tyrant of Syracuse. Conquest at the expense of the Sikels of the interior and of the Greeks of the east coast was the most obvious form of aggrandizement that was open to him. All

¹ See above, p. 450.

² See Appendix XXXI.

³ See Appendix XXXI.

Sikel conquest is now forbidden; as for the Greeks, no CHAP. IX. guaranty of independence is given to the late Chalkidian enemies of Syracuse at Naxos and Katanè. But any action against them is made far more difficult by the guaranty Special importance of the guaranty of Leontinoi. which is given of the independence of Leontinoi. This last was the sharpest cut that could be dealt against any lord of Syracuse, against any commonwealth of Syracuse. Not only was a barrier set up against Syracusan advance to the north, but an actual part of the Syracusan territory was taken away, to form, as in past times, an independent commonwealth of Leontinoi. The new citizens of Leontinoi were the fugitives from Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina. It was before the power of Carthage, the destroyer or subduer of their old homes, that they had fled. The Akragantine fugitives, once zealous supporters of Dionysios, had ceased to be so; the fugitives from Gela and Kamarina had gone to Leontinoi in the character of his open enemies. But Carthage could now take up the cause of her own victims and could guarantee their independence, as a means of putting a further restraint on the advance of Syracuse or her master.

Yet, among so much that was directly designed to weaken Guaranty of the power of Dionysios at Syracuse. the powers of Dionysios, there was one clause specially for his advantage. His dominion was to be carefully hemmed in between the independent commonwealth of Leontinoi, the Carthaginian tributaries at Kamarina, and the free Sikels who fringed the territory between those two points. But within those bounds he was to be acknowledged and to be supported. The words of the treaty in our copy stand thus; "And the Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysios ¹." That is to say, Carthage gives Dionysios a guaranty of the tyranny. He is to be as those Italian princes who, Analogy of Italian princes under the Austrian. during a good part of the present century, were maintained as masters of unwilling subjects by the power of the Austrian.

¹ See Appendix XXXI.

CHAP. IX. There was indeed this difference between the cases, that the Italian princes held a known formal position, with a known title as King or Duke. With them therefore a treaty, whatever its objects, might be made in the usual forms and in the face of day. But, in our lack of trustworthy texts of documents, we are driven to ask in vain, in what shape Carthage gave its guaranty to a power which was incapable of formal description. We may be sure that Dionysios was not described on any stone as tyrant, and it is hard to believe that any stone was graven with the public promise of Carthage to keep the people of Syracuse in subjection to a captain-general of their own choosing¹. One is strongly tempted to believe that a clause of this kind must have been a secret one. But the practical relation which it established must have been, as regarded those who were most nearly concerned, much the same as in the later cases with which we have compared it. If the people of Syracuse should rise against their master, Carthage, it would seem, undertook to put down the revolt. The free citizens of Syracuse were, perhaps by a secret engagement, put in the same case in which the Lacedæmonian helots could be put by an open engagement. When Athens and Sparta became friends and allies, Athens pledged herself, in case of need, to help to put down the bondmen of Sparta²; Carthage now, in the like sort, pledged herself to put down the bondmen of Dionysios.

Difficulty
of describ-
ing Diony-
sios.

Was the
clause
secret?

Bargain
between
Dionysios
and Car-
thage.

It was for the price of this guaranty from the barbarian that the chosen general of Syracuse had sold every cause which he had ostentatiously taken upon him to support. He had risen to power by fierce attacks on his predecessors and colleagues in office; he denounced them as men who,

¹ With the position of Dionysios as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* I shall have to speak more fully in the next chapter. See above, p. 553.

² Thuc. v. 23. 1; *ἢν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανιστήται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.*

for their own ends, were betraying the armies of Syracuse and the cities of Hellas to the barbarian. But whatever Daphnaios or any one else may have done in the way of treason, Dionysios had outdone them all. To establish his own unlawful power, he had sold the interests of Syracuse and of Hellas. He had betrayed Gela and Kamarina to the Phœnician. He had consented to what in some Syracusan eyes might seem almost as grievous, to the dismemberment of Syracusan territory by the restoration of independent Leontinoi. Such was the price which Syracuse and Sicily had to pay for the establishment of despotic power over a single city at the hands of one of its own citizens. Treason of this kind was essentially the work of a tyrant; we can hardly conceive such an act on the part either of a lawful king or of a republican magistrate. A leader of either of those kinds might be driven to accept such shameful terms after a crushing defeat. But Dionysios had undergone no crushing defeat. Syracuse had not been attacked; if the Syracusan army had been defeated before Gela, its defeat was strongly suspected to have been the work of Dionysios himself. It was simply for the sake of establishing his own power that Dionysios stooped to this baseness. We may be sure that the terms to which he agreed were as galling to him as to any of those who were under his tyranny. He did not mean to establish a lasting state of things in which Dionysios should reign as the puppet of Carthage. He simply submitted for the moment, in the hope of presently breaking off the yoke. All that he sought for by the present treaty was time fully to strengthen his power. As soon as that was done, he was ready to step forth in quite another character. He had submitted to the barbarian in order to become fully lord of Syracuse; once undisputed lord of Syracuse, he was ready at once to enlarge the power of Syracuse and to take up the part of the champion of Greek Sicily against Carthage. So he did, and, with

CHAP. IX.

His betrayal of general Sikeliot and of special Syracusan interests.

His treason specially characteristic of tyranny.

His truckling to Carthage only temporary.

His object the immediate strengthening of his power.

Characters and result of his dominion.

CHAP. IX. some ups and downs, on the whole successfully. He made Syracuse the greatest city of Sicily, of Greece, and of Europe. And he made her, not only the greatest city, but the greatest power. He made Sicily, and Syracuse as the head of Sicily, the centre of a dominion such as had never been seen before, but which, if it actually lasted but a little time beyond his own life, suggested much to many who came after. The reign of Dionysios is indeed an epoch-making time, not only in the history of Sicily, but in the history of the world.

Our general view of the position of Dionysios and of the nature of his power will come in another chapter, the chapter which must be given to a full picture of the thirty-eight years of his tyranny. As yet we have had to speak of him and his power in some sort incidentally. Our subject has been the second Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, from the expedition of Hannibal to the treaty with Himilkôn. But we have been unable to record the later stages of the war without bringing in Dionysios as the most prominent actor, and without recording the domestic revolution which enabled him to appear as the most prominent actor. In our next chapter we shall look at him and his dominion directly on their own account. But there are a few points at which we must look before we enter on that fuller picture. After the conclusion of the treaty Himilkôn did not linger long in Sicily; he had no motive so to do. But he had one important piece of business to do before he set forth, to pay off his mercenaries, as many at least as he did not mean to carry with him into Africa. To that end he struck coins of two patterns, patterns well suited for the currency of a Phœnician power bearing rule in Sicily. The artistic type followed the finest models of the Greek coinage of the island. The bridleless horse of Syracuse, the half-horse of conquered Gela, were both copied. But

Camp-
coinage of
Himilkôn.

the palm-tree on the reverse was a badge of the Phœnician master, and letters graven in the Phœnician tongue showed yet more plainly at whose bidding the moneyer plied his skill. The coins of the camp bore the fitting legend of *The Machanai*, long mistaken for a Phœnician name of Panormos; coins. they bore too the name of Carthage itself in its native form, *Kart-chadasat*, the Neapolis of Canaan¹. We are brought nearer to the times of which we write when we look on moneys which passed from hand to hand among men of so many nations, each of which played its part in our Sicilian story.

Another question arises, whether the destroyer of the cities, the grantor of the treaty, the issuer of the coins, had after all to turn away from Sicily in a guise other than that of a conqueror. Our one informant, immediately after his report of the treaty, goes on to say that the Carthaginians sailed for Africa, having lost more than half their army through the plague². He adds further that, after they had crossed to Africa, the plague went on there, destroying many both of the Carthaginians themselves and of their allies³. One suspects some confusion here. The army of Himilkôn had doubtless suffered heavily from the plague while it was encamped before Akragas. But those losses had surely been made up by fresh reinforcements, and we have heard nothing more of the plague since Himilkôn took up his winter quarters in the forsaken city. No plague is spoken of as affecting the Carthaginian army before Gela; and if the enemy's force had been so weakened as this account makes out, Himilkôn would surely have been ready to make peace on terms less unfavourable to

¹ A. J. Evans, *Syracusan Medallions*, p. 98. See vol. i. p. 251.

² Diod. xiii. 114; πλείον ἢ τὸ ἡμισυ μέρος τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποβαλόντες ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου. There has been no mention of any sickness since the plague before Akragas in c. 86.

³ Ib.; οὐδὲν δ' ἤττον καὶ κατὰ Λιβύην διαμείναντος τοῦ λοιμοῦ, παμπληθεῖς αὐτῶν τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν συμμάχων διεφθάρσαν.

CHAP. IX. Dionysios. One is tempted to think that we have here some confused remembrance of the plague before Akragas ; one might even fancy that the destruction of Carthaginian armies by the plague was looked on as so regular an accompaniment of a campaign against Syracuse that it was assumed and recorded in the narrative as a kind of formula.

Its bearing
on the
action of
Dionysios. If this report of the plague is true, it makes the treason of Dionysios yet blacker. At the same time it makes it more unreasonable and unlikely. A guaranty from Carthage in her full might would be worth a high price at the hands of Dionysios. A guaranty from Carthage at a time of Carthaginian weakness would be hardly worth the loss and infamy which it would carry with it. The submission of Dionysios to Carthage was meant to be only for a moment. At a time when Carthage was in no case to support him, there could have been no need for him to make any submission at all.

APPENDIX.

NOTE I. p. 1.

THE AUTHORITIES FOR THE ATHENIAN AND CARTHAGINIAN INVASIONS.

I HAVE already remarked more than once that the first chapter of this volume has had an advantage above all before or after it in having been written with the guidance of the master-piece of all contemporary narrative, the history of the Athenian THUCYDIDES. It calls up strange feelings when one turns from reading his pages by the shore of the Great Harbour, from testing the perfection of his picture on the height of Epipolai or by the banks of Assinaros, and finds that the restless ingenuity of German scholars has developed a *Thukydideische Frage*. Everything else has been cavilled at and guessed at; so those who cannot live without cavilling and guessing have come at last to cavil and guess at those things which cannot be spoken against. Things have indeed changed since it was thought a heinous sin in Grote himself to hint, not that Thucydides had misrepresented a single fact, but that personal feelings had once led him to pronounce a judgement which the facts of his own narrative did not bear out. On such grounds, in those days, a clever writer of imitative verses ventured to match himself with the great master, and to rejoice that such an one as he was no member of either English University. The position taken by Grote, which then was deemed impiety against Thucydides, would now pass for a superstitious worship of him. For the tone of the new school is often that of religious reformers attacking some form of idolatry. The false god Thucydides must be pulled down from his altar, and dragged through the mud like

fallen Peroun through the streets of Kief. Sometimes we are forbidden to believe what Thucydides tells us; sometimes it seems that we are almost forbidden to believe that there was any Thucydides at all. Even in our own land we have been ordered, with all the irresistible authority of a "headmaster," to cast away half the text that was good enough for Thirlwall, Arnold, and Grote. And a German scholar, with a double allowance of *Scharfsinn*, knows exactly how much was thrust into the text by a "bloodthirsty forger," ("ein blutdürstiger Verleumder"), a being more terrible, one is driven to suppose, than the author of the false Phalaris or the false Ingulf (Müller-Strübing, *Thukydideische Forschungen*, p. 149). In the course of several years past a vast *Litteratur* has arisen, of which, by great good luck, a very small part only affects the history of Sicily. (See for specimens, some of which we may have to mention again, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Thukydideischen Frage," by Dr. Georg Meyer, Nordhausen, 1889.) When a question is raised (*Thukydideische Forschungen*, p. 155) as to the possible ways of getting rid of a thousand Mytilenaiian prisoners, our experience of our native Agathoklēs and our invader Hannibal makes the difficulty seem somewhat less. We may even remember that—unless the newest views on the *Annalenfrage* have set the fact aside—Charles the Great, in a single day, successfully accomplished the work of getting rid of more than four times as many Saxons (Einhard, *Ann.* 782). Is Thucydides to be believed? He can answer the question who, with Thucydides in his hand or in his memory, has, in the wake of the last march of Lamachos, stepped out the ground from the cliff of Portella del Fusco to the muddy shore of the Great Harbour. He who has made that journey, he who has made others like it on the hills and the plains of Syracuse, knows well that the crowd of minute local touches can come only from one who has gone over the ground before him and has truly reported what he saw (see pp. 222, 246). And when one who knows Syracuse but does not know Plataia is told that Thucydides' description of Plataia does not agree with the appearances of the ground, he is tempted to be provisionally satisfied with the strong presumption that the caviller has either misunderstood his Thucydides or mistaken his site.

Yes, on the strong height of Epipolai, even on the lowlier vantage-ground of the Olympieion, we may leave the disputants in this *Frage* to see to one another. When Dr. Adolf Bauer of

Graz gives his pamphlet the heading "Thukydides und H. Müller-Strübing," he has not undertaken a task quite so hopeless as his who thought it clever to head his pamphlet "Thucydides or Grote?" Sicilian history is far more nearly touched by another branch of the controversy, namely that which seems to be technically called "Die Entstehung der Thukydideischen Geschichte" (see L. Čwikliński, *Hermes*, xii. 23). The truthfulness of our author is here no longer concerned, but only the date and order of his writings. This does concern us a good deal, a good deal more than the mere cavillers, a good deal more than the "Thukydideslegende" of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (*Hermes*, xii. 326). Here too an amazing *Litteratur* has sprung up, which, if I were to follow it out in every branch and twig, I should hardly live to reach the presence of Count Roger or even of King Pyrrhos. Human nature, at least insular nature, gives way before such a sight as the "Bibliographische Uebersicht" in *Philologus*, vol. xxxviii. p. 751, with a list of nine pages of books all about Thucydides. Yet more does it fail before eighty-two pages of "Jahresberichte," devoted to "Thucydides, Erster Artikel." One tries to make one's way through the α , β , γ , through the endless discussions about $\delta\delta\epsilon$ δ πόλεμος and δ πόλεμος $\delta\delta\epsilon$; and one is perhaps driven to think that all may be endured, so long as we do not make Thucydides number his summers and winters by the years of "the Peloponnesian War." One lights on a discourse, "Ueber die successive Entstehung des Thucydideischen Geschichtswerkes," von Julius Helmholtz, and finds it is only "II. Teil." But it is some comfort to find that is a "Widerlegung der Annahme einer Redaction von fremder Hand," and one learns casually at p. 21 that the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica have given occasion for a *Devastationsfrage*. At last one almost comes instinctively to shrink from all discourses about *Quellen*. One begins to suspect forgetfulness of the truth that the final cause of a "source" is not simply to show our ingenuity in finding the way to it, but to draw something from it when it is found. And it is curious to see the advantage which men who have themselves written history on a considerable scale have over the writers of mere articles and pamphlets, however ingenious. Grote does not enter much on such matters; when now and then he does, he shows the true *Scharfsinn* of a man who knows practically what he is about. Holm too, in his treatment of these questions, stands out

distinctly from the mass of his countrymen. Author of two considerable histories, he knows how history is written. He knows by experience how, in a large work, a work which has gone through much revision, a work which may not have been written in the exact order which it has finally to take, there must be many changes and insertions, how there may well be a few little repetitions, even here and there a trifling contradiction. He knows how easy it is, in correcting a series of passages by some fresh light, to leave some trace somewhere or other of the uncorrected state of things. Having gone through such small accidents himself, he knows how little is proved by them in an ancient writer. In short, men like Grote and Holm are gild-brothers of the craft of Thucydides, and that the writer of the most learned and brilliant dissertation is not.

The way in which Thucydides wrote his history, as far at least as Sicily is concerned, is to my mind clear enough in a general way. According to Müller-Strübing (*Forschungen*, p. 42), up to 1846 everybody believed that Thucydides wrote his eight books all at a pull after the year 404 (cf. H. Welzhofer, *Thukydides und sein Geschichtswerk*, München, 1878). Yet even before Grote came to help us, it was easy to see that there was a fresh start at v. 25 and another at vi. 1. A start at iv. 49 we might not be clever enough to see. One does not need page after page of dissertation to prove that Thucydides first wrote a history of what he calls the first war (*ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος*, v. 24. 2) down to the Peace of Nikias and the fifty years' alliance between Athens and Sparta in the year 421. This part ends with the twenty-fourth chapter of the fifth book. At some later time, when he saw that those formal acts had not really ended the war, he began again (at v. 27) to write the history of its remaining years. I should suspect that this was not very long after the events recorded in the rest of the fifth book. The Melian controversy reads as if it were put in on purpose to point silently the moral of the events which are next recorded; the rest might well be written before the Sicilian war. Thucydides designed (v. 26. 1) to carry his story down to the taking of Athens in 404; he therefore outlived that year; but that does not prove that he may not have begun to write long before it. He seemingly did not carry his actual narrative lower down than the year 411; but, at some time after the events

of 404, he joined the two parts together in a rather inartificial way. This was done in the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh chapters of the fifth book, which form a preface to the second part. He must also, at some time after 413, have revised the first part, and brought in several passages referring to events recorded in later books. The temptation to do something like this, in revising at a later stage of one's experience what one has written in earlier times, is sometimes irresistible.

These insertions specially concern us, because two of them directly refer to the Athenian war in Sicily. One comes in Thucydides' review of the administration of Periklēs, ii. 65. 12, 13, where he sits in judgement on the Sicilian expedition (*ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς*). The other is in iv. 81. 2, where he says that the good impression caused by the conduct of Brasidas made the subject allies of Athens more ready to join the Lacedæmonians after the Athenian overthrow in Sicily (*ἐς τὸν χρόνον ὕστερον μετὰ τὰ ἐκ Σικελίας πόλεμον*). And there is an earlier reference to Sicily which is not so palpably an insertion, but which easily may be one. This is in i. 17. 1, 18. 1, where he is speaking of the tyrannies in Greece. None of the tyrants in Old Greece, he says, founded any great dominion; he adds *οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμει*. Directly after, he tells of Lacedæmonian action against the tyrants: *οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι, πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν*. Each man must judge by his own tact whether these words do or do not sound as if they were put in after Thucydides had come to think and know more about Sicily. Indeed we must not forget that Thucydides lived to see or hear of the rise of Dionysios, which would bring Sicilian tyrants still more strongly before his mind.

As for the two more palpable insertions, it is worth notice that no reference of this kind is made when Thucydides is recording Sicilian affairs in the third, fourth, and fifth books. When he first wrote that part of his narrative, he did not look forward to a time when Sicily should become the chief seat of the warfare of all Greece. When it had taken that character, and when his own knowledge of Sicily had become so much fuller, he worked in these general references to later events. But he did not feel called on to moralize in the same sort over the comparatively small incidents of Sicilian warfare in the earlier books. Only I hold (see pp. 54-57 and Appendix VI) that it was at this stage

that he worked in the speech of Hermokratēs at Gela. And it is open to any one who feels more certain than I can profess to be as to Thucydides' obligations to Antiochos (see vol. i. pp. 455-457) to suppose that he worked in from him such a passage as that which describes the Lipari islands (iii. 88, see vol. i. p. 88). To me this does not read like an insertion. The whole of these notices of Sicily in the third and fourth books are more like the writing of one who had as yet no special knowledge of Sicily, but who was beginning to feel a curious interest in the land, and noted anything that he heard. These passages have their parallel in other parts of his work, such as the curious notice of another set of islands in ii. 102.

I thus make two parts of the History of Thucydides. A work designed to be a whole had a large continuation added to it, because the author saw that the chain of events which he had undertaken to narrate was not really ended. But this second part further contains something which cannot be looked on as a separate work, but which really has in some points more of the character of a separate work than either the first or the second part. This is the part which concerns us most of all, the two books which are given to the great Athenian invasion of Sicily. In these books his references to matters not concerning Sicily, even when they refer to warfare in Old Greece, have the air of episodes, just as in the earlier books his notices of Sicilian affairs have the air of episodes in the history of the war in Old Greece. Still I cannot hold that the account of the Sicilian war (*ὁ Σικελικὸς πόλεμος οὗτος*, vii. 85. 4) formed a separate work in the sense that Thucydides ever put it forth as a separate history of the Sicilian War, apart from what came before and after it. I cannot believe that it was written before the narrative of Peloponnesian events in the fifth book (Čwikliński, *Hermes*, xii. 80). I should conceive that Thucydides started again at v. 27, not knowing that the Sicilian war was in the future, and that he had to change his plan by reason of its coming. But least of all can I believe (see above, p. 592) that Thucydides wrote the earlier notices of Sicilian matters and the description of Sicily in the sixth book as parts of one continuous work written after the Sicilian war. Nothing can be clearer than that the earlier notices belong to a time when Sicily was of comparatively little moment and when Thucydides' knowledge of it was comparatively small. When he was called on again to speak of Sicilian matters in the

sixth book, they had put on an importance which had not belonged to them at the earlier stage, and his own knowledge of them had grown in proportion. Then he wrote that precious sketch of early settlement in Sicily of which I made so much use in my first volume (see vol. i. pp. 310, 564). He may have borrowed it from Antiochos, though it is really hard to see why he may not have put it together from his own researches, Antiochos being likely enough one source among others. He now formally introduces us, as if for the first time, to cities of which he had only casually spoken in his earlier books. No one would write a continuous work in this way; but it was most natural in one who was writing a second part to an earlier work and who had not yet joined the two together. This treatment is peculiar to Sicily, both because Sicily was less known to ordinary Greek writers than any part either of Old Greece or of the coast of Asia, and also because no other land ever became so nearly the exclusive scene of his story as Sicily did during the great Athenian invasion.

For our Sicilian purposes then we may say that, in his sixth and seventh books, Thucydides is driven by the necessities of the case to become a direct historian of Sicily. The books which contain his Sicilian history, though not a separate work in the sense that some have thought, form a distinct section with a separate introduction and a separate peroration (vii. 87). But from our Sicilian point of view we may say more. To us the sixth and seventh books form a great central piece with a prelude and an appendix. To us the first five books are preliminary. They show us the comparatively trifling dealings of Athens with Sikeliots in Sicily. In the central piece Sicily becomes the mid point of everything, the fighting-ground of all Hellas. In the appendix, that is, in the eighth book, there is nothing about Sicily, but a good deal about the deeds of Sikeliots elsewhere.

In this part of his work, for our purposes the most important of all, Thucydides writes with the fullest understanding of our island and all that is in it. To my mind the signs that he had gone over every inch of the ground of the Syracusan siege are beyond all gainsaying. But they cannot be fully taken in except by those who have themselves gone over the ground in the same sort. The oftener I read his text, the oftener I step out the ground, the more thoroughly do I feel that the two fit into one another in the minutest detail. As Thucydides himself tells us

(v. 26), his banishment gave him the opportunity of seeing many men and many lands, of conversing with the enemies of Athens as well as with her allies. It is inconceivable that, in the course of such inquiries, he should have left Sicily out. I confess that the thought has sometimes come into my mind whether the banished Athenian may not actually have been within the walls of beleaguered Syracuse. So it came into the mind of Thirlwall (iii. 338, cf. Arnold on Thuc. v. 26) and Grote (vii. 111) that he may have been present at the first battle of Mantinea. Yet one is loth to fancy Thucydides, even in banishment, taking, like Alkibiadēs, a part against his own people. And after all, his account is the account of an Athenian, as we feel more keenly when we compare his narrative with the fragments and echoes of his Syracusan contemporary. It is perhaps enough to believe that he went over the ground, and heard the story from the actors, while the memory of everything was fresh on the spot. Hermokratēs he can hardly have seen on Sicilian ground, unless he either was present during the siege or came immediately after it. That would be in time to see the sufferings of his countrymen in the quarries. And, if his visit was made at that particular moment, we may better understand why he dwells so emphatically on that part of the story, and leaves out the later stages of their treatment which are clear enough in the Syracusan version (see p. 409 and Appendix XXIV). But he may well have met Hermokratēs on the coast of Asia. And on Syracusan ground it is surely not a forbidden flight of imagination to conceive him going over the ground and hearing the tale from Philistos and the young Dionysios. We may be certain that he began to write the Sicilian part before the destruction of Himera in the year 409; otherwise he could not have said (vi. 62. 2) *Ἱμέραν, ἥπερ μόνη ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς Συκελίας Ἑλλάς πόλις ἐστί.* And we may suspect that he had not finished in 406; it looks very much (see p. 369) as if he perhaps saw with his own eyes, or at any rate heard of, the flight of the people of Akragas and of Gela. It is however possible that the reference may have been worked in in some later revision.

We have other *Fragen* in store for us. The *Entstehungsfrage* is among the more reasonable of the class. To discuss the order in which Thucydides wrote his history is a perfectly rational business; it simply gets a little overwhelming in the hands of some of those who set about it. But when it comes to mere cavillings

against the trustworthiness of our guide, it is enough to turn once more to our Pindar;

σοφὸς δὲ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φύξ· μαθόντες δὲ λάβροι
παγγλωσσὶα κόρακες ὄντι, ἀκραντα γαρύετον
Διὸς πρὸς δρυὶν χαθεῖον.

The appendix of Thucydides, as we have called it from our Sicilian point of view, breaks off suddenly. Had he carried on his work to the point which he designed, the surrender of Athens to Lysandros, the later years of it could hardly have concerned us in Sicily. He might possibly have been led on by some casual occasion to glance at the events which were going on there; but, if so, it could only have been by way of the merest episode. Unluckily he breaks off at a point when, without leaving his main subject, he might still have had something to tell us about Hermokratēs and Dōrieus and the Sikeliot share in the Spartan recovery of Pylos. As it is, the tale of Sikeliot action in Asia, begun in the eighth book of Thucydides, goes on in the first book of the Greek History of his countryman XENOPHŌN. The Athenian partisan of Sparta is our guide for so short a time that there is no need to enlarge on the change which is implied when we pass from one guidance to the other. But we may notice that it is only when the contemporary historian is eked out from the later antiquary, when Pausanias comes to the help of Xenophōn, that we are able to draw the contrast between the treatment which Dōrieus met with at the hands of Athenian and of Spartan enemies (see p. 435). There are also in the first book, as in other books, of Xenophōn some casual references to Sicilian affairs, which later editors have bracketted as the work of an interpolator. If so, he was surely a Sicilian interpolator. As yet they are simple notes of time, and are as such of some value (see pp. 432, 436). Of the later ones we may have to speak elsewhere.

And now we have come to the point at which we have at once to mourn the loss of the perfect work of the Syracusan PHILISTOS, and to rejoice that we can find so much of him as we can find embedded in the narratives of later writers. And here, however disagreeable it is to have to speak in direct opposition to a brother Regius Professor in the same University, love of truth requires me to make a protest. In the introduction to Mr. Jowett's

Translation of Thucydides (i. xvii), I find words which to a historian of Sicily are truly astonishing;

"When, as in modern histories of ancient Greece, the good cloth of Herodotus or Thucydides or Xenophon is patched with the transparent gauze of Diodorus and Plutarch, the whole garment becomes unequal and ragged. There is a special impropriety in combining *the fictions of later writers* with the narrative of Thucydides, who stands absolutely alone among the historians, not only of Hellas, but of the world, in his impartiality and love of truth."

This praise is high, but not too high. Thucydides indeed stands so high that he needs not the sacrifice of his lowlier fellows on his altar. Mr. Jowett's metaphors I need not examine. But it is truly wonderful how a Professor of Greek, who must be familiar with every word of so important a part of Greek literature as the writings of Diodôros and Plutarch, can have mistaken their useful compilations for "*the fictions of later writers.*" Mr. Jowett surely does not suppose that Diodôros and Plutarch deliberately invented everything which they record but which is not recorded by Thucydides. Plutarch, though sometimes careless, is perfectly honest and is often critical; and there is something grotesque in the notion of good, stupid, plodding, Diodôros inventing anything. A compiler is certainly a very inferior being to such an original historian as Thucydides, but he is not therefore necessarily a retailer of fiction. Plutarch and Diodôros used such materials as they had, Thucydides himself among them. "Fiction" is a hard word even for Timaios; it is utterly out of place as applied to the part of the history of Philistos with which we are now concerned. From his narrative, the narrative of a contemporary and actor, Diodôros and Plutarch have preserved to us endless little local and personal details which it was natural that a Syracusan eye-witness should record, but which had little interest for an Athenian visitor even a few months later. Precious scraps like these, fresh from the scene and the actor, have much less of the character of "transparent gauze" than the grossly partisan writings of Xenophôn, whom Mr. Jowett counts among the vendors of "good cloth." It would be the most curious question of all to see what kind of history of Pelopidas and Epameinôndas could be woven out of that cloth only. The writers of "modern histories of ancient Greece"—Thirlwall and Grote

for instance—have simply done their duty to truth by “patching together,” in Mr. Jowett’s scornful phrase, every means of knowledge which they found open to them. In attempting to carry out the same process somewhat further than they did, I feel sure that I should have had their good word. In short, if Mr. Jowett’s rule were to be accepted, there would be an end to all historical criticism. There would be an end to all writing of history, almost to all reading of it. We are solemnly called on to shut our ears to a large part of our evidence. Because one writer undoubtedly stands high above all others, we are bidden to pass by the statements, fragmentary indeed but still the statements, of another writer, doubtless his inferior in many points, but whose means of knowledge were, from one side of the story, even greater than his own.

Philistos has found better appreciation in other quarters. As long ago as 1818 his fragments were collected by Gölter, who added a good account of his life and writings (*De Situ et Origine Syracusarum*, pp. 103 et seqq.). And one may remark in passing that Gölter (see p. 104) had not the least doubt that Diodōros made use of Philistos. Then there is the article “Philistus” in the Dictionary of Biography, happily by Sir Edward Bunbury, and a clear summary by Holm (G. S. i. 308). He is treated of also by Brunet de Presle (14) and C. Müller (I. xlv.). I do not know that I found very much in a dissertation “*de Philisto Rerum Sicularum Scriptore*” by Wolfgang Körber (Breslau, 1874). His geography (pp. 19, 23) at least is odd; Ietai (see p. 240 and Thuc. vii. 2. 3) is near Segesta; Daskōn is “*Siciliæ oppidum vicinum sinui Dasconi*,” and Hykkara is “*oppidulum in inferiore parte insulæ prope Erctam montem situm*.”

The native historian of Syracuse, a maker as well as a writer of history, was a younger contemporary of Thucydides; some add that he was his imitator. I have already hinted that the two may well have met on Syracusan soil. There can be little doubt that, of all who, after Thucydides, took Sicilian affairs in hand, Philistos was the one who came nearest to the great master. Neither of them seems always to have pleased the purely literary critics. Dionysios of Halikarnassos, who, to be sure, also tried history himself, found a good deal to say against both. According to this judge, Thucydides had better not have written at all; it would

have been well if the Peloponnesian war had been forgotten altogether. (Ad Cn. Pompeium, 3; *ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης πόλεμον ἐπιγράφει, καὶ τοῦτον οὕτε καλὸν οὐδ' εὐτυχῇ, δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἀφείλεται μὴ γενέσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεὶς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγεγονότων ἡγησέσθαι.*) So we are not surprised a little way on (c. 5) to find Philistos too called up for a scolding, for which however we may thank the critic, as it has preserved to us a most valuable fragment. (See vol. ii. p. 36.) All that Dionysios has to tell us about Thucydides is very curious indeed, so much so that we could wish he had given a little more space to Philistos.

The personal history of Philistos is very well ascertained. He was one of the most important of the secondary actors in the Sicilian affairs of the last years of the fifth century before Christ, and the first half of the fourth. The confusions of Souidas, who mixed him up with a certain Philiskos of Naukratis in Egypt, were unravelled by Göller. Philistos was no pupil of Euénos or of Isokratēs, and he wrote on no subject but Sicilian history. A Syracusan, son of Archônides (Souidas) or Archomenides (Pausanias, v. 23. 6), he was an eye-witness of the Athenian siege (Plut. Nik. 19, *ἀνὴρ Συρακούσιος καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρπῆς γενόμενος*). He was a rich man and prominent in the Syracusan assembly in 406 (Diod. xiii. 91), where we have seen him (see p. 542) as the first recorded supporter of Dionysios. He is therefore naturally spoken of as an old man (*ἥδη γέρον*, Plut. Dion, 35) when he was killed in battle fifty years later. His life may thus have covered the years from 436 to 356. Indeed one story tempts us to make him older still. There is a strange tale in Plutarch's Life of Dion about an intrigue between Philistos and the mother of the elder Dionysios, seemingly after her son had risen to the tyranny (Dion, 11, *ἣν δὲ λόγος ὥς καὶ τῇ μητρὶ πλησιάζου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου Διονυσίου, τοῦ τυράννου μὴ παντάπασιν ἀγνοούντος*). So the tradition had reached Tzetzés, Chil. x. 829;

*μεγάλως ἦν τιμώμενος παρὰ Διονυσίῳ
ἐλέγετο συνείναι γὰρ τῇ μητρὶ Διονυσίου.*

One could have more readily believed a version which placed the scandal earlier; only then the story could hardly fail to make Philistos the true father of Dionysios. In such a case too we could hardly place the birth of Philistos after the year 450, which would make him fighting at the age of ninety-three. In any case, as we shall see presently, he was for a while the favourite

and minister of Dionysios. He was banished by him about 386, and wrote at least the second part of his History while in exile (Plut. Dion., 11; *τὸν Φίλιστον ἐξήλασε Συκελλίας φυγόντα παρὰ ξένους τινὰς εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν, ὅπου καὶ δοκεῖ τὰ πλείεστα συνθεῖναι τῆς ἱστορίας σχολάζων*). Nor was he allowed to come back till the reign of the second Dionysios (Plut. u. s.), in whose service he died.

These events in the life of Philistos had a great effect on his historical writings. He first wrote a general Sicilian history from the earliest times to the Punic capture of Akragas in 406. He thus took in, as Diodôros says (xiii. 103), the legends and history of eight hundred years in seven books (*τὴν πρώτην σύνταξιν τῶν Συκελικῶν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν κατέστρεψεν, εἰς τὴν Ἀκράγαντος δόωσιν, ἐν βιβλίοις ἑπτὰ διελθὼν χρόνον ἑτῶν πλείον τῶν ὀκτακοσίων*). In the first book he spoke of mythical and præ-historic times, starting, it would seem, from the story of Daïdalos and Kókalos (Theôn, Progymn. ii. 4; see vol. i. pp. 474-476). In his second book, as we know from his critic Dionysios, he dealt with the events of the sixth century before Christ, among them of the war between Syracuse and Kamarina in the year 552. In the third book (Schol. Pind. Ol. v. 19) he recorded the acts of Gelôn. The subjects of some of the other books may be seen from the references made to him by Stephen of Byzantium and others for the names of towns. (Of the most important of these, that about Hybla, I have had to speak at some length in the first volume, p. 515). In his fifth book he recorded the Syracusan expedition to Aithalia or Elba (see vol. ii. p. 337). When Stephen refers to the sixth book of Philistos for the names *Δάσκων* and *Ἰέταις*, it is plain that in that book he treated of the Athenian siege, and therein of the march of Gylippos (cf. Thuc. vii. 2. 2 and Diod. xiii. 13). So when Theôn (xi. 4) quotes the word *νυκτομαχία* as used both by Thucydides (vii. 44) and by Philistos, we can see on what occasion Philistos used it. Stephen's one reference (*Ταρχία*) to the seventh book does not help us; but it follows as a matter of course that in that book Philistos recorded the events of the Carthaginian invasion down to the taking of Akragas. From all this it is plain that Philistos told the history of Sicily in the sixth and fifth centuries at considerable length. His seven books indeed took in eighteen more years than the nine books of Antiochos; but we may suspect that he cut the præ-historic time shorter. How far he may have followed Antiochos in the times which they had in common we

have no means of judging. It would be hard to trace the remoter *Quellen* for the name of a town standing all alone by itself in an entry of Stephen of Byzantium. But we may safely set aside, as the mere talk of a rhetorical critic, the notion that Philistos copied from Thucydides the whole account of the Athenian siege which he had himself seen and in which he could hardly fail to have been an actor (Theón, Progymn. i. 18, καὶ μέντοι γε ὁ Φίλιστος τὸν Ἀττικὸν ὅλον πόλεμον ἐν τοῖς Σικελικοῖς ἐκ τῶν Θουκυδίδου μετεπήροχε. This is accepted as undoubted by Wilamowitz, *Hermes* xii. 328). For the years towards the end of his work, when he thus wrote from personal knowledge, Plutarch, a far better judge of such matters than Theón (Nik. 1), brackets him with Thucydides, as one of his two chief guides, without a hint of his being a copyist. He refers to him again (19) as a distinct authority from Thucydides (φησὶν οὐ Θουκυδίδης μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Φίλιστος, κ.τ.λ.), and in another place (28) he notices the agreement of Philistos with Thucydides. See also the reference in Pausanias, i. 29. 12. (See below, Note XXII.) Dionysios of Halikarnassos, in a passage (*De Vett. Scriptt. Com.* iii. 2), calls him μιμητὴς Θουκυδίδου (like Cicero, *De Orat.* iii. 13), but that is another thing from copying the whole Athenian war from him.

It is only this first work of Philistos, that which went down to the taking of Akragas, with which we are now concerned. Of his six later books, devoted to the acts of the elder and younger Dionysios, we shall have to speak in another volume. It is to be noticed that the earlier work ended with the last event which could be recorded without bringing in either the name of Dionysios or his own. The return of Hermokratēs could be told without mentioning Dionysios; the events that followed the taking of Akragas could not. This distinction most likely marked a wide difference in object and character between the two parts of the history. But we should be glad indeed even of the Dionysian part, and the loss of the part with which we are now concerned is one of the saddest in the whole range of Greek literature. The History of Philistos was the work of a man thoroughly well informed, thoroughly able to make use of what he knew, and who, up to this stage, was under no temptation to colour his narrative in the way which he is charged with doing in his later books. The book which dealt with the Athenian war would have given us exactly what we want, namely, the means of balancing Thucy-

dides with a Syracusan writer of merit only inferior to his own. It is some comfort that we are so often able to listen to him through the voices of later compilers, and that what we learn in this way always leads us to the belief that there was hardly any material contradiction between the Syracusan and the Athenian narrative.

Of Philistos' way of treating his subject his critic Theón (iv. 12) has preserved the fact that he stuck close to the matter in hand, and made no digressions (*παρεκβάσεις*). In this he is contrasted with Theopompos; he might also have been contrasted with Herodotus and Thucydides. He did not approve himself to the taste of Timaios, as appears from Plutarch (Nik. 1), who here too brackets him with Thucydides, just as he does on other grounds a little way on (*Τίμαιος . . . ὅς ἑλπίσας τὸν μὲν Θουκυδίδην ὑπερβαλεῖσθαι δυνάσκει, τὸν δὲ Φίλιστον ἀποδείξειν παντάπασι φορτικὸν καὶ ἰδιώτην*). Plutarch, as we shall see hereafter, had his own hard words for Philistos; but that was on different and more serious grounds, and the censure was clearly not meant to apply to the earlier books. And long after, Timaios seemed in the eyes of Tzetzes (Chil. x. 835) to have found fault with Philistos simply out of envy;

. . . φθόνον δεινὸν ἐντρέφον,
ὥς Σικελὸς τῷ Σικελῷ, ὃς ἄδοξος ἐνδόξῳ.

Philistos fared better at the hands of those who made history than at the hands of those who simply criticized it and sometimes wished it to be forgotten. But it is perhaps unlucky that it was often the part with which we are not now concerned which was picked out for special admiration. Among the books which the Macedonian Alexander chose to have sent up after him into the further parts of Asia (Plut. Alex. 8), the only historian was Philistos, except so far as Homer is entitled to the name. The reason of the choice is plain enough. Nowhere could Alexander find reading more to his taste than in the history of Dionysios, the first man who carried on war on a scale and after a fashion at all approaching to his own. It was the Dionysian books also which specially pleased Cicero (Ep. ad Q. Fr. ii. 13). His brother Quintus was, like Alexander, reading Philistos on his campaign. But he had not told Marcus which of the two parts of his History he was engaged with. "Siculus ille," says the elder brother, "capitalis, creber, acutus, brevis, pene pusillus Thucydides; sed

utros ejus habueris libros (duo enim sunt corpora) an utrosque nescio. Me magis de Dionysio delectat, ipse enim est veterator magnus et perfamiliaris Philisto." Cicero refers to Philistos in several other places, and more than once in company with Thucydides. After his mention of Thucydides (De Orat. ii. 13, cf. 23) he adds; "Hunc consecutus est Syracusanus Philistus, qui quum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda, maximeque Thucydidem est, ut mihi videtur, imitatus." (Cf. the extract from Dionysios, above, p. 602.) In the Orator (17) he makes Brutus complain that neither the elder Cato nor Philistos nor Thucydides himself was thought of as he ought to be ("amatores huic desunt, sicut multis jam ante seculis et Philisto Syracusano et ipsi Thucydidi"). The three are again brought together by Atticus (c. 85); "quum Catonem cum Philisto et Thucydide comparares." In two other places (De Div. i. 20, 33) Cicero refers to him for stories to which we may come again, but the first time not without epithets of honour, as "doctus homo et diligens." The judgements of Alexander and Cicero, to say nothing of Plutarch, may perhaps outweigh those of Timaios and Dionysios of Halikarnassos.

We have been speaking of three contemporary writers, Thucydides, Xenophôn, and Philistos. But we must not forget that the elder contemporary of Thucydides, ANTIOCHOS of Syracuse, ought to be one of our authorities for the early part of our story, as far as the Peace of Gela (see vol. i. p. 456). But unluckily, of the few fragments of his writings that are preserved, none come from that part of his work. And it is curious to remember that Herodotus, and even Hellanikos, might have been among our contemporary authorities, if they had chosen. We have also got a scrap or two (see pp. 414, 454) from a contemporary writer who was not an historian, namely the orator LYSIAS, whose sojourn at Thourioi may have given him some knowledge of Sicilian affairs. No great space need be given to the only remaining candidate for the rank of a contemporary authority. Diodôros (xiii. 83) quotes a certain POLYKLEITOS as an eyewitness for the prosperity of Akragas before the Carthaginian siege (*ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ἐξηγεῖται*). There is a question whether he is or is not the same as a certain POLYKRITOS, who is quoted by Diogenes Laertios (ii. 7. 6) as having written a history of Dionysios (*ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιου*), and who is twice referred to by the

marvel-mongers (Pseud. Arist. 112, Antig. Caryst. 135) for physical wonders in Sicily and elsewhere (cf. Plin. N. H. xxxi. 14, where Brunet de Presle (24) reads "Polyclitus"). Diogenes calls him *Μενδαῖος*, from Mendé in Thrace, one would think. It is quite certain that we cannot, with Brunet de Presle (24), read *Μενδαῖος* for *Μενάιος* in Stephen of Byzantium. *Μίναί, πόλις Σικελίας ἔγγυς Παλίκων*, needs no doubtful disputations. If we believe the false Aristotle, Polykritos wrote a history of Sicily in verse (*δὲ τὰ Σικελικὰ γυγροφῶς ἐν ᾠέσιν*). Can this be the work of Polykleitos which Diodoros quotes?

Of the writers of whom we have now been speaking, it is needless to say that Thucydides wrote in his native Attic. It is not quite so clear whether Antiochos and Philistos asserted their right, as Corinthians, kinsfolk of Bellerophontes, to write the Doric of Peloponnésos (see vol. i. p. 334). In their day, in the day of Antiochos still less than in the day of Philistos, the Attic form of Greek, or something professing to continue it, had not yet won that literary supremacy which it possessed a generation or two later. We have no fragment either of Antiochos or Philistos long enough to give us any real notion of the style or dialect of either. In most of the references to Philistos the writer who makes the quotation is not copying his exact words, but simply referring to him for a fact. The only serious case is the account of the war of Syracuse and Kamarina quoted by Dionysios (see above, p. 600). There the extract, though short, is long enough to show either that Philistos did not write Doric or else that Dionysios translated him. We have seen Philistos spoken of more than once as an "imitator" (*μιμητής*) of Thucydides. But it is possible to imitate the manner of a writer in another dialect of the same language, or even in another language. Still the statement at least suggests the thought that Philistos may have imitated Thucydides in his dialect as well as in other points, and, if so, the fact is one of importance in the history of the Greek tongue. He would be one of the first, perhaps the very first, of that long string of writers, reaching down to our own day, whose native tongue was Greek, but who wrote, not in the Greek which they spoke at their own hearths, but in an artificial speech as near to the natural speech of Athens as they could bring it. If this be so, it was a remarkable turning-about of things, when Athens made this literary

conquest of one who had borne his part in driving back her fleets and armies from his native city.

In later volumes we shall again have to speak of writers who recorded parts of the history of Sicily from their personal knowledge. But we have now to turn to writers of another class, those who recorded the events of past times from contemporary materials, and who are to us at least the echo of the original writers. The greatest of the class, POLYBIOS himself,—for he belongs to the class through a great part of his writings,—could not, from the nature of his subject, give us much help at our present stage. His one or two references to matters which concern us are quite incidental; but we are glad to have even his *obiter dicta*, as about Gelôn (see vol. ii. p. 516), so about Hermokratês (see pp. 48, 55, and Appendix VI). It is later writers again, more strictly to be called compilers, with whom we have to deal at present. Through the whole of this volume we have had the company of DIODÔROS, and in the chapter on the Carthaginian invasion he is, we may say, our only guide. We have already learned what he is like, without bringing him up for any formal judgement. He could not make himself contemporary, and it was not in him to be critical. But, if often stupid and sometimes careless, we must allow him the merits of untiring industry and thorough honesty. His treatment of his subject is strangely unequal. Very often a really good spell of narrative, clearly coming straight from some trustworthy writer, is followed by a meagre piece of mere confusion and blundering. In the times with which we are concerned, through the greater part of the Athenian story, he is at his worst, as if the company of Thucydides had overwhelmed him. Just towards the end he gets better, and gives us, as I have often pointed out in the text, many valuable notices from the Syracusan side. In the Carthaginian story we have no other account to check him by; but I see nothing in his narrative to make us doubt its general trustworthiness. The question naturally comes at both these stages, Where did he find his story? What in short were his *Quellen*? On this head, as on the closely connected question of the *Quellen* of PLUTARCH of Chairôneia, German scholarship has found much to say. And it is a question which touches us in Sicily much more nearly, and which calls for somewhat more minute treatment, than the “Thukydeische Frage” in any of its forms.

On all these matters Holm has a most useful *Anhang* in his second volume, pp. 340 et seqq. But for him I might not have known some of the strange things that have been said. But I have looked for myself at the writings which he refers to and at some others besides ; and my experience of the wonderful fruits of ingenious guessing is increased in proportion. In these literary questions it is open to a man to guess anything in a way which he cannot do in dealing with questions of recorded fact. Where did Diodóros and Plutarch get their materials? We cannot say for certain, except when they tell us themselves, which Plutarch does much more commonly than Diodóros. For the rest we may, within certain bounds of possibility, guess anything that we please, and nobody can prove to absolute demonstration that we are wrong. The thing very largely depends on a certain instinct, what we used to call *αισθησις*. And that instinct is, almost as a matter of course, far stronger in Holm than in the writers of these ingenious pamphlets. In times past, as Holm points out, it was, naturally and reasonably, believed that, when Diodóros or any other writer of his class sat down to make his compilation, he got together all the books that he could. But now it has become the fashion to take for granted that he could never have had two books before him at once. He may have used different books at different stages, but never two books actually at the same time. He had one book before him and he copied that one. Why this should be taken for granted it is very hard to see. One can only say that ingenious men have taken it for granted ; and of course, when it is taken for granted, a beautiful field is open for guesses of any kind as to the author who is followed in each particular case. Thus C. A. Volquardsen (*Untersuchungen über die Quellen der Griechischen und Sicilischen Geschichten bei Diodor*, Kiel, 1868) knows for certain (p. 80) that Diodóros never looked at Antiochos, Thucydides, or Philistos ; he did not even look at Ephoros ; he got all that we are concerned with from Timaios. On the other hand, W. Collmann (*de Diodori Siculi Fontibus*, Marburg, 1869), as he will have no Philistos, will not even have any Timaios. There may be some Thucydides indirectly ; for, though Diodóros copied nobody but Ephoros, yet Ephoros copied Thucydides. W. Fricke (*Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Plutarchos . . . sowie des Diodoros*, Leipzig, 1869) allows Diodóros to have used two books, Ephoros and Theopompos. Of course he did not

use both together, but sometimes one and sometimes the other, and Fricke knows exactly which chapters come from each. Volquardsen has to struggle with the fact that Diodóros several times refers to Ephoros and compares his statements with those of Timaíos (xiii. 54, 60, 80; xiv. 54). But the explanation is ready (p. 93). Diodóros got his knowledge of the statements of Ephoros only from the quotations of Timaíos. Diodóros too mentions (xii. 37, xiii. 103) the points to which both Thucydides and Philistos carried down their Histories; but, according to Volquardsen (p. 5 et seqq.), this does not prove that he had ever read those writers; he got the dates from Apollódoros, and put them in along with the poets and others. That Diodóros did use Apollódoros is perfectly plain from i. 5. So nowadays one often uses Clinton; but it does not follow in either case that the original text has never been read.

Some of the particular arguments are droll enough. Any likeness in fact or word, even when such likeness could hardly be helped in telling the same story, is held to be enough to prove that A is the source of B or that A and B have a common source in C. Sometimes it would seem that an unlikeness—even an imaginary unlikeness—will do as well as a likeness. If I rightly understand Volquardsen in p. 89, Diodóros must have got his account of the treaty between Gelón and Carthage from Timaíos, because Timaíos mentions the forbidding of human sacrifices, while Diodóros says nothing about it. Here one is tempted to ask about Volquardsen's own *Quellen*, seeing that the fragment of Timaíos (89, C. Müller, i. 214) says no more about human sacrifices than the text of Diodóros. The human sacrifices come from Theophrastos, not from Timaíos (see vol. ii. p. 523). The story about Phalaris' bull in Diodóros, xiii. 90 (see vol. ii. p. 462), is of course insisted on to prove, what doubtless it does prove, that Diodóros used Timaíos. But then unluckily it also proves that he used other writers as well, and that he sometimes preferred their accounts to those of Timaíos. Anyhow the bull altogether upsets Collmann's argument, and he shows no inclination to take so dangerous a beast by the horns.

The strong sense and sound experience of Holm naturally casts away all these vagaries, "die ich nicht billige," as he emphatically says (G. S. ii. 341). And he no less naturally uses the bull (342) to gore their authors withal. He does not stop to comment on Volquardsen's very vague notions about the Palici (pp. 79, 83),

as indeed it is hardly worth while doing, except that we have here a case of the man of Agyrum speaking at first hand. When Diodōros describes the lake (xi. 89, see vol. i. p. 523), he is clearly not copying Timaios or anybody else, but speaking of what he had seen for himself. Of course a great deal has been made of the mere blundering of Diodōros, for which we must always allow. Some special source is sought for (Collmann, p. 9) to account for simple stupid confusion, as when Diodōros jumbles together the Athenian warfare at Mylai (xii. 54, see p. 31) and the Sikel warfare by Naxos (see p. 43). So again when Diodōros makes the Athenians occupy the Olympieion (xiii. 6, 7, see Appendix XI), Holm (ii. 360) finds out the true cause more quickly and surely than a thousand dissertations; "*Die Besetzung des Olympieion hat dagegen Diodor nicht aus einem anderen Schriftsteller, sondern allein aus schläfriger Lectüre des Thukydides.*" Holm then goes on to quote various passages in which we hear an echo of Thucydides in the words of Diodōros, and where there certainly is no reason to suppose that Ephoros or any one else was needed as a go-between.

Since Holm wrote, his common-sense notion of a sleepy reading of Thucydides on the part of Diodōros (more delicately called a "Missverständnisse") does not at all approve itself to the mind of Ludwig Holzapfel (*Untersuchungen über die Darstellung der Griechischen Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1879); but in the last thing that I have seen, "*Untersuchungen über Timaios von Tauromenion*" by Christian Clasen (Kiel, 1883), it is a comfort to see (pp. 46, 47) that the rational treatment of Holm largely prevails.

Is one really bound to dispute at length on all these points? After Holm's settlement of the matter, one is tempted to say, *περὶ δμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο*. That Diodōros did not slavishly copy Timaios can be easily shown. He says (xiii. 34), *Συρακούσιοι . . . τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους συμμαχήσαντας, ὃν ἦρχε Γύλιππος, ἐτίμησαν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου λαφύροις*. Plutarch (*Comp. Tim. et Æm.* 2) says, *Τίμαιος δὲ καὶ Γύλιππον ἀκλεῶς φησι καὶ ἀτίμως ἀποπέμψαι Συρακουσίους*, giving as a reason the *φιλοπλουτία* and *ἀπληστία* of which we have already heard. It may be that the two statements are not formally contradictory. Formal honours may be consistent with openly expressed public disfavour; or a very ingenious disputant might argue that Diodōros meant to exclude Glylppos himself from the honours which were voted to those whom he com-

manded. Still it seems quite impossible that Diodóros and Plutarch should at this point have been drawing from the same source, and we know from what source Plutarch drew. Here however the relations of Thucydides to either writer are not touched. I am more concerned with some points which do touch him, with that long series of passages in the latter part of the Athenian war, in which Diodóros, aroused from his sleepy reading of Thucydides, turned to some other book, and read it in a more wide-awake fashion. We may place his awakening at about xiii. 12. From that point onward he gives us a number of details which are certainly not from Thucydides, but which hardly ever really contradict Thucydides, and which to my mind at least—every man must use his own *αἰσθησις* in such matters—bear the unmistakable stamp of coming from an eye-witness. I have pointed out a great number in the text and in the Appendix (see pp. 324, 341, 345, 349, 350, 351, 353, 354, 356, 359, 362, 363, 400, 403, 404, 409, 410, and Appendix XX, XXIII, XXIV).

I cannot prove that these come from Philistos, as I have not the text of Philistos before me; but the conviction is as strong on my mind as any conviction about such a matter can be. Holm sums up the whole case in a formal way (ii. 364).

I. There are passages in which Diodóros directly contradicts Thucydides. These, when they really come from a separate source, come from Ephoros. They are distinctly mistakes, therefore not from a Sicilian author.

II. There are many passages, especially in the description of the last sea-fight, where Diodóros, without contradicting Thucydides, adds many details, clearly from a Sicilian source. This source may be either Philistos or Timaios.

III. There are many passages in which Diodóros seems directly to follow Thucydides, nor is there any need to suppose that he got at him only through Ephoros.

To all this I can readily subscribe, save that I feel more certain on the second point than Holm does. Anyhow he speaks most truly when he says of Diodóros, "er hat einzelne schlecht gearbeitete Partien und andere recht gute." If there is some "transparent gauze," there is some "good cloth" as well.

We now come to PLUTARCH, a large part of whose Life of Nikias and a smaller part of that of Alkibiadēs closely concern us.

He at least used many authorities ; he refers to them often ; in one place (see above, p. 602, and Appendix XXIII) he quotes three in a breath and remarks how the two best agree together against the third. A man who, as he tells us, wrote Lives and not History, and who could not find the whole life of any of his worthies described in any one book, was obliged to consult and to compare authorities even more largely than Diodôros, who wrote, or tried to write, history in the stricter sense. Yet some of the dissertation-writers, though they cannot deny that Plutarch used many books, will not allow that he can ever have used two over the same chapter or sentence. He may have gone backwards and forwards from one to another ; but he must always have had some one which he immediately followed, some *Hauptquelle*, as the phrase is. Thus Fricke, who has been already quoted, tells us in an " Uebersicht der gefundenen Resultate " whence Plutarch got every chapter of the Lives of Nikias and Alkibiadês, not one of them being from Thucydides. This doctrine of the *Hauptquelle* is not very easy to understand. Does it mean copying the words, or only following the matter ? For it is quite possible to follow, even slavishly, the matter of an earlier writer without reproducing his words, and it is equally possible to reproduce his words wittingly or unwittingly, while altogether departing from his matter. The position of Diodôros, much more that of Plutarch, was quite different from that of a monastic annalist who copies an earlier writer as long as it suits his purpose, and then continues him with original matter. But even in this case the reviser adds, omits, or alters, when he thinks good, and the alterations become of some moment when the Radical Matthew Paris revises the Tory Roger of Wendover. The writers with whom we have to deal were more in the position of William of Malmesbury. Bishop Stubbs can show us, we can sometimes find out for ourselves, where William got his facts and fictions ; but he never copies in the way in which the Saint Albans writers copy. Whencesoever the matter may come, it is at least translated into the style of William himself. And the Doric, or even the attempted Attic, of Philistos would need some translation before it was qualified to appear in the pages of our compilers four or five centuries later. The truth is that these mere verbal likenesses or unlikenesses prove very little either way, unless they are so marked as to show a formal purpose on the part of the later writer. The theory of Fricke, and indeed the whole school to which he belongs,

was well upset by Holm (G. S. ii. 343 et seqq.), whose words are often witty as well as wise. He shows the absurdity of supposing, as Fricke does, that Plutarch, not writing the history of the time but the Life of Nikias, wishing therefore before all things to give a true, or at least a possible, picture of Nikias, should run backwards and forwards, copying such and such chapters from one who spoke well of Nikias and such and such others from one who spoke ill of him. But in the very year in which Holm's second volume appeared (1874) Giessen greeted its Grand Duke with a discourse on the sources of the Life of Nikias, "Adolfi Philippi Commentatio," in which we hear a great deal about Timaios and Philochoros, and something about Philistos, but from which Thucydides seems to be shut out, even when Plutarch directly quotes him. Since Holm things seem to have mended somewhat. Otto Siemon, "Americanus," disputes against Fricke (*Quomodo Plutarchus Thucydidem legerit*, Berlin, 1881), and takes a line which is refreshing after much that one has read by showing how much knowledge of Thucydides is implied in various passages of Plutarch's other writings. He comes (p. 51) to the very rational conclusion;

"Thucydidem igitur maxime secutus est [Plutarchus], sed ex Philisto, Timæo, aliisque scriptoribus non pauca addidit in hac Niciae vita conscribenda."

I do not see that Siemon refers to Holm, which seems strange. Neither does another later writer whom I have lighted on, who is distinctly more rational than Fricke, though he has some odd things in his paper, and though he cannot altogether get rid of the notion of the inevitable *Hauptquelle*, of which he teaches us the Latin. This is a discourse "*Quomodo Plutarchus Thucydidem usus sit in componenda Niciae vita*," by Max Heidingsfeld (Liegnitz, 1890). He does not however (p. 31) exactly agree with Siemon;

"Plutarchi expeditionem Siciliensem narrantis *fontes primarius* et quasi dux fuit Philistos; Thucydidem autem ita usus est biographus ut partibus quibusdam ex eo desumptis Siciliensis scriptoris narrationem compleret atque amplificaret. Cum vero Philisti liber quo propius accederet ad finem expeditionis, eo copiosius narratas exhiberet res, in tertio expeditionis anno describendo multo rarius Thucydidis historia evoluta est a Plutarcho."

My own belief is that which Holm (G. S. ii. 340) speaks of as the old one, namely that Diodoros, and Plutarch, by the necessity

of the case, still more than Diodôros, did very much what Holm and I have done ourselves. That is to say, they used such authorities as they had, giving perhaps throughout a certain precedence to some one, certainly preferring the statements of one writer to another in particular places. Nothing can be clearer than that Plutarch, when he wrote the twenty-eighth chapter of the Life of Nikias, had Thucydides, Philistos, and Timaios open before him. Very likely he had many others as well; we know from the twenty-third chapter that he turned to Philochoros and Autokleidês on special points. In truth he found very little material difference between Thucydides and Philistos. But, specially towards the end, Philistos supplied him as well as Diodôros with a great number of details which concerned the Syracusan much more than they did the Athenian. (So grants even Fricke, p. 46; "Für Thukydides hatte diess auch kein Interesse, wol aber für den Syrakusien Philistos"). And these he brought freely in.

I have said that there is little substantial contradiction between Thucydides and Plutarch. That is there is little between Thucydides and Philistos; for we may be sure that, when Plutarch seems to depart from Thucydides, it is commonly through following Philistos. A good many apparent contradictions have been brought together in the course of these controversies. Perhaps the most serious is the one which is least likely to come from Philistos, and as to which Philistos would certainly be of less authority than Thucydides. There is the place where Plutarch (Nik. 20; see Fricke, 40, Heidingsfeld, 13) says that, even before the letter of Nikias reached Athens, the Athenians had been designing a second expedition, but that it was hindered by the enemies of Nikias;

οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἔρμηγτο πέμπειν ἑτέραν δύναμιν εἰς Σικελίαν, φθόγῳ δὲ τῶν πρῶτον πραττομένων πρὸς εὐτυχίαν τοῦ Νικίου τοσαύτην πολλὰς διατριβὰς ἐμβalόντων τότε γοῦν ἱσπευδον βοηθεῖν.

There is no trace of this in Thucydides, and it seems hard to reconcile with the inferences which we cannot fail to make from him as to the continued trust which the Athenian people put in Nikias. But it is not likely that Philistos troubled himself about such matters; the statement is far more likely to come from some inferior Athenian writer, Philochoros, if any one pleases.

I do not see more than seeming contradiction when Plutarch

says that the Syracusans did not believe the good news brought by Gongylos till it was confirmed by a message from Gylippos bidding them to meet him (c. 19). He tells the bringing of the news, much as in Thucydides (vii. 2. 1, see pp. 238, 239);

ὅτι Γύλιππος ἀφίξεται διὰ ταχέων καὶ νῆες ἄλλαι βοηθοὶ προσπλέονται. οὕτω δὲ τῷ Γογγύλῳ πιστευόντων βεβαίως ἤκεν ἄγγελος περὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου κελεύοντος ἀπαντᾶν.

It is possible that Plutarch has here partly misunderstood Philistos. But the two statements, if they are looked at from the several points of view of the Athenian and the Syracusan, do not necessarily contradict one another. The coming of Gongylos hindered the meeting of an assembly in which surrender was to be at least discussed; negotiations were therefore broken off; that was all that concerned Thucydides. One might think from his words (vii. 2. 3) that the Syracusans started to meet Gylippos the moment Gongylos came (*οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῷ Γυλίππῳ εὐθύς παστρατιᾷ ὡς ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον*). But the nature of the case implies that there was some interval—for Gongylos (see p. 239) could not have brought the news of Gylippos' landing in Sicily—and it is implied in the words which follow (*ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ἡσθάνοντο αὐτὸν*) which must mean a second message. In this interval the first tumult of rejoicing might well give way to a certain amount of distrust, and the people might come to the state of mind described in the words *οὕτω πιστεύοντες βεβαίως*.

It has been alleged as a contradiction between Plutarch and Thucydides that Thucydides (vi. 8. 2), as does Diodōros also (xiii. 2), mentions Alkibiadēs first among the three generals who were to command in Sicily, while Plutarch (Nik. 12) says that the vote of the assembly was *στρατηγὸν εἰεσθαι πρῶτον ἐκείνον μετ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ Λαμάχου*. This assumes that Thucydides would necessarily follow the order of the names in the formal decree. But we shall see in another note (Appendix III) that this was not always his practice. And nothing is more likely than that Alkibiadēs should be chosen first in the sense of having his name shouted in the assembly before that of Nikias. But, when the decree was put into formal shape, Nikias, his senior in the college of generals, would take the precedence due to his years and honours.

I do not feel sure whether it is a contradiction or a mistake when Plutarch (Nik. 17) seems to make the Athenians, when they

first climbed up Epipolai, take captive three hundred of the chosen regiment under Diomilos (see p. 212), (*ἔλκιν μὲν τριακοσίων*), whereas they certainly were killed. *ὁ τε Διόμιλος ἀποθνήσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τριακοσίοι*, says Thucydides (vi. 97. 4). Fricke assures us that *ἔλκιν* in the sense of killing would be too poetic for Plutarch, but that perhaps it ought to be *ἀνελεῖν*.

It would be endless to go through all the questions and difficulties which ingenious men have raised, mostly out of nothing. In all this *Quellenfrage*, even in the *Thukydideische Frage* itself, I have found nothing whatever in any way to affect my notions of any point of Sicilian history of the slightest moment. The line of argument is different when a fact is called in question. Then there must be a right and a wrong, and it is often possible to find out which is right and which is wrong. There are often real arguments which carry conviction one way or another. In these cases where there can be no direct proof, we may simply guess for ever, and I decline to guess at all.

Holm (G. S. ii. 365) gives a page or two to JUSTIN, and some of the dissertation-makers come across him also. As an abridger of a compilation, he hardly ranks with either Diodôros or Plutarch. He used some good materials, but, as a rule, he confuses and misunderstands his materials, good and bad. I can therefore hardly think him worthy of any long search into his sources, any more than into those of Polyainos and others of that class. Not but what Polyainos too used good materials here and there. I have often noticed the statements of both in their proper places.

NOTE II. p. 16.

ATHENIAN DESIGNS ON CARTHAGE.

WE are here concerned with two passages in the Knights of Aristophanês. The one is at v. 1303, where the personified ships say ;

φασὶν αἰτεῖσθαι τῶν ἡμῶν ἑκατὸν ἐς Καρχηδόνα.

The other comes earlier, 173 ;

*ἔτι νῦν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν παράβαλ' ἐς Κάρϊαν
τὸν δεξιὸν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἐς Καρχηδόνα.*

Our familiar Dindorf gives us *Καρχηδόνα* in both places ; but there

can be no doubt that H. Droysen (Athen und der Westen) and later scholars in general are right in reading *Καρχηδόνα*. I believe that *Καλχηδόνα* has no manuscript authority whatever, and the internal evidence for *Καρχηδόνα* is overwhelming. The Scholiast says, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἔω, ἡ Κάρια, ἡ δὲ πρὸς δύσω ἡ Καρχηδών, ἡ λεγομένη Καπράγενα*. That is just the whole matter. Dēmos on his Pnyx has Karia on one side of him and Carthage on the other; bring in Kalchēdōn, and there is no point. Dindorf strangely comments; "inepta de Carthagine cogitavit grammaticus vitiosa deceptus scriptura Καρχηδών pro Καλχηδών." But no one in the Scholiast's day would have turned the very familiar *Καλχηδών*, close to Constantinople, seat of Councils and what not, into the much less familiar *Καρχηδών*. The natural Greek name for the Roman colony of Carthage was in his day, as he himself shows, *Καπράγενα* or something like it; *Καρχηδών* needed explanation. The older Greek name had by that time become a high-polite archaism. In the grand style no doubt African Saracens might be called *Καρχηδόνιοι*, as in the grand style anybody may be called anything.

It is always with fear and trembling that I part company from Bishop Thirlwall on any matter which he had really weighed, as distinguished from matters on which fresh light has been thrown since his time. But I cannot follow his note at vol. iii. p. 359. He seems hardly to have taken in the manuscript evidence, to go no further, for *Καρχηδόνα*. Surely nobody seriously thought of attacking Carthage except by way of Sicily, though a comic poet might talk as freely of Carthage as of Ekbātana.

On later talk about Carthage and places beyond Carthage see Appendix VII.

NOTE III. p. 19.

THE WESTERN ALLIANCES OF ATHENS IN THE YEAR

B.C. 433-432.

THE treaties between Athens and Rhégion and between Athens and Leontinoi of which we have several times had to speak were concluded on one day in the archonship of Apsendēs, that is the year B.C. 433-432. The archonship seems to have begun about the end of July, 433 (H. Nissen, *Historische Zeitschrift*, xxvii. 398).

There is no distinct evidence (Ib. 399) as to the time of the year when these alliances were concluded. The alliance, the *ἑμπυχία* (Thuc. i. 44. 1), between Athens and Korkyra was also concluded in the same year; it was (Nissen, 399) one of the first acts of the archonship. We have now to determine the relation, both of date and cause, in which the two transactions stood to one another. And this examination opens a wide field of inquiry as to the events of the few years before the actual breaking-out of the Peloponnesian war.

The inscription which contains the treaty with Rhêgion has long been known; that which contains the treaty with Leontinoi is one of the later discoveries. Both are printed in the Collection of Attic Inscriptions, i. 33, Suppl. i. 13, and in Hicks, pp. 56, 57. The fact that one document was known and the other not has led to some mistakes as to the beginning of Athenian relations with Sicily (see below, Note VI). No one can doubt that the two treaties concluded on the same day on the motion of the same speaker had a common object. But in form they are quite independent; neither mentions the name of any city except Athens and the city with which Athens is immediately dealing. The treaty was concluded with envoys sent from each of the cities concerned (*πρέσβεις ἐκ Ῥηγίου, ἐκ Λεοντινῶν*). The oaths are very full and solemn, but the actual matter of the treaty takes the simplest form, *ἑμπυχίαν εἶναι Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ῥηγίους* or *Λεοντινούς*. The proposer Kallias may very well be the son of Kalliadês, the Athenian general who not very long after died before Potidaia (Thuc. i. 61-63). We seem too late for Kallias the *ἀμύρατος*, who fought at Marathôn and showed himself *ἀμύρατος ἀνθρώπων καὶ παραμύρατος* (Plut. Arist. 5), and who went as ambassador to Artaxerxes (Herod. vii. 151), and who perhaps negotiated the famous peace. And we seem too early for his grandson *ὁ πλούσιος* (Plut. Per. 24), of whom both Xenophôn and Plato have much to say. The Kallias who married Elpinikê sister of Kimôn (Plut. Kim. 4) is also too old. As to the policy which the treaties represented we shall be a little better able to speak when we have looked at the Korkyraian alliance and what followed it.

As the narrative of Thucydides (i. 45-55) has been commonly understood, the Athenians, as soon as they had concluded their treaty with Korkyra, sent out ten ships under Lakedaimonios, Diotimos, and Prôteas, with instructions not to attack the Corin-

thians, unless they attacked the town or territory of Korkyra (Thuc. i. 45. 2; *μη ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίους, ἢν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν, ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων οὕτω δὲ καλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν*). They sail to Korkyra at once, and find the Corinthians warring against their allies. The battle of Sybota follows between the Corinthians and Korkyraians (c. 49). In this the Athenian ships take no share till its last stage, when they step in to save the Korkyraians from utter destruction. The scale is turned by the sudden appearance of twenty more Athenian ships commanded, according to Thucydides (c. 51), by Glaukôn and the famous Andokidês. These ships had been sent (c. 50) for fear that the ten which were first sent might not be enough for the work to be done. Athenians and Korkyraians now offer battle, which the Corinthians decline (c. 52), and there is no more fighting just yet in the parts of Korkyra.

Now there is an Attic inscription of which I shall speak presently which definitely fixes the sending forth of the ten ships to a time not later than the autumn of B.C. 433. It does not so definitely fix the time of sending forth the twenty ships; as far as the inscription goes, it might have been as late as the spring of 432. We must therefore be prepared for the assertion of an interval of several months between the two. This possibility does not seem to have come into the heads of any of the writers who wrote before the inscription was known. They seem to fix the date of the battle of Sybota by the date of the revolt of Potidaia, which Thucydides places very soon after that battle (i. 56, 57; *μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθύς, εὐθύς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρα ναυμαχίαν*). And the revolt of Potidaia they fix in the midsummer of 432. Thus Clinton, under 433, places the embassy from Korkyra to Athens, and quotes the inscription recording the Rhégine treaty. Under 432 he says; "Sea-fights off Corcyra in the spring;" "*Ποτιδαία ἀπέστη*, about midsummer." So Arnold, in his dates, puts the Korkyraian embassy in 433 and the battle of Sybota in 432. But he puts no gap between the ten ships and the twenty; the gap must come between the embassy and the ten ships. Thirlwall, in the like sort, puts the same dates as Arnold; but, when he tells the story (iii. 58, 59), he brings all things into much closer connexion;

"They concluded a treaty of defensive alliance with Corcyra . . . and not long after ten ships were sent to the assistance of

the Corcyraeans. . . . The preparations which the Corinthians had been making now enabled them . . . to send out a fleet of 150 gallees. . . . A few days after, the two fleets met in order of battle."

Grote (vi. 82) does not, at this exact stage, give any dates at all, and his narrative is perhaps not so explicit as that of Thirlwall; but he clearly never thought of any long interval, and he says distinctly, "the great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took its departure for the Gulf." In truth, in the narrative of Thucydides taken by itself, there is nothing whatever to suggest anything but a swift movement of events after the Korkyraian embassy. The opening words of c. 46, *οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάστο, ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν*, refer to the long and busy preparations which are recorded in c. 31. Both sides were quite ready for action. In c. 47 the Korkyraians bring a hundred and ten ships to meet the hundred and fifty that came against them. Certainly no one would infer from Thucydides that several months took place between the debate at Athens and the battle of Sybota.

We now come to the inscription (C. I. A. i. 79; Suppl. i. 30; Hicks, 58) already spoken of, which ought to tell us something about these matters, and which does tell us something. It is the statement of the sums paid to the generals for the expenses of each of the two expeditions. The money is paid by the keepers of the holy treasure of Athênê—the goddess takes her full form 'Αθηναία—to the generals who sailed to Korkyra; *στρατηγοῖς ἐς Κέρκυραν τοῖς πρώτοις*—or *δευτέροις*—*ἐκπλέονσι*. The payment for the first ten ships was made on the thirteenth day of the first *πρυτανεία* of the year; but the name of the presiding tribe is lost. The date stands thus: [*ἐπὶ τῆς . . . ν*] *τίδος πρυτανείας πρώτης πρυτανεύουσης, τ]ρεῖς καὶ δέκα ἡμέρας ἐξελθ[υ]θείας . . .*].

That is to say, the payment was made about August 13, B.C. 433, and the ten ships then set out.

The payment to the commanders of the twenty ships was made on the last day of the *πρυτανεία* of the tribe Aiantis; but the word is broken off which should have told us at what time of the year that *πρυτανεία* came;

[*ἐπὶ τῆς*] *Αἰαντίδος πρυτανείας* [. . . *τῆς πρυτανεύουσης*] *τῇ τελευ[ταίῃ]* *ἡμέ[ρᾳ τῆς πρυτανείας]*.

This last filling up seems fair enough, but how are we to fill

up the space which ought to hold the numeral fixing the date of the *πρωarella* of Aiantis? This point is discussed at length by Nissen (p. 402). Boeckh, and seemingly everybody else before Nissen, filled it up with *πρώτης*, and filled up the name of the tribe which held the *πρωarella* at the time of the first payment as Aiantis. Both payments thus come in the same month, the first on the thirteenth day of the *πρωarella* of Aiantis, the second on its last day, August 30th. That is to say, the twenty ships followed the ten in about seventeen days, and the battle of Sybota took place in September. H. Droysen (p. 14) takes this relation of the two parts of the document for granted, only he places it earlier in the year, "Mitte Sommers." With the inscription before him, he reads the story in the same way in which Thirlwall and Grote read it before the finding of the inscription. Holm, in his *History of Sicily*, takes no notice of the matter. In his *Griechische Geschichte* of 1889 (ii. 352, 373) he tells the story in much the same way as the earlier writers, and refers to the inscription only for the names of the generals. Nissen is quite of another mind. In filling up the second part of the inscription, he will have nothing to say to *πρώτης*. The right word, as far as the *Buchstabenzahl* goes, might be equally *τρίτης*, *δύδης*, or *ένάτης*. Of these he chooses *δύδης*, and so rules that the second payment was made May 5, 432, that therefore the sailing of the twenty ships and the battle of Sybota did not happen till nine months after the sailing of the ten ships.

This is somewhat startling; but Nissen (p. 402) brings several reasons to defend his position.

First, according to Thucydides (i. 56, 57) the affair of Potidaia followed at once after the battle of Sybota (*μετά ταῦτα εὐθὺς, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρα ναυμαχίαν*). If the battle of Sybota is placed in September 433, there remains a void space of nine months, "ein neunmonatliches Vakuum, das kein menschlicher Scharfsinn zu erklären vermag."

Secondly, the battle of Leukimmê (Thuc. i. 30), two years before (i. 31), was fought, not in the autumn but in the spring. "Die gerade zwei Jahre vorausgehende Schlacht," means, I suppose, two years before Sybota, whenever Sybota was.

Thirdly, the ancients avoided the sea in the winter.

Fourthly, every impartial reader ("jeder unbefangene Leser") of the narrative of the battle of Sybota in Thucydides, i. 47-51,

will see that it implies a longer daylight than there would be in September.

We may look to these reasons presently; let us first see what follows, if we accept Nissen's view. He is (p. 398) as clear as possible that ten ships started in August 433; only the twenty ships did not follow them till May 432. What were the ten ships doing all this time? Nissen says most truly (399), "um neun Monate bei den Phäaken still zu liegen, wurden sicherlich keine zehn Schiffe im August 433 ausgeschiedt." The Rhégine and Leontine inscriptions are called in to solve the question. The treaties recorded by them are held not to have been the only ones made at this time. The words of Thucydides, iii. 86. 3, are referred to to show that other Chalkidian cities also had treaties. Lakedaimonios and his colleagues sailed about for nine months making treaties here and there, or at least suggesting to the cities to send to Athens to make them. And a strange notice at which I have glanced in the text (see p. 14) is very ingeniously pressed into the service. Diotimos was one of the commanders of the ten ships, and Timaios recorded a story about Diotimos, which may be fitted in here very nicely. One of the dark sayings of Lykophrôn (732) stands thus;

πρώτη δὲ καὶ ποτ' αἴθι συγγόνων θεῶ
κράνων ἀπάσης Μόψωπος ναυάρχιας
πλωτῆρσι λαμπαδοῦχον ἔντοναί δρόμον,
χρησμοῖς πιθήσας. ὃν ποτ' αἰρήσει λειδὸς
Νεαπολιτῶν, οἱ παρ' ἀελυστον σέπας
ὄρμων Μισηνοῦ στόφλα νάσσονται κλίτη.

On this the Scholia Vetera (see C. Müller, i. 268) comment;

φησὶ Τίμαιος Διοτίμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ναύαρχον, παραγενόμενον εἰς Νεάπολιν, κατὰ χρησμὸν θύσαι τῇ Παρθενόῃ, καὶ δρόμον ποιῆσαι λαμπάδων, διὸ καὶ οὖν τὸν τῆς λαμπάδος ἀγῶνα γίνεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς Νεαπολίταις. Μοψοπία δὲ καλεῖται ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἀπὸ Μόψωπος.

By the time Tzetzes wrote, there were no more lamp-races at Naples; so he altered the statement to the past tense. He also thought that his readers might not know who Timaios was; so he added the rather unlucky description *ὁ Ζικελός*, for which some read *Ζικελικός*. Lastly he added the words

Διοτίμος δὲ εἰς Νεάπολιν ἦλθεν, ὅτε στρατηγὸς ὦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐπολέμει τοῖς Ζικελόις.

Beloch (Campanien, 30) seizes on the story with great glee. He calls up an Attic colony at Naples, and adds, "so wurde Neapel

der äusserste Punkt des grossen athenischen Reiches nach Westen hin." He speaks specially of the coins, which, if they are so late as Head (33) places them, namely from B.C. 340 to 268, do not prove much.

Now is there anything in all this at all to set against the impression which every one would take in from the story in Thucydides that the battle of Sybota followed as soon as possible after the conclusion of the *ἐμπυχία* between Athens and Korkyra? With that impression the inscription exactly falls in, if only we fill up the blank with *πρώτης* and not with *δύτης*. And it is something in favour of *πρώτης*, something that is in favour of putting the sailing of the twenty ships soon after the sailing of the ten, that the inscription couples them under one general head of money spent about Korkyra. Nissen's whole notion is simple conjecture. The Rhegines and Leontines might have sent an embassy to Athens without Lakedaimonios going to stir them up. Indeed the language used both by the Korkyraians and by Thucydides himself about the convenience of Korkyra for Athenian dealings with Italy and Sicily would rather imply that something of Athenian negotiation was going on in those parts before the Korkyraian embassy to Athens. As for the story of Diotimos, whatever we hold it to prove, there is no necessity to place his visit to Naples in the archonship of Apseudês. It would be unfair to press the comment, most likely a blundering comment, of John Tzetzés, and to say that, whenever it happened, it did not happen in B.C. 433-432, because in that year Athens certainly had no war with any Sikels. But his visit, whatever it means, may just as likely have been earlier or later. Diotimos was most likely general several times, and we hear of him in parts of the world very far from Naples. In Strabo, i. 3. 1, he goes on an embassy to Sousa. The whole thing is mere guess-work. And Nissen does not answer one very important question. What were the Corinthians, after their great preparation spread over so long a time, doing in all the months which he assumes to have passed between their embassy to Athens and the battle of Sybota? And, if the ten ships had been going hither and thither all this while, it was remarkably lucky that they should get to Korkyra, and that the twenty ships should come to reinforce them, just in the nick of time.

Still we must look to Nissen's special arguments in support of

his view, as I have already set them forth. The first is to my mind the only weighty one. The third and fourth surely go for very little. The second argument is put in so few words that it is not easy to be sure of its meaning. The battle of Leukimmé must have been fought in the autumn of 435. It is hard to see why Nissen assumes it to have been in the spring. The Corinthians were engaged in making ready for two years between Leukimmé and the Korkyraian application to Athens. That seems to fix the date of the battle. During the first of those years the Korkyraians had command of the sea (*ικράτουν τῆς θαλάσσης*, Thuc. i. 30. 3). In the summer of 434 (*περιόντι* or *περιμέντι τῷ θέρει*, a passage on which I am convinced by a letter of Mr. Goodwin) the Corinthians came out with a greater force, and the two watched one another during that summer (*τὸ θέρος τοῦτο*, i. 30. 5). I do not quite understand whether Nissen carries the two years back from his Sybota in the spring of 432 to Leukimmé in the spring of 434.

But the argument which really needs an answer is the first. If we place, as the inscription make us place, the sending forth of the ten ships about August 433, and if we place the revolt of Potidaia, where it is commonly placed, in the summer of 432, we must be driven to some such conclusion as Nissen's. That revolt was *εὐθύς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρα ναυμαχίαν*, that is the battle of Sybota. If then the embassy and the two sendings out of ships all happened in August and September 433, the revolt of Potidaia must have been earlier than the date commonly given to it, midsummer 432. H. Droysen, looking to the west only, and not to eastward Potidaia, does not seem to have thought of this. Now the conference at Sparta which followed *εὐθύς* (Thuc. i. 67. 1) after some events at Potidaia seems clearly fixed to the year 432 by the date in i. 87. 6 that it happened *ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει καὶ δεκάτῳ τῶν τριακοντουτίδων σπονδῶν προκεχωρηκυῖων αἱ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὰ Εὐβοϊκά*, that is in 445. It seems to be commonly taken for granted that all the events recorded at Potidaia in i. 56–65 happened within a very short time in the year 432. Clinton places the revolt at midsummer and the congress at Sparta in the autumn of the same year. Yet the only direct statements of time are that the chain of events recorded at Potidaia began speedily (*εὐθύς*, i. 56. 1, 57. 1) after the battle of Sybota, and that the congress at Sparta happened speedily (*εὐθύς*, i. 67. 1) after the last event recorded at this stage.

There is nothing directly to show over how long a time all the recorded events were spread. There is the message from Athens to Potidaia, the intrigues of Perdikkas, the revolt of Potidaia, the succours sent thither from Corinth, the peace between Athens and Perdikkas and its breach, the Athenian march on Potidaia, the battle, the first blockade, the more effectual blockade, the escape of Aristeeas, his further operations and those of Phormiön. All this might well take up a good deal of time, and our only hint as to the chronological relation of any of these events to any other is that (i. 60. 3) the Corinthian succours reached Potidaia forty days after the revolt of that town from Athens. And this seems to be mentioned, not as a note of time, but to mark the energy and speed with which the Corinthians set to work. But we do know that the battle of Potidaia (i. 62) was (ii. 2. 1) six months before the Theban attack on Plataia, that is about October, 432. And we have surely events enough to fill up the time from Sybota in September 433 to the congress in October 432. It is hardly a difficulty that Thucydides says nothing about summer and winter. At this stage he is not carefully dividing his years in the way that he does when he gets to his main story. Nor is it any difficulty that this view requires a good deal to go on in the winter of 433-432. A winter campaign in the parts of Potidaia was what everybody specially disliked, but it had to be largely gone through a little later. In all this there is surely no such difficulty as there is if we suppose a long interval, to be filled up with events at pleasure, between the sending of the ten and the twenty ships to Korkyra. And it seems that we must choose one or the other. The time of sending the ten ships is fixed with absolute certainty by the inscription. The time of the congress at Sparta is fixed with only less certainty by the date in Thucydides. Between the two comes a time of rather more than a year. One must suppose either the action at Korkyra or the action at Potidaia to have taken a longer time than one would think at first sight. Of the two alternatives I prefer the second.

Nissen has a good deal to say about the state of parties at Athens, into which a historian of Sicily is perhaps not bound to follow him. In the course of his remarks we hear of "der Geldfürst Grote," and of a "*Reichspolitik*" on the part of Athens. It may be that the "Geldfürst" by talking of an "Athenian empire"

gave occasion for this last word. But it is quite worth considering whether there is not some force in what H. Droysen (16-19) has to say about the position of Periklēs as the representative of dealings, but only moderate dealings, with the West. He is for simple defensive help to Korkyra, for the *ἐπιμαχία* which is held not to break the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce. It is the party of more energetic action which carries the alliance with Rhégion and Leontinoi and the sending of the larger force to Korkyra. This last falls in with the notice preserved by Plutarch (Per. 29); *κακῶς οὖν ὁ Περικλῆς ἀκούων διὰ τὰς δέκα ταύτας τριήρεις, ὡς μικρὰν μὲν βοήθειαν τοῖς δεσθεῖσι, μεγάλην δὲ πρόφασιν τοῖς ἐγκαλοῦσι παρεσχηκὼς, ἑτέρας αὖθις ἵσταί τε πλείονας εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν, αἱ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἀφίκοντο.* And the words of Thucydides (i. 50. 6) about the twenty ships might be taken the same way; *ἀς ὕστερον* [surely not nine months after] *τῶν δέκα βοηθῶν ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεισάντες ὅτι ἐγένετο, μὴ νυκθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεροι δέκα νῆες ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὦσι.* But we must in any case, as Thirlwall did long ago, cast aside Plutarch's absurd story that Periklēs sent Lakedaïmonios against his will and with ten ships only, *οἷον ἐφυβρίζων*. Droysen takes this to come from Stésaimbrotos, who is quoted several times in the life of Periklēs (8, 26, 36) but not here; in any case Plutarch seems not to have understood the course of political events.

Thucydides gives the names of the commanders of the ten ships as Lakedaïmonios, Diotimos, and Prôteas. The inscription gives Lakedaïmonios and Diotimos, and a name has dropped out between. The twenty ships he places (i. 51. 4) under Glaukôn and Andokidēs—the well-known orator of that name, who was afterwards in Sicily (see p. 75). But the names in the inscription are Glaukôn, [Metag]enēs, and Drakontidēs. Mr. Hicks remarks; "Either Thucydides made a slip or Andokides was unofficially attached to the expedition." (Cf. on the order of the names of the generals, above, p. 614.) It is to be noticed that the inscription writes the natural *Κόρκυρα*, not the literary *Κέρκυρα*. An inscription of B.C. 375 (Hicks, 148, 149) fluctuates between the two spellings. *Κορκυραία* seems to be the best reading in the Birds, 1463, where see the scholia, and it seems to be coming into fashion in various editions. *Κέρκυρα* is really a little like the French fancy of "Cantorbéry."

In my second volume (425) I placed the preparations of Syracuse which were the last events recorded there in the year 439. Nissen (393) points out the chronological confusion of Diodóros, who places these preparations in 439, according to the reckoning of archons, and in 446, according to his reckoning of consuls. I took the later date, because the archons were more likely to be right than the consuls, and because the preparations spoken of are not likely to have happened before the death of Ducetius. Nissen is hard on Diodóros, calling him "Schwachkopf," and saying that he deals with his dates like a pack of cards. He says truly that Diodóros places these preparations in the same year as the beginnings of quarrel about Epidamnos. That was certainly, as he says, not in the archonship of Glaukidas (439-438), but in that of Antilochidēs (435-434) or possibly earlier. This connexion goes for quite as much as his date, perhaps for more. If we can bring down the Syracusan preparations as late as 435, we bring them into direct connexion with the Athenian treaties with Rhégion and Leontinoi in 433.

The names of the Leontine envoys are worth recording; they are so truly Sikeliot. Timénór son of Agathoklēs; Sôsis son of Glaukias; Gelôn son of Exêkestos.

NOTE IV. p. 23.

THE EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SICILY TO THE PELOPONNESIAN FLEET.

THE well-known passage in Thucydides, ii. 7. 2, is both hard to construe and hard to fit in with what we know of the facts of the case. The words stand thus;

καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τάκεινων ἐλομένοις ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὥς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἑσομένων, καὶ ἀργύριον ῥητὸν ἐτοιμᾶν.

Arnold remarks that "it would not be easy to parallel the obscurity and grammatical solecisms of this sentence." He discusses the construing at some length, as do Grote (vii. 177) and Mr. Jowett (Thuc. ii. 90). One is inclined to say that, at whatever risk of grammar, αὐτοῦ must surely mean "in Italy and Sicily," as

assuredly there were no Italiot or Sikeliot ships ready in Peloponnēsos just then. But, if καὶς be taken as the nominative for νῆες, αὐτοῦ may stand for Peloponnēsos. Still this, or any other construction or emendation, takes us only a very little way. The puzzle is that there is assumed to be a Peloponnesian party in Sicily (οἱ τὰς αἰῶνας ἐλόμενοι), and that language is used like ἐπεράχθησαν, which has a sound of supremacy about it. Perhaps we ought not to insist too much on this last point; but the fact remains that, beyond this passage, there is nothing to imply even alliance between Sparta or the Peloponnesian confederacy and any Sikeliot city whatever. To send embassies to persuade them to take the Peloponnesian side would be the most natural thing in the world, all the more so after the Athenian alliance with Rhégion and Leontinoi. But here an existing alliance, looking rather like a dependent alliance, seems taken for granted. On the other hand, a later passage, at the time when the Athenian intervention in Sicily actually begins, seems to imply that the alliance was contracted now (iii. 86. 3);

ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἦσαν πλὴν Καμηραιῶν αἱ ἄλλαι Δωριῶδες πόλεις, αἵ περ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχίαν ἐτάχθησαν, οὐ μὲντοι ξυνεπολέμησάν γε.

These last emphatic words contain the root of the matter. Whatever engagements were entered into now, nothing came of them; if ships were ordered to be built, they were not built.

In two later passages, at the beginning of the great Athenian invasion, it again seems implied that there was no alliance. Thus, in vi. 11. 3, Nikias is made to say that the Sikeliots may haply act against Athens out of good will to the Lacedæmonians (νῦν μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἔλθοιεν ἕκαστοι χάριτι), quite another thing from being bound by treaty. And in vi. 34. 3, Hermokratēs is made to recommend asking help at Sparta and Corinth (πέμψωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον, δέοντες δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν), just as he recommends asking for it at Carthage and elsewhere. But here it may be said that the pacification of Gela had put an end to Peloponnesian, as well as Athenian, alliances in Sicily.

Our one undoubted fact is that, till the sending of Gylippos, Peloponnesians and Sikeliots did nothing for one another. It thus becomes a curious question and no more whether the five hundred ships mean the whole Peloponnesian fleet or the part of

it which was to be supplied by Italy and Sicily. Arnold and Thirlwall (iii. 83) take it in the latter sense, which is the most obvious meaning of the words; but five hundred is so vast a number that the other meaning, taken by Grote, Holm, and Mr. Jowett, seems more likely. It draws also some confirmation from the words of Diodóros, xii. 41; *καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν συμμάχους διακοσίας τριήρεσιν ἔπεισαν βοηθεῖν.*

H. Droysen (Athen und der Westen, 55) has an "Excurs" headed "das dorische Flottenproject." He refers to the words put into the mouth of the Korkyraians in Thuc. i. 36. 2, about Korkyra; *τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παραπλοῦ κείται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκείθεν ναυτικὸν εἶσαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν τό τ' ἐνθάδε πρὸς τὰκί παραπέμψαι.* His comment is;

"Reichen die Anfänge des dorischen Flottenprojectes bis in den Sommer 433, so ist die Thukydeideische Nachricht im zweiten Buche falsch; ist dagegen diese Nachricht richtig, so scheint die Andeutung in der Rede der Korkyräer ohne Grund zu sein. Hat Thukydides in der spät ausgearbeiteten Rede vielleicht die Zeiten nicht streng auseinander gehalten?"

Surely this is seeing rather further than we can see. Droysen has himself shown as well as any one how Athens had been for a long time looking westward. The words in the Korkyraian speech need not refer to any definite proposal like the "dorische Flottenproject" of 431. The Korkyraian orators are simply putting all manner of cases that may possibly happen, and showing how useful to Athens the alliance of Korkyra will be in any of them.

This last suggests the contrast with a later time when the value of Korkyra to Athens was insisted on, with reference, not to Italy and Sicily, but to points nearer home. So Isok. xv. 108; *τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε Κόρκυραν* [so Ellass; it used to be *Κέρκυραν*] *μὲν ἐν ἐπικαιροτάτῃ καὶ κάλλιστα κειμένην τῶν περὶ Πελοπόννησον.* Cf. Xen. Hell. vi. 2. 9. Just above (vi. 2. 3) Sicily comes in, but from the other side; *ἔπεμψαν* [οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι] *πρὸς Διονύσιον διδάσκοντες ὡς καὶ ἐκείνῃ χρήσιμον εἴη τὴν Κέρκυραν μὴ ὑπ' Ἀθηναίοις εἶναι.*

In both this and the last note I am deeply obliged to Mr. Goodwin for many suggestions.

NOTE V. p. 28.

THE EMBASSY OF GORGIAS.

THIS embassy from Sicily to Athens is of high historical importance on account of the later events which it led to; but it clearly became much more famous on account of the share which the Leontine orator Gorgias was said to have had in it.

The two main accounts are those of Thucydides (iii. 86. 4) and Diodóros (xii. 53). Thucydides does not mention Gorgias; it was not at all his way to do so. His words are simply; *ἐς οὖν Ἀθήνας πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι ἴσμεν ἦσαν, πείθουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι τὰς ναῦς.*

Diodóros, on the other hand, speaks of Gorgias as head of a Leontine embassy; *Λεοντῖνοι . . . ἐξέπεμψαν πρέσβεις εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας . . . ἦν δὲ τῶν ἀποσταλμένων ἀρχιπρεσβευτὴς Γοργίας ὁ ῥήτωρ.* He then goes on to say a great deal about Gorgias' rhetoric, and attributes to him the winning over of the Athenians to the Leontine petition. He appears as *τέλος πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχεῖν τοῖς Λεοντῖνοις.*

The difference is remarkable. Grote says (vii. 180);

"Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus the pupil of Isokratés. Among the writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for much more than in the estimation of Thucydides."

In such a case Thucydides was sure to make the least and Diodóros the most of such a man as Gorgias. But there seems no reason to doubt that Gorgias was there. He may very well have spoken, and his style of oratory may very well have been noticed, whether it directly led to persuasion or not. His presence is distinctly asserted by Plato, Hippias Major, 282; *Γοργίας οὗτος ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἴκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὥς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν τῇ δῆμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν.* So Timaios, as quoted by Dionysios (de Lysia, p. 3), speaking of Gorgias as an orator, adds, *ὥς μὲν Τίμαιός φησιν . . . ἦν ἵκα Ἀθήνας πρεσβεύων κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἀκούοντας.*

The remarkable thing in the narrative of Thucydides is, not that he does not mention Gorgias, but that he seems to make no mention of Leontine envoys at all. His words are *οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι.* I do not know that anybody has noticed this

except Arnold, whose comment was most thoroughly to the purpose as long as only the Rhegine, and not the Leontine, treaty was known. "He says 'the allies of the Leontines' rather than 'the Leontines and their allies,' because the argument of 'an old alliance already subsisting' could only *as far as we know* be used by the Rhegians, and not by the Leontines themselves." He goes on to refer to the Rhegine inscription. But now that we know that there was a Leontine treaty, we must look for some other explanation. Perhaps, like the idiom of *οἱ περὶ*, the words *οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι* may be taken to mean "the Leontines and their allies."

There must have been some confusion when Pausanias (vi. 17. 8) seems to have thought that Gorgias and Tisias (see vol. ii. 412) were fellow-envoys; *εὐδοκμησάιν δὲ Γοργίαν λόγων ἕνεκα ἐν τε παπηγύρει τῇ Ὀλυμπικῇ φασὶ καὶ ἀφικόμενον κατὰ πρεσβείαν ὁμοῦ Τισίᾳ παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις*. But Tisias, if he was there at all, must have gone, as Holm (ii. 404) suggests, to speak for Syracuse against Gorgias. Plato (Phaidros, p. 267) couples Gorgias and Tisias, but it need not refer to the embassy.

Thucydides puts the reason which determined the Athenians to send the help that was asked of them in a very practical shape;

ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σίτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν, πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἶη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ὑποχέρμα γενέσθαι.

The vague looking towards Italiot and Sikeliot affairs which we have seen at the beginning of the war and long before has now grown into a more definite feeling. Sicilian conquest now presents itself as a possible thing, the chances of which should be enquired into. The full frame of mind of the great invasion was yet to come.

Diodóros (xii. 54) puts the case strongly, but his words read a little like a paraphrase of those of Thucydides;

Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πάλαι μὲν ἦσαν ἐπιθυμηταὶ τῆς Σικελίας διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας, καὶ τότε δ' ἀσμένως προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς τοῦ Γοργίου λόγους, ἐψηφίσαντο συμμαχίαν ἐκπέμπεω τοῖς Λεοντίνοις πρόφασιν μὲν φέροντες τὴν τῶν συγγενῶν χρεῖαν καὶ δέησιν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ τὴν νῆσον σπεύδοντες κατακτήσασθαι.

He then goes back to the Corinthian and Korkyraian orations,

and makes the remarks quoted in p. 19. He further finds something to say about the Athenian dominion in general, and then goes on with the expedition of Lachês and Charoiadês.

NOTE VI. p. 53.

THE SPEECH OF HERMOKRATÊS AT GELA.

THAT this famous speech is somewhat startling, not exactly what we should have looked for from a Syracusan orator of the time, is plain on the face of things. Into this point I have gone somewhat largely in the text. But I do not see that we need make the inferences which H. Droysen (*Athen und der Westen*, Excurs. I. pp. 50-54) makes from it. His conclusion is;

“So vortrefflich diese Rede des Thukydides componirt ist, *den Werth einer Urkunde* für jene Verhältnisse und Vorgänge wird man ihr nicht beimessen dürfen; sie schildert die Situation so wie Thukydides sie sich vorstellt, nicht wie sie in Wirklichkeit gewesen ist.”

I am not aware that any one ever attributed to this speech or to any speech in debate, however reported, the exact value of a formal document. The value of a speech and the value of a document are of quite different kinds; the merits and the weaknesses of the two sources of knowledge are as nearly as possible opposite to one another. But neither Thirlwall nor Grote found out this marked contrast between the facts of the case and the speech as reported by Thucydides. Neither did Droysen's countryman Holm, whose summary of the matter (*G. S.* ii. 8) is very much to the purpose. The result, he says, of the present Athenian invasion was to unite the Sikeliots, at least for a moment;

“In dieser Hinsicht ist das Auftreten des Hermokrates von grosser Bedeutung; die sicilischen Griechen fühlen sich als die Vertreter von ganz Sicilien, wo Sikeler und Phöniciër kaum mitzählen und Athener Fremdlinge sind. Est ist die beste Erläuterung des im Anfange dieses Abschnitts Dargelegten.”

Droysen is anxious to find out how Thucydides came to know about the speech. He says (p. 53), with perfect truth, that Thucydides could not have been at the congress of Gela. Certainly he was in quite another part of the world (*iv.* 104. 3). His personal enquiries among men on the Peloponnesian side

began later (v. 26. 5). He could hardly, Droysen says, have heard it from the Athenian generals when they came back—he and they alike—to their trials. Perhaps too the Athenian generals did not know exactly what went on at Gela. Perhaps too Thucydides may have heard something when he was in Sicily; only when was he in Sicily, and could anybody have remembered the speech? Perhaps, as this congress of Gela was (see above, p. 604) the last event recorded by Antiochos, he read it in Antiochos' book. Only could we trust Antiochos to report Hermokratēs' speech "authentisch," "unparteiisch"?

I cannot see much in all this. Before I saw Droysen's pamphlet, I had come to the conclusion that the authority was Hermokratēs himself. So I have said in the text (see p. 56), and I see no reason to change it. I bring in again my old rule; "Credo quia impossibile." It is the very unexpectedness of the position taken by Hermokratēs which is the strongest ground for believing it to be genuine. Thucydides, according to his own rule (i. 22), would set down, if possible, what Hermokratēs was reported to have said, failing that, what he, Thucydides, thought Hermokratēs was likely to have said under the circumstances. Now the speech attributed to Hermokratēs, though it in no way contradicts the state of things at the time of the congress of Gela, is certainly not what, at the time of that congress, was likely to come into the head of Thucydides as the kind of speech which Hermokratēs would naturally make. It seems still less likely when we compare it with the speeches attributed to Hermokratēs at a later time (see p. 117). From them the peculiar insular view of the speech at Gela, wide on one side and narrow on another, has altogether vanished. Doubtless circumstances had changed and had made that view altogether out of place. But that is not the whole of the case. The doctrine of Sikeliot unity, as taught in the speech at Gela, though possible at the earlier time and impossible at the later, is just as remarkable at one time as at another. It was a doctrine very natural to occur to Hermokratēs; it was not at all likely to come into the head of Thucydides as what Hermokratēs might *à priori* be expected to set forth. And, considering the character of Thucydides' Sicilian narrative at this stage, I cannot think it likely that he would, when first writing it, have thought of putting in any speech at all. All this helps towards the belief that this speech does not come under Thucydides' second

head, of speeches which he thought likely to have been made, but rather under the first head, when he hands down to us, doubtless in his own words, speeches to which he had himself listened or the substance of which had been reported to him. And, if the speech at Gela comes under this last class of all, no reporter is so likely as Hermokratés himself. Hermokratés would remember his own speech, if other people had forgotten it, and he and Thucydides would have every temptation to talk over the matter together. And I need not stop to point out that the banished Thucydides had plenty of opportunities of talking to Hermokratés, either when he was serving in the Ægean or even in Sicily a little earlier (see above, p. 596).

The words in iv. 60. 1, *Ἀθηναίους οἱ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων* (see p. 57), fit in excellently with the time of the congress at Gela. The Athenians had won their success at Sphaktêria and they had taken Kythêra (iv. 53); the Thracian exploits of Brasidas and the Athenian defeat at Dêlion had not yet happened, or, if they had happened, they could not yet have been known in Sicily. On the other hand, Grote (vii. 188, see p. 56) has something to say on the words in Thucydides (iv. 60. 1) where the Athenians are spoken of as *ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*, with the purpose of coming with a greater force at some future time. He argues that the Athenian fleet now off Sicily could not be called "a few ships," that the words could be used only by comparison with the greater fleets that came afterwards. He argues therefore that the speech was written after the great Athenian expedition, "though," he adds, "I doubt not that Thucydides collected the memoranda for it at the time."

This falls in exactly with my notions, save only that I doubt about Thucydides "collecting memoranda" in this particular case. In some cases in the eighth book we may very well, with Arnold (iii. 403), see preparations for speeches to be worked in when the writer came to his final revision. But that hardly applies here. Thucydides, as I hold (see above, p. 592), wrote a narrative of these earlier Sicilian wars soon after the time. When he came to revise that narrative, he worked in this speech from his fuller knowledge, knowledge largely derived from Hermokratés himself. The only other alternative that I can conceive is that Thucydides wrote the speech when he wrote the rest of the fourth book, and that he wrote it with the slighter knowledge of Sicilian

affairs which he had then. We should thus have to suppose that the special and singular position taken up in the speech, the omission of any mention of the barbarians of the island, the remarkable line taken up towards Greeks out of the island, were due, not to any peculiarity in Hermokratês' personal view of things, but to the comparative ignorance of Thucydides himself at the time when he wrote the fourth book. But in his general treatment of Sicilian affairs in the third, fourth, and fifth books, a speech of any kind seems rather out of place, and the personality of Hermokratês could not have impressed him then as it certainly did afterwards. Besides, though Thucydides, when he wrote the fourth book, did not know so much of Sicily as he came to know afterwards, he knew much more than this view would allow. For instance, he knew perfectly well the importance of the Sikels. And I think we may add that he was not indisposed (see above, p. 594) to bring in what he did know about Sicily (see iii. 88. 2, 3; i. 16. 1, 2; iv. 24. 5; perhaps iii. 103. 1; v. 4. 4). There is also Grote's very strong argument for the later date.

At the same time, though Thucydides learned, as I feel sure, a good deal about the speech from Hermokratês, it is quite possible that he may also have read something in Antiochos. I think I can afford to make Droysen a present of all that can be got out of *περικλυζομένη* in vi. 3. 2, and of *περίφρωντος* in iv. 64. 3 (see vol. ii. p. 457). These last words come happily for Droysen, to whom they give a chance of talking (p. 51) of "eines meerumschlungenen Vaterlandes." The word carries one back to the songs of forty years back and more.

We must here not forget the speech put into the mouth of Hermokratês by Timaios, which was so severely blamed by Polybios (xii. 25 k). The case is somewhat the same as that of the speeches (other than those in Herodotus) which were attributed to Gelôn at the time of the coming of the Athenian and Spartan envoys. See vol. ii. p. 516. Only we have here nothing answering to the speech (from Antiochos or Philistos?) which in that case Polybios approved, and which was certainly not that in Herodotus. If we are surprised then at Polybios' not mentioning the speech in Herodotus, we are yet more surprised now at his not mentioning the speech in Thucydides. But so it is.

The passage in which Polybios discusses the speech devised by

Timaios (see p. 56) is, unluckily, not only a fragment but a mutilated fragment. But we can see that Polybios' chief objection was that Hermokratès, one of the most practical of men (see p. 48), one of the least likely to talk childish common-places (*οὐκ ἤκιστ' ἂν δέοι περιάπτειν μαιρακιδείας καὶ διατριβικοὺς λόγους*), is made to spend too much time in setting forth the advantages of peace above war in an assembly which knew all about it (*ἐν συνεδρίῳ καλῶς γιγνώσκοντι τὰς τοιαύτας περὶ πεινείας*), and in praising the men of Gela and Kamarina first, for having made peace with one another, secondly for trying to bring the other cities to the like godly unity. This last does not seem a very bad fault; and some talk of that kind might be politic. But the third ground of praise is remarkable and instructive. While the other two are obvious and open to any rhetorician, this one, we feel sure, Timaios must have found in Antiochos or some other good authority. The words stand thus;

τρίτον ὅτι προνοηθεῖεν τοῦ μὴ βουλεύεσθαι τὰ πλήθη περὶ τῶν διαλυσέων, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προεστῶτας τῶν πολιτευμάτων.

The ground of praise seems to be that this delicate diplomatic business was done in a way more like that of modern diplomacy than was usual in the Greek commonwealths (see p. 48). The Geloans and Kamarinaians chose to have the matter debated by a small body of leading men from each city—by a diplomatic congress in fact—rather than to leave it to the popular assemblies of each city. They might, when they had concluded their own peace or truce, have carried it round to the other Sikeliot cities, asking each separately to agree to it. This was what was afterwards actually done to the Italiot cities, when the peace was offered to them and accepted by all except Lokroi (see p. 64). In this way the whole matter would have had to be debated separately in the popular assembly of each city. Instead of this, the matter was put into the hands of a single representative body, of deputies sent by each city. The final confirmation of each city might still be needed; but it would be merely the acceptance or rejection of a treaty already discussed and put into shape by a select body. Such a body, had it become permanent, might have become the kernel of a Sikeliot confederation. That such was the nature of the gathering at Gela is perfectly clear from the words of Thucydides (iv. 58. 1). The *κοινόν* to which Hermokratès speaks is made up of *ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων πρέσβεις*. And these *πρέσβεις* are

spoken of as equivalent to *οἱ ἅλοι Συκελιῶται ἐκτελθόντες ἐς Γόλαν*. This almost looks as if they came with full powers to consent to anything in the name of their several cities. But even if the treaty had afterwards to be put to a Yea or Nay vote of each city, the details at least had been discussed and the document drawn up by the representative body. The account in Thucydides (iv. 65) does not absolutely rule this point; but perhaps it looks more as if the decision of the assembly had been final.

The oligarchic, perhaps federalist, Hermokratēs would naturally prefer the single smaller body.

In this way the despised Timaios, if he does not actually help us to a new fact, at least puts a fact recorded by Thucydides into fresh and very instructive prominence.

NOTE VII. p. 88.

THE DESIGNS OF ALKIBIADÈS.

THE question of the designs of Alkibiadēs in the great Sicilian expedition stands quite distinct from that of the designs of the Athenian people in general. And both are distinct from the designs of the Athenian people at the earlier time with which I had to deal in Note II, when Alkibiadēs was not yet a political leader. And in both cases we must again distinguish the vague thoughts which float in the minds either of one man or of a multitude from deliberate purposes which have taken a definite shape and which either man or multitude would openly avow.

In the earlier stage of Athenian intervention in Sicily we have seen that Sicilian conquest, whole or partial, was seriously looked on as something possible on the part of Athens (see p. 29). We have seen also (see above, p. 615) that Carthage had a large enough place in men's minds to supply the comic poets with jokes. This last does not prove that any man would have spoken seriously of an attack on Carthage in the assembly or elsewhere.

At the time which we have now reached, Thucydides distinctly describes the Athenian people in general as entertaining serious schemes of Sicilian conquest, seemingly of the conquest of the whole island. He comments—with all the full knowledge of his sixth and seventh books—on their ignorance of what Sicilian conquest

involved and specially of the size of the island (see Grote, vii. 220, 221). Speaking in his own person, he says nothing about Carthage. At the very beginning of the sixth book he says ;

τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλοντο αὐθις μείζονι παρασκευῇ τῆς μετὰ Λάχης καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαντες καταστρέψασθαι, εἰ δύναιντο, ἄπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων.

A little later, just after his description of Sicily (vi. 6. 1) he says that the Athenians designed the conquest of Sicily, but cloked it under a show of helping their kinsfolk and allies ;

τοιαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ᾤκει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσόνδε ὁδὸν αὐτῇν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ᾤρμητο, ἐφειμένοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἀρξείν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς αὐτῶν συγγένεσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις συμμάχοις.

Here, when speaking of the people at large, there is nothing about Carthage. Carthaginian conquest, though a good deal in men's heads, had not taken the same definite shape as Sicilian conquest. But Thucydides, in his own person (vi. 15. 2), puts Carthaginian designs into the mind of Alkibiadès ; he is μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι.

Views on Carthage seem to imply views beyond Carthage ; and Alkibiadès, in his speech at Sparta (vi. 90. 1), is made (see p. 198) to set forth the very widest views as those of the whole Athenian people ;

ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, Σικελιώτας καταστρεφόμενοι, μετὰ δ' ἐκείνους αὐθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσομεν.

It is worth notice that there is here no distinct mention of the barbarian part of Sicily, though Panormos, Solous, and Motya must be understood as coming under the head of the Καρχηδονίων ἀρχή.

All this, so says Alkibiadès, was only to find the means of making an attack on Peloponnèsos, and in the end ruling all Hellas, seemingly both continuous and scattered (τοῦ ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἀρξείν). To this end the Athenians were to build ships with the timber of Italy (τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθορα), and to bring with them the whole force of the West, Greek and barbarian (κομίσαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκείθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους μισθωσάμενοι,

καὶ Ἰβήρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ, ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχησέ-
 τουν). In all this description, spoken when and where it was
 spoken, Alkibiadēs was sure to make the most of everything and
 he was not unlikely to invent something. On the whole, it may
 be safe to say that he takes his own serious schemes and his own
 dreams to boot, and speaks of them all as the serious schemes of the
 Athenian people. But no doubt both he and the people in general
 were quite ready to take anything that they had a chance of
 getting. This was ἡ ἄγαν τῶν πλείων ἐπιθυμία, as Thucydides calls
 it (in vi. 24. 3) when ὁ πολλὸς ὄμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης hoped ἐν τε τῇ
 παρόντι ἀργύριον οἶσιν, καὶ προσκτήσασθαι δύναμιν ἔθεν αἰδῶν μισθοφορὰν
 ὑπάρξειν.

The later writers—even the contemporary Philistos would for
 these matters be in some sort a later writer—naturally exaggerate.
 I have quoted (see above, p. 630) the place in Diodóros (xii. 54)
 where he speaks of Athenian plans at the time of the embassy of
 Gorgias. At the present stage (xiii. 2) he does not talk, as one
 might have expected, about Carthage and more distant places, but
 only of Sicily; *ἅπαντες μεμεταωρισμένοι ταῖς ἑλπίσιν, ἐξ ἐτοίμου κατα-
 κληροῦν ἡλπίζον τὴν Σικελίαν*. But he has also a very strange story,
 wherever he found it, about a secret agreement between the Senate
 and the generals, in which Nikias must surely have been outvoted;
*τότε μὲν οὖν οἱ στρατηγοὶ μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἐν ἀπορήτῃ συνεδρεύοντες,
 ἐβουλευόντο πῶς χρὴ διοικῆσαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἐὰν τῆς νήσου κρατήσω-
 σιν. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς, Σελινουντίους καὶ Συρακουσίους ἀνδραποδίσασθαι,
 τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀπλῶς τάξαι φόρους οὐς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν οἴσουσι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*.
 This comes up again in the imaginary speech of Gylippos (xiii. 30).
 The story is hardly worth refuting.

Plutarch, in the Life of Alkibiadēs (17), brings out more
 strongly than Thucydides does the distinction which Thucydides
 certainly draws between the schemes of Alkibiadēs and the
 schemes of other people. The Athenians had wished for Sicily
 even during the life-time of Periklēs. It seems implied that
 Periklēs kept them back; for, as soon as he died, they eagerly
 welcomed every opening for meddling in Sicilian affairs (*Σικελίας
 καὶ Περικλέους ἔτι ζῶντος ἐπεθύμουν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἤταπτον
 καὶ τὰς λεγομένας βοηθείας καὶ συμμαχίας ἔπεμπον ἑκαστότε τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις
 ὑπὸ Συρακουσίων ἐπιβάθρας τῆς μείζονος στρατείας τιθέντες*). But till
 Alkibiadēs stirred them up, nobody thought of anything beyond

Sicily; it was he who first dreamed of Carthage and Libya and of attacking Peloponnèsos with Western help (*ἀρχὴν γὰρ εἶναι, πρὸς ἡλπίαι, διανοεῖτο τῆς στρατείας, οὐ τέλος, ὥσπερ οἱ λοιποὶ, Σικελίαν . . . Καρχηδόνα καὶ Λιβύην ὀνειροπολῶν, ἐκ δὲ τούτων προσγενομένων Ἰταλίαν καὶ Πελοπόννησον ἤδη περιβαλλόμενος, δλίγου δὲ ἐν ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου Σικελίαν ἐποιεῖτο*). This may seem to come from Alkibiadès' speech at Sparta in Thucydides. He persuaded the young to share in his dreams (*τοὺς μὲν νέους αὐτόθεν εἶχεν ἤδη ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐπηρμένους*); the old seem not to go beyond telling stories of old campaigns which stir up the young still further (*τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων ἡρώωντο πολλὰ θαυμάσια περὶ στρατείας περαιούτων*). Many therefore take to the study of military geography (see p. 105) and begin to draw maps of the lands spoken of (*ὥστε πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς παλαίστρας καὶ τοῖς ἡμικυκλίοις καθίεσθαι τῆς τε νήσου τὸ σχῆμα καὶ θέσιν Λιβύης καὶ Καρχηδόνας ὑπογράφοντες*).

In the Life of Nikias (12), written, one may suppose, later than that of Alkibiadès, the influence of Alkibiadès seems to go further. The wish for the Sicilian expedition is universal. And the old men draw maps as well as the young, only they seem not to draw actual maps of Libya, but only specially to note those points of Sicily which look towards Libya (*ὥστε καὶ νέους ἐν παλαίστρας καὶ γύροντας ἐν ἐργαστηρίοις καὶ ἡμικυκλίοις συγκαθεζομένους ὑπογράφειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς Σικελίας καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῆς περὶ αὐτὴν θαλάσσης καὶ λιμένας καὶ τόπους, οἷς τέτραπται πρὸς Λιβύην ἡ νῆσος*). But they all look to Sicily as merely a starting-point; they are to overcome Carthage, and to become masters of Libya and of the whole Western Mediterranean (*οὐ γὰρ ἄθλον ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου Σικελίαν ἀλλ' ὁρμητήριον, ὥς ἂν αὐτῆς διαγωνισόμενοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους καὶ σχήσαντες ἅμα Λιβύην καὶ τὴν ἐντὸς Ἑρακλείων στηλῶν θάλασσαν*).

When we have got to the pillars of Hēraklēs, we have got to those Iberians whom Alkibiadès, according to his account at Sparta, thought of hiring to attack Peloponnèsos (see p. 198). Were they brought into contemporary comedy at this date, as one of the dreams of the time? So thought Grote (vii. 200), holding that the *Τριφάλης* of Aristophanès was acted about this time. I am not greatly concerned whether *Τριφάλης* meant Alkibiadès or a dæmon, a point discussed in our familiar Dindorf's Aristophanès, ii. 658, and more largely by Süvern (*Clouds*, p. 84 et seqq., Eng. Tr.). But the date does matter. There is a long extract from the uncurtailed Stephen of Byzantium (*Ἰβηρίαι δύο*)

preserved by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Adm. Imp.* 23. Here we get two fragments of the *Τριφάλης*;

καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης Τριφάλῃτι·
 μανθάνοντες τοὺς Ἴβηραν τοὺς Ἀριστάρχου πάλοι.
 καὶ
 τοὺς Ἴβηρας οὗς χορηγεῖς μοι βοηθῆσαι δρόμῳ.

The mention of Aristarchos looks dangerously as if the *play* belonged to a later date, after the time of the Four Hundred. Aristarchos appears in Thucydides, viii. 98. 1, as one of that *body*, and as general. At the fall of his party in B.C. 411, he flees to Oinoë, λαβὼν κατὰ τύχος τοξότας τινες τοὺς βαρβαρώτατους. The well-known τοξόται were hardly Iberians, and we may hope that the countrymen of Arganthônios, if *βάρβαροι*, were not *βαρβαρώτατοι*. There is also a reference (Fr. IX. Dindorf) to Thêramenês, as well as to Aristarchos. It is quoted by Soudas, τῶν τριῶν κακῶν ἐν, and the verse runs,

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀπὸ Θηραμένους δέδοικα τὰ τρία ταυτί.

The *τρία κακά* are ἡ ξύλον ἐφέλκειν ἢ πιεῖν κώνειον ἢ προδότα τῇν ναῦν ὅπως τύχιστα τῶν κακῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι. Thêramenês could hardly have been described as dispensing punishments at this rate at any time before the Four Hundred. (So Stüvern, *Clouds*, p. 84.) Otherwise Thêramenês and Aristarchos, so prominent in 411, might well have been important enough in 416-5 to be brought on the comic stage. They may have been among the strong supporters of Alkibiadês, or we might look for them on the other side. Still, on the whole, the fragments, without explanation, read as if they belonged to the later time. And some explanation is needed to tell us whether the Iberians whom Alkibiadês seems only to have dreamed of, came under the actual command of Aristarchos. The dream was fulfilled in another way in the next generation, when Dionysios sent Iberians, if not to Athens, yet to Peloponnêsos.

One may believe that, in the minds both of Alkibiadês and of other people, there were three degrees. There were things that were dreamed of and perhaps talked about vaguely. There were things that men seriously hoped for and seriously discussed among themselves. There were things that could be openly discussed in the assembly. The conquest of all Sicily had by this time

assuredly reached the second stage; we can hardly think that it had reached the third. Indeed the speech of the Athenian Euphêmos at Kamarina (see p. 191) seems distinctly to exclude it. He disclaims on the part of Athens all design of seeking in Sicily for any but independent allies. As for Carthage, the thought of conquest there had reached the first stage as long ago as the acting of the Knights (see above, p. 615). It must by this time have got into the second. Thucydides, it must be remembered, distinctly says, through the mouth of Hermokratês (vi. 34. 2), that the Carthaginians lived in constant fear of an Athenian attack (*ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μήποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν*).

But unless such Iberians had anyhow got to Athens, and had suggested the thoughts of others to come, we can hardly fancy that dominion as far as the pillars of Hêraklês had got beyond the first stage.

The remarks of Grote in the note to vii. 221 seem hardly to distinguish between what Alkibiadês would say in the assembly and out of it.

NOTE VIII. pp. 85, 89.

SICILIAN EMBASSIES TO ATHENS IN B.C. 416.

THERE seems no reason to doubt from the words of Thucydides that a formal embassy from Segesta came to ask for help for that city, according to the existing treaty between Segesta and Athens, that, among the arguments which they employed, they pleaded the further call on Athens to give help to the Leontines, and that their arguments were at a later stage backed by the prayers of Leontine exiles who were at Athens. It does not appear that there was any formal Leontine embassy, and it is not clear that there was at this time any constituted Leontine commonwealth capable of sending an embassy.

In Thucydides, vi. 6. 2, the Segestan envoys remind the Athenians of their own treaty with Athens renewed by Lachês (see p. 33);

ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λαχίητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι συμμαχίαν ἀναμνησκόντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, εἶδόντο σφίσι καὺς πείψαντας ἐπαμύναι.

They then add further arguments, and they enlarge on the interest which Athens had in defending the Leontines and all her Sicilian allies;

λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακοῖσι Λεοντίνους τε ἀναστήσαντες ἀτιμώρητοι γενήσονται, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἔτι ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν διαφθείροντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ἅπασαν δύναμιν τῆς Σικελίας σχήσουσι, κίνδυνον εἶναι . . . σῶφρον δ' εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμμάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Συρακοῖσις.

The immediate claim of the Segestans was their own treaty with Athens. Under that they ask for help against Selinous. But they bring in the treatment of Leontinoi by Syracuse and the general ambition of Syracuse, as further motives for Athenian intervention in Sicily.

There is no mention of Leontine speakers at this stage. They come in later, after help has been voted to Segesta and after the debate has been reopened between Nikias and Alkibiadēs. After the speech of Alkibiadēs, the Segestans—that is the envoys who came back in vi. 8. 1—are again heard (vi. 19. 1); so are Leontine exiles. The two classes, envoys and exiles, seem to be distinguished;

οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου [Ἀλκιβιάδου] τε καὶ τῶν Ἑγεσταίων καὶ Λεοντίνων φυγάδων, οἱ παρελθόντες εἰδένότῳ τε καὶ τῶν ὀρκίων ὑπομνησκοντας ἰκέτευον βοηθῆσαι σφίσι.

There is nothing here to suggest any formal Leontine embassy. It may have been the way in which the Segestan envoys and the Leontine exiles are coupled by Thucydides which suggested such an embassy to Diodōros. In his version (xii. 83) the remnant of the Leontines (οἱ φυγάδες αὐτῶν συστραφέντες) determine to make another appeal to the Athenians on the ground of kindred (ἐκρῶν πάλιν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους προσλαβέσθαι συμμάχους, ὅτας συγγενεῖς). The next words are remarkable;

περὶ δὲ τούτων κοινολογησάμενοι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν οἷς συνεφρόνησαν, κοινῇ πρίσβεισι ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἀξιούντες βοηθῆσαι ταῖς πόλεσιν αὐτῶν ἀδικουμένοις.

Ἔθνεσιν is an odd word. It may have been chosen expressly to take in the barbarians—one is tempted to say the *gentiles*—of Segesta. At any rate it includes them, and Segestan and Leontine envoys go to Athens together. Diodōros seems (at the end of c. 82) to look on this application from the Leontines to Segesta as coming by a happy accident (οἷς συνέργησε ταυτόματον)

just when the Segestans had made up their minds to send to Athens about their own affairs.

All this is just possible, if only we do not suppose a formal Leontine embassy. But I should rather infer from Thucydides that the Leontines came between the first Segestan application in vii. 6 and the return of the Athenian and Segestan envoys in vi. 8.

Plutarch (Nik. 12) is not perfectly clear. Nikias speaks, τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρίσβειν καὶ Λευκτίνων παραγεγομένων καὶ πειθόντων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους στρατηγεῖν ἐπὶ Σικελίαν.

It is now also that the wonderful embassy comes in Justin, iv. 1. 4 (see p. 73, and Grote, vii. 194). It is seemingly sent, not either from Segesta or from Leontinoi, but from Katanê.

"Cum fides pacis a Syracusanis non servaretur, denuo legatos Athenas mittunt [Catinienses], qui sordida veste, capillo barbaque promissis et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam anquisito contionem deformes adeunt; adduntur precibus lacrimæ, et ita misericordem populum supplices movent ut damnarentur duces qui ab his auxilia deduxerant. Igitur classis ingens decernitur; creati duces Nicias et Alcibiades et Lamachos."

Here is a distinct confusion between the events of the year 416 and the punishment of the generals in 424 (see p. 65). We have nothing whatever to do with Katanê just now.

In writing the text I took for granted at p. 33 that, to say nothing of the earlier dealings between Athens and Segesta (see vol. ii. p. 554), an alliance had been made between them by Lachês. This was an inference from the words of Thucydides, vi. 6. 2, quoted above. They were so understood in 1850 by Grote, vii. 181, 197, and in 1870 by Holm (ii. 406) who argues the point against a weak objection of Curtius. Nothing can be plainer than that an existing alliance between Athens and Segesta is assumed throughout. Nikias (vi. 10. 5) says ἡμῖς Ἑγεσταίους οἶσι συμμαχοῖς, ὥς ἀδικουμένοις, ὁξέως βοηθοῦμεν, which cannot possibly refer to an alliance made a few days before. And his language a little further on (vi. 13) also implies an existing alliance;

τοῖς δ' Ἑγεσταίοις ἰδίᾳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνευ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνήψαν πρὸς Σελωνοῦντιους τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον, μετὰ σφῶν καὶ καταλύεσθαι· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν συμμαχοῦς μὴ ποιέεσθαι, ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν, οἷς κακῶς μὲν πράξασιν ἀμυνοῦμεν, ὠφέλλας δ' αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες οὐ τευξόμεθα.

It is therefore a little strange to read, in a commentary of the year 1881 on the passage in vi. 6. 2 (Jowett, ii. 344);

"*Λεοντίνων* is to be taken, not with *πολέμου*, but with *ξυμμαχίαν*. The Eggestaeans reminded the Athenians that they had already interfered in the affairs of Sicily, which was a reason for their interfering again. It is nowhere stated that the Athenians had made an alliance with the Eggestaeans, previous to that of vi. 8. But the words *τοὺς λοιποὺς ἔτι ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν*,—*μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμμάχων*,—below probably include them, as well as the other Sicilian states mentioned as allies of the Leontines, and therefore of the Athenians, in iii. 86 med. The Eggestaeans naturally call themselves allies of the Athenians, because they are willing to become so."

Several remarks occur. First, in vi. 6. 2 *Λεοντίνων* must be taken, not with *ξυμμαχίαν* but with *πολέμου*. The construing is doubtless harsh either way; but our interpretation must be guided by the facts. In the expedition of Lachês Athens waged a war on behalf of the Leontines; she made no alliance with Leontinoi at that time, because she was already bound by the *παλαιὰ ξυμμαχία* of iii. 86. 4, that is the alliance recorded in the inscription of 433, an inscription found, one may add, before 1877.

Secondly, No alliance between Segesta and Athens is mentioned in vi. 8—because the former alliance referred to in vi. 6 is taken for granted.

Thirdly, The notion that the Segestans "call themselves allies of the Athenians, because they are willing to become so" might seem to come from the confused story in Diodóros (xii. 83); *τῶν Ἐγισταίων ἐπαγγελλομένων χρημάτων τε πλῆθος δώσειν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ συμμαχήσειν κατὰ τῶν Συρακουσίων*. It is always right to be kind to our friend at Agyrium, but we cannot hearken to him when he thus contradicts Thucydides.

NOTE IX. p. 126,

ATHÊNAGORAS' THEORY OF DEMOCRACY.

THE definition of democracy here given by the Syracusan demagogue is as clear as words can make it. Democracy is not the rule of one class of the people over other classes, but the common

rule of the whole people. In a democracy every class has its special function; the rich have theirs; the men of ability have theirs; the ordinary citizens have theirs. Every citizen has an equal vote in the final decision; but there is plenty of room for the action both of classes and of individuals before the final vote comes on. Democracy is not a corruption of something else, as tyranny is of kingship, as oligarchy is of aristocracy; it is one of the primary forms of government, capable, like the other two, of being corrupted into something else. This is the true theory of Greek democracy; this is what the name means in the mouth of practical men like Thucydides and Polybios. It is also what it means in the mouth of Isokratēs, perhaps not really a practical man, but one who at least wished to be so.

Every one knows the passage in praise of democracy in the Funeral Oration of Periklēs (Thuc. ii. 37. 1). The definition is not quite so clear as that of Athēnagoras, but it is to the same effect. Power is in the hands of the whole body; all are equal before the law; each man is valued according to his personal merit; poverty does not shut out a man from serving the state.

Isokratēs was doubtless something of a dreamer; but he was a dreamer of a different kind from Plato. If the ideal democracy of which he loves to speak never existed in fact, it was at least suggested by facts. He dislikes the democracy of his own day; he looks back to a better state of things; but his *buono stato* was still a democracy, though one better ordered than that which he saw around him. In the Areopagitic oration he describes his ideal time, when men did not apply the name *δημοκρατία* and other good names to things which did not deserve them (c. 20);

οἱ γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦντες κατεστήσαντο πολιτείαν οὐκ ὀνόματι μὲν τῇ κοινοτάτῃ καὶ πρασιτάτῃ προσαγορευομένην ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων οὐ τοιαύτην τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι φαινομένην, οὐδ' ἡ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπαίδευσε τοὺς πολίτας ὥστ' ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀκολασίαν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανομίαν ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν δὲ παραρησίαν ἰσονομίαν.

In the good old times they had not the lot; for the lot was less democratic than election (*δημοτικώτερον ἐνόμζον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ λαγχάνειν γενομένην*, c. 23). There was danger lest an oligarch should draw the lucky bean. He presently describes the ideal democracy, in which the whole people is absolute master—he does not scruple to say *tyrant*—(*δεῖ τὸν*

μὲν δῆμον ὥσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούμενων, c. 26), while the men of leisure and of wealth have their several duties under him as his servants (ὥσπερ οἰκέται), like Nikias and Dēmostenēs in the Acharnians. And he winds up;

πῶς ἂν τις εὖροι ταύτης βεβαιότεραν ἢ δικαιότεραν δημοκρατίαν, τῆς τοὺς μὲν δυνατωτάτους ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τοῦτων τὸν δῆμον κύριον ποιούσης;

He comes back to the same theme in the Panathenaic oration, where he sometimes (c. 131, 132) uses nearly the same words as in the Areopagitic. But he brings in a new phrase for the old good democracy, δημοκρατία ἢ ἀριστοκρατία χραμένη or μεμγμένη (c. 131, 153). He also gives, what neither Periklēs nor Athénagoras gives us in so many words, the formal division of governments under three heads. We have seen it already in Pindar (see vol. ii. p. 537), and it comes out clearly in the famous discourse of the three Persians in Herodotus (iii. 80–82). There we do not find the actual word δημοκρατία, though ὀλιγαρχία is found. The words there are δῆμος, πλῆθος, μέσον, and the most formal opposition is δῆμος, ὀλιγαρχία, μοναρχος. The attractive name (ὄνομα πάντων καλλίστον) is here ἰσονομία. This passage of Herodotus, like that of Pindar, shows that the threefold division was already fully accepted in their time; but Isokratēs—who, we must remember, was born while Periklēs was alive—seems to be the first fully to draw it out in a regular shape. With him (Panathenaic, 132) the three forms are ὀλιγαρχία, δημοκρατία, μοναρχία. We should rather have looked for ἀριστοκρατία, especially after his use of the word in the other places.

The view of Isokratēs is essentially the same as that of Athénagoras. Athénagoras does not in the same way speak of the embodied Dēmos as sovereign or tyrant, and of those who have the immediate management of affairs as his servants or even slaves. But he has exactly the same idea of giving to different classes of men their several functions in the commonwealth, while the assembly of all classes, the whole people, has the final authority in all things. We cannot say how far the democracy of Syracuse in the time of Athénagoras would have answered to the ideal of Isokratēs; it at least agreed with it so far that the lot, which Isokratēs so specially disliked, did not come in till the changes under Dioklēs (see p. 441, and Appendix XXVI).

We may be sure that both to Athénagoras and to Isokratēs a commonwealth from which any particular class was shut out would not have seemed a true democracy. Florence, after the nobles were disfranchised, would have seemed, no longer δημοκρατία, the rule of the whole people, but δλιγαρχία, the rule of a class, even though classes might happen to have been turned about. So Polybios sees the model of democracy in the Federal constitution of the Achaean League, which certainly was in practice δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατία μεμιγμένη, and which one might say came very near to answering the literal meaning of ἀριστοκρατία. With him (ii. 38) we may mark that παρρησία, which in Isokratēs has a bad sense, is used honourably;

ἰσθητορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀθηναίων σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εὐδικρατιστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὖροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπαρχούσης.

Under Roman rule and supremacy, both aristocracy and democracy became mere shadows, but they went on in name in the dependent commonwealths, and the political thinkers of those times went on defining them just like Athénagoras and Isokratēs. Both Plutarch and Diōn Chrysostom think monarchy the best form, the most likely to be well worked. It is of course to be a monarchy which carries out the ideal of Claudian (II. Cons. Stil. 114);

"Nunquam libertas gratior extat
Quam sub rege pio."

It is to be βασιλεία and not its corruption and counterfeit τυραννίς. Still the other forms are lawful, and may be good, though not likely to be so good as the other. Both writers keep up the tradition of δημοκρατία as a thing in itself honourable, though liable to be corrupted. With Plutarch in the short treatise περὶ Μοναρχίας κ.τ.λ. (c. 3) the three forms of government are μοναρχία, δλιγαρχία, δημοκρατία, for which he refers to Herodotus. All are liable to corruption (συμβέβηκε παρακρούσεις καὶ διαφθοράς κατ' ἑλλειψιν ἢ ὑπερβολὴν εἶναι). The corruptions are τυραννίς, δυναστεία, ὀχλοκρατία. They come about

ὅταν βασιλεία μὲν ὕβριν ἐντέκη ἀνυπεύθυνον δλιγαρχία δὲ ὑπερφροσύνην, τὸ αὐθαδὲς δημοκρατία δ' ἀναρχίαν, ἰσότης ἀμετρίαν, πᾶσαι δὲ τὸ ἀσύτητον.

We may remark that ὀχλοκρατία, not being the rule of the whole, would not answer Athénagoras' definition of δημοκρατία, and that

ἀμετρία would be the exact opposite to the harmonious working of different classes conceived both by him and by Isokratēs.

Dion Chrysostom is yet more royalist than Plutarch; but he admits democracy among lawful and possibly good forms of government; it is simply very hard to manage it well. In his third oration to Trajan *περί βασιλείας* (vol. i. p. 47, Trübner), he says;

τρία γὰρ εἶδη τὰ φανερώτατα πολιτειῶν ὀνομάζεται γεγομένων κατὰ νόμον καὶ δίκην μετὰ δαίμονος τ' ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τύχης ὁμοῦς.

Monarchy is the most likely to succeed; aristocracy less so; democracy is a beautiful ideal, again with an attractive name;

τρίτῃ δὲ πασῶν ἀδυνατωτάτῃ σχεδὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀρετὴ ἄνθρωπον προσδοκῶσα ποτε εὐρήσειν κατάστασιν ἐπιεικῇ καὶ νόμιμον, δημοκρατία προσαγορευομένη, ἐπιεικὲς ὄνομα καὶ πρῶτον, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν.

Each of the three has its corruption (*τρεις ἐναντίαι παράνομοι διαφθοραί*), *τυραννίς*, *ὀλιγαρχία*, and something which seems to have no particular name, but which of course is Plutarch's *ὀχλοκρατία*.

ἡ δ' ἐξῆς ποικίλη καὶ παντοδαπὴ φορὰ πλήθους, οὐδὲν εἰδότες ἀπλῶς, ταρπαστομένου δ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἀγραίοντος, ἀπὸ ἀκολάστων ὁμιλητῶν ὥσπερ κλύδωνος ἀγρίου καὶ χαλεποῦ ὑπὸ ἀνέμων σκληρῶν μεταβαλλομένου.

All these writers use *δημοκρατία* in one sense, and an honourable one. It may be corrupted, like the other forms of government; but, like them, it is good in itself.

The other notion of democracy as something in itself bad, a mere corruption of one of the forms of lawful government, seems to spring wholly from a fancy of Aristotle. In the well-known place in the *Politics* (iii. 7. 2) he makes the three forms of government *βασιλεία*, *ἀριστοκρατία*, and *πολιτεία*. Their corruptions (*παρεκβάσεις*) are *τυραννίς*, *ὀλιγαρχία*, *δημοκρατία*. His definition of *πολιτεία* is;

ὅταν τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία.

The corruptions are when, not the common good, but only the good of a certain class, the monarch, the rich, or the poor, is sought;

ἡ μὲν γὰρ *τυραννίς* ἐστὶ *μοναρχία* πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ *μοναρχοῦντος*, ἡ δ' *ὀλιγαρχία* πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ *δημοκρατία* πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

He goes on in the next chapter to give several definitions, the object of which is to show that the difference between *ὀλιγαρχία* and *δημοκρατία* is essentially the difference between wealth and

poverty. The question of numbers is accidental. The rule of many rich over a few poor would be an oligarchy, not a democracy. The case will never happen, but that does not affect the principle.

φ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτος ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἂν τ' εὐέλαιστος ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει . . . τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς.

It is plain at once that this δημοκρατία of Aristotle is not the δημοκρατία of Periklēs or Athēnagoras or any one else. It may be the debased democracy of Isokratēs or the ὀχλοκρατία of Plutarch. For whatever reason, Aristotle uses words in a sense different from everybody else. What all other speakers and writers from Periklēs to Diōn Chrysostom call δημοκρατία he chooses to call by the vague name πολιτεία, and to transfer the name δημοκρατία to what Plutarch calls ὀχλοκρατία. Endless confusion has been the result; it is mainly owing to this strange fancy of Aristotle that a word so honourable in the mouth of Periklēs and Polybios should have got the meaning which it often has in the mouths of modern babblers. But Aristotle himself cannot keep consistently to his own rule. When he has to speak of facts, he cannot help adapting language to facts. Thus, in recording the political changes at Athens (ii. 12. 2, 3, where see Mr. W. L. Newman's note), he cannot help using δημοκρατία in the wider sense, taking in the forms both approved and disapproved by Isokratēs. So in the newly found Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία by himself or a disciple—a question on which I will not breathe a word further—it is just possible that πολιτεία in c. 13 (followed directly after by ἡ μέση πολιτεία) may be meant in the special Aristotelian sense, as δημοκρατία might just possibly be taken in c. 23. But in c. 29 the constitution of Kleisthenēs, and in c. 41 that of Solon, are both called δημοκρατία, just as they are by Isokratēs and everybody else. Indeed he cannot keep himself from giving even the despised δημαγωγός an honourable epithet, when (c. 28) he tells us how ἐν τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις αἱ διετέλουν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες.

Aristotle's use of πολιτεία has a modern parallel. To most people in Great Britain the word "constitution" suggests one particular kind of constitution. I have seen the words "constitutional government" opposed to a commonwealth, as well as to a despotism.

Altogether our Syracusan demagogue gives the truest and clearest of all definitions of democracy, the one which was generally accepted by practical men in Greece. But the nomenclature of Aristotle illustrates a difficulty of language of a kind analogous to the use of Ἑλλήν and Ἑλλάς spoken of in vol. ii. p. 179. Δῆμος is the whole people, not any class in it, and δημοκρατία is the rule of the whole people, not of any class in it. Yet it is hardly possible, as Herodotus and Thucydides themselves show, to avoid using the word δῆμος for a particular class, the class specially opposed to the οἱ ἄλλοι. But at any rate no Greek writer ever sank to the last vulgarism of modern political talk, which speaks of "the democracy," meaning, not a form of government but a class of men. A δῆμος in the narrower sense may set up a δημοκρατία, but it is never itself called a δημοκρατία.

NOTE X. p. 157.

LAIS AND TIMANDRA.

I HAVE not made a special study of the acts of Lais, as some German scholars seem to have done; but she does in a slight way teach Sicilian history; she has also a special interest, such as it is, as one of the very few persons of Sikan race to whom we can attach any personal idea. For I suppose we must allow that some Lais formed part of the human spoil of Nikias at Hykkara. With any Lais who was not in some shape Sicilian we have nothing to do.

Holm (G. S. ii. 410) has brought together a great deal about Lais, and uses his materials with judgement. The article Lais in the Dictionary of Biography (not having the letters E. H. B. to it, as a Sikan subject ought to have had) is utterly confused. One thing is plain. Either there were two women of the name, or some of the stories must be altogether false. For instance the story told about Apellès and Lais by Athénaios, xiii. 54, is wholly impossible of our Lais of Hykkara. So is the story in the same chapter which connects her with the orator Dêmosthenès, who must have been forty years younger than our Lais. Most impossible of all is the story of the scholiast on Aristophanès (Plutus, 179) that not Lais herself, but her mother, went to Persia with Alex-

ander. After this the tales which connect Lais with Aristippos and Diogenēs the Cynic (Athen. xiii. 54, 55), if unlikely, seem credible.

Yet it is clear that Athēnaïos means our Lais, as he says distinctly in the same chapter that she was ἐξ Ὑκάρων (ποῦς δ' αὕτη Σικελικὴ, ἀφ' ἧς αἰχμάλωτος γυναικὴ ἦκεν εἰς Κόρινθον, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Πολέμων), and again c. 55, Νυμφόδαμος ὁ Συρακόσιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ θαυμαζομένων ἐξ Ὑκάρων Σικελικοῦ φρονιρίου εἶναι τὴν Λαίδα. Perhaps there was another of the same name; perhaps the names of courtesans got as easily confounded as those of tyrants, and the story of Apellēs may belong to somebody else. There was a Nais in the same line (Ath. xiii. 52, and Steph. Byz. in Εὐκαρπία, to which we shall come again), which would supply an easy means of confusion; but she does not concern us.

The evidence which makes Lais a captive of Nikias at Hykkara seems quite strong enough. There is the passage in Plutarch's Life of Nikias quoted in p. 157, where she appears as a little child. The scholiast on Aristophanēs, Plut. 179, adds her exact age of seven years, and tells us what further happened to her; ληφθῆναι γὰρ φασιν αὐτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ πολυχρίου τινὸς καὶ δλόντος ὑπὸ Νικίου ἐπτείνω ὠφθῆναι δὲ ὑπὸ Κορυθίου τινὸς καὶ πεμφθῆναι δῶρον τῇ γυναικὶ εἰς Κόρινθον. Pausanias (ii. 2. 5) tells the same story, and mentions another tomb in Thessaly, connected with another story about a certain Hippostratos, Eurylochos, or Pausanias, or Aristonikos, which is also told by the Aristophanic scholiast. She would thus be born in B.C. 422. The story which Athēnaïos (xiii. 45) quotes about her and Euripidēs who died in 406, from the comic poet Machôn, is therefore just possible, though it is more likely to belong to somebody else. Nor is there any objection to the reference to her by Aristophanēs (Plut. 179) in B.C. 389, which forms the scholiast's text;

ἐπεὶ δὲ Λαίς οὐ διὰ σὲ Φιλανίδου;

This is addressed to Ploutos, and refers to the greediness of Lais, on which cf. Athen. xiii. 26, Ælian, V. H. xiv. 35. There is also the story (Ælian, V. H. x. 2) about her and Eubōtas, who won the Olympic prize in B.C. 408. She is said in the scholiast to have been put to death out of jealousy by the Thessalian women. It is odd that Soudas has nothing to say about her, beyond the unintelligible Λαῖδος ἡ ἑταιρὶς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Χελώνῃ, and Diogenēs Laërtius, who has to bring in different relations of hers to two

philosophers, Aristippos and Xenokratēs, tells us nothing that concerns us. And Xenokratēs, who is said to have been born in B.C. 396, would rather go with Apellēs and Dēmostenēs the orator.

But there are two other points about Lais which do concern us in Sicily. Other Sicilian, other Sikan, spots claimed her besides Hykkara. Stephen of Byzantium, under *Υκκαρον* or *Υκκαρα*, gives her to Hykkara. But he also, under *Κραστός*, mentions the claims of that Sikan town. See vol. i. p. 120, ii. p. 543. He adds; *Ἀπρίων δὲ ὅτι μόνος Πολέμων ἔφη τὴν Λαῖδα Κορινθίαν*. It would be an easy confusion; but we have seen that Polemōn brought her from Hykkara. There is a more mysterious entry under *Εὐκαρπία*, a place of which I know nothing; *ἔστι καὶ Εὐκαρπία φρούριον Σικελίας ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις Τιμαίοις καὶ γενέσθαι Λαῖδα ἐν τούτῳ, τὴν ἐπὶ κάλλει διαβεβημένην ἑταῖραν, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ Κορινθίαν φασί· τὴν οὐδὲ Λαῖδα τιεῖς λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ Ναῖδα καὶ Ὑκκαρικὸν ἀνδράποδον, ὡς Συνέσιος ἐν ἐπιστολῇ*. All this is puzzling; but it is a second mention of Nais, of whom we have already heard.

Another puzzle comes from what Plutarch says in the Life of Alkibiadēs, 39. At his death in B.C. 404 Alkibiadēs has with him his mistress Timandra. She is said to have been the mother of Lais; *ταύτης λέγουσι θυγατέρα γενέσθαι Λαῖδα τὴν Κορινθίαν μὲν προσαγορευθείσαν, ἐκ δὲ Ὑκκάρων, Σικελικοῦ πολιέματος, αἰχμάλωτον γενομένην*. As Holm suggests, mother and daughter may both have been taken captive. So Athēnaios (xii. 48) says of Alkibiadēs; *στρατηγῶν συμπεριύγγο αὐτῷ τὴν Λαῖδος τῆς Κορινθίας μητέρα Τιμάνδραν, καὶ Θεοδότην τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑταῖραν*. Elsewhere (xiii. 34) he carries about *Δαμασάνδραν τῆς Λαῖδος τῆς νεωτέρας μητέρα καὶ Θεοδότην*. Some here make *Δαμασάνδρα* a nickname of Timandra; but in any case we have a distinct assertion of an older and a younger Lais. Still in this case *νεωτέρας* must be wrong. The Lais of Apellēs could hardly be daughter of the Timandra of Alkibiadēs. Most puzzling of all is another of the tales told by the Aristophanic scholiast. He mentions Lais, and adds;

αὕτη δὲ θυγάτηρ ἦν Ἐπιμάνδρας [the editors correct Τιμάνδρας], ἥτις ἐξ Ὑκκάρων τῆς Σικελίας ἦν ταύτην δὲ Φιλοξένῳ τῷ διδυραμβοποιῷ δέδωκε Διονύσιος ὁ ἐν Σικελίᾳ τύραννος· εἰς Κόρινθον οὖν ἦλθεν ἅμα Φιλοξένῳ καὶ ἐπίσημος ἐκεῖ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐφιλήθη ὑπὸ πάντων καὶ περιβόητος ἦν ἑταιρίς. λέγουσι δὲ ὅτι ἅμα Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἀπεδήμησεν εἰς Πέρσας ἐκ Κορίνθου· ἣ δὲ Λαῖς ἐπίσημοτέρα γέγονε τῆς μητρὸς ἐν Κορίνθῳ.

We may well echo the amazement of the old commentator Hemsterhuis;

"Habebimus igitur Timandram puellam nonagenariam, certe dignam quæ id ætatis juveni regum maximo grata comes adhereret."

He goes on to suggest that Timandra and Lais have been somehow made out of Thais. Even the part about Philoxenos—him of the Latomia by Buffaloro, to whom we shall come in due time—is very odd. It is of course possible that Dionysios may have given an Epimandra of Hykkara to Philoxenos; but then she could not be Timandra mistress of Alkibiadès, nor is she likely to be mother of Lais the captive of Nikias.

On the whole, it seems pretty certain that one Lais of Corinth—there may have been another—was carried off from Hykkara by Nikias. There is a dim likelihood that her mother, Timandra, Damasandra, Epimandra, anything else, was carried off with her and became the companion of Alkibiadès. The philosophers who either turned away from Lais or did the opposite do not concern Sicilian history.

Far prettier than all this is the local legend of which Holm speaks, G. S. ii. 411. "La Bedda di Liccari"—the Fair One of Hykkara—dwelled in a town near the sea. The town was sacked and destroyed; she was spared for her beauty; she so won on her captors that she was able by their help to found a new Liccari at a little distance. She ruled over all men—was she Damasandra?—and over nine Emperors of the East ("alle Menschen und neun Kaiser der Levante"). One would like to be able to trace the growth of these tales; but one does seem to see signs of Nikias, of Lais, and of an attempt to explain why Carini is not on the site of Hykkara.

NOTE XI. p. 166.

THE FIRST ATHENIAN ENCAMPMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

I FORMED my first notion of this very momentary piece of topography from several walks on the spot. I afterwards thought over the remarks of Holm (G. S. ii. 383), and modified my conclusions in some points. The materials for a discussion are but

small, as there is no room for controversy as to the general position of the camp. Still to one who has got attached to the very ground of Syracuse there is a temptation to try to get a meaning out of every word of Thucydides, and to attach that meaning to some square yard or other of the soil which he has so often trod.

The general position is quite clear. The encampment lay between the point of *Dasikôn* to the east and the *Olympieion* to the west. It did not take in the *Olympieion*. It must have lain mainly south of *Dasikôn*. I should say further that it lay altogether east of the Helorine road. The *ἔρμα* on *Dasikôn* (*ἐπὶ τῇ Δάσκων*) I take to have been on the little peninsula between the Harbour and the present salt-marsh. Thucydides (vi. 65. 2) says that the Athenians *ἄμα ἔφ' ἐξέβαινον ἐς τὸν κατὰ τὸ 'Ολυμπιεῖος*. That is a most natural way of describing the approach, specially *ἄμα ἔφ'*. They would seem to be sailing towards the temple; they would hardly know till they landed how far they really were from it. It may have been this prominence given to the *Olympieion* in marking their position, which led to the mistake of those later writers who fancied that they occupied the temple or its precinct. That they did not do so is perfectly plain from the statement of Thucydides (vi. 70. 4) that the Syracusans, even after their defeat, were still in possession of it (*ἐς τὸ 'Ολυμπιεῖον σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακὴν*), and from the statement that follows (61. 1); *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον*. The place was between the sea and the Helorine road. In vi. 66. 3 the Syracusans, after surveying the Athenian camp, cross the Helorine road and bivouac on the other side of it from that occupied by the Athenians (*διabάντες τὴν Ἑλωρινὴν ὁδὸν ἠύλισαντο*); that is, in or near the temple precinct.

The description of the place given by Thucydides (vi. 66. 1, 2, stands thus;

καθίσαν τὸ στράτευμα ἐς χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον τῇ μὲν γὰρ τευχία τε καὶ οἰκίαι εἶργον καὶ δένδρα καὶ λίμνη, παρὰ δὲ τὸ κρημνοί. καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς δένδρα κόψαντες καὶ κατενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, παρὰ τε τὰς ναῦς σταύρωμα ἔπηξαν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ Δάσκων ἔρμα τέ ᾗ ἐφοδότατον ἦν τοῖς πολέμοις, λίθοις λογάδην καὶ ξύλοις διὰ ταχέων ἔρθωσαν.

Holm divides this description into two parts. Down to *κρημνοί* it describes the "Lagerplatz;" after that comes "das Terrain nach dem Meere." I think he places the *ἔρμα*, as I do, on the piece

of ground just by the point of Daskôn or Caderini, close above the sea, and, now at least, between the sea and the salt-marsh. The *λίμνη* I took to mean the salt-marsh, as more likely than the wide extent of Lysimeleia or Syrakô to be spoken of in this casual way. The *κρημνοί* I took to be the sea-cliffs. Holm carries both further inland. He takes the *λίμνη* to be the marsh now called Pantanna, that which the river Kyana now flows through, and the *κρημνοί* to be the heights nearer to the Olympieion ("die Abhänge der Höhenzüge nach N.O."). I believe I took the *τεῖχια καὶ οἰκίας* to mean the buildings the traces of which are to be seen on Daskôn itself; Holm takes them for the buildings of Polichna and the Olympieion ("die Polichne und das Olympieion im Norden"). This opens another question. The Athenian camp, keeping outside the Olympieion, must have needed some defence on that side, the west and north-west side. And these walls and houses in some way supplied that defence (*εἰργον*). It is hard to see how that defence could be supplied by any buildings about the Olympieion; but it is perfectly possible that there may have been a wall, in whatever state of repair, on the east side of the Helorine road, of which the Athenians may have taken advantage. But in any case I doubt whether their camp could have reached the greater marsh. Holm, if I rightly understand him, makes the camp cross the Helorine road at some point south of the Olympieion ("das Olympieion aber und ein Stück des helorischen Weges blieben nördlich von ihrer Stellung unbesetzt"). It may be so; it is impossible to say how far south the camp went. But I should have thought from the way in which Thucydides speaks of the road that the camp lay wholly east of it.

The *ἐρπυμα* must have been where both Holm and I place it. Yet it is odd that it should be called *ἢ ἐφοδόμενον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις*, while the Olympieion was in the hands of the Syracusans. It would be so if a joint attack by land and sea was thought of.

After all, these points do not greatly matter, and we can get a general meaning without insisting on the exact force of every word. We see generally where the first Athenian encampment was, and we contrast a camp pitched by the pious Nikias, who respected the temple, with the doings of later invaders who did not respect it. And we must distinguish this first encampment by Daskôn and the Olympieion from any of the ground occupied by the besiegers at any later stage. They never came back to this ground again.

Diodóros (xiii. 6) is of course quite wrong when he says τοῦ τε Ὀλυμπίου κύριοι κατέστησαν καὶ πάντα τὸν προκείμενον τόπον καταλαβόμενοι, παρεμβολὴν ἐποίησαντο. The notice of Pausanias (x. 28. 3) is more curious. He too has got wrong in his fact; but he does not forget the piety of Nikias; ὥς Ἀθηναῖοι δῆλα ἐποίησαν ἥνικα εἶλον Ὀλυμπίου Διὸς ἐν Συρακούσαις ἱερὸν, οὔτε κινήσαντες τῶν ἀναθημάτων οὐδέν, τὸν ἱερεῖα τε τὸν Συρακούσιον φύλακα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἑάσαντες. Plutarch (see p. 174) conceives the state of the case quite rightly.

NOTE XII. p. 178.

THE FORTIFICATION OF TEMENITÊS.

I HAVE suggested in vol. ii. p. 43 that the Temenitês, the quarter containing the *temenos* of Apollôn, had up to this time been a detached outpost commanding the approach to Syracuse by the great inland road. Holm, on the other hand, (*Topografia*, 197; *Lupus*, 116; cf. G. S. ii. 28, 384) infers from the passage of Thucydides (vi. 75. 1) with which we have now to deal that it remained unfortified to this time ("Der Temenites, welcher später einen Theil von Neapolis bildete, war noch nicht befestigt"). I do not see that the words of Thucydides prove this. On the other hand, the point is not of any very great moment for our present purpose. Whether the temple stood absolutely undefended or whether it stood, like the Olympieion, in a fortified outpost, it was now that Temenitês became part of the continuous city, that its walls became part of an unbroken line of defence along with those of Achradina and Ortygia.

Holm notices (G. S. ii. 384), that in the map in his first volume, the word Temenitês goes too far to the west. I should place the temple as he does in his later map on the high ground above the theatre, which I take to be ἡ ἄκρα ἡ Τεμενίτις spoken of by Thucydides at the coming of Gylippos (vii. 3. 3). This is the place given to the quarter in the great map in the *Topografia*. The word ἄκρα might suggest that the quarter came someway down the hill; but I cannot pretend to say how far. I cannot believe, with Leake (*Notes on Syracuse*, p. 258), that Temenitês, and Syka also, were much further to the west. So Schubring places them in the map in the *Bewässerung* (p. 584). I go altogether, as far as the hill is concerned, with Holm and Lupus in their later map.

The words of Thucydides (vi. 75. 1) are; *ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακοῖαι ἐν τῇ χειμῶνι πρὸς τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς ὁρῶν, ὥπως μὴ δι' ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτειχίστοι ᾖσιν, ἣν ἄρα σφάλωνται, καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα φρούριον καὶ ἐν τῇ Ὀλυμπίῳ ἄλλο.*

Temenitês then, whatever we understand by the name, was now joined on to the city. From the state of things described in Livy, xxv. 25, when Marcellus pitched his camp between Tycha and Neapolis or Temenitês (inter Neapolim et Tycham—nomina partium urbis et instar urbium sunt—posuit castra), it is plain that Tycha and Temenitês both stood out westward from the western wall of Achradina, with an open space between them. As I understand the passage, the western faces of the two projecting quarters were now joined by a wall (so Schubring, Bewässerung, 621) running north and south. This would exactly answer the description, *τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς ὁρῶν*. The Syracusans now had a wall right across the hill, made up of the western walls of Tycha and Temenitês and the wall which joined them. This last clearly was not there when Marcellus came; that is to say, it was a mere temporary defence, not needed after Dionysios had fortified the whole hill. It was therefore swept away with all the other temporary walls and counter-walls raised by both besiegers and besieged.

The wall was built and Temenitês was taken within the city, *ὥπως μὴ δι' ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτειχίστοι ᾖσιν*. That is to say, the object was to drive the besiegers, if they should ever attempt to hem Syracuse in by a wall across the hill, to fence in a greater space than they otherwise need have done. The words *δι' ἐλάσσονος* are used in a like meaning in vii. 4. 4, where the advantages of the Athenian occupation of Plêmyrion are spoken of; *δι' ἐλάσσονος γὰρ πρὸς τῇ λιμένι τῇ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς*. And the advantage of making the besieging wall as short as possible comes again in vi. 99. 1; *ἀεὶ ἥπερ βραχύτατον ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπὶ τὴν ἐνέραν βάλασσαν τὸ ἀποτείχισμα*. The wall in any case had to stretch from some point on the northern brow of the hill to some point in the Great Harbour. Leake remarks (292) that "the shortest line from the outer sea to the Great Harbour of Syracuse is from Scala Greca to the shore of the harbour beyond the theatre. But this shortest line was interrupted by the outworks of the Syracusans at Temenites." Supposing Temenitês unfortified.

or, as I hold, an outpost which the invaders would most likely be able to occupy, the Athenians could have carried their wall down to the harbour at a point much nearer to the western wall of Achradina than that to which they actually did carry it. The new fortification of Temenitês drove them to make their wall further to the west, and so to make a longer wall. Holm says (*Topografia*, 202; *Lupus*, 121) the best thing that the Syracusans could have done would have been to forestall the work of Dionysios and to fence in the whole hill. Failing that, they tried a "Palliativ." "Um den Bau einer feindlichen Mauer schwieriger zu machen, dehnten sie die Linie der eigenen Mauern aus; denn so war auch der Feind gezwungen seine Mauer um manche Stadien länger zu machen."

The extent of the new fortification southward can hardly be exactly fixed. Holm and Lupus, in their last map, carry the west wall down the hill to the middle level. Then it turns and runs due east just under the theatre, and turns again to meet the wall of Lower Achradina somewhat to the south. This will do as well as anything else; but I do not see how the exact extent can be fixed. Of course I do not believe that the wall now built went down to the Great Harbour, as shown in Grote's map. This follows naturally on his notion (vii. 333, 556) that Lower Achradina was not yet fortified, that in fact this was the first fortification of it. It is strange that he could have been led away into this notion, after what he had said before (v. 286) and which he thought it needful to retract. Neither could the wall have started, as he thinks, from Santa Panagia on the north. This is to forget the fortification of Tycha.

The new quarter presently took the name of Νέα πόλις (*Diod.* xiv. 9), which in Roman times was extended further south, down to the Great Harbour.

Since this note was written, I have received Cavallari's *Appendice alla Topografia Archeologica di Syracusa* (Torino: Palermo, 1891). He deals chiefly with Temenitês and its neighbourhood. His illustrations give a clear view of many Sikel tombs brought to light in the south side of the hill between Portella del Fusco and the Theatre, and also of the diggings in the δμᾶδον near the burying-ground, which I fully believe with him to mark the precinct of the temples of Dêmêtêr and the Korê, of which we

shall have more to say in another chapter. He seems inclined, as Holm once was, to carry the name Temenitês further to the west than Holm's second thoughts carried it. But one cannot reach exact certainty, and room must be found for the Hêrakleion also, which was certainly (see p. 220) very near to Portella del Fusco.

NOTE XIII. p. 210.

THE ATHENIAN OCCUPATION OF EPIPOLAI AND THE SYRACUSAN COUNTER-WALLS.

THE first point of difficulty in this narrative is the meaning of the word *Λέων* in Thucydides, vi. 97. 1, and the position of the thing meant by it. His words are ;

σχόντες κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα καλούμενον, ὅς ἀπέχει τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐξ ἡ ἑπτὰ σταδίων, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀποβιβάσαντες.

The other place where *Leôn* is mentioned is Livy, xxiv. 39. Titus Quinctius is encamped on the south side of Syracuse, near the Olympieion, Marcellus on the north ;

"Ipse hibernacula quinque millia passuum Hexapylo (Leonta vocant locum) communivit ædificavitque."

We ask, What was *Leôn* ? Was it a mere point on the shore of the bay ? Was it a village, a fort, or what ? And what was its position ? Can the measurements in Thucydides and in Livy be made to agree ?

Arnold, in his note on the passage in Thucydides, remarks that *κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα* "implies nothing as to the distance of *Leôn* from the sea." The phrase, he might have added, is the same as that which is used in vi. 65. 2, where the Athenians *ἐξίβαυον εἰς τὸ κατὰ τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον* (see his Appendix, iii. 405). He speaks of *Leôn* again in the Appendix, ii. 409, and pronounces the difference between the two measurements to be "a hopeless contradiction, if the text be right." He mentions a suggestion (which is rather more than a guess) of "II millia" for "V millia" in the text of Livy.

Grote (vii. 558) agrees with Arnold "that the words of Thucydides do not necessarily imply that the place called *Leon* was on the sea or intimate what distance it was from the sea." He places it north of Thapsos. The troops, he holds, were landed there before the ships reached the peninsula. I do not understand his difficulties about the army getting up the hill, and any point north

of Thapsos would be several times six or seven stadia in distance from any point of Epipolai.

Schubring (*Bewässerung*, 630-632) holds, nearly with Grote, that the army landed on or near Thapsos, and thence marched to León. This he places at Targia just below the hill, some way east from Euryalos, and calls it a "städtchen." He accepts the correction of II for V in Livy.

Holm (*G. S.* ii. 385) holds that León must have been on the sea, and suggests the *Casa delle Finanze* between Thapsos and the hill as a likely point and one answering nearly to the measurement in Thucydides. That in Livy he gives up. Later (*Topografia*, 205; *Lupus*, 124) he seems not to fix the exact spot, but he holds that it must have been on the sea and as near as might be to the hill.

I am not specially concerned as to the exact site of León. If there is a mistake, it must be with Livy and not with Thucydides. Assuredly no point that is five Roman miles from the Hexapylon (*Scala Greca* or somewhere near it) can be so little as six or seven stadia from any point west of the neck of Euryalos. The words *κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα καλούμενον* certainly do not prove that León is a point immediately on the coast; it might be as far from the sea as the Olympieion is. But, as Holm argues, the army would be landed as near as possible to the scene of their work, that is at some point south of Thapsos. Wherever León was, it was within a mile from the point of ascent; from León to the foot of the hill they went at full speed (*ἐχάρει εὐθὺς δρόμῳ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς*). Over the flat ground between Targia and the sea it would be easy to do so. But it does not greatly matter whether León was actually on the sea, or whether a short march thither was needed. Whatever León was at the earlier time, in the hands of Marcellus it became a fortress. If Livy gave a wrong distance, it was not wonderful; he had not been over the ground like Thucydides. If his transcriber confused a right distance into a wrong one, that was not wonderful either. We must further remember that Thucydides and Livy reckon from different points of the hill, and that Livy's measurement ought to be the longer. Still the five Roman miles are a great deal too much.

The Athenians went at their quick pace to the foot of the hill. Then they climbed up—*φθάνει ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον*. I have defined Euryalos in vol. i. pp. 578-580. It is the site of Dionysios'

castle close to and on the neck. The army went up close by it; the path is there and still in constant use. I fully go along with Holm, G. S. ii. 386; Topografia, 207; Lupus, 125-127. The older writers put Euryalos on Belvedere. Holm quotes Bonanni—whom I have looked at at Palermo but whom I cannot say that I have studied—as the first to put it in the right place. Arnold and Grote were somewhat misled by A. P. Stanley, afterwards Dean of Westminster; but it is curious to see the two great scholars kicking at some parts of his teaching. Their sound instincts could see some things more clearly in their studies than their impulsive guide could on the spot. Grote's unassisted reason could put Labdalon in its right place.

It is specially to be remembered that this point on the north side of the hill, just east of the neck, is that where all the three ascents that we are concerned with were made, this first one now, that of Gylippos (vii. 23, *ἀναβάς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον ἥπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον*), and that of Dêmostenês (vii. 43. 3, *κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἥπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη*).

The site of the Athenian fort of Labdalon is clearly marked by Thucydides, vi. 97. 5. The Athenians march down the gentle slope of the hill (*ἐπικαταβάντες*); they march up again (*ἐπαναχωρήσαντες*); then

φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Λαβδάλῳ φεκοδόμησαν, ἐπ' ἅκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα.

He mentions Labdalon again (vii. 3. 4), when it was taken by Gylippos. He adds—with the minuteness of one who knew the ground—that it was not in sight from the Athenian position at Syka; *ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον.*

On this matter Arnold, oddly enough, went yet further wrong than Stanley. So, yet more strangely, did Leake (291). In Arnold's map Labdalon appears far away towards Belvedere, though Stanley got so far eastward as to put it in at Mongibellisi, that is on the site of the castle. Grote (vii. 558, cf. Göller, 89) saw the place clearly on the north brow of the hill somewhat eastward of the neck. So Holm (G. S. 387; Topografia, 209; Lupus, 128), who most truly remarks that, owing to the difference of height between the central part of the hill and the actual brink of the cliffs, a point just on the cliff would not be seen from the Athenian *κύκλος* to which we shall presently come. Schubring (629) believed himself to have found the exact spot by means of

a fountain. I was satisfied with noting more than one point in the western part of the north side of the Dionysian wall which would do very well for Labdalon. It cannot possibly be on Buffalaro; ἐπ' ἀκροῖς τοῖς κρημνοῖς means of course immediately on the cliffs, not on the highest ground of the hill.

Anyhow it is odd to say (Jowett, ii. 399), after Grote, Schubring, and Holm had all shown the way;

"The Athenians gained the summit of Epipolae by the Euryelus or 'broad knoll' on the north side. The exact position of the Euryelus, the part of the hill by which Epipolae was ascended, and of Labdalon, the fort which the Athenians erected on the north cliff of Epipolae, is unknown. The former has been supposed to be either Belvedere, the highest summit of Epipolae, or the rocky eminence nearer the city, a point now called Mongibellisi."

The next question follows in c. 98. 2, as to the headquarters of the Athenian army. The words of Thucydides are;

καταστήσαντες ἐν τῷ Λαβδαλῷ φυλακὴν ἐχώρου πρὸς τὴν Συκὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵνα περ καθιζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.

The first thing that strikes one here is the use of the article. Whatever Συκὴ and the κύκλος were, one would have thought that the spot would not be familiarly known to everybody when Thucydides wrote. It is another sign how well the ground and its story was known to himself.

It is hardly needful nowadays to show that Συκὴ has nothing to do with Τύχη or Τύκη (see vol. ii. p. 548; Göller, 66, 89). Arnold (iii. 128, 410) doubted at first, but presently saw his way, and he put Syka in the right place. Grote (vii. 559) made the matter perfectly clear. He is followed by Schubring (629) and Holm (G. S. ii. 387; Topografia, 210; Lupus, 129). It is Holm who suggests the origin of the name and the analogy with Achradina. Stephen of Byzantium has collected a long list of places called Συκὴ and Συκαί. ἔστι καὶ ἄλλη Συκὴ πλησίον Συρακουσῶν καὶ Κιλίκίας.

That the κύκλος means a round fort at Syka, not an imaginary circumvallation of Syracuse, hardly needs proof. Thucydides, though his constructions are sometimes harsh, knew his tenses—that is practically, for he could hardly have been taught them—and, when he said ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους, he meant that the persons spoken of built something and built it speedily; he did

not mean that "they immediately commenced building a wall round the city," which they never finished. A besieging wall "round" Syracuse, all round Achradina and its cliffs—whether in the sea or on land—all round the isthmus and Ortygia, and back again, one must suppose, to some point on the hill, would be an enterprise fit only for the Kyklôpes or for Poseidôn himself. It is not wonderful that it was only "commenced" and not finished. But those whom Thucydides speaks of at this stage in the aorist did more than "commence"; they finished their immediate work. When, as at the next stage in the next chapter, the Athenians "commenced" something else which they did not finish, they did it in the imperfect, *ἐτείχιζον*. (There is surely no analogy between *ἐτείχιζον* and such aorists as *ἐβασίλευσεν* and *ἐτυράννευσεν*.) The source of error might seem to come from a "fiction" of a "later writer" (Plut. Nik. 17), this time "transparent" indeed; *ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ περιετείχισε Συρακούσας, πόλιν Ἀθηῶν οὐκ ἐλάττωτα, δυσεργότεραν δὲ χωρίων ἀνωμαλίας καὶ θαλάσσης γειννίαση καὶ παρακειμένοις ἔλεσι τείχος κύκλῳ περὶ αὐτὴν τοσοῦτον ἀγαγεῖν*. In the modern version the completed wall of Plutarch is at least softened into a "commencement." In this case certainly the "good cloth" of Thucydides needs no "patching" from any quarter; yet the stuff supplied by Diodôros (xiii. 7) is not altogether threadbare. There is nothing to be said against him when he tells us; *κατασκευάσαντες δὲ περὶ τὸ Λάβδαλον ὀχύρωμα, τὴν πόλιν τῶν Συρακουσίων ἀπετείχιζον*.

Arnold (iii. 128) saw the meaning of *κύκλος* in this place, and in 99. 1, 101. 1 perfectly well. Only he was needlessly perplexed at its use in vii. 2. 4. So is Holm (G. S. ii. 388; Topografia, 210-211; Lupus, 130). Schubring (629) has no doubt about the meaning of *κύκλος*, and the question of vii. 2. 4 hardly came within his range. Grote (vii. 559) is the clearest and boldest of all. The passages that we have to deal with are these.

First, the present one, where the *κύκλος* appears as something finished. That is, it is a round fortification built at a particular point named Syka, not a wall begun but not finished, whether round Syracuse or only across the hill.

Secondly, the first words of the next chapter (see p. 216); *καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορείαν τοῦ κύκλου τείχος, οἱ δὲ λίθους καὶ ξύλα ξυμφοροῦντες παράβαλλον, ἐπὶ τὸν Τρωγίλον καλούμενον . . . τὸ ἀποτείσμα*. The *κύκλος* here is something finished, something in the middle of the whole works; the *τείχος* or *ἀποτεί-*

χῶμα is something distinct from it, something which is begun on each side of it. That is to say, the wall, meant, not to go "round the city" (according to Plutarch's and the most modern notion), but, as Thucydides expresses by the word ἀποτείχισμα, to go across the hill and down to the two seas, starting on each side from the κύκλος as its central point.

Thirdly, in the same chapter (99. 3), the Syracusans build their ἐγκάρσιον τείχος, to which we shall come presently, κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου; that is on a level lower than that of the Athenian central fort.

Fourthly, in 101. 1, ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχεζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνόν. We shall come to this κρημὸς presently.

Fifthly, in 102. 1. 3 (see p. 225) we read how the Syracusans attack the κύκλος when Nikias is in it, and we find that it had a προτείχισμα or προπύργιον in front of it;

μέρος τι αὐτῶν πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν κύκλον τὸν ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς, ἡγούμενοι ἔρημον αἰρήσειν, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα αὐτῶν αἰρούσι καὶ διεπύρθησαν, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον Νικίας διεκάλυσεν. ἔτυχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ ἀσθένειαν ὑπολελειμμένος.

Then comes the burning of the engines, and then πρὸς τε τὸν κύκλον βοήθεια ᾗδῃ . . . ἐπαγγεί.

The position of the sick Nikias at this moment is not clearly set forth when the first τὸν κύκλον is translated by "the wall of circumvallation," when the second αὐτὸν τὸν κύκλον appears as "the lines themselves," and ἐν αὐτῷ [τῷ κύκλῳ] ἀπολελειμμένος is turned into "happened to be left *there*." Thucydides surely did not mean that Nikias was left within a "wall of circumvallation," which, if there were any "circumvallation" at all, would be equally true, in the present or the future, of the whole city of Syracuse. Nor does it greatly mend matters to suggest that the wall was double at this point, as it certainly was afterwards lower down, and that Nikias was left between the two walls. The meaning of ἐν αὐτῷ surely is that Nikias was *in* the κύκλος, inside some building in which a man, and a sick man, could find shelter and defence. So in vii. 43. 2, where we read that Nikias ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπελείπειτο, τὰ τείχη pretty well answers to κύκλος, the fortress or castle, taking in doubtless the actual walls on each side, but not meaning that Nikias was simply left between two walls. The κύκλος appears as a building that was attacked but not taken, though the assailants took and destroyed its προτείχισμα or προπύργιον. Προπύργιον τοῦ κύκλου is the phrase

of Polyainos, i. 39. 2. (I will not venture to guess whether he looked on the κύκλος τοῦ τείχους as itself a πύργος.) A wall of circumvallation would surely have more προπύργια than one. To the question, "if the circular fort were intended, what would have been the use of an outwork nearly a quarter of a mile in length?" (τὸ δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα) the answer seems to be that it would depend a good deal on the size of the κύκλος, which is not defined. Holm at least (G. S. ii. 36) is not troubled; "Diese eroberten das 1000 Fuss breite Vorwerk, und waren im Begriff, in das Rundfort selbst einzudringen."

Sixthly, there is the passage in Thucydides, vii. 2. 4, which describes the state of the Athenian works at the time of the coming of Gylippos. After speaking of (see p. 238, note 2) the state of the wall on the southern side, he adds; τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλεονίῳ ἦδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἂ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελείπετο. Here, to give the word κύκλος any force, it must mean a central point between the two pieces of wall spoken of, one stretching northward and one southward. It has no force if it is taken to mean the whole τείχισμα of which the northern and the southern wall were both parts. Or rather, if there was no such central point, as all scholars from Arnold onwards have taken the κύκλος to be, there would be no parts at all, but a simple continuous wall. The obvious meaning of τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is "on the other side of the round fort." It would mean exactly the same as τὸ πρὸς βορείαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος in vi. 99. 1. This gives a perfect sense, and each part of the description has its full force. Only, as a matter of construing, can τῷ ἄλλῳ have that meaning? (There is another reading τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, which would agree with the notion of the κύκλος meaning the whole line; but that would not suit the grammar of the whole sentence.) Arnold (iii. 128) seems to have taken for granted that it could not be so understood; he therefore thought that κύκλος in this passage had another meaning from what he had been the first to see that it had in all the others. Grote (vii. 341, 559) saw that this could not be, and he seemingly saw no difficulty in the text. He takes τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου to be "equivalent to ἐτέρῳ τοῦ κύκλου." Holm (G. S. ii. 338; Topografia, 211; Lupus, 130, 131) fully accepts Grote's fact; "Hier kann τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου nur die Mauer vom Kyklos nach N. bezeichnen." But he does not like Grote's construing, and he

goes off to seek for this or that "Konjektur." When it comes to "Konjektur," we can of course do anything we please, even to striking out the very important words τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸ Τρώγιον. The case is simply this. We must explain the passage by the facts, as we learn them both from this passage and from the others. Thucydides here pointedly distinguishes the wall north of the κύκλος from the wall south of it. He does so by saying τῇ ἄλλῃ τοῦ κύκλου. That is, τῇ ἄλλῃ τοῦ κύκλου must mean, as Grote says, the same as ἐτέρωθεν τοῦ κύκλου. And why should it not?

No one denies that the word κύκλος is used in other places in describing a wall of circumvallation and that it is used for the actual wall. But its use in the two passages which have been quoted to that effect is quite different from its use here. In Thucydides, ii. 13. 8, the word κύκλος is applied to the wall which went all round the city of Athens, as distinguished from the wall which connected the city with the haven of Phaléron (τοῦ τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους στάδια ἦσαν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ φυλασσόμενον τρεῖς καὶ τεσσαράκοντα). Nothing can be more clearly described. So in the Athenian siege of Mytilênê, the besiegers in the first stage (iii. 6. 1) completely blockade the town by sea, only partially by land; τὸ πρὸς νότον τῆς πόλεως ἐτείχισαν στρατόπεδα δύο ἐκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως. (Our κύκλος is called στρατόπεδον in Plut. Nik. 24.) Afterwards (iii. 18. 4) they do the work more thoroughly; περιτειχίζουσι Μυτιλήην ἐν κύκλῳ ἀπλῇ τείχει· φρούρια δὲ ἔστιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν καρτερῶν ἐγκαταφυκόδμηται· καὶ ἡ Μυτιλήνη κατὰ κράτος ἤδη ἀμφοτέρωθεν καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης εἴργετο.

As I understand these last passages, the besiegers first built the στρατόπεδα on each side. Then they built detached forts at convenient points. Lastly they joined all their buildings together by a continuous wall. This might very well be said to be built ἐν κύκλῳ. In shape it must have been a large segment of a circle. Combined with the fleet, it made up a something, call it κύκλος or anything else, which altogether surrounded the besieged city. Neither of these passages, neither the κύκλος τοῦ ἄστεος at Athens nor the building of a wall ἐν κύκλῳ at Mytilênê, has anything in common with the phrase ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. In our case the besiegers did not *begin to build* a κύκλος in the sense of a wall round the city. For no such wall was thought of. The wall is called περιτειχισμα, an usual military phrase, which does not so distinctly imply

surrounding as *κύκλος* would. And in the place where that word is used (vi. 101. 1), the *περί* is not wholly out of place. The wall from *Portella del Fusco* to the Great Harbour would most likely take a somewhat different course, one coming nearer to the nature of a *κύκλος*, from that taken by the wall that was simply carried across the hill. But, in describing the whole Athenian works, the word *κύκλος* would seem quite wrongly applied to a wall which was not meant to go round anything, and whose shape need not have been even the segment of a circle. At Mytilênê too there was a real surrounding of the town, which at Syracuse there was not. There is really nothing to shake us in cleaving to the sound interpretation of Grote and Holm. The Athenians, at this stage, *ετείχισαν τὸν κύκλον*. They built, they finished at once, a certain definite building called *ὁ κύκλος*. From this the wall was to stretch over the hill both ways, north and south.

Our next point is the first Syracusan counterwall, the *ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος* of Thucydides, vi. 99. 3. At the beginning of that chapter we read, *οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἑρμοκράτους τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐσηγησαμένου μάχαις μὲν πανθημαὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐκέτι ἐβούλοντο διακινδυνεύειν, ὑποτειχίζειν δὲ ἤμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι ἢ ἐκείνοι ἐμὲλλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος*.

Presently come the words of which Grote (vii. 559, 560) seems to have been the first fully to grasp the true meaning;

ετείχισον οὖν ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι, κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἄγοντες.

Göller (95) had the sense to correct a scholiast who thought that this wall—perhaps confounding it with the second Syracusan counter-work—went through a *χωρίον τελματώδες*. But he would seem to have thought that the *ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος* went across the hill. Arnold saw that *ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος* meant a wall at right-angles to the Athenian wall, that is a wall carried from east to west. But he oddly thought (iii. 412) that it was carried “along the terrace of Neapolis,” that is, the *δμαλὴν* of Thucydides, the level of Fusco and Galera. He adds;

“But certainty is not attainable on this question, any more than on many others in ancient military geography; and it may be doubted whether Thucydides himself had a perfectly clear notion of the operations of the siege, which, as well as the nature of the ground, *must have been necessarily described to him by others*.”

Arnold and Grote knew the ground wonderfully well for men who had not seen it. But Thucydides knew it better, because he had seen it. In this case Grote (vii. 561) was the first to see, in opposition to both Arnold and Leake, that *καίτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου* did not mean on a lower level than the Athenian fort, but simply lower down on the hill, nearer to the cliff, but still on the hill. But, not having himself seen the ground, he adds "that Thucydides, in his description, manifests no knowledge of that intermediate level which expositors speak of as *the platform of Neapolis*. He mentions only the cliff above and the marsh below."

The fact is that the lower terrace, that of the road to Tremilia and Euryalos, is here wide and not boldly marked; a little way further east it loses itself altogether. It was pointedly distinguished in military reckonings from the cliff above; it was less pointedly distinguished from the marsh below. But all three levels are there, and all three are twice distinguished by Thucydides in a later chapter (101. 11. 3), where we have *ὁ κρημὸς* or *αἱ Ἐπιπολαί*, *τὸ δμαλόν*—the level of Fusco and Galera—and *τὸ ἔλος* below, all clearly marked.

Grote's map seems to me to show the general direction quite rightly; but at the eastern end he is hampered by his notion about the wall of Temenitēs (see above, p. 658). He brings it to about what I take to be the right point, near Portella del Fusco. That is, that was the point that was aimed at, for the wall could not have really reached it. Holm carries it a little further to the west; but there is of course no certainty as to the exact point. Holm's map is clearer at the other end, as marking the connexion with the new fortification of Temenitēs. Now that Temenitēs was within the city, the words *ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως* in c. 99. 3 are determined by the phrases in 100. 2; *τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλῖδα* and *τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τὸν Τεμενίτην*. The same is implied in the cutting down of the olive-trees in c. 99. 3. The *πυλὶς* must be a postern in the wall of Temenitēs. One might add that the cutting down of the olives in Temenitēs better agrees with a wall on the hill than with one down below.

Our next point of dispute is found in c. 101. 1; *τῇ δ' ὕστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχισαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔλους, ὅς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ καὶ ἤπειρ αὐτοῖς βραχύ-*

ταυτα ἐγένετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὄραλου καὶ τοῦ ἔλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα.

It was something to be able to revise the text that I had already written, and to write the first sketch of the present note in the evening (March 17, 1890) after a climb earlier in the day up the *κρημὸς* so perfectly described. It can hardly admit of a doubt that the point meant is the cliff of *Portella del Fusco*, which answers every point of the description. As I just before said, Thucydides here clearly marks the three levels. There is Epipolai, the hill with its *κρημὸς*. Below it is τὸ ὄραλόν, the level ground of Fusco, where are the diggings which may be those of the *temenos* of the goddesses (see vol. ii. pp. 213, 524). Below that is the *ἔλος*, the marshy ground, through which the *περιτείχισμα*, the wall which was to hem in Syracuse, was to be carried down to the Great Harbour. The point which Thucydides immediately means by the *κρημὸς* I take to be that on the west side of the combe, where one most commonly goes up. This is the point where the wall of Dionysios stopped along the cliff, to be carried down, like the Athenian wall, to the Great Harbour. As we see cuttings, which may well be the work of Nikias, on the cliff itself, so a few yards off we see pieces of the wall of Dionysios, and within them are cuttings like those on Achradina, some of them clearly the foundations of large buildings. One is tempted to fancy that we have here the site of the *Hērakleion*; only it is perhaps more likely to have been on the other side of the combe. But the exact force of the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχισον τὸν κρημὸν is perhaps not quite so easy to fix as the site of the *κρημὸς* is. It is almost needless to say that it does not mean that "the Athenians, beginning at one end of the unfinished circle, proceeded to bring the wall down over the cliff." Arnold (iii. 132), without having stood on the cliff of Fusco, quite understood the case;

"I understand ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου to be equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμαινόμενοι, that is, that they set out from the part of the line already completed on Epipolæ, and began to work on the cliffs which formed the southern extremity of the high ground, above the valley of the Anapus. The work here begun was undoubtedly in the same line as that part already completed, and was intended to be joined to it hereafter. . . . But the Athenians hastened to complete their lines below Epipolæ from the cliff to the sea, because it was here that the Syracusans were naturally attempting

to carry their counter-wall. [He must mean the second counter-wall through the marsh.]”

Grote (vii. 346) is equally or even more clear ;

“Without staying to finish his blockading wall regularly and continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ—he left the Circle under a guard and marched across at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. . . . The intermediate space between the Circle and the fortified cliff, was for the time left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it (as was in fact afterwards done).”

As for ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου he takes it to mean “apart from, at some distance from” the round fort, as ἀπὸ θαλάσσης is used. It gives me rather the idea of starting from the κύκλος, keeping the κύκλος in view as a point to be joined on some day, but at the moment building at some little distance from it.

Holm (G. S. ii. 392) is less happy than usual. He quotes Ullrich, whose work I do not know, as taking κύκλος to mean the whole wall, but as saying that, at this particular moment, a fresh start was made on the cliff. His narrative in his older work (G. S. ii. 35) is fairly clear ;

“Es erschien ihnen deshalb zweckmässig, die nördliche Mauer einstweilen unvollendet zu lassen und die nach Süden zu beginnen. Sie befestigten zunächst den Rand des südlichen Abhangs von Epipolæ da, wo derselbe am wenigsten weit von dem Hafen entfernt war, um dann durch die Ebene und den Sumpf das Ufer zu erreichen.”

This agrees with Arnold and Grote. But in his later work (Topografia, 214; Lupus, 133) he takes another view ;

“Sie brachen nämlich die Errichtung der nördlichen Einschliessungsmauer ab und wandten sich mit ihren Angriffsbauten zunächst südlich vom Kyklos, wo sie unbestrittene Herren des Terrains und des syrakusischen Baumaterials geworden waren . . . Sie beginnen also ihre südlichen Werke mit einer Mauer vom Kyklos bis zum Rand des Südabhangs von Epipolai und zwar bis zu einem Punkte desselben, welcher vom grossen Hafen am wenigsten weit entfernt war, um dann durch die Ebene und den Sumpf das Ufer zu erreichen.”

This is quite another thing. Arnold, Grote, and seemingly Holm himself when he wrote the *Geschichte Siciliens*, conceived a fortifying of a point on the cliff from where the wall was afterwards to be carried northwards to the κύκλος. Holm now makes the wall be carried at this time from the κύκλος southward to the cliff. Accepting this, Holm's editor Lupus not unnaturally takes to improving the text, and proposes to put in ἐς before τὸν κρημνόν. He goes on to argue that the wall was in the end finished between the κύκλος and the κρημνός. Nobody had doubted it; Grote had strongly asserted it. Only we hold that the first step after the breaking-down of the first Syracusan counter-wall—the wall from the κύκλος to the κρημνός was most likely already begun—was to fortify the cliff. For this way of carrying on the work Grote gives two very good reasons;

"First, he [Nikias] prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second counter-wall As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance."

This is perfectly true, though Grote perhaps thought that to climb up by *Portella del Fusco* was a greater feat of mountaineering than I have several times found it.

The Athenians thus occupied and fortified the cliff on the west side of *Portella del Fusco*. From thence they meant to build, and in the end they did build, their wall north and south, back again to the κύκλος and down the hill to the Great Harbour. The effect of this last part of the work was that the Syracusans were driven to make their second counter-wall down below, across the marsh itself. About this wall, if one can call it a wall, there seems to be little difficulty or controversy. Holm, in his History, does not even give it a paragraph. Grote (vii. 562) saw that the works must have reached, or have been meant to reach, as far as the Anapos. So Holm, *Topografia*, 215; Lupus, 135.

After their destruction of this second Syracusan counterwork the besiegers were able to carry their wall from the cliff down to the Great Harbour. It was unfinished when Gylippos came. (See vii. 2. 4.) It was finished a little later. (See vii. 4. 2.) This was a double wall (διπλοῦν τεῖχος, vii. 2. 4); at its lower end, close to the sea, it was specially needful that it should be so. But it

does not follow that the wall from the κύκλος to the cliff was also double. They must, as Grote says, have also gone on building this at the same time as the lower wall. For Lupus (134) says truly that it is implied that this part was finished at the time of the fighting with Gylippos on the hill. The words εἰχίζον τὸν κρημνόν show that that point was attended to before the gap between it and the κύκλος was filled up. It cannot be argued from the words in c. 4. 1, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσης τείχος ἐπιτελίσαντες, either that every man had been down below or that every man had come up again. The κύκλος must have been guarded all the time, and the southern work on the hill, from the κύκλος to the κρημνός, may have gone on meanwhile.

So much for the witness and interpretation of Thucydides. Since this note was written, I have received a letter from Mr. Goodwin, in which he thus speaks of the phrase τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου (see above, p. 665).

"I have thought much of Thuc. vii. 2 ; τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιον. The first principle of interpretation here, in my humble opinion, is that these words must mean 'the remainder of the wall north of the circular fort.' If τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου can mean 'the wall on the other side of the κύκλος,' i.e. = ἐτέρῳ τοῦ κύκλου, it is all right ; and I am half inclined to think this is right. But as most critical scholars* think this is too much of a strain on the words, and I am half (*the other half*) inclined to think this is true, I bring in πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιον to help out the construction, and govern τοῦ κύκλου by Τρώγιον (*on the Trogilos side of the κύκλος*), just like τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τείχος in vi. 99. 1. This would be perfect if we only had τῷ πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιον ; but as an explanation of τῷ ἄλλῳ casually thrown in, it seems to me good enough. I should translate ; 'and from the rest of the wall to the other sea, on the Trogilos side of the κύκλος, stones had been deposited,' &c.

Of the other writers, Plutarch and Diodóros have little to tell us beyond the passage from Plutarch, a truly wonderful one, which is quoted above, p. 663. He shows a dim notion of the second counter-work when he says (Nik. 18) ὁ Λάμαχος προσεμάχετο τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐκ τῆς πάλαιος τείχος ἀνάγουσι πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὁ καλύσειν ἔμαλλε διὰ μέσον τὸν ἀποτεειχισμόν.

Diodōros indeed has a passage quite as wonderful as any (xiii. 7 ; see above, p. 609) ;

οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ μέρει τῆς δυνάμεως τὸν ὑπερκείμενον τοῦ λιμένος τόπον καταλάβοντο, καὶ τὴν καλουμένην Πολίχνην τειχίσαντες, τό τε ἐς τοῦ Διὸς ἱερὸν περιβάλλοντο καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπολιόρκουν.

It is remarkable that this same notion of an encampment on both sides of the hill appears also, though in a different shape, in the passage quoted from Polyainos (i. 39. 3) in pp. 224, 225. Did it come from the Roman siege ?

It has struck me throughout this inquiry that many modern writers have been more or less led astray—or at least led to put things a little out of their due proportion to each other—by making too much of the slope of the hill of Syracuse from west to east. It is a real thing ; but it is not the main feature of the hill. In walking westward from Achradina to Euryalos, there is not—except in particular places—any marked feeling of going up hill ; but, if you look round at any point, you see that you have gone up a good way. Thucydides is quite right in using words like *ἀνω* and *κάτω* to describe operations along this line ; but his readers have sometimes taken them as meaning more than they do. Again the use of the word *Ἐπιπολαί* is sometimes confusing. It helps, I think, to clearness to keep the hill—of which *Ἐπιπολαί* is the part which at any time is unoccupied—in the mind's eye, and carefully to bear in mind the points of the compass. This is easily done, as the hill runs very nearly due east and west. I have noticed how very seldom “east, west, north, and south” come in most of our modern narratives. I hope I have made things plainer by bringing them in pretty largely.

I conceive that the name *Ἐπιπολαί* was given originally from Ortygia, not from Achradina. It withdrew westwards, as the hill was occupied.

NOTE XIV. p. 24 v.

THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY OF THE SAVES AT SYRACUSE.

POLYAINOS, diligent gatherer of both wheat and tares, has (i. 43. 1) a story which, if it happened at all, must have happened at this

time, and which Holm (G. S. ii. 37) seems to accept. But it struck me as far too doubtful for a place in the text.

A great number of slaves in Syracuse revolt and assemble (χρηρὸς πολλῆς οἰκετικῆς ἡθροισμένης) under a leader (ἡγούμενος) named Sôistratos. Hermokratês sends to them as envoy (πρεσβευτής) one Daimachos an officer of cavalry (ἓνα τῶν ἱππάρχων). He is συνήθης καὶ φίλος to Sôistratos, who therefore cannot have been himself a slave. Daimachos is to tell him that the generals admire his spirit and will set the slaves free (τὸ φρόνημα αὐτοῦ θαυμάζοντες πάντας μὲν ἐλευθέρους ἀφιδῶσι). They shall have heavy armour (πάντας ὀπλιούσι) and the full pay of the soldiers. Sôistratos is to be an additional general, and is asked to come at once and take counsel with his colleagues (αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Σωσίστρατον ἀποφαίνουσι συνάρχοντα, καὶ ἤδη γὰρ ἦκειν βουλευσόμενον μετὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὅσα τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν κατεπείγου). Sôistratos trusts Daimachos, and comes to the generals, bringing with him twenty men who are described as τοὺς ἡγεμονικαύτους τῶν δούλων. They are imprisoned. Then Hermokratês goes with six hundred heavy-armed, gets hold of the slaves (τοὺς δούλους λαβών), and swears that they shall have no harm done to them, if each man goes home to his master. So they do, all but three hundred, who desert to the Athenians.

Till these last words there is nothing to fix the date except the mention of Hermokratês as general, which he doubtless was at other times besides during the siege. But surely the story, as it stands, is quite unworthy of belief, though either a revolt of slaves or their desertion is likely enough.

NOTE XV. pp. 246, 257.

THE WALL OF GYLIPPOS.

OUR notions of the third counter-wall built for the defence of Syracuse, that which was made under the orders of Gylippos, have to be put together from several detached passages in the seventh book of Thucydides.

The first comes in the fourth chapter. Gylippos has taken the Athenian fort on Labdalon (c. 3. 4). The Athenians have carried their southern wall down to the Great Harbour (c. 4. 2, οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσῃ τείχος ἐπιτελέσαντες, see above, p. 247). Gylippos' main object now is to hinder them

from carrying their north wall to the edge of the cliff, and down to the water on that side. He attacks the imperfect wall of the Athenians (c. 4. 2, 3), which they do something to improve; but his main work is to carry a cross wall westward, north of the point which the Athenian wall has reached. The words are;

ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι, ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τείχος ἀπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναντο κωλύσαι, μηκέτι οἰοί τ' ὄσω ἀποτείχισαι.

The Athenians then leave off building on the hill and fortify Plēmmyrion (c. 4. 4, see p. 249). Gylippos meanwhile goes on (c. 5, see pp. 252–256) both with his attacks on the Athenian wall and with the building of his own (c. 5. 1);

ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἅμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τείχος, τοῖς λίθοις χρώμενος οὐδὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεβάλλοντο σφίσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρέτασσαν ἐξάγων, κ.τ.λ.

Thus far there seems no serious difficulty. The only question is as to the *construing* of the words *πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τείχος ἀπλοῦν*; the *meaning* is quite clear. The words must be taken in connexion with the other passage in vi. 99. 3; *κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τείχος ἄγοντες*. That wall was *κάτωθεν*, south of the Athenian *κύκλος*, and stretched towards the southern brow of the hill. In the present passage *ἄνω* is not north and south, but means that the wall was carried westwards, up the slope of Epipolai. We further see that the force of *ἐγκάρσιον* is "at right angles to the Athenian wall." The wall moreover was *ἀπλοῦν*, a single wall, as distinguished from the double wall which the Athenians had carried southwards down the hill. We thus get the general meaning; *πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον* is, as Grote says (vii. 562), "equivalent to an adjective or adverb." (So Holm, *Lupus*, 139, "in die Quere"). It is just as if he had directly called this wall an *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος*, as he did the other, and as he calls this in vii. 7. It is hardly needful to argue against those (see Grote, u. s.; Holm, G. S. ii. 392) who have fancied that *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* meant something other than this third Syracusan wall. One might be tempted to fancy that it meant the Athenian wall; but this is forbidden by vi. 99. 3 and vii. 7. 1. Thucydides would not apply the words *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* both to a wall running north and south and to a wall running east and west. But he does apply them to two successive walls running east and west, each alike *ἐγκάρσιον* to the one that ran north and south. The Syracusans first build

one *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* of which we have heard a good deal, and which the Athenians had destroyed (vi. 100. 3, *τὴν τε ὑποτείχισιν καθείλωσαν* κ.τ.λ.). Now they build another in the same general direction, but much further to the north, on the other side of the Athenian κύκλος.

In the fifth chapter there is a battle *μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων* (2), *ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν* (3). That is, the ground would have the Athenian wall to the west, the Syracusan wall of vi. 75 to the east, and the *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* now in building to the north.

In the next chapter (c. 6. 1) the *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* has almost, but not quite, reached the point where it would cross the Athenian wall and hinder its being carried to the north brow of the hill;

ἦδη γὰρ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους τελευτήν ἢ ἐκείνων [Συρακοσίων] τειχισίς.

Nicias and the Athenians, *νομίζοντες . . . ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι μὴ περιορᾶν παροικοδομούμενον τὸ τείχος*, go out to fight. Gylippos comes out too;

καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον προαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ' ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς ἐκ πλαγίου τήσας τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ἣ τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔλθον.

This is a little hard. I can only understand, with Grote (vii. 372), that this *εὐρυχωρία* was to the west of the Athenian wall. The Athenians are defeated and driven within their own lines (*νικηθέν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατηράχθη ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα*). This enables the Syracusans to accomplish their immediate object the same night; they carry their *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* westward of the point which the Athenian wall had reached towards the north;

τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἔτι σφᾶς ἀποτερίχισαι.

This is plain enough, but immediately after (c. 7. 1) follows a passage which is more difficult, one at least which has given rise to more controversy;

αἱ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα . . . καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους.

Here the statement that the ships helped to build a wall has an odd sound; but the meaning is clear. Thucydides put in

an explanatory detail or two between the words δώδεκα and ξυντείχισαν, and then went on as if the nominative had been, not νῆες, but ναῦται, or something to that effect. (Grote aptly quotes iii. 17. 4, where ships receive pay, as among ourselves they are "paid off.") The question as to μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους is more serious, and we shall come to it presently.

Presently, the letter of Nikias (c. 11. 3) describes the result of the whole work. The intention of Gylippos to hinder the Athenians from reaching the north edge of the hill was carried out ;

οἱ δὲ παρακοδομήκασιν ἡμῶν τείχος ἀπλοῦν, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτοὺς, ἢν μή τις τὸ παρατείχισμα τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἔλῃ.

Here we have the παρατείχισμα as equivalent to the ἐγκάρσιον τείχος. Both names apply to this counter-wall of Gylippos ; παρατείχισμα seems to be its regular name. It is, like the earlier counter-wall to the south, an ἐγκάρσιον τείχος in its special relation to the Athenian wall. The best name of all for it is that in c. 5. 1, τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τείχος (cf. 14. 1). That describes its position, while the other describes its purpose. And this name suggests further that it was meant to go along the whole length of Epipolai. At the east, the part first built, it starts ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως. That must mean starting from Tycha, just as the same words in vi. 99. 3, when applied to the earlier wall to the south, meant starting from Temenitēs. As to its extent westward we learn a great deal from several notices in the account of the night-attack of Dēmosthenēs (vii. 42, 43). Dēmosthenēs has two alternative ways of carrying out that storming of the παρατείχισμα which Nikias had suggested in his letter. The first plan was that of an open attack on its south side with engines, clearly at some point not far from the Athenian lines. When this is defeated (c. 43. 1), he turns to the other scheme of a night-attack on the north side, by the same way up the hill by which Lamachos and Gylippos had gone up. The words (42. 4) are ;

ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκάλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀπλοῦν τε ὄν, καὶ εἰ ἐπικρατήσῃ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου ῥαδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθῇν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομένειν ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα.

Here we have something called a στρατόπεδον in close relation to the παρατείχισμα. Presently we learn something more. In c. 43. 3 we read ;

ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς [ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς], κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἤπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη, λαμβάνουσί τε τοὺς φύλακας τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ προσβάντες τὸ τείχος οὗ ἦν αὐτόθι τῶν Συρακοσίων αἰρούσι, καὶ ἄνδρας τῶν φυλάκων ἀποκτείνουσιν. οἱ δὲ πλείους διαφυγόντες εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία ἐν προτειχίσμασιν.

Presently (c. 43. 5) they get beyond the στρατόπεδα ἐν τοῖς προτειχίσμασιν to the παρατείχισμα itself;

Ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, σὺχ ὑπομένοντων τῶν φυλάκων, ἤρουν τε καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπέσυρον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων.

It is perfectly plain from these passages taken together that the wall of Gylippos, the ἐγκάρσιον τείχος or παρατείχισμα, stretched westward along the whole hill from the wall of Tycha to Euryalos. It had a στρατόπεδον or τείχος at the end of it, that is a fort on Euryalos. It had three προτειχίσματα in advance of it on the north side. The Athenians, climbing up by the path near Euryalos, came first to a τείχος at the end of the wall to the west. Part of them are presently engaged with the defenders of the προτειχίσματα north of the wall. Another division reaches to the παρατείχισμα itself, evidently at a point between the τείχος at the extreme west end and the most western of the three προτειχίσματα (that is between the neck of Euryalos and Buffalaro). All this seems quite clear. It is strange that Arnold (iii. 195, 417) could have thought that the forts were all on the *southern* part of the hill, somewhere near Temenitês. Where could he have thought that the Athenians went up? Grote (vii. 562-564) explained the whole matter. And I do not see that there is any difference between him and Holm as to what was done, but only as to the order in which it was done. The maps in the *Geschichte Siciliens*, in the *Topografia*, and above all the admirably clear one in Lupus, show the wall and the forts just as Grote conceived them. Only Holm does not like Grote's construing of μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους, and he does not seem to understand the reason for the course of action which those words express. Grote holds that, when the wall had been carried westward from Tycha so far as to cross the unfinished Athenian wall and to hinder its being carried on to the brow of the hill, Gylippos began to work at the extreme point of Euryalos and

then built eastward till he reached the wall already begun at the other end—*μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*. The key to the whole thing is that, just as with the Athenian wall itself, the work was begun at the two ends and finished in the middle (see above, p. 671). This is in many cases an obvious thing to do, as thereby much greater command is gained of the whole ground to be dealt with. And it is specially obvious in this particular case. Holm (G. S. ii. 395) asks;

“Was aber die Sache selbst anbetrifft, so muss man fragen, was in aller Welt hätte denn die Syrakusaner bewegen können, statt in dem begonnenen Werke weiter zu bauen, es plötzlich zu unterbrechen, um von der entgegengesetzten Seite her zu beginnen?”

I hope their reasons are clearly stated in the text. There is no need to go all over the world to look for them. They are plain enough on the top of Epipolai. The wall of Gylippos had two objects. There was its object as an *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος*, the immediate object of stopping the Athenian wall from reaching the brow of the hill to the north. There was also its wider object as a *παρατείχισμα*, a *τείχος διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν*, the object of commanding the whole line of the hill, and specially of strengthening the western end by forts. The first object had now been accomplished. Gylippos now went on to accomplish the second. This was far better done by making a fresh start from Euryalos, and building eastward to meet the piece already built, than by building from that piece westward. He therefore built from Euryalos *μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*. The work had reached that point by the time that Nikias wrote his letter in c. 7. He could then say, *οἱ δὲ παρεμποδίσαντες ἡμῖν τείχος ἀπλοῦν*; that is the *παρατείχισμα* of c. 42, 43 ending westward in the fort on Euryalos.

Taking all this in, there really is no difficulty in the words in vii. 7; *ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*. The *ἐγκάρσιον τείχος* had been carried westward beyond the Athenian wall. The wider *παρατείχισμα*, of which it was to be a part, τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν *τείχος* in its fullest growth, had been begun at the west end by the fort on Euryalos. There was still a gap, τὸ λοιπόν, which the new-comers helped to fill up, building eastward till they met the wall which had been begun at the east. Nothing can better express this than the words *μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους*. Nevertheless not a few attempts have been

made to improve the text. Arnold was puzzled at τὸ λαοκρίν. Later editors have dealt with the evidence as they thought good. As Lupus (see above, p. 671) in vi. 101. 1 stuck in ἐς, so now Holm himself (Topog. 220; Lupus, 140) strikes out μέχρι. He quotes the passage without it, and says, "Die Handschriften haben hier freilich μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τοίχους." And so assuredly had the first manuscript of all, the autograph of Thucydides. Nothing in human nature could have tempted the copyist of any later manuscript to stick it in. Bolder text-tinkers seem to have gone further still, and to have struck out the whole four words μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τοίχους. What do they think was the frame of mind of the copyist who stuck them in?

Between the appearance of the *Geschichte Siciliens* and that of the *Topografia*, Grote found another adversary (Jowett, ii. 409 et seqq.), who however does not show any knowledge of the ground. It is perhaps needless to dwell on more points than two. First, we are told (p. 410), "the extent of the work seems out of proportion to the advantage gained. The Syracusans maintained a detached fort on the Olympieum, why not then on the Euryelus?"

The answer is easy. The circumstances of Polichna and Euryalos were wholly different. Polichna was an old outpost, one perhaps as old as the city itself. It had not occurred to any man at any time to join it to the city by long walls. Nor was there any strong military reason for doing so now. The object of the occupation of the Olympieion was to watch and harass the besiegers, on Plèmyrion, in their lower camp, or anywhere else; no help was likely to come to the Athenians on that side. But on the north side of the hill help and supplies were very likely to come to the Athenians from their allies in that quarter. To cut off this communication by land and sea on that side was an object only second to keeping the Athenians from hemming in the city. Having accomplished that first object, Gylippos went on to the second.

It is further objected (p. 411) that "the words ἡ ἐκάλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κ.τ.λ. [vii. 42. 4] would be a singular way of describing a wall which had been elongated two or three times its original length, and now reached to the top of Epipolæ and to the Euryelus." It is hard to see the singularity. To keep the Athenians from hemming in the city was the first object, though another had also been accomplished by it. And it is quite possible that

Thucydides had specially in view the first attack made by engines on the south side of the *παρτειχισμα*. This was doubtless made at a point far nearer to the *κύκλος* than the *τείχισμα* or *στρατόπεδον* on Euryalos. It is again said (p. 411), "In c. 43 med. the taking of the *τείχισμα* and the *παρτειχισμα* are spoken of as two distinct operations. But if the fort on the Euryelus had really been connected with the city by a long wall, the possession of the one would have implied the possession of the other. . . . And it would have been a useless waste of time to pull the battlement off the wall;" &c. Yet to make a breach in the wall was surely a gain, when the only other way of getting to the south side would be through a fort standing most likely close on the edge of the hill. So at least Grote thought (vii. 420). And I do not know what is meant by saying "that the alarm would have been given by running along the wall, as well as being *carried by the guards into the city*." There is nothing in Thucydides about any alarm being carried into the city. The alarm was carried *πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία ἐν προτειχίσμασιν*, a long way off from the city. In one of these were Gylippos and his immediate companions, as they *ἐβόηθον ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων*.

To my mind the only difficulty in the whole matter is the way in which Thucydides speaks in vii. 7. 1. It is rather a casual way to speak of *τὸ λοιπὸν* when nothing has been said about the *τείχισμα* and the *παρτειχισμα* by the neck of Euryalos. But it is not very uncommon with Thucydides to speak of things in this casual way, to pass by a thing at the time, and often to describe it a good while after. On any showing, he does so in this case with the *στρατόπεδα* and *προτειχίσματα* in c. 42, 43. We hear of them then for the first time, because that is the first time that they become of importance; but they must have been in being some while before. And the obvious time for their being called into being is that recorded in c. 7. 1. We must explain one place by another. Chapters 42 and 43 explain the first words of c. 7.

The other writers tell us very little. Plutarch (Nik. 19) has a dim account of the building of the wall of Gylippos; *τοῖς λίθους οἷς ἐκείνοι [οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι] προσεκόμζον καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ παροικοδομῶν εἰς διαστολὰς ἀπὸκόνε τὸν ἐκείνων περιτειχισμὸν, ὥστ' αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι πλέον κρατούσι*. Diodóros certainly had no clear notion of the objects of Dêmosthenês'

attack on Epipolai when he says (xiii. 11) *πίσας τοὺς συνάρχοντας ἐπιθίσθαι ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς, ἄλλως γὰρ οὐ δυνατόν ἦν ἀποτειχίσαι τὸν πῶλον*. But he got, either from Thucydides or from Philistos, a clearer notion of what Dêmosthenês actually found at the top ;

φρουρίων τέ τινων ἐκράτησαν καὶ παρεισπεσόντες ἐντὸς τοῦ τειχίσματος τῆς Ἐπιπολῆς, μέρος τι τοῦ τείχους κατέβαλον.

NOTE XVI. p. 249.

THE DOCKS IN THE TWO HARBOURS.

It is quite plain that the Syracusans at this time had docks in two places, in the Great Harbour and also in the Lesser. It is equally plain that those in the Lesser Harbour had been in use for a shorter time than those in the Greater. It is likely, but not certain, that they had been made with reference to the present war (see vol. ii. p. 131). They may, as Grote says (vii. 399), have been at this time the "principal docks"; they certainly at the moment with which we are concerned contained the greater number of ships. But the time of their greatest importance comes later, under Dionysios.

Thucydides first mentions the docks in vii. 22. 1, when Gylippos is going to make his attack on Plêmmyrion (see p. 249);

αἱ τρεῖρες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἅμα καὶ ἐπὶ ξυθήματος πέντε μὲν καὶ τριάκοντα ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπέπλεον αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, οὗ ἦν καὶ τὸ νεώριον αὐτοῖς.

These last words are explained by the other passage, vii. 25. 5. The Athenians and Syracusans are both in the Great Harbour, and the Syracusans are strengthening their docks there (see p. 287);

ἐγένετο καὶ περὶ τῶν σταυρῶν ἀκροβολισμὸς ἐν τῇ λιμένι, οὗς οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσοίκων κατέπηξαν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ.

In the second passage the docks in the Great Harbour are spoken of as the "old docks"; in the former some explanation is thought to be needed of the fact that there were docks in the Lesser Harbour also.

The best account of these docks is given by Schubring, *Achradina*, pp. 21 et seqq., and his first map shows them very clearly as they stood in the time of Dionysios, as also the changes of

the coast-line. But he is not satisfied with the words of Thucydides, *οὗ ἦν καὶ τὸ νεώριον αὐτοῖς*, which, though the article is a little queer, seem to give the meaning well enough. He wishes (p. 22) to read *ἄλλο* or *καὶνόν*. Construing by the facts, this hardly seems needful. I am more tempted to risk a "Konjektur" on Schubring's own text. In p. 21 he says; "Denken wir uns etwa die *Ostseite* der Insel für die Handelsmarine reservirt, für welche wie jetzt ein Quai von der Arethusa bis zum Isthmus gebaut war, so nahm die Werfte den Isthmus und das Lokal bis zu den Sümpfen ein." For "*Ostseite*" I am tempted by the facts as described by Schubring and pictured in his map to read "*Westseite*." It is the easiest of mistakes and the easiest of corrections.

But it is odd, after Schubring's explanation, even after his conjecture, to translate in c. 22, "where they had their arsenal," and in c. 25, "in front of their old dock-houses," seemingly without a thought of the *καὶ* in the former passage or of the connexion between the two.

NOTE XVII. p. 305.

ARTAS THE MESSAPIAN.

THE mention of Artas comes in Thucydides, vii. 33. 3. The Athenian fleet under Dêmostenês and Eurymedôn sails from Korkyra;

ἐπεραιώθησαν ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ τὸν Ἴόνιον ἐπ' ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ ὀρμηθέντες αὐτόθεν κατίσχουσιν ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους Ἰαπυγίας, καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τε τινὰς τῶν Ἰαπύγων, πενήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν, τοῦ Μεσσηπίου ἔθνους, ἀναβιβάζονται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τῷ Ἀρτᾷ, ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς θυνάστις ὧν παρέσχεν αὐτοῖς, ἀνανεωσάμενοί τινα παλαιὰν φιλίαν ἀφικροῦνται ἐς Μεταπόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας.

We further learn from c. 57. 11 that Artas did not supply the darters out of pure zeal for his allies. They appear in the list as *Ἰάπυγες μισθοφόροι*.

Several things may be noticed here. We have, as in vi. 44, the careful distinction between Iapygia and Italy (see p. 133 and vol. i. p. 480), the mention of Metapontion as the first town within the Italian border. Secondly, we have the mention of the Iapygians as a whole, of which the Messapians are part. Cf. Herod. vii.

170, and vol. ii. p. 253. And more than this, curiosity is awakened by the mention of the old alliance between Athens and Artas or his people, which was now renewed. It reminds one of the early dealings of Athens in the West, and specially of the first treaty with Segesta. See vol. i. p. 554.

The *Χοιράδες νήσοι* seem (see Arnold's note, and Bunbury, Dict. Geog. in Choerades) to be the two small islands off the haven of Taras. There are no others between the Iapygian promontory and Metapontion, or indeed between the promontory and Krotôn. And the account in Thucydides reads as if all the dealings with Artas took place while the ships were at this station. Otherwise two barren rocks off an unfriendly haven (see vi. 44. 2) seem a strange station to choose for dealings with a prince whose territory lay mainly inland behind Taras, but who had a little sea-board further to the south-east. And there are some other notices of Artas which speak of great hospitality shown by him to some at least of the Athenians, which implies a visit to him on land. In *Athēnaïos*, iii. 73, we read—with a poor pun on the name of Artas very feebly dragged in ;

ἄρτου δέι, καὶ οὐ τοῦ Μεσσηπίων βασιλείῳς λέγων τῶν ἐν Ἰαπυγίᾳ, περὶ οὗ τὸ σύγγραμμα ἔστι Πολέμωνι. μνημονεύει δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Θουκυδίδης ἐν ἰβδόμῃ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ κωμικοποιὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιγραφομένῃ Σικελίᾳ διὰ τούτων

κἀκείθεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀνέμψ νότον
διεβάλομεν τὸ πέλᾳγος εἰς Μεσσηπίου·
Ἄρτας δ' ἀναλαβὼν ἐξένισεν ἡμᾶς καλῶς,
ξένος χαρίεις γὰρ ἦν ἐκείνοιο καὶ μέγας
καὶ λαμπρός.

We should be well pleased to have the play called *Σικελία* perfect, if it was the work of a contemporary and contained more narratives like this. Another fragment quoted from the same play refers to a later event in Greek history not directly connected with Sicily, though references to it might easily have been brought into a play on a Sicilian subject. Hesychios in *ἐμπήρους* quotes *Δημήτριος ἐν Σικελίᾳ* ;

Λακεδαιμόνιοι θ' ἡμῶν τὰ τείχη κατέβαλον,
καὶ τὰς τρήρεις ἔλαβον ἐμπήρους· ὅπως
μηκέτι θαλασσοκρατοῦντο Πελοποννήσιοι.

In another place (ix. 70) *Athēnaïos* quotes another play of his, as it seems, for a strictly Sicilian allusion, though of much later date ;

κατὰ τὸν κομικὸν Δημήτριον, ὅς ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Ἀρεσπαγίτῃ ταύτῃ
εἴρηκεν·

ἄβυρτακοποῖς παρὰ Σίλεσκον ἐγενόμην·
παρ' Ἀγαθοκλείδῃ δὲ πρῶτος εἰσήνεγκ' ἐγὼ
τῷ Σικελιώτῃ τὴν τυραννικὴν φακὴν.

Ælian too (N. H. xii. 10) has a reference to Δημήτριος ἐν Σικελίᾳ τῷ
δράματι, but it does not help us. John of Stoboi too (B. 1) has
an extract from Dēmētrios which concerns us yet less.

We have another notice of Artas in Soudas, with another
reference to Polemōn; Ἄρτος ὁ ψωμός· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὄνομα τυράννου
Μεσσηπίων, ὃν καὶ πρόξενον Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαί φησι Πολέμων.

Artas then had a special treatise written about him by Polemōn,
that is the περιηγητής who wrote about the Palici (see vol. i. p.
519). He lived, according to Soudas, in the time of Ptolemy
Epiphanēs, B.C. 205-181. Artas is also mentioned by the comic
poet Dēmētrios. Now Diogenēs Laertios (v. 5. 11) mentions two
poets of that name, πρῶτος ἀρχαίαν κομψοδίαν πεποικώς· δεύτερος ἐπὶ
ποιήτης, οὗ μόνον σώζεται . . . τάδε. (Three hexameters which do not
concern us.) Athēnaios speaks as if the passages which he quotes
were all from one poet, and they all have the same general ring.
But no man can have been entertained both by Artas and by Agathoklēs.
Either then there were two poets of the name (see Clinton,
F. H. in a. 299; Diet. Biog. in Demetrius, p. 971), of which there
is no hint, or else all the fragments must belong to a time long
after Artas. If this be so, the reference to Artas in Dēmētrios loses
one kind of interest, as not being contemporary; but it gains
another. Artas must have impressed the mind of posterity
more than one would have looked for, if a comic poet talked of
him more than a hundred years after his time, and if Polemōn
wrote a special book about him later still.

It will be seen that in some of the extracts the name of the
Messapian king, tyrant, or δυνάστης, is written, not Ἄρτας, but
Ἄρτος. It was evidently thought funny to play on the name.
They did not remember that the true Messapian name for bread
had passed into some forms of Greek. See vol. i. p. 489. And
when Soudas thinks it needful to define ἄρτος as ψωμός, we
have lighted on an important fact in the history of the Greek
language.

NOTE XVIII. pp. 320, 341.

THE LAST ATHENIAN ENCAMPMENT.

It is perhaps hardly needful now to argue against the older notion, held by Göller (*De Situ*, 75) and others, that the last position of the Athenians on Syracusan soil was close on the bay of Daskôn. This has been fully done by Holm, *G. S.* ii. 395. But there is another question which arises out of the words of Thucydides describing the Athenian action between the sea-fight recorded in vii. 51-54 and the last fight of all. He says in vii. 60. 2 ;

ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τεῖχη τὰ ἄνω ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δὲ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον οἶόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν.

And directly after he says ;

οἱ μὲν, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν, ἕκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν, κ.τ.λ.

The question which this suggests is perhaps more clearly put by Mr. Jowett (ii. 441) than by any one before him ;

"Had the Athenians retained their lines on Epipolæ until now ? or had they quitted them after the completion of the Syracusan counter-wall, so that τὰ ἄνω τεῖχη in this passage means only the part of the lines under Epipolæ and furthest from the harbour ?"

With my notions of the works on the hill, I should say that the question was whether the Athenians had up to this time kept the κύκλος and the other works actually on the hill, or whether they only held the double wall stretching down from Portella del Fusco to the Great Harbour. Arnold (iii. 220, 416) assumes that the works actually on the hill were forsaken as soon as the wall of Gylippos (see p. 258) was finished. The ἄνω τεῖχη of this passage he understands to be "the upper extremity of the Athenian lines, where they came most immediately under the cliffs of Epipolæ, and were most distant from the sea-shore." Or, as he says in the same note, when speaking of the Hêrakleion, "under Epipolæ, but raised on a sort of lower ridge above the valley of the Anapus." This would mean on the intermediate level of Fusco. He says distinctly in p. 416 that τὰ ἄνω τεῖχη "do not mean their lines on Epipolæ." Thirlwall does not seem quite clear about the matter. In iii. 434, describing Dêmosthenês'

night attack, he speaks of "Epipolæ, which the Athenians appear to have entirely evacuated." In iii. 444, just before the last sea-fight, he says; "It was determined that they should abandon the greater part of their fortifications on the side of Epipolæ." One may perhaps understand this as meaning that the *κύκλος* was already forsaken, but that it was now that the walls down the hill from Portella del Fusco were given up.

Grote gives no hint that the completion of the wall of Gylippos led to any forsaking of the Athenian position on the hill. When he (vii. 417) comes to the alternative plans of Dêmôsthenês (see p. 308), he says;

"By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. . . . The Syracusans as defenders were on the north side of this counter-wall [the wall of Gylippos]; he and the Athenians on the south side."

By "slope," we must remember, Grote means the gradual rise of the hill from east to west, so much more important in many narratives of the siege than it is in reality. But here the description is made unusually clear by the use of the words "north" and "south." When he comes to the preparations for the last sea-fight (vii. 439), he says distinctly;

"They now evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ and even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern cliff, confining themselves to a limited fortified space close to the shore."

Holm (ii. 395), chiefly intent on refuting the mistake of Göller, says almost casually;

"Als die Athener den Lagerplatz am Plemmyrion aufgeben mussten, waren sie wieder auf den zwischen ihren doppelten Mauern bei Syrakus selbst in dem Sumpfe Lysimeleia belegenen beschränkt."

In the narrative of the preparations for the last sea-fight (ii. 58), he says;

"Man beschloss, auf der Stelle den ganzen oberen Theil der Doppelmauer aufzugeben, nur den unmittelbar am Hafen gelegenen beizubehalten, den Raum zwischen beiden Mauern durch eilig errichtete Querwerke nach dem Lande hin zu schützen."

I altogether go with Grote. I do not see what τὰ ἅμα τεῖχη can mean except the whole Athenian position on the hill, *κύκλος* and everything else. I see no signs that anything had been already

forsaken. I see no difficulty in the objection that "we hear nothing of the Athenian lines in the account of the night attack on Epipolæ." Of course not; for that attack was made on the north side of the wall of Gylippos, while the Athenian post on the hill was to the south of it. But the Athenian position on the hill seems to be implied when (vii. 43. 1) Dêmosthenês attacks the wall of Gylippos with engines from the south side. There is not a word about his going up, as there surely would have been if the κύκλος had been forsaken, and the whole Athenian force had been down below. And after the defeat of the night attack, we read (vii. 46. 1) of Gylippos, *ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὦν καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἰρήσειν βίβη, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς οὕτω ξυρέθη*. This is most naturally understood of a position on the hill. And we must remember that the language of Thucydides and of everybody else is somewhat affected by that gradual withdrawing westward of the name Ἐπιπολαί of which I spoke in p. 207, and above, p. 673.

The only passage in Thucydides which at all looks the other way is where (vii. 47. 2) he says, *καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἅμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἐλῶδες καὶ χαλεπὸν ἦν*. Ever since the lines had reached the Great Harbour, the lower part of the Athenian position, that close to the shore, had been ἐλῶδες. And anybody that chooses may say that the part near Portella del Fusco was χαλεπόν. But the mere mention of τὰ ἄνω τεῖχη implies the occupation of something higher than the marshy ground by the harbour, and it most naturally suggests that the whole position on the hill was still occupied.

The whole thing seems to be made clear by what Plutarch—or Philistos speaking through his mouth—says (Nik. 24) about the Hêrakleion (see p. 342) just before the last battle;

τὸν δὲ λοιπὸν ὄχλον ἔστησε παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, ἐκλιπὼν τὸ μέγα στρατόπεδον καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τὰ συνάπτοντα πρὸς τὸ Ἡράκλειον, ὥστε μὴ τεθυκότων τὴν εἰθισμένην θύσιαν τῇ Ἡρακλεΐ τῶν Συρακουσίων, θύσαι τότε τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἀναβάντας.

That is to say, the Athenians now forsake the κύκλος, τὸ μέγα στρατόπεδον. They forsake also the post at Portella del Fusco near the Hêrakleion. The position of the Hêrakleion is fixed to the hill, not to any position on the level of Fusco or Galera, by the word ἀναβάντας. The whole Athenian force now comes down to the χωρίον ἐλῶδες, the lowest part of this position close to the shore, and this they defend with a new wall to the north.

The position of the Hérakleion is plainly marked on the hill. (See Holm, G. S. ii. 397; Topografia, 226; Lupus, Stadt Syrakus, 146). The only question is on which side of the combe we are to place it. On the whole I should say the east. That seems better to suit a site which was clearly not occupied by the Athenians, though their neighbourhood made men afraid to keep up the regular worship. The case was rather different from that of the Olympieion within an outpost of its own. But it is truly wonderful that any one with the word *δυσάβητος* before him can have placed it anywhere near the bay of Daskón.

The last Athenian position, close to the water and partly in the swamp, suggests the *χηλή* spoken of by Thucydides, vii. 53. 2, though the mention of it comes (see p. 329) a little before the time when the army was wholly confined to that space. Arnold (i. 74, iii. 210) well explained the general nature of a *χηλή*, with an apt reference to the "crepidines" of Syracuse, spoken of by Cicero (Verres, v. 37), when a "piraticus myoparo"—one thinks of our Saxon vessels in Sidonius—"ad omnes crepidines urbis accessit." The *χηλή* or "crepido" is a kind of sea-wall which, as Arnold says,

"After following the city wall for some way, till it turned off in an inland direction, . . . continued to run along the edge of the harbour, forming a sort of narrow causeway between the sea on one side, and the marshy ground on the other."

This part of the *χηλή* outside the city naturally lay partly within the Athenian lines and partly outside them to the west, thus forming an approach for Gylippos. And those who were driven off the *χηλή* would naturally be driven into the swamp.

Schubring (Achradina, 24, and in his map) understands the *χηλή* of a *Hafendamm*, protecting the docks in the Great Harbour. It is hard to see how in this case the Syracusans could have attacked the Athenian lines or how they could have been driven into the swamp. Holm (G. S. ii. 396) explains the matter at large, in substantial agreement with Arnold, but without mentioning him. He points out that Grote has rather left the *χηλή* out. And certainly his words (vii. 435) "Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge," and again, that the Etruscans "drove them away from the shore into the marsh," do not bring out the state of the case. But it is plain enough in Thirlwall (iii. 443);

"Gylippus . . . hastened with a body of troops to the water-side, where a high firm road ran between the sea and the Lysimelian marsh . . . He was encountered by the Tyrrhenians . . . dislodged from the causeway, and forced on the marsh."

Here again the guide of our youth is not "superseded."

NOTE XIX. p. 325.

THE ANSWER OF THE PROPHETS TO NIKIAS.

DID the prophets whom Nikias consulted about the eclipse of the moon bid him stay thrice nine days or only three days?

The account in Thucydides (vii. 50. 4) seems to imply that the prophets enjoined the longer period;

ὁ Νικίας . . . οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρὶν, ὥς οἱ μάντις ἐξηγούντο, τρίς ἑννέα ἡμέρας μέναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινήσῃ.

According to Plutarch (Nik. 23) the prophets said three days, but Nikias insisted on waiting during a whole revolution of the moon;

ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν περὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἐποιούντο φυλακὴν, ὥς Ἀντικλείδης διέγραφεν ἐν τοῖς ἐξηγητικοῖς. ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἄλλην ἔπεισε σελήνης ἀναμένειν περίοδον, ὥσπερ οὐκ εὐθὺς θεασάμενος αὐτὴν ἀποκαθαρθεῖσαν, ὅτε τὸν σκιερὸν τύπον καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀντιφραττόμενον παρῆλθε.

He had just before explained that, owing to the death of Stilbides, Nikias was badly off for prophets at this particular moment;

τῷ μὲντοι Νικίᾳ συνηνέχθη τότε μηδὲ μάντιν ἔχειν ἔμπειρον· ὁ γὰρ συνήθης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθῆκει μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν.

He adds that the interpretation given to the eclipse by such prophets as Nikias had was wrong;

ἐπεὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ὥς φησι Φιλόχορος, φεύγουσιν οὐκ ἦν πονηρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνν χρηστόν. ἐπικρύψεως γὰρ αἱ σὺν φόβῳ πράξεις δέονται, τὸ δὲ φῶς πολέμιόν ἐστιν αὐταῖς.

Diodōros (xiii. 12) mentions only the three days announced by the prophets, and the forced consent of Dēmōsthenēs to a stay seemingly of that length;

συνεκάλεσε τοὺς μάντις. τούτων δ' ἀποφνημαμένων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς

εἰδομένους τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναβάλλεσθαι τὸν ἐκπλουν, ἡραγκάσθησαν καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένην συγκαταθέσθαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐλάβειαν.

On these passages Grote (vii. 433) remarks ; "I follow the statement of Thucydides : there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed."

The case is not quite so clear as this. Whatever the statements of Plutarch and Diodōros are worth otherwise, they surely prove that three days was the received time to wait in such a case. Those writers both state that the prophets prescribed a stay of three days only. It may be that Stilbidēs would have prescribed three days only, but that his less learned successors prescribed twenty-seven. (This seems to be the view taken by Thirlwall, iii. 441, 442.) Plutarch and Diodōros may have inferred from the usual practice that the prophets did prescribe only three days, and Plutarch may have gone on to infer from the fact that the fleet stayed longer that Nikias himself enlarged the time. On the other hand, it may be that Plutarch and Diodōros are reporting a fuller statement of Philistos, and that Thucydides, knowing that the determination taken was to stay twenty-seven days, and that they did stay, though not twenty-seven days, yet more than three, may, in his more compressed narrative, have neglected to distinguish between the answer of the prophets and the final purpose of Nikias. Nor do I see anything grossly absurd in the suggestion that Nikias himself extended the term. If the inferior prophets, now the great master was gone, spoke somewhat hesitatingly and confusedly, it would be quite like him—*ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῇ τοιούτῃ προσκείμενος*—to determine to be on the safe side. And Dēmōsthenēs may well have been frightened too, *διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐλάβειαν*. We might perhaps add that the fault which is laid to the charge of these misleading prophets is not a wrong statement of days, but a failure to understand that to men in the position of the Athenian army the omen was a good one. This was one of the deeper mysteries of the science, in which they were more likely to go wrong than in an almost mechanical rubrical direction about staying three days.

I do not profess to rule the point, nor is it one of great moment. But it is clear, if only from his mention of the death of Stilbidēs and of the continued religious ceremonies of Nikias (c. 24, see pp. 325, 326), that Plutarch had before him some narrative fuller than that of Thucydides. And this can hardly fail to have been

the narrative of Philistos. That the Syracusan historian should be fuller than the Athenian on such a matter, even though it went on within the Athenian camp, is not very wonderful, if we consider the temperament of Thucydides. And it is plain that Plutarch had taken some special pains over this matter of the eclipse. It may be said that he got it all from Philochoros *περὶ μαντικῆς* (see Soudas in *Φιλόχορος*, and above, p. 690); but Plutarch did read Philistos; perhaps Philochoros did too.

As for Stilbidēs, one might not perhaps infer much about him from the text in Aristophanēs where his name is found (Peace, 1032);

ἡς χίσα γούν ἐνημένη τὸν Στιλβίδην πείζει,
καὶ τὴν τράπεζαν ὀσσομαι, καὶ παιδὸς οὐ δεήσει.

But the scholiasts have something to say about him. He was *εὐδόκιμος καὶ περιβόητος μάντις, τῶν τοὺς παλαιούς χρησμούς ἐξηγουμένων* [Cf. vol. ii. p. 86]. *ἀστειώτατα δὲ τοῦτο παρέπλεξε*. Another scholiast refers, like Plutarch, to Philochoros; *ὃν φησι Φιλόχορος ἀκολουθῆσαι ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ἥνικα ἐπολέμουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ εἰς Σικελίαν ἐστράτευσεν*. Eupolis also is quoted as mentioning Stilbidēs;

ὥς οὖν τίν' ἔλθω δῆτά σοι τῶν μάντεων;
πότερος ἀμείνων ἀμφοτέρων, ἢ Στιλβίδης;

On Nikias and his prophets Grote has more to say in vi. 389, where he compares Nikias' change of prophets to Lewis the Fourteenth's change of confessors.

One may be inclined to ask whether Plutarch has not exaggerated the scientific knowledge of the age of Nikias when he says (Plut. Nik. 23) that even *οἱ πολλοί* understood (*συνεφρόνουν*) that the eclipse of the sun was caused by the moon's shadow. Thucydides himself seems only feeling his way on the matter. In i. 23. 4 he places *ἡλίου ἐκλείψεις, αἱ πυκνότεραι παρὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρὶν χρόνου μνημονεύμενα ξυνέβησαν* among the physical phenomena of the time, along with *σεισμοί, αἰχμοί, λιμοί*, and the *λοιμώδης νόσος*. In ii. 28 he notes an eclipse of the sun *νοσηνία κατὰ σελήνην, ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίνεσθαι δυνατόν*. He notes another (iv. 52. 1), as also *κατὰ νοσηνίαν*, and adds *τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἱσταμένου ἔσεισε*. Plutarch himself (Pel. 31) mentions how the eclipse of the sun in Pelopidas' time frightened everybody (*ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ φάσμα συντεταραγμένους πάντας*); but he set out all the same with a volunteer company, *οὔτε τῶν μαντέων ἐόντων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων συμπροθυμουμένων πολιτῶν*. When we come to Diōn (Plut. Dion, 24), we shall see that he knew about

an eclipse of the moon and had a good prophet to explain it. Before Pydna (Liv. xlv. 37) Gaius Sulpicius foretold the coming eclipse to the Romans, but the Macedonians and their prophets were much frightened.

Polybios (ix. 19) seems to have thought that the utter destruction of the Athenians followed sooner on the eclipse than it did;

Νικίας, ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, δυνάμενος σώζειν τὸ περὶ τὰς Συρακούσας στράτευμα, καὶ λαβὼν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸν ἀρμόζοντα καιρὸν εἰς τὸ λαθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀποχωρήσας εἰς ἀσφαλές, κἄπειτα τῆς σελήνης ἐκλείψεως, δεισιδαιμονήσας, ὥς τι δεινὸν προσημαινούσης, ἐπίσχε τὴν ἀναζυγὴν. καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο συνέβη, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιούσαν αὐτοῦ νύκτα ποιησαμένου τὴν ἀναζυγὴν, προαισθημένων τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ὑποκρίτους γενέσθαι τοῖς Συρακουσίοις.

As his words seem to refer to a land-march, not to a voyage, Polybios must have thought that the eclipse happened on the night when the false message of Hermokratēs came to Nikias in Thucydides vii. 73, 74. The source of the mistake doubtless is that this time (c. 75) they really delayed till the third day.

NOTE XX. pp. 327, 340.

THE BATTLES IN THE GREAT HARBOUR.

IN what relation does the account given by Diodōros (xiii. 13) of the earlier battle in the Great Harbour in which Eurymedôn was killed stand to the account given by Thucydides (vii. 69) of the last and decisive battle? If we read Diodōros' account of the earlier battle along with that of Thucydides (vii. 51), our impression is that Diodōros, while contradicting the account in Thucydides in no important point, has preserved, doubtless from Philistos, some valuable details which Thucydides has left out. Diodōros' account is much the fuller of the two. Thucydides seems in a manner to keep back his energies for the great picture of the last battle. In this earlier fight Diodōros alone describes the whole disposition of the fleet on both sides. Thucydides, in recording the death of Eurymedôn (vii. 52. 2), mentions that he commanded the right wing. Diodōros describes the whole arrangement, as I have followed him in the text. It is the same as that given

by Thucydides (vii. 69, 70) for the last battle, with this difference that, whereas in the former battle Eurymedôn was present, while Dêmosthenês stayed on shore, in the last battle, Dêmosthenês takes the place of the slain Eurymedôn. In the first fight Dêmosthenês was needed on shore to oppose Gylippos. The place of the death of Eurymedôn in Thucydides, ἐν τῇ κόλῳ καὶ μυχῇ τοῦ λιμένος, is made clearer by Diodôros in the words πρὸς τὸν κόλπον τὸν Δάσκωνα μὲν καλούμενον ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατεχόμενον. This is surely no *scholion* on Thucydides, but a genuine bit of Philistos.

So too I see Philistos in the statement which I have followed in the text (see p. 345), where Diodôros (xiii. 15) makes Nikias give his last exhortation to the captains from a vessel in which he sails round to each ship; ἐπὶ τινα ναῦν ἀνέβη καὶ παρέπλει τὰς τριήρεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων. This is surely a contemporary touch; and it is just what a man would do in that extreme state of anxiety in which Thucydides describes Nikias. He makes the general exhortation on shore; then, when all are on board, he sails round to each ship for one more last word to each. This is far more emphatic than speaking to each severally on land. And, though Thucydides does not speak of the last exhortation as being given on the water, his words do not contradict it. When he says αὐθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει (vii. 69. 2) that may be just as well by water; while the words in 69. 3 ἀποχωρήσας ἤγε τὸν πεζὸν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν rather fall in with the account in Diodôros, whose own words are πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν τάξιν ἐπανήλθεν. There is no special force in ἀποχωρήσας if he stayed on land all the time. Even the words that follow, how the generals on board ship, ἄραυτες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐαυτῶν στρατοπέδου, εὐθὺς ἔπλεον, need not be a contradiction; Nikias could of course sail round while they were still quite close to the shore.

Again, in the description of the barrier across the mouth of the Great Harbour Diodôros helps us to some touches from the eyewitness.

First of all, Thucydides (vii. 59. 2, see Arnold's note) tells us that the Syracusans began the work at once (εὐθύς, see below, Note XXV) after their first victory; but he does not say how long the work took. It is from Diodôros (xiii. 14) that we get the three days. And Diodôros' account of the barrier is really clearer than that of Thucydides. The latter (59. 3) says only; ἔκληρον οὖν τὸν λιμένα . . . τριήρεσι πλαγαῖς καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἀκάτοις, ἐπ' ἀγκυρῶν ὀρμίζοντες. (I do not, with Grote, understand πλαγαῖς as meaning "in an

oblique direction.”) Later on (69. 4) he implies that there was a passage, when he says, *εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τὸ ζεύγμα τοῦ λιμένος καὶ τὸν παραλειφθέντα* [I need not dispute about the reading] *διέκπλουν, βουλόμενοι βιάσασθαι ἐς τὸ ἔξω*. In this latter place Thucydides uses the word *ζεύγμα*, which he did not bring in before, and which is foremost in Diodōros. Diodōros also brings out more clearly the nature of the *διέκπλους*. A passage was left between two masses of vessels at anchor, a passage guarded by bridges and chains. His words (xiii. 14) are;

ἐπιέφραττον τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος ζεύγμα κατασκευάζοντες. ἀκάντους τε γὰρ καὶ τρύραις ἐτι δὲ στοργγύλας ναῦς ἐπ’ ἀγκυρῶν ὀρμίσαντες, καὶ σιδηραῖς ἀλύσεσι διαλαμβάνοντες, ἐπὶ τὰ σκάφη γεφύρας ἐκ σανίδων κατεσκεύασαν.

But he does not bring out the attack on the barrier so clearly as Thucydides. That is, as ever, he is casual; he makes good use of his Philistos in one page and not in the next.

I have ventured, I know not whether rightly, to transfer the story of the boys, and specially of the lad Hērakleidēs and his uncle Pollichos (Plut. Nik. 24), from the former battle to the last. Grote (vii. 446) does the same as far as the general action of the boys is concerned; but he does not mention the particular story of Hērakleidēs. Of the action of the small boats we have heard already in a yet earlier fight (Thuc. vii. 40. 4); but there is nothing about the boys. Diodōros does not mention the particular story of Hērakleidēs in the former battle; but he speaks generally of the action of the boys in the last (xiii. 14);

συμπάρεϊποντό τε τὰς ὑπηρετικὰς ἔχοντες ναῦς παῖδες ἐλεύθεροι, τοῖς τε ἔτεσιν ὄντες ὑπὸ τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων ἡλικίαν καὶ συναγωνιζόμενοι μετὰ τῶν πατέρων.

I take the story of Hērakleidēs to be a particular case coming under this general head. It is certainly a genuine story, just what the Syracusan would record and the Athenian would pass by. But it seems more in place in the last battle than in the former. Plutarch tells the story almost as if it brought on the general action; the words *ναυμαχίας ἰσχυρᾶς γενομένης* immediately follow the account of Hērakleidēs. This it certainly could not really have done even in the first battle; still less did it bring about the great object of the second, the breaking down of the barrier. Yet it is more in place in the second. For the first

battle seems to have been won with a kind of general rush at the beginning, while, in the last battle, the incident of Hêracleidês, though it did not bring on the general action, was just the thing to bring on one of those particular actions which Thucydides speaks of as going on all over the harbour. And the action of the boys seems to fit on exactly with the general effort which marked the last battle. The small boats doubtless played their part in all the battles; in the enthusiasm of the last fight the boys went on board of them. And it is specially in character when (Plut. Nik. 24) the *παιδάρια* . . . *προσπλέοντα προύκαλειτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ προπηλάκιζεν*. The case is nearly the same in the great sea-fight with the Carthaginians in Diodôros xiv. 74. The boys and old men sail out, *τοῖς εὐτυχίμασι μετεωρίζόμενοι*.

The sacrifice to Hêraklês in Plutarch, Nik. 24 (see above, p. 689 and p. 342), and the signs given by the victims are just the things which Thucydides would leave out, but which Philistos would not fail to record. We have already seen that they completely fall in with Thucydides' account of the Athenians coming down from the higher ground. They also fall in with the fact which he casually records (vii. 73. 2), that the day of the last battle was a festival of Hêraklês.

A good many other touches are preserved by Diodôros and Plutarch which would naturally occur to the local writer but which the Athenian inquirer was not likely to think of. Thus in describing the attack on the barrier, Thucydides (vii. 70. 2) says;

ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προσέμισγον τῷ ζεύγματι, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες ἐκράτουν τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπειρῶντο λύειν τὰς κλήσεις.

The words of Diodôros (xiii. 15) are; *οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παιανίσαντες ἔπλεον, καὶ φθάσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους διέλυσαν τὸ ζεύγμα*. Philistos had heard the psæan; and the word *φθάσαντες* doubtless refers to the warning preserved by Plutarch about the letting the invaders strike the first blow. Thus each of our compilers keeps something of the lost treasure.

Again, the presence of the spectators on the walls and high places of Syracuse would have no interest whatever for Thucydides, whose thoughts were drawn to the feelings of the two armies on the shore. But the introduction of the parents, wives,

and children is no common-place flourish of Diodōros. It was a main difference between the position of the defenders and that of the invaders, and Philistos would be sure to enlarge on it. The first passage above all (xiii. 14, see p. 354) brings out a piece of topographical accuracy from the local writer;

τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχη καὶ πᾶς ὁ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερκείμενος τόπος ἔγμε σωμάτων. γυναῖκες τε γὰρ καὶ παρθέναι καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ χρεῖαν παρέχασθαι μὴ δυνάμενοι, τοῦ παντὸς πολέμου τὴν κρίσιν λαμβάνοντες, μετὰ πολλῆς ἀγωνίας ἐπεθεώρουν τὴν μάχην.

So again at the end of c. 15;

οἱ δὲ Συρακοῖοι θεατὰς τῶν ἀγώνων ἔχοντες γυνεῖς καὶ παῖδας, ἐφιλοτιμούντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐκάστου βουλομένου δι' αὐτοῦ τὴν νίκην περιγενέσθαι τῇ πατρίδι.

And lastly in c. 16;

οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν τευχῶν, ὅτε μὲν ἴδοιεν τοὺς ἰδίους εὐημεροῦντας, ἐπαιάνιζον, ὅτε δ' ἐλαττωμένους, ἔστενον καὶ μετὰ δακρύων τοῖς θεοῖς προσήνυχοντο. ἐνίοτε γὰρ, εἰ τύχοι τῶν Συρακοσίων τρήρων παρὰ τὰ τεῖχη διαφθείρεσθαι τινας συνέβαινε, καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν συγγενῶν ἀναιρεῖσθαι, καὶ θεωρεῖν γυνεῖς μὲν τέκνων ἀπώλειαν, ἀδελφὰς δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀδελφῶν οἰκτρὰν καταστροφὴν.

The word *θεωρεῖν* and others like it, I suppose suggested to Grote (vii. 447, 450, 451), as they did to me also (see p. 352), the thought of the amphitheatre.

We may notice that the iron hands which Thucydides mentions before the battle (c. 62. 3; 65. 2), though only in an incidental way in the speeches, are not mentioned by him in describing the battle itself. Diodōros on the other hand (see note 1 in p. 351) does not speak of them before—that is, he copied his Philistos rather casually—but he does speak of them in the battle itself, and thereby makes the account of Thucydides clearer.

It is Plutarch (Nik. 25) who notices the differences between the stones used by the Syracusans, according, he says, to the teaching of Aristōn, and the arrows and javelins used on the Athenian side (see p. 351, and Thirlwall, iii. 449);

βαλλόμενοι λίθοις ὁμοίαν ἔχουσι τὴν πληγὴν πανταχόθεν ἀντίβαλλον ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασιν, ὃν ὁ σάλος τὴν εὐθυβολίαν διέστρεφεν, ὥστε μὴ πάντα κατ' αἰχμὴν προσφέρεισθαι.

This is exactly what the Syracusan general foretells in Thuc. vii. 67. 3, but which Thucydides does not mention in the narrative.

Here we may be thankful that Philistos was read at Chairōneia as well as at Aggium.

In the very last stage of all, when the flying Athenians are getting to land, we find our best possible illustration of the way in which Diodōros used his two main authorities. He has just mentioned that it was the Athenian ships nearest to the walls of Syracuse which were the first to give way (see p. 355), a fact which Thucydides does not mention, and which Philistos was more likely to notice. Then the last scene is thus described by Thucydides (vii. 71. 5, 6);

οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι . . . ἔτρεψάν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἐπικείμενοι λαμπρῶς, πολλῇ κραυγῇ καὶ διακελευσμῇ χρώμενοι, κατεδίωκον ἐς τὴν γῆν. τότε δὲ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς, ἄλλος ἄλλῃ, ὅσοι μὴ μετέωροι ἐάλωσαν, κατενεχθέντες ἐξέπεσον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.

Diodōros (xiii. 17) tells it thus;

οἱ μὲν οὖν Συρακόσιοι μετὰ πολλῆς κραυγῆς κατεδίωκον τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν· τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ὅσοι μὴ μετέωροι διεφθάρησαν, ἐπεὶ πρὸς τὰ βράχη προσηνέχθησαν, ἐκπηδῶντες ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ἀπολομένων εἰς τὸ πεζὸν στρατόπεδον ἔφειυγον.

Here we have several of the actual phrases of Thucydides; but we have also, just as before, phrases and facts which do not contradict but fill up his narrative. The bit about the βράχη clearly comes from a local hand.

About the numbers too of the ships engaged and lost Diodōros is more precise than Thucydides. In vii. 70. 1 Thucydides says that the Syracusan ships were *παραπλησίου τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρότερον*. That is, their number was somewhere about seventy-six, the number in the former battle (vii. 52. 1). Diodōros (xiii. 14) gives the exact number as seventy-four. Thucydides first (vii. 60. 1) speaks on the Athenian side of *τὰς ναῦς ἀπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἀπλοώτεραι*, and then (60. 3) gives the number as *δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν*. Diodōros (xiii. 14) makes them 115 (*πέντε λειπούσας τῶν ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι*). Plutarch (Nik. 24) makes them 110, adding, *αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ταρσῶν ἐνδεεῖς ἦσαν*. After the battle, Thucydides (vii. 72. 3) reckons *ὡς ἐξήκοντα* to the Athenians and *ἐλάσσους ἢ πεντήκοντα* to the Syracusans. Diodōros (xiii. 17) says that the Athenians had lost sixty ships, while the Syracusans had *ὀκτὼ μὲν τελείως διεφθαρμένας, ἑκαίδεκα δὲ συντετριμμένας*. That would give the survivors as fifty-five Athenian and fifty Syracusan. This is not exactly *ἐλάσσους ἢ πεντήκοντα*, but it is not far off, and the

Syracusans would know the number of their own ships better than the Athenians. Thucydides set down in a general way what he heard from eye-witnesses; Philistos took down the exact figures of his own side at the time, and Diodōros copied them. For mere copying he is more trustworthy than Plutarch, though not for understanding a story.

NOTE XXI. p. 360.

THE CORRESPONDENTS OF NIKIAS IN SYRACUSE.

WE have seen, at various times during the war before Syracuse, that there was a party within the walls which kept up communications with the invading general which, in any Syracusan citizen, must be looked on as the blackest treason. Such treason however is not uncommon in the history of the Greek, and specially of the Sikeliot commonwealths, and in the case of these last it often takes a shape in which its blackness is a good deal lessened (see p. 42). A party in a town might have dealings with the immediate enemy, if sometimes in narrower, yet sometimes in wider, interests than those of a single city. But at Syracuse we are emphatically told (Thuc. vi. 20. 2; vii. 56. 1, see pp. 99, 331) that the Athenians had nothing to hope for from divisions in the city, such as they had profited by in the elder Megara and elsewhere. Yet there is a party in Syracuse in correspondence with Nikias, and, from the way in which Thucydides speaks of it, one

—¹ take it for a Syracusan party. There were (Thuc. vi. 64. 1, see p. 1. . . Syracusan exiles acting on the Athenian side; but those whom we have now to deal with are within the city. In vii. 48. 2 (see p. 322) we hear of them as *τι καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ πράγματα ἐνδοῦναι* (cf. p. 229), and soon after (49. 1) how *ἦν αὐτόθι που* [in Syracuse] *τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα*. It is to be noticed that in the former passage he merely states the fact how their party *ἐπικηρυκεύετο ὡς αὐτὸν [Νικίαν] καὶ οὐκ εἶα ἀπαίστασθαι*, while in c. 49. 1 he seems to guarantee the truth of this report;

Νικίας . . . ἰσχυρίζετο, αἰσθόμενος τὰ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ἀκριβῶς καὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἦν αὐτόθι που τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἐπικηρυκεύομενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ἀπαίστασθαι.

At the present stage (vii. 73. 3) they are *τινες τῇ Νικίᾳ διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν*. And Hermokratês knows that there are such, perhaps knows who they are. We hear of them again in 86. 4 distinctly as *Συρακοσίων τινές*, but with the qualification *ὡς ἔλεγτο*. Here they urge the death of the Athenian generals lest their communications with them should be found out. It is certainly hard to see what Syracusan party could have had an interest in treason.

Of the writers who may be following Philistos, Plutarch (Nik. 21) speaks of the correspondence of Nikias in Syracuse as counselling him to stay before Dêmosthenês' attack on Epipolai, a piece of advice which seems moved backward from the time just after;

ἦσαν ἄνδρες οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ἐν Συρακούσαις διαλεγόμενοι τῇ Νικίᾳ κρύφα καὶ μένειν κελεύοντες.

In describing the trick of Hermokratês, he says (c. 26);

Ἑρμοκράτης αὐτὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ συνθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸν Νικίαν ἀπάτην ἔπεμψε τινας τῶν ἑταίρων πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀπ' ἐκείνων μὲν ἤκειν φάσκοντας, οἱ καὶ πρότερον εἰώθεσαν κρύφα τῇ Νικίᾳ διαλέγεσθαι.

Polyainos (i. 43. 2) tells the story thus;

Ἑρμοκράτης . . . αὐτόμολον πέμπει φράσσοντα πρὸς Νικίαν, ὡς μέχρι νῦν πάντα σοὶ μηνύοντες φίλοι προσαγορεύουσιν, ἣν ἀποκινήσης νύκτωρ, ἐνέδρας ἐμπίπτεις καὶ λόχοις.

Diodôros (xiii. 18) has a much more important suggestion, which must at least be carefully weighed. According to him, the informants of Nikias, at any rate at this last stage, were Leontines; *Ἑρμοκράτης . . . ἀπέστείλε τινας τῶν ἱππέων ἐπὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοὺς ἐροῦντας, κ.τ.λ.* Then *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες τῶν Λεοντίνων τινὰς εἶναι τοὺς δι' εὐνοίαν ἀπηγγελκότας, κ.τ.λ.*

There is every chance that this is a genuine bit of Philistos; no later writer would be likely to think of Leontines. As such it must prove something. But it does not seem quite certain that it proves everything. It stands by itself, not like the corresponding passage of Thucydides, which is connected with other notices before and after. We know not what Philistos said at the other points where Thucydides mentioned the action of Nikias' correspondents within the city. Whoever these were, Thucydides looked upon them as Syracusans, and it was from them that, in his version, Nikias believed the message to come. This looks for once like a contradiction between Thucydides and Philistos. If it be so, Philistos is clearly the best authority for what went on in Syracuse, and Thucydides for what was thought in the Athenian camp.

Yet it is quite possible that the Athenians might take the false informants for Leontines rather than for the Syracusan partisans of whom Thucydides speaks. It does not seem likely that there would be any Leontines favourable to Athens within the walls of Syracuse. The Athenian party among those Leontines who were removed to Syracuse had left Syracuse long ago (see p. 70). On the other hand, if any stray Leontines still held out at Phokaiai and Brikinniai, they would certainly be watching the course of things, and they might be in the habit of bringing information to the Athenians. And, as the Athenians were expected at Katanê and did not come (see p. 340), those who dwelled between Syracuse and Katanê would be likely to be anxious just at this moment. Anyhow the seeming contradiction between Philistos and Thucydides, perhaps the only one, is to be noticed.

Grote (vii. 428) accepts the statement of Diodôros so far as to think that "the party in Syracuse which corresponded with Nikias . . . consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the Syracusan citizenship." So Holm, ii. 62. Thucydides might without inaccuracy speak of such men as Syracusans; but one doubts whether they would be favourable to Athens, and the words of Diodôros sound more like Leontines elsewhere. What we want is the text of Philistos in the other places where the correspondents of Nikias are mentioned.

NOTE XXII. p. 365.

THE RETREAT OF THE ATHENIANS.

As to the details of the Athenian retreat I find myself, after a careful examination of nearly the whole of the ground, in substantial agreement with the views of Holm set forth in the *Geschichte Siciliens* and in the *Topografia di Siracusa*. The only difference of any moment is as to the object with which the Athenians made the first part of their march, the attempt on the Akraian cliff of which the modern town of Floridia was the centre. I still hold that they were aiming to get to Katanê, though certainly by a very roundabout road. Holm holds, followed by Lupus, that they had by that time given up all thoughts of getting to Katanê. But I see no material difference between us as to

anything that was certainly done. So as to the unfulfilled purposes of Nikias and Dēmosthenēs we may perhaps agree to differ.

I hold that, as long as the Athenians were striving to reach the Akraian cliff, they were still hoping to get to Katanē. Their hope before the last fight in the Great Harbour was to get thither by sea (Thuc. vii. 60. 2, *ἢ μὲν νικῶσιν, ἐς Κατάνη κομίσσεται*); their defeat made that impossible. The notion of going thither by any comparatively direct way, say round the point of Belvedere, became hopeless when they first heard (falsely) that the roads were blocked. The Syracusans would block that road before all others. But this does not at all shut out the belief that, when they made their first attempt to get up to the Sikel hills, it was with the notion of fetching a long compass, and coming down on Katanē by any path that they could find far away from Syracuse. When they could not force their way to the cliff and could not find any other road in the neighbourhood, when they tried to reach the Sikel heights further to the south, Katanē ceased to be an immediate object. They would doubtless hope to get there, as they hoped to get to Athens, some time or other, by some means or other. But they were no longer directly aiming at Katanē, even by the most roundabout road. They wished to find any safe place that they could, where they might rest and think over the chances of ever getting to Athens, whether by Katanē, Messana, or any other course. Still even at the last Katanē was not wholly forgotten. We must not forget the horsemen who escaped thither even from the slaughter at the Assinaros (see p. 399).

Diodōros is very short and most likely confused. It was just like him to raise himself above his level for the last scene in the Great Harbour, and then to fall below his level for what came next. He describes the first part of the march as a march to Katanē (*προήεσαν ἐπὶ Κατάνης*, xiii. 18). Then the army changed its course, because the Syracusans, by blocking the roads, *ἀπείργον εὐθυπορεῖν πρὸς τὴν σύμμαχον Κατάνην* (ib. 19). They now took to the Helorine road, *παλιωδίαν καταναγκάσαντες [οἱ Συρακόσιοι] ποιήσασθαι διὰ τοῦ Ἑλωρίου πεδίου*. The first form of words would be true, according to my notions; the word *εὐθυπορεῖν* is in any case quite out of place. It shows that Diodōros was writing carelessly. Holm (G. S. ii. 62, 399; Topografia, 227; Lupus, 147) takes the words *προήεσαν ἐπὶ Κατάνης* to come from a misunderstanding of the words of Thucydides, vii. 80. 2; and he holds that all thought of Katanē is shut

out by his words in c. 60. 2. In this last place, after the words already quoted, *ἦν μὲν νικῶσιν, εἰς Κατάνην κομίζεσθαι*, Thucydides adds ;

ἦν δὲ μὴ, ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς, περὶ ξυνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν, ἢ ἂν τάχιστα μέλλωσι τινος χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φιλίου ἀντιλήψεσθαι.

In the other place (80. 1, 2), after the failure of the attack on the cliff (see p. 376), Nikias and Dēmosthenēs determine

ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν, μηκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἢ διενόηθσαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἢ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτήρουν, πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν. ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῇ στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας, τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ πόλεις καὶ Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους.

The former of these passages, taken alone, would most naturally imply that all notion of going to Katanē was given up at that stage. But the former passage must be interpreted by the second. Holm maintains with some emphasis that in that passage *ἡ ξυμπᾶσα ὁδὸς αὕτη* means the whole retreat from the moment of leaving the encampment, taking in the attempt on the cliff as well as the march along the Helorine road. But, if this be the meaning, the remark is surely brought in somewhat needlessly and in a rather unnatural way. It has much more force if we take the description of *ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη* as explaining what has just gone before about *πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν*. At this stage they wholly changed their road. Thucydides says that the road which they now took was no longer towards Katanē, but in the direction of Kamarina and Gela. The most natural meaning of this surely is that their earlier object, *ἡ αὐτὴ ὁδὸς ἢ διενόηθσαν*, had been Katanē, by however roundabout a road Katanē might have to be reached. That was the road which the Syracusans had specially blocked. They now take an opposite road, which they hope not to find blocked. They no longer seek to go towards Katanē—*ἐπὶ Κατάνης*—as the object of the march. They go instead, not towards Kamarina or Gela in the same sense in which they had been going towards Katanē, but generally in the direction of Kamarina and Gela, *τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν κ.τ.λ.*

With this view, we can understand the former passage (vii. 60. 2). They no longer hoped to go straight to Katanē (*κομίζεσθαι εἰς Κατάνην*) either by land or sea. The immediate object (*ἢ ἂν τάχιστα μέλλωσι*) was to find some place of immediate shelter. But this

does not imply that Katané was not still their ultimate object, and the second passage seems to me to imply it. That passage has the force of a correction or further explanation.

Grote (vii. 466) understands the matter as I do. "They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akraean cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable."

After all, the matter is not of any great moment, as it is merely a question of an unfulfilled purpose.

I have not actually seen the Ἀκραίων λέπας. On February 8, 1889, I toiled a long way up the *Cava Spampinato*, quite far enough to see what it was like; but human nature failed before I reached the cliff itself. There is a view of it in the *Topografia*, p. 232, and in *Lupus*, p. 37. I believe I have gone over every step of the retreat, except this and the path, which must be conjectural, by which the Athenians came down into the Helorine road. My general view is quite the same as Holm's, though one or two smaller points may be spoken of. Thus *Lupus* (*Stadt Syrakus*, 150) sees a difficulty in the words of Thucydides (vii. 78. 4) describing the halting-place of the Athenians on the second night; κατέβησαν εἰς χωρίον ἀπεδόν τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπέδευσαν. He stumbles at the word κατέβησαν, and suspects either a false reading or a mistake of Thucydides himself. He says, with perfect truth, that the road to Floridia on the whole rises, and that the level ground about Floridia is not lower than the road but higher. But there is the rough ground which I speak of in the text (p. 375), just below Floridia, which is in fact one end of the *Cava Spampinato*. It struck me at once when I saw it that this was the χωρίον ἀπεδόν to which the Athenians κατέβησαν. The description seemed exactly to suit the spot.

In Thucydides vii. 80. 4, I understand the words ἀφικνούνται ὁμῶς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, κ.τ.λ. of the division of Nikias only. It is that division which Thucydides has in his mind at that stage; of the division of Dêmosthenês he speaks in the next chapter. I hold therefore that Dêmosthenês did not cross the Kakyparis. If the words of this chapter are taken as implying that he did, they must imply also that he reached the Erineos also, which would contradict the whole story. Nikias then got into the Helorine road at

day-break on the sixth day. It is not accurate to speak of his reaching the sea or the coast, as is done even by Grote (vii. 466, 467, where for *πρός* he reads *ἐς*). The words *πρός τὴν θάλασσαν* simply point to the Helorine road as running not far from the sea, and nearly parallel to it, in opposition to the inland march to the Akraian cliff. The great modern road along this line does at this stage represent the Helorine road in a general way; sometimes it actually coincides with it, sometimes not. Further on, the new road altogether leaves the line of the old, in order to reach the modern town of Noto; but the old road can still be traced to Helóron. At the particular point of crossing the Kakyparis, the old road is still in being, and crosses the stream by a ford. The new road crosses it by a bridge a little lower down, and the still newer railway blocks up the mouth of the combe by a huge viaduct. The words of Thucydides imply that Nikias reached the Helorine road at a point some way north of the Kakyparis; but they do not enable us to fix the exact distance;

ἰσθάντες ἐς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ἐλωρινὴν καλουμένην ἐπορεύοντο, ὅπως, ἐπειδὴ γένοιτο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Κακυπάρει, παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἴωεν ἄνω τῆς μεσογείας. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ, εὗρον, κ.τ.λ.

One can hardly say, with Grote (vii. 466), that they designed to cross the river and march up the right bank. Such phrases are out of place in these mountain gorges. Here in this of Cassibile, as the stream flows now, a march up the combe would sometimes be on one side, sometimes on another, sometimes on island ground between two branches. It is very likely that in the September of B.C. 413, the bed of the river was much fuller than it was in the March of A.D. 1889; still one cannot be sure about right and left.

By the Kakyparis two questions arise. Who were the Sikels whom Nikias expected to meet there? Who were the Syracusans whom he actually did meet? Of the former the words are (vii. 80. 4, filling the blank in the last quotation); *ἤλαψον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Σικελούς ταύτῃ οὗς μετέπεμψαν, ἀπαγγέσθαι*. Holm (Topografia, 228; Lupus, 148) understands this of the message spoken of in c. 77. 6 (*προπέμπεται ὡς αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἀπαντᾶν εἰρημένον*), and he further uses this as an argument to show that, when the Athenians first started on the retreat, they had no thought of going to Katanê. But the word *μετέπεμψαν* sounds like a newer message. And it seems likely that the partial change of plan on the fifth day's march

(see p. 377), when the attempt on the Akraian cliff was given up and the search for some other road began, may have led to sending new messages to the Sikel allies. There was a chance that the Athenians might be driven to the course which they actually took; and it would be only prudent to have friends ready at the Kakyparis. The same partial change of plan would also be noticed by Gylippos and Hermokratês, and they also would make ready in their way for the same chance. They might either send on a detachment of their own, or perhaps send word to the levies of Neaiton and Helôron to be ready there. It is hardly likely that a Syracusan force had been waiting by the Kakyparis all these days. We must always remember that the Helorine way was commanded, for a great part of its extent, by the Syracusan fortress at the Olympieion.

As for the rivers on the line of march, I have taken for granted, as every one else seems to do, that the Kakyparis is the modern Cassibile. The present name is most likely a corruption of the old one. And I have as little doubt that the Assinaros is the Falconara or *Fiumara di Noto*. (On this head see Holm, G. S. ii. 401; Topografia, 236; Lupus, 167, 168, where he argues against the belief of Leake and others that the Assinaros is the Tellaro, founded partly on the existence of the monument spoken of in p. 401.) The Falconara is marked *Assinaro* on the Italian ordnance map, but this is only like talking about Oreto and Simeto (see vol. i. p. 83). The name is certainly not in common use, and its employment on the map—unless in a different type as the obsolete name—is likely to lead to confusion. Still we are pretty sure as to the position of the first and third of the three rivers spoken of in Thucydides' narrative of the last stage of the Athenian march. But to fix the position of the stream which is spoken of between them, namely the Erineos, is by no means equally easy. Thucydides gives no account of the stream itself which would enable us to fix it to one point more than another. Some things might make us fix it nearer to the Kakyparis and some nearer to the Assinaros. That is, the last day's march before the final destruction at the Assinaros may be conceived as longer or shorter.

The words of Thucydides in vii. 80. 5 and 82. 4 might suggest that the Erineos was only a short distance from the Kakyparis. The first passage says; βιασάμενοι αὐτὴν [τὴν φυλακὴν] διέβησάν τε τὸν

ποταμὸν καὶ ἐχάρουν εὐθὺς πρὸς ἄλλον ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν· ταύτῃ γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐκέλευον. The second runs thus; ἀφικνούνται ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ [the sixth day of the retreat, the day of the surrender of Dēmosthenēs] ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν, καὶ διαβὰς πρὸς μετέωρον τι καθίσει τὴν στρατίαν. At all events the ford of the Erineos was not defended. It might be argued that a single Syracusan detachment had the charge of defending both the neighbouring rivers, and that after it had been scattered at the Kakyparis, it had not formed again to defend the Erineos. Again, when Nikias encamped for the night by the Erineos, he did not yet know of the surrender of Dēmosthenēs. He might therefore not wish to be too far ahead of him; he might think it well to wait till the second division came up. He might wish to concert some plan of action with his colleague, whether by still attempting the combe of the Kakyparis or in any other way. These considerations might point to a stream to the north of Avola, marked on the maps as Elanici, as being the Erineos. The name sounds like a possible corruption of Erineos, as Cassibile of Kakyparis. Like several of the streams along this line, its bed is very narrow, and altogether waterless in the dry season; but at the time of year of the Athenian march, and after the rain which had lately fallen (see p. 377), it may well have been a rushing torrent. The same may be said of the Mamaledi and the Cavallata. The Kakyparis, on the other hand, and the Assinaros seem to have some flow of water at all times, and they enter the sea by mouths of considerable breadth.

On the other hand, the words in c. 84. 1, 2, when the Athenians set forth on the last day of the march from their post by the Erineos, might be understood as showing that the distance from there to the Assinaros was but short. Νικίας . . . ἤγε τὴν στρατίαν . . . οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἡπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμὸν, κ.τ.λ. And the raging thirst which forms the chief feature in the description tends to show that the Assinaros was the first water that the army came to after leaving the post by the Erineos. If the Elanici is the Erineos, both the Mamaledi and the Cavallata would have to be passed. Neither of them is likely to have been dry; but the Mamaledi at least, a very small stream in a narrow gorge, would not be so well suited for giving drink to a whole army as the wide bed of the Assinaros. The extreme thirst of the army might be thought to imply a longer march than that from any point near the Erineos to the Assinaros. But the hill itself

may very likely have been waterless; anyhow they could have got no water from the Erineos after the morning of the seventh day.

The statement about the *μετέωρον* *τι* on which the sixth and seventh nights were passed does not greatly affect the question either way. There are plenty of points of rising ground along the whole way, the last off-shoots of the mountains into which the Athenians wished to make their way, any of which might serve such a purpose.

On the whole, it is perhaps safer not to be very positive as to the middle stream of the three mentioned by Thucydides. The Kakyparis and the Assinaros are clearly made out; and, not only are the streams made out, but the course of the Helorine road gives us the exact points of the crossing of the Kakyparis and of the final destruction of the army in the Assinaros. As to the stream between the two, the Erineos, the evidence is less distinct. I incline to the Cavallata; but I cannot be so sure of it as Holm seems to be.

It was held by Thirlwall (iii. 455) and Arnold (iii. 422) that the division of Dêmosthenês crossed the Kakyparis, and that his surrender took place between the Kakyparis and the Erineos. Grote (vii. 467) argued that the surrender happened north of the Kakyparis, and Holm was of the same mind in the *Geschichte Siciliens* (ii. 65), as is Mr. Jowett (ii. 456). But in his later work (*Topografia*, 235; *Lupus*, 156) Holm retracts this view, and falls back on the earlier belief, because he holds that the distances should be measured by a shorter stadium than usual, one of 150 French metres only. (See *Topografia*, 27; *Lupus*, 24.) I do not see the force of this, and whatever measure we reckon by, we cannot be very certain. When the division of Nikias reached the Helorine road at daybreak of the sixth day, he was greatly in advance of Dêmosthenês (*προέλαβε πολλῶν*, vii. 80. 3). When the Syracusans overtook Dêmosthenês *περὶ ἀρίστον ὥραν* on the same day (vii. 81. 1), he was fifty stadia in advance (Ib. 3); but from the whole story of the day's work (c. 82. 4) we should not infer that he had yet reached the Erineos, but rather that he was somewhere between Kakyparis and that stream. Holm's fifty stadia would be about four miles and a half, instead of a little over six miles. If the Erineos be the

Cavallata, that is about the distance between it and the Kakyparis, so that the place of surrender would still be north of Kakyparis. Indeed, reading the 81st chapter in the belief that ἀφικνούνται in the 80th chapter refers to the division of Nikias only, I had always fancied that Dêmosthenês was overtaken before he had reached the Helorine road. I do not think that we can fix the exact site.

It is from Thucydides that we get the description of the place where Dêmosthenês struck his last blow (see p. 385). It is from Plutarch (Nik. 27) that we get the name of it as ἡ Πολυζήλειος ἀλλή. This again is one of the little points which the Syracusan would notice, but which would have no interest for the Athenian. Plutarch also preserves the fact that Dêmosthenês tried to kill himself, which is also preserved by Pausanias, with a direct reference to Philistos (see p. 388). Thucydides simply leaves out the fact. It is curious to see how Justin (iv. 5. 10) jumbles up this genuine bit of Philistos with the tale of Timaios, to which we shall presently come, about both Nikias and Dêmosthenês killing themselves in prison. Nikias submits to captivity (cf. p. 397); Dêmosthenês avoids it by self-slaughter.

“Demosthenes, *amisso exercitu*, a captivitate gladio et voluntaria morte se vindicat. Nicias autem ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo ut sibi consuleret admonitus, cladem suorum auxit de decore captivitatis.”

If there is any place where I should be tempted to suspect Plutarch either of indulging his own fancy or of following Timaios and not Philistos, it is where Nikias surrenders himself to Gyliппos without terms, but prays for mercy to his soldiers. Thucydides (vii. 85. 1) says simply;

Νικίας Γυλίππῳ ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι, πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν χρησθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ὃ τι βούλονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους στρατιώτας παύσασθαι φονεύοντας.

In Plutarch (Nik. 27) this grows into a little speech, with pleadings and motives, and we hear of a suppliant gesture on the part of Nikias;

Νικίας Γυλίππῳ προσπεσὼν εἶπεν, “Ἐλεος ὑμᾶς, ὦ Γυλίππε, λαβέτω πικρῶντας, ἐμοῦ μὲν μηδεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τηλικαύταις ἀνυχίαις ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν ἔσχω, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων, ἐννοηθέντας ὅτι κοινὰ μὲν αἱ τύχαι τοῦ πολέμου, μετρίως δ’ αὐταῖς καὶ πρῶτος ἐχρήσαντο ἐν οἷς εὐτύχουν Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

There is nothing here that would be the least out of place if Nikias had been, like the Plataians, pleading for himself or his soldiers before a Spartan court-martial. Only we know the fondness of even the best historians for bringing in speeches, and one doubts whether Nikias, clasping the knees of Gylippos—that one may believe—would say more than a very few impassioned words. Even Philistos might yield to the temptation of expanding them a little. If one could only fancy time for talking at all, the arguments are sound enough, and appropriate in the mouth of Nikias. The reference to his former good luck is what we have often heard before (see p. 233); and the claims of Athens, that is really of Nikias himself, as also the motives which Plutarch assigns to Gylippos for yielding to the prayer of Nikias, all fall in with what Thucydides himself says a little later. Plutarch goes on to say;

τοιαῦτα τοῦ Νικίου λέγοντος, ἔπαθε μὲν τι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ὁ Γυλίππος· ἦδει γὰρ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους εὖ πεπονητάς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τὰς γενομένας διαλύσεις· μέγα δ' ἤγειτο πρὸς δόξαν, εἰ ζῶντας ἀπαγάγοι τοὺς ἀντιστρατήγους.

This last word Plutarch most likely got from Thucydides, vii. 86. 2, 3;

ὁ γὰρ Γυλίππος καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἐνόμζεν οἱ εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοὺς ἀντιστρατήγους κομίσαι Λακεδαιμονίους· ξυνέβαινε δὲ τὸν μὲν πολεμώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένην, διὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ Πύλῳ, τὸν δὲ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύτατον. τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικίας προὔθυμήθη, σπονδὰς πέρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι. ἀνθ' ὧν οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἦσαν αὐτῷ προσφιλεῖς, κάκεῖνος οὐχ ἥκιστα πιστεύσας ἑαυτὸν τῷ Γυλίπῳ παρέδωκεν.

In short, Plutarch, writing with both Thucydides and Philistos before him, describes the workings of the minds of Nikias and of Gylippos as we know that one of his authorities did before him, and as most likely both did. The only question is whether either Philistos or Plutarch did not improve the story a little bit, by throwing a few words of agony into the form of a speech, though a short one.

Diodōros (xiii. 85) is at his worst at this stage. He jumbles the fate of the two divisions together; but we have to thank him for one phrase which is clearly from Philistos, that of τὸ Ἐλῶριον πεδῖον. He wakes up a little when he gets to the trophies (see

p. 400). After going through all these statements of different writers, one is a little surprised at some late reflexions (Jowett, ii. 458) on some of them. "But such witnesses (*with the single exception of Philistus*, if he is rightly cited) are not worth adducing either in opposition to the authority of Thucydides or in support of him." Who ever thought that the secondary authorities were "witnesses" to anything, except so far as they preserve to us some scraps of contemporary writers? (Cf. Grote, vii. 446.)

Anyhow one cannot put Polyainos under that head, when he tells us (i. 39. 4) an absurd story, in which we see a grotesque version of what went on the hill by the Erineos. Nikias, caught up by the enemy, sends a herald offering to submit to any terms (*φάσκων πάντα ποιήσειν τὰ προστατόμενα*), and asking for an envoy to be sent to take and receive the needful oaths. Gylippos is taken in; he stops the pursuit and encamps; meanwhile Nikias occupies a stronger position, and goes on with the war (*τῶν ὀχυρωτέρων λαβόμενος, πάλιν ἐπολέμει, τὴν ἀποχώρησιν τῇ διὰ τοῦ κήρυκος ἀπάτη στρατηγήσας*).

This is truly the "fiction of a later writer." Yet, we have sometimes found even Polyainos preserve for us some shreds of very good cloth.

NOTE XXIII. p. 404.

THE FATE OF NIKIAS AND DĒMOSTHENĒS.

THE witness of Thucydides (vii. 86. 2) is express that Nikias and Dēmosthenēs were put to death by the Syracusans and their allies, in opposition to the wish of Gylippos. He tells the story in very few words;

τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὁπόσους ἔλαβον, κατεβίβασαν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας, ἀσφαλεστάτην εἶναι νομίσαντες τὴν τήρησιν. Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένην ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν.

He goes on to explain the motives of Gylippos, and then describes the fate of the prisoners in the quarries more at large.

Philistos, as we learn from Plutarch (Nik. 28), gave the same account. But he tells us also that Timaios had another story, which made them die by their own hands in prison. This was through the intervention of Hermokratēs, who sent them the

means of so doing before the assembly which decided their fate had broken up;

Δημοσθένην δὲ καὶ Νικίαν ἀποθανεῖν Τίμαιος οὐ φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακουσίων καταλευσθέντας [al. κελευσθέντας], ὡς Φίλιστος ἔγραψε καὶ Θουκυδίδης, ἀλλ' Ἑρμοκράτους πέμψαντος, ἔτι τῆς ἐκκλησίας συνεστώσης, καὶ δι' ἐνὸς τῶν φυλάκων παρέντων, αὐτοὺς δι' αὐτῶν ἀποθανεῖν.

The latter part is not perfectly clear, and there is an important doubt as to the reading, to which we shall presently come. But Plutarch distinctly says that Philistos agreed with Thucydides, and that the story of their dying by their own hand came only from Timaios, and contradicted the report of the two contemporaries.

Diodōros (xiii. 33) has no alternative story, and quotes nobody. He records a debate in the assembly to which we shall come presently, and says; οἱ μὲν στρατηγοὶ παραχρῆμα ἀνηρέθησαν. He adds, καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, an addition so strange that one is tempted to fancy that something must have dropped out of the text.

Now what Thucydides and Philistos agree in reporting cannot be gainsayed, and Plutarch is surely quite right in saying that Timaios' story contradicts theirs. So thought Thirlwall (iii. 459) and Holm (G. S. ii. 68). One is surprised to find Grote (vii. 478) thinking that the two may be reconciled; οἱ Συρακούσιοι . . . ἔσφαξαν would be a very strange way of speaking, even if it meant, which Timaios seemingly did not mean, that the Syracusans, as a commonwealth, allowed them to put themselves to death. I have no doubt that they died by the hand of the executioner. It strikes me that the story of the generals dying in prison by their own hands arose out of the attempt of Dēmosthenēs to slay himself when he made terms for his division. We have seen that this did grow into a story of Dēmosthenēs actually killing himself then (see above, p. 709). A further improvement would take in Nikias and would remove the scene to the prison. Then the question would arise, how they were able to kill themselves in the prison, and the agency of Hermokratēs would suggest itself as an easy explanation.

It is a harder question by what kind of death the captive generals died. To examine this we must go back a little. The words of Thucydides (vii. 86. 1, see p. 403) imply that whatever was done was done by the vote of the general assembly of the Syracusans and their allies. By saying that the generals were

put to death *ἀκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου*, he implies, one must suppose, that Gylippos argued in the assembly against their death. He mentions two other classes of men who argued for it. These were the former correspondents of Nikias (see above, p. 700) who feared to be found out, and above all the Corinthians ;

ἀλλὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων τινές, ὡς ἐλέγγο, οἱ μὲν δεισάντες, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκεκοινολόγηντο, μὴ βασανζόμενος [ὁ Νικίας] διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο ταραχὴν σφίσιν ἐν εὐπραγίᾳ ποιήσῃ, ἄλλοι δὲ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Κορίνθιοι, μὴ χρήμασι δὴ πείσας τινάς, ὅτι πλούσιος ἦν, ἀποδρᾶ καὶ αὐθις σφίσι νεώτερόν τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται.

He goes on to mention the imprisonment of the other prisoners in the quarries.

Diodōros (xiii. 19) has something which to me reads very like a summary of the actual decree passed on the motion of Dioklēs. We must of course allow for some blunders and confusion in the report. We must remember that Diodōros may either have read the decree in Philistos or have seen it on the actual stone. His words are ;

τῇ δ' ὑποτεταγῇ συναχθείσης ἐκκλησίας ἐβουλευόντο πῶς χρήσονται τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις. Διοκλῆς δέ τις, τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἐνδοξότατος ὢν, ἀπεφώνητο γνώμην ὡς δέοι τοὺς μὲν στρατηγούς τῶν Ἀθηναίων μετ' αἰκίας ἀνελεῖν.

This is as much as concerns the generals ; the rest of the decree concerns the other prisoners. The account of the debate, to which we shall come presently, follows. In c. 33 the motion is carried, and the words follow which I have quoted above.

Plutarch (Nik. 28) seems also to give a shorter summary of the decree, which he attributes to a demagogue named Euryklēs, not Dioklēs (see p. 404). The words that concern the generals are merely, πλὴν τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἐκείνους δ' ἀποκτείνειν.

Now may we believe that Nikias and Dēmosthenēs were simply put to death by the sword or the axe, or are we driven to infer that they suffered a more cruel form of death? If Diodōros has at all rightly reported the decree, Dioklēs proposed a death of torture, μετ' αἰκίας ἀνελεῖν, and he says in c. 33 that the motion of Dioklēs was carried. Now *αἰκία* is the regular word for death by torture, as when (xiii. 62) Hannibal at Himera πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε, or when Xenophôn describes the fate of Menôn (Anab. ii. 6. 16). The word καταλευσθέντας in Plutarch would imply stoning, a frightful form of death, but not exactly what is suggested by *αἰκία*. Here comes in the question of the reading. Grote prefers κελυσθέντας,

which I do not understand and which is hardly grammar. Surely *ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κελευσθέντας* would be a very strange way of expressing a decree for their death. On the other hand, whatever Philistos said, Thucydides does not mention stoning. Moreover his word *ἀπίσφαξαν* does not read like stoning; it suggests death by some weapon; stoning too does not seem to agree with what Plutarch himself says afterwards, that the bodies were exposed outside the gate. This would suggest that the bodies could be recognized, which would hardly be after stoning. Stoning too is hardly a thing to be done in a prison; the whole force of that form of death is that it should be done publicly, in the open air, and that the sufferer should be buried under the cairn heaped upon him. Thucydides uses the word *βασανιζόμενος*; but *βασανίζειν*—to extract evidence by torture—would be a strange word to express putting to death by torture, and the *βάσανος* of which Thucydides speaks is not anything that did happen, but only something that some people thought might happen.

The question seems to come to this. Are we certain enough of the text of Plutarch to accept *καταλευσθέντας* as the right reading? Can *ἀπίσφαξαν* be taken to include stoning? The words *μετ' αἰκίας ἀνελεῖν* in Diodōros are likely to be a genuine part of the decree proposed by Dioklēs. But perhaps the statement in c. 33 that his motion was carried (*τὸ πλῆθος τὴν Διοκλέους γνώμην ἐκύρωσε*), might be satisfied, especially when Diodōros is the reporter, if the final vote was for death in a milder form. Hermokratēs, though he was hooted, might prevail so far as this; so might Gylippos, who also pleaded for mercy.

The opposition of Hermokratēs to the death-sentence is not mentioned by Thucydides; but, recorded as it is both by Diodōros and Plutarch, we may accept it as coming from Philistos. From Plutarch I further infer that Philistos recorded the opposition of Gylippos, which Thucydides implies. But Diodōros goes on to make an astounding blunder. He gives (xiii. 20–32) two speeches, one against, the other for, the slaughter of the generals. The first is put into the mouth of an old Syracusan named Nikolaos, who had lost two sons in the war; the second, in forgetfulness of Thucydides, is spoken by Gylippos. It is hard to believe that Diodōros invented both the speeches and the situation; he was at once too dull and too honest. But it is likely enough that he

found the speeches—or their groundwork—in Timaios or somewhere else, and that he mistook the situation. A Syracusan named Nikolaos may likely enough have made a speech in favour of mercy, and Diodôros may have mistaken the speech of some Corinthian on the other side for a speech of Gylippos.

The speeches are very long, and for the most part very foolish, in the poorest style of rhetorical common-place. But they contain a few things worth notice. The speech of Nikolaos is of course rich in references to Sicilian history, and it also sets forth the legendary glories and merits of Athens in a strain almost as glowing as any effort of her own Isokratês. They are entitled to pity who were the first of mankind to raise an altar to pity (c. 22, οἱ πρῶτοι βωμὸν ἰλίου καθιδρυσάμενοι). It concerns us more that Gelôn is somewhat strangely said to have become leader of all Sicily by the willing consent of its cities (c. 22, τῆς Σικελίας ὅλης ἡγεμὸν ἐγένετο, τῶν πόλεων ἑκουσίας εἰς τὴν ἐξουσίαν παραγεγομένων), and it is added that the Syracusan commonwealth had ever since aimed at the same supremacy (c. 22, ἀπ' ἐκείνων τῶν χρόνων τῆς κατὰ Σικελίας ἡγεμονίας ἀντιποιουμένης τῆς πόλεως). Whether we call this true or false will depend on the sense which we give to the word ἡγεμονία. One would like to know whether it is Diodôros or some earlier writer who uses (c. 24) the phrase Πελοποννησιακὸς πόλεμος. It is not however like translating Thucydides' ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε by "Peloponnesian war." The Πελοποννησιακὸς πόλεμος is the earlier part of the war, specially that of Sphaktêria. It is what Thucydides calls ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος (v. 24. 2), ὁ δεκάτης πόλεμος (v. 25. 1), and, with a nearer approach to the later phrase, ὁ πόλεμος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου (vii. 28. 5), and at the very beginning of all (i. 1. 1) ὁ πόλεμος τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων. Such an use of the phrase is far more accurate than the more common fashion, since Πελοποννησιακὸς πόλεμος well balances the Σικελικὸς πόλεμος ὅδε of Thucydides himself (vii. 85. 4). Then, with a knowledge of the eighth book of Thucydides, the orator warns his hearers that the power of Athens is by no means wholly destroyed (c. 25, μὴ οἴεσθε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον τελείως ἐξησθηκέναι διὰ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ συμφορὰν). It is stated, truly or falsely, that Nikias had always been the friend of Syracuse and had been her recognized advocate at Athens (c. 27, ὅς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὴν πολιτείαν ὑπὲρ Συρακουσίων ἐνστησάμενος μόνος ἀντίπεν ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν στρατείας, αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν παρεπιδημούντων Συρακουσίων φροντίζων καὶ πρόξενος ὧν διατετέλεκεν).

There is less to notice in the speech so unluckily put into the mouth of Gylippos. He makes it a point against Nikias that, when Dêmosthenês and the whole army wished to go away (see p. 321), he chose to stay and make war on Syracuse (c. 32, *ὁ φιλανθρώπως διακείμενος πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Δημοσθένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων βουλομένων λῦσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν, μόνος ἐβιάσατο μένειν καὶ πολεμεῖν*). And he is further made to quote the imaginary Athenian design that the Syracusans and Selinuntines should be made slaves and the other cities of Sicily brought under tribute. See above, p. 638.

NOTE XXIV. p. 407.

THE TREATMENT OF THE ATHENIAN PRISONERS.

IN the decree of the military assembly as reported by Diodôros (xiii. 19), it is ordered that for the present all the prisoners shall be put into the stone quarries (*ἐν μὲν τῷ παρόντι τεθῆναι πάντας εἰς τὰς λατομίας*), that, after some time not stated, the allies of Athens shall be sold and the Athenians themselves shall be set to work in the prison (*μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς μὲν συμμαχήσαντας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις λαφυροπωλῆσαι, τοὺς δ' Ἀθηναίους ἐργαζομένους ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ κ.τ.λ.*).

When he comes (c. 33) to the carrying out of the decree, his present text says, first of all, that the allies were put to death along with the generals (*οἱ μὲν στρατηγοὶ παραχρῆμα ἀνιρέθησαν καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι*). The Athenians were put into the quarries; after a while the mass of them were set to work in wretchedness in the prison for the rest of their days, but the cultivated among them were delivered by force by the young men (*οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεδόθησαν εἰς τὰς λατομίας, ὧν ὕστερον οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πλείον παιδείας μετασχηκότες ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἐξαργαγίντες διεσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ κακούμενοι τὸν βίον οἰκτρῶς κατέστρεψαν*).

I believe that Diodôros has here got hold of a perfectly genuine document and also of the genuine narrative of Philistos. Only he has blundered some things and left out others. If we compare his account with that of Thucydides, we shall see that each explains and fills up some things in the other. The massacre of the allies is too gross a blunder even for Diodôros in his worst moods. Some words must have dropped out of the text, telling how, according to the decree, the allies were first put into the quarries and

then taken out and sold. It is from Thucydides that we learn both how long the whole body were kept in the quarries and whom we are to understand by *οἱ σύμμαχοι* in Diodōros. First, all were put in the quarries as a matter of precaution (vii. 86. 1, *τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὁπόσους ἔλαβον, κατεβέβασαν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας, ἀσφαλεστάτην εἶναι νομίσαντες τὴν τήρησιν*). By *ὁπόσους ἔλαβον* I understand those who became prisoners of the commonwealth, that is, the whole division of Dēmostenēs and a thousand of that of Nikias, as distinguished from those who came into private hands at the Assinaros. The vague notes of time in Diodōros, *μετὰ ταῦτα* and *ὑστερον*, become in the narrative of Thucydides two definite periods, seventy days and six months (vii. 87. 1, 2, *εἰδίδουσιν αὐτῶν ἐκάστη ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ μῆνας κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο κοτύλας σίτου . . . καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἐβδομήκοντά τινες οὕτω διηγήθησαν ἀθρόοι*). We further learn who the *σύμμαχοι* were who were taken out and sold at the end of the seventy days. They were the allies of Athens, subject and independent, from Old Greece (*ἔπειτα, πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέδωκεν*). The Athenians and their Sikeliot and Italiot allies stayed in the quarries for about six months longer. Thucydides does not tell us what became of them then, though one might infer from the words in c. 87. 1 (*τοὺς ἐν ταῖς λιθοτομίαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχείρισαν*) that some change in their lot was made at the end of the eight months. Diodōros tells us what that change was. They were taken out of the quarries and set to work in the prison, save those who in any way escaped or were released by personal favour.

All this hangs very well together. Diodōros has clearly blundered to some extent; but he and Thucydides together supply us with the means of correcting his report of the decree in one or two points. In c. 19 he calls those who were first taken out and sold *τοὺς συμμαχίσαντας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*. We find from Thucydides that they were the allies of Athens from all other parts except Sicily and Italy. But the words in Thucydides, *εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν*, compared with the *συμμαχίσαντας* just above, sound to me like an echo of the decree. I should be inclined to think that the formal words *συμμαχίσαντας* (or the equivalent and rather more emphatic *συστρατεύσαντας*) *τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις* were used in the decree to mark the Sikeliot and Italiot allies of Athens, just as they are in Thucydides, and that Diodōros

has confusedly applied them to the more ordinary *σύμμαχοι* of Athens.

The end of the decree as given by Diodōros has a very odd sound; τοὺς δ' Ἀθηναίους ἐργαζομένους ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ λαμβάνειν ἀλφίτων δύο χοίνας. On this Grote (vii. 476) remarks;

"One may judge of his [Diodōros'] accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chœnikes* of barley-meal instead of two *kotylæ*; the *chœnix* being four times as much as the *kotylê*."

This is with reference to what Thucydides says about δύο κοτύλαι. Now Diodōros may be right or wrong in his figures—I am not skilful either at Attic or at Winchester measures—but he in no way contradicts Thucydides. They speak of two different times. Thucydides says that the prisoners had two *kotylai* while they were in the quarries. Diodōros says that they had two *choinikes* afterwards, when they were set to work in the prison. The Syracusans first gratified their spite by leaving the prisoners in the quarries to suffer, among other evils, from hunger and thirst. They gave them barely enough to keep soul and body together. They had half the usual allowance of an ordinary slave. (See Arnold's note on Thuc. iv. 16. 1.) When spite had been gratified, and it was thought better to make something out of the prisoners, when they were put to hard labour in the prison, their allowance of food was necessarily increased. To this day hard labour implies an increased allowance, and it is said that some prisoners like hard labour better on that account.

At the same time it is inconceivable that the decree can have been worded exactly as Diodōros makes it. He has at least left out something. If the larger allowance for the time of hard labour was really stated in the decree, the smaller allowance for the time in the quarries was surely stated also. How one yearns for the graven stone which may still be somewhere, like the stone which records the treaty between Athens and Leontinoi.

Plutarch (Nik. 28) hurries over matters. He leaps over the seventy days during which all were in the quarries together. The distinction is made at once; the allies and, he adds, the slaves never go into the quarries at all (τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων τοὺς μὲν οἰκίτας ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμαχοὺς, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Σικελίας φρουρεῖν ἐμβάλλοντας εἰς τὰς λατομίας). Of the removal from the quarries to

the prison, recorded by Diodóros and implied by Thucydides, he says nothing. Most of them died in the quarries of disease or hardship. Many however escaped, namely, those who were embezzled by private men—at the Assinaros or afterwards—and those who were taken for slaves, who perhaps passed themselves off as slaves, and who had to undergo the branding along with the real slaves (see p. 410). He naturally says nothing of those who, according to Diodóros, were released by the young Syracusans at the time of the removal to the prison. But he too mentions the advantages found by those who won the regard of their masters by their *παιδεία*. It is from him that we get the story of their repeating and singing passages of Euripidēs (see p. 411).

All this may be a little highly coloured; but it does not seem to contradict the narrative of Thucydides. All that is there mentioned comes just after the slaughter at the Assinaros (vii. 85. 3, 4). Sicily was full of those who were embezzled (*τὸ δὲ διαλαπέν πολὺ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν*). But many escaped, some from the Assinaros—does this take in the horsemen spoken of in p. 399?—and some who were made slaves and afterwards ran away from slavery (*πολλοὶ δ' ὅμως καὶ δίφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραντίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον*). They naturally made their way to Katané (*τούτοις δ' ἦν ἀναχώρησις εἰς Κατάνην*), see p. 414.

NOTE XXV. p. 415.

THE ASSINARIAN GAMES AND COINAGE.

THE institution of the Assinarian Games at Syracuse seems plain enough from the account which Plutarch (Nik. 28) gives of the decree proposed and carried by Dioklēs, his Euryklēs (see p. 404). The games were to be held on the anniversary of the surrender of Nikias at the Assinaros. Besides the fact itself, their institution is important in two ways. As the date of the festival is known, we are able to reckon the days backward to the last battles with absolute certainty, and to the eclipse of the moon with a good deal of likelihood. There is also reason to believe that some of the finest Syracusan coins were struck with reference to these games, and it even seems possible that these coins may have formed part of the prizes of the victors. In view of the

connexion of these two subjects, I have put the present note at this point, the time of the first celebration of the games.

The day and month come from Plutarch (Nik. 28); *ἡμέρα δ' ἦν τετράς φθίνοντος τοῦ Καρνείου μηνός, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεταγειτνιακά προσαγορεύουσι*. Grote (vii. 478) says that we cannot safely infer that the Dorian Karneios and the Attic Metageitniôn exactly corresponded. He places the surrender "about September 21." It is perhaps possible, with Holm, to get a little nearer. The eight days of the retreat are clearly marked in Thucydides; as Plutarch puts it (Nik. 27), Nikias was *ἐφ' ἡμέρας ὀκτὼ βαλλόμενος καὶ τραυματιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων*. At the other end the date of the eclipse is of course absolutely fixed to August 27. The retreat began (see p. 352) two days after the last battle. The barrier at the mouth of the Great Harbour had taken three days to make (see above, p. 694, and p. 342). This is a point on which we may be sure that Diodôros is the mouth-piece of Philistos. The battles described in Thucydides vii. 51-53 (see pp. 326-330) took two days; but though Thucydides (vii. 69. 2) says *ἔλθον οὖν τὸν τε λιμένα εὐθύς τὸν μέγαν*, the word *εὐθύς* need not imply that the making of the barrier began on the morrow of the second battle. It seems more reasonable to allow a somewhat longer time. So again we cannot be quite certain how many days passed between the eclipse on August 27 and the two days' fighting. But the words of Thucydides (vii. 51. 2) seem to imply that it was more than one or two days; he speaks of *ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἰδόμενοι ἱκανοὶ εἶναι*. We thus have two periods to fill in by conjecture. We can reckon backwards from the twenty-sixth day of Karneios when the surrender happened at the Assinaros, to the fourteenth, when the Syracusans began to make their barrier. But we do not know exactly what days those answer to in our kalendar. Even if we did know, we could not be quite certain as to the number of days on each side of the two days' fighting in vii. 51-53. But I think that Holm (G. S. ii. 404) distinctly shows that the earlier reckonings were too short, while that of Grote seems a little too long. It is a great gain to have days clearly marked, and for the last thirteen days the succession is marked with absolute certainty. I have therefore not scrupled to put the dates suggested by Holm in the margin. They cannot be many days wrong. But the reader must remember that they are only provisional, as depending on the time between the eclipse and the two days' fighting, and

again between the two days' fighting and the beginning of the barrier.

Another question has been suggested to me by Mr. Goodwin, which I do not remember to have seen discussed anywhere, and which I should have mentioned sooner if I had heard of it sooner. What was the length of time between the night-attack on Epipolai and the eclipse? On that night the moon must have been something more than a new moon (see pp. 314, 317). Does this give time enough for the mission of Gylippos to Selinous and his return (see pp. 318, 319), before the eclipse? Or must we suppose that it was an earlier moon which gave light on Epipolai, and that a whole month and more passed between the night-attack and the tardy consent of Nikias to retreat?

We have wandered a good way off from the proper subject of this note. The coinage connected with the Assinarian games has been fully examined by Mr. Arthur Evans (Syracusan Medallions, p. 132 et seqq.). The coins in question are a very noble issue of *Penékontalitra*, which are fixed by independent comparison to a time soon after the year 415. Their devices seem certainly to connect them with the Assinarian festival. Mr. Evans looks on them as a revival of the *Δαμαπέρτιον* which I spoke of in vol. ii. p. 190. He rejects the view of the lexicographers that the *Δαμαπέρτιον* was made out of the gifts of Damareta and the other Syracusan ladies, and accepts the statement of Diodóros (xi. 26), which I there rejected, that the *Δαμαπέρτιον* was coined out of the crown sent to Damareta by the Carthaginians. The argument is that, if the coins were struck out of the ornaments, it would have been a gold coinage, which was not known at Syracuse so early, and that the existing specimens of the *Δαμαπέρτιον* are of silver. And one might add that the obvious answer that they might be coined out of the price of the ornaments would hardly apply. The story seems to imply an actual lack of bullion, which the ornaments supplied. Mr. Evans further goes into the question as to the different values of the talent, and rules that the crown would produce a substantial amount for a special coinage.

This coinage commemorating the victory over Carthage Mr. Evans holds to have been reproduced in a coinage commemorating the victories over the Athenians, and specially referring to the Assinarian

games. The coins have a legend ΑΘΑΑ, sometimes in such small letters as to be read with difficulty by the non-expert; they have also representations of armour and weapons which seem to be the *ἀθλα* referred to, with perhaps a special reference to the armour of Nikias (see pp. 400, 406). Mr. Evans collects various instances from Homer onwards of prizes of substantial value, and not merely the honorary rewards so admired by Tritantaichmēs (Herod. viii. 26), and concludes that the Athenian spoils, with perhaps some of the coins themselves, were distributed as prizes in the Assinarian games. He holds that the spoils generally, and specially the money poured by the captives into the shields (see p. 389), would supply materials for a coinage.

I am not competent to form a judgement on minute points of numismatic detail; but the general argument seems one that may be safely followed, and I have not scrupled to speak accordingly in the text. The first distribution would be on September 18, B.C. 412, when Hermokratēs was in the Ægean.

There are also coins in which Nikē meets Persephonē and holds in her hand the *aplustre* of a captive vessel, with a manifest reference to the battles in the Great Harbour. One is reminded of the Himeraian coins spoken of in vol. ii. p. 520. The coin is described and figured by Professor Salinas in the *Notizie degli Scavi* communicated to the Academy of the Lincei, May, 1888, p. 307.

NOTE XXVI. p. 442.

THE LAWS OF DIOKLĒS.

THE most distinct notice of the changes made at this time in the Syracusan constitution does not mention the name of Dioklēs. This is that of Aristotle, Pol. v. 3. 6;

ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γινόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

Here we must remember the peculiar sense in which Aristotle uses the words *πολιτεία* and *δημοκρατία*. (See above, p. 648.) Any one else would have called the Syracusan constitution democratic already, as Thucydides does in vii. 55. 2. But what Aristotle says quite falls in with the intelligible parts of Diodōros' account of Dioklēs. Diodōros had mentioned him before, as τῶν *δημαγωγῶν*

ἐνδοξότατος, in the debate about the Athenian generals (xiii. 19, see p. 404). He now (xiii. 35) tells us how, after the rewards had been voted to citizens and allies, after Hermokratês and his force had been sent to the war in Asia (c. 34),

τῶν δημαγωγῶν ὁ πλεῖστα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἰσχύσας Διοκλῆς, ἐπεισε τὸν δῆμον μεταστῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὸ κλήρω τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖσθαι, εἰσεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ νομοθέτας, εἰς τὸ τὴν πολιτείαν διατάξαι, καὶ νόμους καινοὺς ἰδίᾳ συγγράψαι.

They accordingly elected a commission of wise men, of whom Dioklês was chief (τοὺς φρονήσει διαφέροντας τῶν πολιτῶν εἰλοντο νομοθέτας, ὃν ἦν ἐπιφανέστατος Διοκλῆς). Dioklês was so much more thought of than his colleagues that their joint work was called by his name (τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διήνεγκε συνέσει καὶ δόξῃ, ὥστε τῆς νομοθεσίας ὑπὸ πάντων κοινῇ γραφείσθαι, ὀνομασθῆναι τοὺς νόμους Διοκλείους). These laws were adopted by other Sikeliot cities besides Syracuse (πολλαὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον πόλεων χρώμεναι διέτελεσαν τοῖς τοῦτου νόμοις). Later Syracusan lawgivers, Kephalos and Polydôros (see p. 444), were looked on only as his interpreters (οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἀνόμασαν νομοθέτην, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐξηγητὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου). Of Dioklês himself we hear a good deal further on.

All this would be perfectly clear and straightforward, if it stood by itself. But it is mixed up with a good deal that has a very legendary sound. First of all, Dioklês and his laws have already been mentioned in c. 33. Immediately after the account of the Athenian prisoners, before we come to the rewards and the expedition of Hermokratês in c. 34, we read;

μετὰ δὲ τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου Διοκλῆς ἀνέγραψε τοῖς Συρακοσίοις τοὺς νόμους, καὶ συνέβη παράδοξον περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον γενέσθαι περὶπέτειαν.

Diodôros then goes on to tell, in different words, the story which he had already told of Charôndas in xii. 19 (see vol. ii. p. 62). We have again the prohibition of bearing arms in the assembly, the lawgiver's unintentional breach of his own law, and the punishment which he inflicts upon himself. When he tells the story of Charôndas, he remarks that it was also told of Dioklês; when he tells it of Dioklês, he makes no reference to Charôndas. He also, in xiii. 33, speaks of the character of the laws of Dioklês. He was ἀπαραίτητος ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις . . . καὶ σκληρῶς κολάζων τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας. So in the fuller account of the laws in c. 35, he speaks of their severity and minute-

ness in the distinction of offences and portioning out of punishments ;

μισοπότηρος μὲν φαίνεται, διὰ τὸ πάντων τῶν νομοθετῶν πικρότατον πρόστιμα θείναι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀδικούντων δίκαιος δ', ἐκ τοῦ περιττότερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστην τὸ ἐπιτίμιον ὑπάρχει· πραγματικὸς δὲ καὶ πολύπειρος, ἐκ τοῦ πᾶν ἐγκλημά τε καὶ πταῖσμα δημόσιον τε καὶ ἰδιωτικὸν ἀμφισβητούμενον ἑρισμένης ἀξιώσαι τιμωρίας.

He then refers to the story of his death (*ἐμαρτύρησε δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σκληρότητα τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ περὶ τὴν τελευταίην περιπέτειαν*). Earlier in the chapter (35) he tells us of the heroic honours of Dioklēs, of his temple, and of its destruction by Dionysios (*οἱ Συρακούσιοι . . . τελευτήσαντα τιμαῖς ἡρώικαῖς ἐτίμησαν, καὶ νεὸν φιλοδόμησαν δημοσίᾳ, τὸν ὕστερον ὑπὸ Διονυσίου κατὰ τὴν τοιχοποιίαν καθαιρεθῆναι*). After all this, he is brought in again without special notice as an actor in the general narrative. He comes in at the end of c. 59, and he is mentioned several times till we come to his banishment in c. 75, after which there is no more of him.

It seems almost impossible that all these things can be true of the same man. Between the banishment of Dioklēs in 407 and the rise of Dionysios to power in 406-405 there is hardly time for Dioklēs to be recalled, to die, and to have a temple built to him. Add to this that the story of his death is clearly that of Charōndas over again ; add further that all that we hear of his laws, save the provision about the lot, seems to belong to a primitive lawgiver and not to a demagogue contemporary with Hermokratēs and Athénagoras. The story of the temple can hardly be sheer invention ; we may believe that Dionysios did pull down some temple, but hardly one built to his political opponent of a few years before. As for the story of Dioklēs' death, the same, as Diodōros himself observes, as that of Charōndas, it is perfectly possible that history may have so remarkably repeated itself ; it is yet more possible that Dioklēs, finding himself in somewhat the same position as Charōndas, may have consciously imitated the act of Charōndas. But this is the kind of thing which, though possible, is in itself so unlikely, so likely to be the result of confusion in the telling, that we ask for it somewhat stronger evidence than usual. We should believe it if we read it for ourselves in Thucydides. We should believe it if Plutarch reported it on the distinct evidence of Philistos. But

the present very confused statement of Diodôros is surely not evidence enough.

That there is some confusion in his story is clear; but after all the confusion is not necessarily greater than that which he had already made in his twelfth book, when he translated the primitive Charôndas to the early days of Thourioi (see vol. ii. p. 451). There may have been an earlier Syracusan lawgiver named Dioklês, who had a temple built to him; the story of the death may belong to him, and it may have been transferred to Charôndas. Or again it may belong to Charôndas, and it may have been transferred to Dioklês. And one saying of Diodôros (xiii. 35) seems to point to such a primitive lawgiver. This is when he says that later lawgivers at Syracuse were called only the interpreters of Dioklês, because of the ancient dialect in which his laws were written (*διὰ τὸ τοὺς νόμους γεγραμμένους ἀρχαίᾳ διαλέκτῳ δοκεῖν εἶναι δυσκατανοήτους*). Holm (G. S. ii. 78) says truly that this is not likely to be the real meaning of the name *ἐξηγηταί*; but it does look as if the laws of which they were the *ἐξηγηταί* were something older than the days of Dioklês the demagogue. The difficulty is to find a place in Syracusan history for an earlier Dioklês, or indeed for any lawgiver of the type of Charôndas.

Both Arnold (Hist. Rome, i. 440) and Grote (x. 537) accept the main story without much misgiving. Both accept the laws as the work of the demagogue Dioklês. Arnold draws his picture;

"A man somewhat resembling the tribune Rienzi, a sincere and stern reformer, but whose zealous imagination conceived schemes beyond his power to compass, endeavoured at once to give to his countrymen a pure democracy, and to establish it on its only sure foundation, by building it upon a comprehensive system of national law."

He tries to connect the legislation of Dioklês with the circumstances of the times. He supposes a recall of Dioklês after his banishment, and he suggests that the disturbance which led to the death of Dioklês was no other than that in which Hermokratês was killed (see p. 505). This is tempting for a moment, and the more so as the words used by Diodôros about Charôndas and about Dioklês are not exactly the same, and those about Dioklês would better agree with Arnold's view. In the story of Charôndas (xii. 19), he goes out against robbers (*διὰ τοὺς ληστές*); Dioklês goes

out, *προσαγγελλέντων πολεμίων ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας*. In the Charondas story we have a disturbed assembly (*ἐκκλησίας συνεστάσης καὶ παραχῆς ἐν τοῖς πλῆθεσι*), while in that of Dioklēs we hear generally of disturbance without mention of an assembly (*αἰφνιδίου στάσεως καὶ παραχῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν γενομένης*). And the law which the law-giver breaks differs accordingly in the two accounts. Charondas' law was *μηδένα μεθ' ὅπλου ἐκκλησιάζειν*, while that of Dioklēs was *ἐάν τις ὅπλον ἔχων εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν παραγίνηται, θάνατον εἶναι πρόστιμον*. Here the law and its breach might refer to the *ἀγορά* at any time, not necessarily at the time of an assembly. This difference is curious; but it is hardly to be set against Diodōros' own assertion that the two stories were the same. Arnold does not seem to have thought of the story of Charondas at all, and it seems dangerous to guess quite so much as he seems to do.

Grote accepts all about the laws, but doubts the story of the death, "a story of more than doubtful credit, and of which the like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators." Before Grote, Punbury (*Dict. Biog.*, Diocles) had thrown doubt on the story, on account of its likeness to that of Charondas, and the difficulty of "connecting it with the subsequent revolutions of Syracuse." But he accepts the laws.

Brunet de Presle (210) seems to have been the first to suggest that two persons are confounded in this story of Dioklēs. Holm (*G. S.* ii. 78) is more distinct on the point. He accepts an earlier Dioklēs distinct from the demagogue, and to whom a temple was built as a hero.

Holm has also (*G. S.* ii. 418) well pointed out the little that we know about the changes made by the historical Dioklēs. The short notice of Aristotle exactly falls in with the one clear statement of Diodōros (xiii. 35), *ἔπεισε τὸν δῆμον μεταστῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὸ κλήρεν τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖσθαι*. This is what Aristotle calls bringing in democracy. Nobody will infer that the generals were ever appointed by lot at Syracuse any more than at Athens; but it looks very much as if the generals were displaced from the presidency of the assembly in which we have already seen them (see p. 129) clothed with such large powers. In the debate in which Dionysios first comes forward (*Diod.* xiii. 91), the *ἄρχοντες* who preside are distinct from the *στρατηγοί* who are accused, and, though they can impose a fine for breach of order, they

seem to have no power of stopping the debate (see p. 541). This certainly seems to have been one of the changes brought in by Dioklês. We may further guess that the breach of order committed by Dionysios—besides the plainly illegal nature of his proposal—consisted in his speaking out of a settled order of speakers marked by letters of the alphabet. So at least one might infer from the very unlikely story which comes first under his name among Plutarch's *Apophthegmata*; *Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος, κληρουμένων κατὰ γραμμάτων δημηγορούντων, ὡς ἔλεγε τὸ Μ, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, μωρολογεῖς, Διονύσιε, μοναρχήσω μὲν σὺν εἴπῃ.*

On the whole, we may very safely accept Dioklês the demagogue as an author of democratic changes in the interval between Athenian and Carthaginian invasion. We may believe that in this story of Dionysios we have got hold of one of those changes. And we can have little doubt in believing that it was Dioklês who proposed the sentence of banishment against Hermokratês and his colleagues. Anything further, above all the existence of an earlier Dioklês, it is wiser to leave open. The grievous thing is that we have not a single Syracusan inscription to throw any light on these constitutional matters. For some Sikeliot cities, at least in later times, we are better off.

NOTE XXVII. p. 493.

THE RETURN OF HERMOKRATÊS.

ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝ (Hell. i. 4. 1) says distinctly that Hermokratês and his brother Proxenos were among the envoys and others whom Pharnabazos had with him when he purposed to take them all up to Sousa. He gives the list of envoys from Athens and Argos, and adds;

ἐπορεύοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις Πασσιππίδας καὶ ἕτεροι, μετὰ δὲ τούτων καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πρόξενος, καὶ Φαρνάβαζος μὲν τούτους ἤγε.

None of them reached Sousa. Pharnabazos and the envoys spent the winter of 409-408 at Gordieion (Ib. 4. 2, *ἐν Γορδιείῳ ὄντες τὸν χειμῶνα*). With the spring (*ἀρχομένου τοῦ ἔρος*) they set out to go to the King, but on their way they met Cyrus, whose coming

put an end to their mission. The Athenian and Argeian envoys were kept in Asia three years (Ib. 4. 7). Nothing is said of Hermokratēs and Proxenos. It is not even clear that they got as far as Gordieion.

We next hear of Hermokratēs at Messana (Diod. xiii. 63) with the gifts given him by Pharnabazos. He hires mercenaries and builds ships. His work at Selinous and his campaign against Panormos are all put (cf. c. 54) in the Athenian archonship of Dioklēs, that is the year 409-408; while his work at Himera and his death are placed (c. 68, 75) in the archonship of Euktēmōn, that is 408-407.

Here seems a great deal to get into the first half of the year 408. But on the one hand Xenophōn does not necessarily imply that Hermokratēs was even at Gordieion, much less that he went so far as to meet Cyrus. On the other hand the usual chronology of Diodōros is not so precise as to hinder us from placing the warfare at Panormos in the latter half of our year 408. It is enough if Hermokratēs comes into Sicily within the official year of Dioklēs, in the first half of 408; and this he may easily have done, if we suppose that he left Pharnabazos before he set out to go to Sousa, perhaps even before he went to Gordieion at all.

Holm (G. S. ii. 424) discusses other views. There can at least be no need, first to carry Hermokratēs to Sicily, then back to Asia, and then back to Sicily again.

NOTE XXVIII. p. 520.

THE CARTHAGINIAN CAMPS BEFORE AKRAGAS.

THE description given by Diodōros, xiii. 85, runs thus;

οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς δυνάμεις διαβιβάσαντες εἰς τὴν Συκελίαν, ἀνέειζαν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων, καὶ δύο παρεμβολὰς ἐποιήσαντο, μίαν μὲν ἐπὶ τινῶν λόφων, ἐφ' ὧν τοὺς τε Ἰβήρας καὶ τινὰς τῶν Λιβύων ἔταξαν εἰς τετρακισμυρίους· τὴν δ' ἄλλην οὐκ ἀποθεν τῆς πόλεως ποιησάμενοι, τάφρῳ βαθεῖ καὶ χάρακι περιέλαβον.

In writing the first sketch of my narrative on the spot it did not come into my head that the *λόφοι* here spoken of could be other than the heights on the left bank of the Akragas. The Campanians were clearly set there to keep the way from Gela, and to

meet any help coming to Akragas from that side. This we find them doing at the beginning of chapter 87. It is strange then that Siefert (Akragas 40) and other earlier enquirers should have placed the camp of the Iberians on the same side as the main camp, only further inland, on the hills west of the Hypsas. But it is more strange that Schubring, who knew the ground, should (*Historische Topographie von Akragas*, 67) also have placed it there. Grote's instinct saw the right place, and he answered Siefert (x. 590). Holm (G. S. ii. 426) argues the point, and makes it, I think, perfectly clear.

The only question that can be raised is whether Diodōros, when he says (c. 87) that the Iberians and others were sent to meet the Greek force coming from Gela, means that no Iberians had been placed on the east side of the town before. His words are;

Ἱμילκων δὲ πυθόμενος τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον, ἀπέστειλεν αὐτοῖς ἀπαντᾶν τοὺς τε Ἰβήρας καὶ Καμπανοὺς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τετρακισμυρίων.

Grote seems to think that it was now that Iberians were sent for the first time to occupy the eastern post. But the words of c. 85 certainly seem to imply the making of two camps from the beginning. They give the main and formal account, to be assumed in what follows. Holm, who is quite distinct as to the eastern camp in p. 90, says at this point; "Ihm [the Greek army] sandte Himilkon die Iberer und Kampaner und *ausserdem* 40,000 Mann anderer Truppen entgegen." I cannot help thinking that by the words in c. 87 Diodōros simply means that he ordered the troops quartered on the eastern hill to go and meet the Greeks. That is, the forty thousand in c. 85 and the forty thousand in c. 87 are the same body of men. Diodōros indeed describes them differently; in the first place, they are Iberians with some Libyans; in the second, they are Iberians and Campanians and some others not named. This is just the kind of thing in which Diodōros was likely to be confused or even contradictory. But I do not see that he is contradictory. It may very well be that he leaves out the Campanians the first time, and that the *τινὲς τῶν Λιβύων* in the one account are the same as the *οἱ ἄλλοι* in the second. We need not press the words so closely as to suppose two parties of 40,000, though, if any one pleases, he may understand that Himilkôn told the 40,000 on the eastern hill to go down, and sent other 40,000 to help them.

It should be noticed that (see p. 521) the Akragantines plant their Campanians on the hill of Athênê, clearly to watch the Punic force to the east of them. This may be turned either for or against the belief that among those whom they had to watch were other Campanians.

NOTE XXIX. p. 561.

THE DAUGHTERS OF HERMOKRATÈS.

OF the historic daughter of Hermokratès, who, so unluckily for herself, became the wife of Dionysios, the name seems not to be known. But the imagination of a late Greek writer provided her with a sister, and provided that sister with many strange adventures. The writer, who has been placed at different dates from the fifth to the ninth century of the Christian era, bears the name of Charitôn of Aphrodisias. This some have thought to be an assumed name, befitting the author of a love-story. That such an one at such a date should have picked out a daughter of Hermokratès of Syracuse for his subject is passing strange and awakens a certain interest in the man and his work. It is curious to see the writer's way of treating names which are so familiar to us. The story is perhaps about as far removed from historic truth as the Macbeth of Shakespere and the Ivanhoe of Scott. Anyhow it is a story of straightforward human passion, which is healthy reading after much of Plato and Theokritos.

That either a real or an assumed Charitôn of Aphrodisias should write in the character of a secretary of Athênagoras, a man whom we know only from his one precious speech in Thucydides (*Ἀθηναγόρου τοῦ ῥήτορος ὑπογραφεύς*, i. 1), is startling enough. Hermokratès (*Ἑρμοκράτης, ὁ Συρακουσίων στρατηγός, ὁ νικήσας Ἀθηναίους*) lives quietly on at Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenians. He has a daughter of wonderful beauty, Kallirhoê by name, who is sought in marriage, like another Agaristê of Sikyôn, by many private men and many sons of tyrants (*μνηστῆρες κατέρρπον εἰς Συρακούσας ἰδιῶται τε καὶ παῖδες τυράννων, οὐκ ἐκ Σικελίας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Ἠπείρου*). The names of these tyrants have dropped out of Sicilian history. The thought of Epeiros may have been suggested by several later events, or even because

Agaristê had (Herod. vi. 127) a Molottian wooer. There was also a certain Chaireas, whose beauty equalled that of Achilles or Alkibiadês; he was son of Aristôn, the man next in eminence to Hermokratês in Syracuse (*τὰ πρῶτα ἐν Συρακούσαις μετὰ Ἑρμοκράτην φερομένου*), but opposed to him in politics (*ἐν αὐτοῖς πολιτικὸς φθόνος*). In him one seems to see the Corinthian Aristôn turned into a Syracusan. Youth and maid meet by chance; mutual love follows; Chaireas has no hope of the daughter of his father's rival; but the two are betrothed by a kind of irregular decree of the Syracusan people assembled in the theatre. A νόμιμος ἐκκλησία is held, and the debate takes this unexpected turn;

συγκαθεσθεὶς οὖν ὁ δῆμος τοῦτο πρῶτον καὶ . . . ἐβόα' καλὸς Ἑρμοκράτης, μέγας στρατηγός, σῶζε Χαιρέαν. τοῦτο πρῶτον τῶν τροπαίων. ἡ πώλις μνηστεύεται τοὺς γάμους σήμερον ἀλλήλων ἀξίως τίς ἀνὴρ μνηύσειε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐκείνην ἥς ὁ Ἔρως ἦν ὁ παραγωγός. ἀνὴρ δὲ φιλόπατρις Ἑρμοκράτης ἀντειπεῖν οὐκ ἠδυνήθη τῇ πώλει δεομένη, καταπεύσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ πᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἐξεπήδησε τοῦ θεάτρου.

(*Καλός* is here used in the later sense, and there is clearly something wrong in the text about *ἀξίως*. Has *ἀξίους* dropped out?)

The two are married, to the wrath of the suitors, the tyrant of Akragas and the son of the tyrant of Rhêgion among them (i. 2). Many strange things happen. Kallirhoê is buried alive; she is carried off from her tomb by a pirate Thêrôn. She comes near to Athens, where there are archons more stern—at least to evil-doers—than tyrants (i. 11, *Ἄρειος πάγος εὐθύς ἐκεῖ καὶ ἄρχοντες τυράννων βαρύτεροι*). She calls on her father who had overcome the Athenians (*οὐ μὲν, ὦ πάτερ, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ θαλάσῃ τριακοσίας ναῦς Ἀθηναίων καταναυμαχήσας . . . τάχα δὲ ἀγοράσει τις τὴν Ἑρμοκράτους θυγατέρα δεσπότης Ἀθηναίων*). She is sold in Ionia to a certain Dionysios, neither of Syracuse nor of Hêrakleia, who marries her. Chaireas, after catching Thêrôn, who is impaled by decree of a Syracusan assembly (iii. 4, viii. 7), is himself sold in Ionia and is very nearly crucified (iv. 4). A satrap or two come in, as also Stateira wife of the Great King and the Great King himself, Artaxerxes, and we see them at home at Babylon. Chaireas takes service with the revolted Egyptians and does wonderful exploits, taking Tyre and Arvad, and restoring his captive wife to the Great King. In the end Chaireas is able to bring back his own lost wife, to the delight of her father and of all Syracuse, and

we have another picture of a Syracusan assembly, in which everything is settled happily.

The story in short is much on a level with the Epistles of Phalaris, except that the writer most likely did not expect his romance to be believed. It is a strange accident of fortune that this kind of thing should have been preserved, while Philistos and the *Altraia* of Æschylus and all the documents of free Syracuse have perished. And several scholars seem to have given quite as much time and pains to Charitôn as they could have given to Philistos.

NOTE XXX. p. 564.

THE CARTHAGINIAN SIEGE OF GELA.

THE action of the Carthaginians and of Dionysios before Gela is not hard to understand on the spot. Grote's narrative (x. 621 et seqq.) gives but little notion of it. It is wonderful how well he understood the topography of Syracuse in his library; but he had not such good materials for Gela and other places. The siege was well worked out by Schubring (*Alt-Sicilien*, 79 et seqq.), who gives a very good map of the surrounding country, which is mainly followed by Holm in his second volume. There is little difference between Schubring and Holm, and where there is any, I am inclined to go with Holm. He brings (see his map and ii. 429) the Carthaginian camp nearer to the sea than Schubring does, and he brings the camp of Dionysios nearer to Gela. Neither seems to have thought of the western mouth of the Gelas which Mr. Evans and I believed ourselves to have found to the west of the hill of Apollôn (see vol. i. p. 402). But, as we all put the attack of the fleet at that point, the question does not affect the history of the battle.

According to Diodôros (xiii. 109), Dionysios makes three divisions of his foot. The course of the first is plain enough; *ἐν τάγμα ποιήσας τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, οἷς προσέταξεν, ἀριστερῇ τὴν πάλω ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα τῶν ἐναντίων πορεύεσθαι*. In an inland march north of the town, they would of course have the town to their left. It is hard to see what Grote meant when he said (x. 622) that "they were ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of Gela." Then follow the words, *τὸ δ' ἕτερον τάγμα συμμάχων καταστήσας,*

ἐκέλευσε δεξιᾷ τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντας ἐπείγασθαι παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν αἰγιαλόν. This is perfectly clear; but no one who has not been there would think for a moment what a narrow and sandy path it is, at present at least, by which they must have gone. One is tempted to think that the coast must have been different, but at all events the passage proves that there was room for a march between the town-wall and the sea. The third division is thus described; αὐτοὺς δ' ἔχων τὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων σύνταγμα διὰ τῆς πόλεως ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον οὗ τὰ μηχανήματα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἦν. This I should understand of a march through the town, that is along the ridge of the narrow hill, to the north-west end of Lindioi. The orders given to the horse are; ἐπειδὴν ἴδωσι τοὺς πεζοὺς ὥρμημένους, διαβῆναι τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὸ πεδίον καθιππάζεσθαι· κἂν μὲν ὀρώσι τοὺς ἰδίους προτεροῦντας συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς μάχης· ἀν' ὃ ἡλαττωμένους, δέχεσθαι τοὺς θλιβομένους.

The fleet was specially to co-operate with the Italiots, but their several attacks were to be made at two different points. This, I think, is plain from c. 109, 110;

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παρήγγειλε, πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν ἔξοδον τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιπλεῦσαι. εὐκαίρως δ' αὐτῶν ποιησάντων τὸ παραγελθὲν, οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος παρεβόηθουν, ἀκρίργοντες τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ἀποβαίνοντας· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ὠχυρωμένον τὸ μέρος εἶχον ἅπαν τὸ παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τῆς στρατοπεδείας. οἱ δ' Ἰταλιῶται κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν τὸ πᾶν διανύσαντες, ἐπέθεντο τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τοὺς πλείστους εὐρόντες παραβεβοηθήκotas ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς.

The point to which the Carthaginians went to defend the camp against the fleet, and the point which by so doing they left open to the attack of the Italiots, are clearly distinct. The point of attack of the fleet was surely the most distant, at the point where the western part of the camp, the nearest to the sea, was less strongly fortified. The point where the Italiots attacked was not close on the sea, and the camp had a ditch. The Carthaginians drove them out; μόγῃς ἐξέωσεν τοὺς ἐντὸς τῆς τάφρου βιασάμενους; and directly after, κατὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὸ τοῦ χάρακος ἀπωξυμένον ἐνέπιπτον, οὐκ ἔχοντες βοήθειαν. If we suppose the fleet attacking at the west end of the hill of Apollôn and the Italiots at the east end, all fits in well. The Sikeliots come naturally διὰ πεδίου. The only difficulty is how Dionysios and the mercenaries found it so hard to get through the town.

NOTE XXXI. p. 579.

THE TREATY BETWEEN DIONYSIOS AND CARTHAGE.

I FEEL certain that the account of this treaty given by Diodóros (xiii. 114) is a genuine report of its text, though most likely reported in a confused and blundering way. It is drawn up according to the ordinary fashion of a Greek treaty. I do not pretend to decide whether Diodóros copied it from Philistos or any other writer or whether he read it for himself on a stone. Either way of getting at it is quite possible. The report runs thus;

τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο· Καρχηδονίαν εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποίκων ἄλλους, καὶ Σικανούς, Σελινουντίους τε καὶ Ἀκραγαντίους, ἔτι δ' ἱμεραίους· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Γελφούς καὶ Καμαριναίους οἰκεῖν μὲν ἐν ἀτειχίστοις ταῖς πόλεσι, φόρον δὲ τελεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· Λεοντίους δὲ καὶ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Σικελούς ἅπαντας αὐτονόμους εἶναι· καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι· τὰ δὲ αἰχμάλωτα καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀποδοῦναι τοὺς ἔχοντας τοῖς ἀποβαλοῦσι.

Here the opening clause, which would begin *ἐπὶ τοῖσδε εἰρήνην εἶναι Καρχηδονίους καὶ*—are we to add *Διονυσίῳ* or *Συρακοσίοις*? *Συρακοσίοις* seems most likely—is lost. We have instead Diodóros' bit of narrative, *τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο*. The clauses that follow seem all right as far as they go, though we cannot be sure that something may not have dropped out.

It is the words *Συρακουσίους ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι* at which we halt. These words can never have been used in a public treaty. It is of course possible that no part of the treaty was public, and that it was not set up openly anywhere in Syracuse. Only in that case how was it handed on to Diodóros or his authorities?

The use of *ἀποικοὶ* to take in both the Old-Phœnician colonies—and seemingly the Elymians also, as they are nowhere else mentioned—seems very strange, but we have no means of correcting or supplying anything missing. We know that Segesta was now at least a dependency of Carthage; it may by this time have been more. The complete subjection of Eryx seems plain from that one of the Phœnician inscriptions in Sicily which proves anything for our present purposes. This is the famous votive tablet of Eryx, which will be found in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum*, i. 168 et seqq. It has been read in various ways, some

of them rather romantic; but the one now received is practical enough, and suits us very well. Himilkon son of Baaljaton (. . . . בעלי חמלק בן), therefore not our Himilkôn son of Hannôn, dedicates—it does not matter to us what—to the Lady Ashtoreth the giver of life (לברת לעשתרת ארך חים); and he does it in the magistracy of the Shophetim Magon and Bodastrath (שפטים מגון וברעשתרת). These are surely local Shophetim of Eryx. (See vol. i. p. 288.) Or if any one chooses to take them for the Shophetim of Carthage, that would only mark a more complete subjection. In either case Eryx was now completely under Punic dominion, and we shall see presently that the Elymians did not like that state of things. We now also come to coins of Eryx in which we are spared all trouble about $\epsilon\rho\upsilon\chi$, as the name takes the Semitic shape of ארך. (See Head, 120.)

The other Phœnician inscriptions in Sicily are of little historic importance. The masons' marks, as I take them to be, on the walls of Eryx (C. I. S. i. 175), I have already spoken of out of due time. (See vol. i. p. 280.) I will not err again in the like sort by saying a single word now about an inscription, and more than an inscription, from unborn Lilybaion. One from Motya (C. I. S. i. 176) may very well be of this time, and cannot be much later. But it records only the name of Matar the potter. Of two from Panormos (C. I. S. 166–168) one can hardly be read by the best Semitic scholars, and at most it gives us only a name. The other does no more; the name is Asdrubal; but we cannot connect its bearer with the line of Barak.



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
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